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Abstract 
 
In most of the world’s states, bureaucrats are managed based on patronage: political 
discretion determines recruitment and careers. Corruption, poverty and lower growth 
often result. Unsurprisingly, patronage reform has taken centre stage in foreign aid. 
Yet, reforms overwhelmingly fail. Bad government is often good politics. When does 
good government become good politics in patronage states? 
 
To address this conundrum, this dissertation develops and tests a theory of reform of 
patronage states. The theory builds on a simple insight. Not all patronage states are 
the same: bad government takes different forms in different countries. Patronage states 
differ in particular in the institutional locus of control over patronage. Variably, sway 
over patronage benefits is allocated to the executive, other government branches or 
public servants. These institutional differences shape the electoral usefulness of 
patronage states to incumbent Presidents and Prime Ministers. Where institutions 
deprive incumbents and their allies of patronage control, incumbents face greater 
incentives to draw on their legal powers to professionalize.  
 
The theory is empirically validated through a comparison of reforms in Paraguay and 
the Dominican Republic, which draws on 130 high-level interviews. Evidence from 
patronage reforms in the U.S. and U.K., and from cross-country expert survey data on 
government structures underscores the theory’s external validity. 
 
The theory’s implication is clear: the origins of professional bureaucracies may lie in the 
institutional design of patronage states. This finding challenges scholarly convictions 
about the ephemeral nature of institutions in patronage states: strong formal 
institutions may exist in weak institutional contexts. Moreover, formal institutions may 
be causes – rather than only consequences – of the demise of patronage, clientelism and 
bad government. As a corollary, this dissertation adds a fresh argument to the age-old 
debate about the merits of power centralization and fragmentation: good government 
may arise from fragmented control over bad government. 
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 ‘‘The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization                              
has always been its purely technical superiority.” 
Max Weber, Economy and Society (1978, p. 973) 
 
“What are we here for if not for the offices?” 
Webster O’Flanagan, Delegate at the 1880 U.S. Republican National Convention 
 
 
1  
 
Introduction 
 
The study of good governance has taken centre stage in scholarly works. In developing 
countries in particular, “the good governance agenda has to a large extent replaced 
what was known as the ‘Washington Consensus’.” (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012, p. 14) 
While it is conceptually contested, governance – and a panoply of neighbouring concepts 
such as quality of government and state capacity – may be understood as the 
“government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services.” (Fukuyama, 
2013, p. 350) It has become a central development paradigm. The rationale is simple. 
Development “necessarily centres around the process by which political institutions 
emerge, evolve and … decay.” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2014, p. 7)  
Central within the good governance agenda is the professionalization of 
patronage states (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012; Weber, 1978). In patronage 
states, political and personal criteria largely determine bureaucratic recruitment and 
careers. Professional bureaucracies1, by contrast, emphasize merit: the most qualified 
candidates for recruitment and promotion are sought. Giving pride of place to 
bureaucratic professionalization in good governance is motivated by its development 
impact. It is empirically associated with crucial economic, social and political benefits, 
including: economic growth in general and the growth spurt of the East Asian miracle 
economies in particular (Evans, 1998; Evans & Rauch, 1999); lower poverty and child 
                                        
1 Following Fukuyama’s (2013, p. 347) equation of states with the “functioning of executive branches and 
their bureaucracies,” I use the terms ‘state’ and ‘bureaucracy’ interchangeably in this dissertation. 
 13 
mortality (Cingolani, Thomsson, & de Crombrugghe, 2013; Henderson, Hulme, Jalilian, 
& Philips, 2003); reduced corruption (Dahlstroem, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2011); more 
foreign investment (Neshkova & Kostadinova, 2012); democratic stability and the 
absence of civil wars (Cornell & Lapuente, 2014; Lapuente & Rothstein, 2013); a more 
level playing field in electoral contests (Greene, 2007); and greater legitimacy for 
democracy at-large, to name a few (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2013). 
These effects may not surprise. When professional competence is 
deprioritized in bureaucratic recruitment and careers, bureaucratic performance 
inevitably suffers. At the extreme, competency shortcomings in patronage states are 
such that bureaucracies fail to provide even the most basic public services (Fukuyama, 
2007). Moreover, in patronage states, bureaucrats owe their recruitment and careers to 
patron-politicians; their loyalty thus tends to rest with them. Bureaucratic 
professionalization, by contrast, shifts the loyalty of bureaucrats towards the state. 
Impartial performance in office – rather than performance for patrons – becomes the 
yardstick for recruitment and advancement (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Weber, 1978).  
In democracies – on which I will focus in this dissertation – bureaucratic 
professionalization is, consequently, central to the decline of clientelism. As the 
antithesis of bureaucratic impartiality, clientelism personalizes public administration: 
state benefits – such as public sector jobs and social assistance transfers – are targeted 
to voters in exchange for their electoral support. “Perverse accountability” ensues: 
parties hold citizens accountable for their votes – rather than citizens parties for their 
performance in office (Stokes, 2005, p. 315). The democratic spirit thus becomes 
“drenched in … patronage:” bloated “runaway states” channel resources towards 
electoral reward networks or outright corruption rather than socio-economic 
development priorities (Diamond, 2007, p. 119; O'Dwyer, 2006); electoral playing fields 
are tilted towards elites controlling clientelist resources; civil society atomizes; and 
citizens become disillusioned with democracy as a political system, associating state 
failure with democratic failure (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007b). Why bureaucratic 
professionalization is found to exert such positive effects on development is thus easy 
to see: many development failures are by-products of its absence. 
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Yet, for many developing countries, the construction of professional 
bureaucracies has been as relevant for their development as it has been historically 
elusive. According to expert survey data, political criteria trump merit criteria in the 
recruitment of personnel in the majority of the world’s states (Dahlberg, Dahlström, 
Sundin, & Teorell, 2013; see chapter 8). For countries outside the OECD, this share 
reaches 64 percent. Patronage rather than professionalization is thus the rule of the 
game in most of the world’s bureaucracies – and, in developing countries, the exceptions 
to this rule are few and far between.  
Patronage persistence is not for a lack of professionalization attempts. 
Paralleling scholarly works, development practitioners have put good governance in 
general – and bureaucratic professionalization in particular – square and centre. The 
World Bank (2008), for instance, lent US$422m per year for civil service and 
administrative reform between 2000 and 2006. Yet, this lending had no measurable 
impact. Other aid organizations report similar failures (see, for instance, DFID, 2006). 
In Africa, reform attempts were even associated with deteriorations in administrative 
capacity (Andrews, 2013).  The prime obstacles to change were found to lie in patronage 
systems. As a corollary, they were political rather than technical in nature (World 
Bank, 2008).  
Professional bureaucracies may thus well offer the “technical 
superiority” Weber (1978, p. 973) attributes to them. This technical superiority does 
not, however, implicate inevitable progress towards professionalization. Instead of 
technical superiority, political superiority determines the fate of patronage and 
professionalization. The political superiority of professionalization is thereby anything 
but a foregone conclusion. Voters and campaign workers frequently demand bad 
government, signalling to parties that they are “here for … the offices” – as the Delegate 
at the 1880 U.S. Republican National Convention in the epigraph did. For this and 
other reasons which I detail in chapter 2, the political superiority of patronage is often 
over-determined. Against this backdrop, scholars agree that bureaucratic 
professionalization is central to development; that it is a rare occurrence; and that 
political rather than technical factors are to blame. The precise set of political factors 
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which bring about these rare occurrences of bureaucratic professionalization are thus 
the key conundrum to be explained.  
Yet, these factors are precisely the ones which are contested in the 
literature. As Kurtz (2013, p. 5) puts it, “it has been impossible to approach a consensus 
as to the factors that produce or make possible a successful state-building effort.” More 
narrow accounts of the replacement of patronage with professional states mirror this 
dissent (cf. chapter 2). As a result, the transition from patronage to professional states 
remains “most poorly understood.” (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 26) In this dissertation, I 
improve this understanding through important theoretical, conceptual and empirical 
innovations.  
 
Theoretical, Conceptual and Empirical Contributions 
At the core of the dissertation stands the development and empirical validation of a 
theory of reform of patronage states. I will term it the “patronage control theory.” The 
theory nuances the scholarly understanding of institutions in patronage states, adds a 
powerful and hitherto omitted explanatory factor to studies of patronage reform and 
resolves contradictory findings about the causal role of key variables in the literature. 
The theory is based on a simple recognition: not all patronage states are the same. As 
much as “good government means different things in different countries” (Andrews, 
2010, p. 7), so does bad government mean different things in different countries. 
Patronage states differ in their institutional design, and these differences shape the 
electoral utility of patronage states to incumbents.  
Theory development narrows in on one hitherto overlooked set of 
institutions in particular: those allocating patronage control. Such institutions may 
deprive incumbent Presidents or Prime Ministers of patronage control in two ways. 
Institutions may shift control over patronage to other government branches – and, as 
a result, to electoral challengers when these control non-executive branches. To 
illustrate, parliaments in presidential systems may control the creation of individual 
public sector positions and high-level appointments. Institutions may also shift the 
private goods benefits of patronage states towards public employees – without 
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obligating them to provide reciprocal political support to incumbents. Lifelong tenure 
protections for patronage appointees are the prime example. Cross-country survey data 
suggests that patronage states differ widely in these two sets of institutions (see chapter 
8). They deprive incumbents of patronage access, yet do not professionalize the 
bureaucracy. As a result, they reduce the electoral utility incumbents derive from 
patronage states – and enhance their incentives to advance professionalization.  
Three mechanisms are theorized to be at play. When institutions deprive 
incumbents of patronage control, they face incentives to professionalize to cut off 
patronage access of electoral challenges; elicit cooperation from tenured appointees of 
preceding incumbents; and shift electoral competition towards public goods provision 
in the context of an inability to compete based on patronage alone. As incumbents are 
(usually) legally empowered to impose conditions of personnel selection, they are able 
to professionalize at least part of the state when facing incentives to do so. 
Empirical evidence strongly supports the theory. In a comparison of 
reforms in two archetypical patronage states – Paraguay and the Dominican Republic 
(DR) – institutions allocating patronage control were decisive determinants of diverging 
professionalization outcomes. Drawing on over 130 high-level interviews, the case 
comparison is an important empirical addition to the literature in its own right: research 
on patronage reforms in the developing world remains scarce. To illustrate, the World 
Bank, as the major financier of such reform projects, has “rarely ever analyzed the 
political considerations that make civil service reform so difficult” (World Bank, 2008, 
p. 54); and, more generally, “explicit political … perspectives on public sector reform 
challenges [in developing countries] are still rare.” (Bunse & Fritz, 2012, p. 6)  
Beyond Paraguay and the DR, I show that the patronage control theory 
sheds new light on two of the most paradigmatic cases of patronage reform in the 
literature: the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, large-n cross-country 
expert survey data supports tentatively that bureaucracies are, ceteris paribus, more 
meritocratic where institutions shift patronage control away from incumbents. 
  Next to adding a potent explanatory factor to the literature – 
institutions allocating patronage control – the theory clarifies the causal role of other 
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key variables. Electoral competition is a case in point. Scholars are split in regards to 
whether it incentivizes or thwarts professionalization (compare, for instance, Geddes, 
1991; Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009). Its interaction with the 
patronage control theory may resolve part of this dissent. Where institutions deprive 
incumbents of patronage control, we may expect electoral competition to incentivize 
reform. Yet, where incumbents monopolize patronage control, electoral competition 
thwarts reform: incumbents face incentives to turn disproportionate patronage access 
into electoral advantage.  
  The patronage control theory addresses the front end of the unilinear 
view of patronage and its reform in the literature: all patronage states are the same. 
The tail end of this view – all patronage reforms are the same – has, as I shall 
demonstrate, further added to contradictory findings. The political incentives for 
distinct Weberian reforms – such as the introduction of tenure protections from 
dismissal (tenure) and meritocratic recruitment and promotion (merit) – differ. Tenure 
for patronage appointees after electoral losses and meritocratic recruitment of personnel 
for critical service delivery positions, for instance, are motivated by very distinct 
concerns. It is, hence, unsurprising that studies conflating distinct Weberian reforms 
into a ‘Weberianness’ variable produce contradictory evidence about the determinants 
of patronage reform.  
At the same time, professionalizing patronage states requires merit only. 
Statistical studies associate only merit – rather than tenure – with enhanced public 
goods provision. The patronage control theory takes this into account: it solely explains 
merit reforms. It thereby focuses on reform in practice. As I will show, outlawing the 
spoils is an illusion: merit laws are neither necessary nor sufficient for merit in practice. 
The panoply of large-n studies operationalizing patronage reform with the adoption of 
civil service laws thus suffers from serious validity limitations.  
To account for reform in practice, the patronage control theory sheds 
light on incumbent incentives. Most prior studies – most prominently Geddes’ (1996) 
“politician’s dilemma” – have focused on incumbent ability to reform. Both are needed. 
Yet, as I demonstrate, incumbents facing incentives to reform tend to be able to do so 
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– even if only incrementally. Contrary to prior convictions, this suggests that incentives 
rather than ability to reform is the key explanandum.  
Beyond disentangling merit and tenure, the dissertation sheds new light 
on the determinants of tenure in patronage states – a largely overlooked topic of study. 
Existing studies had focused on incumbent incentives to introduce tenure. An empirical 
implication of the patronage control theory may account for incumbent incentives to 
resist tenure: it jeopardizes incumbent patronage control and electoral mobilization 
capacity. In conjunction with prior studies, the conundrum of bureaucratic job stability 
in some patronage states, yet not others is thus partially resolved. 
 For the prospects of patronage reform in the world, this dissertation is 
good and bad news. On an upside, it suggests that reform incentives may emerge 
unintendedly as consequences of institutional choices in patronage states. The trend 
towards hyper-presidentialism in many regions, however, indicates that such choices are 
not being made (Van de Walle, 2003; Zovatto, 2014). Absent changes in other reform 
drivers, patronage reform will thus remain a Holy Grail in most developing countries.  
Several implications for donors seeking to improve the dismal track 
record of patronage reform projects follow. Donors would do well to be more selective 
in choosing which countries to assist. Patronage persistence – and thus reform failure – 
is often overdetermined: bad government is often good politics. Where institutions 
deprive incumbents of patronage control, good government can become good politics. 
An analysis of patronage systems should thus precede donor decisions about patronage 
reform assistance. Moreover, donors should circumscribe their support to reform in 
practice. By legitimizing 'window dressing' incumbents, donor support to legal reforms 
may incentivize patronage rather than professionalization. Lastly, where patronage 
reform is politically irrational – as is often the case – donors should assist institutional 
reforms which enhance the incentive-compatibility of professionalization. As this 
dissertation has shown, institutions which deprive incumbents of patronage control, yet 
not of their ability to professionalize are particularly conducive to this end. 
  Beyond its policy weight, this dissertation also refocuses scholarly 
attention on the role of formal institutions in good government. That “parchment” 
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institutions like laws and constitutions may matter is, of course, axiomatic to note 
(Carey, 2000). In the weak institutional contexts of patronage states, however, 
conventional scholarly wisdom holds they usually do not (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013). 
As corollary, formal institutions had largely figured as consequences – but not causes – 
of the demise of patronage, clientelism and bad government.  
This dissertation challenges this conviction. Institutions may well be 
ephemeral in patronage states; civil service laws are a case in point. Yet, strong 
institutions may exist in weak institutional contexts. In the cases studied, institutions 
allocating patronage control had causal efficacy of their own – rather than being merely 
intervening variables; concomitantly, reform was an unintended consequence of prior 
institutional choices. Institutions thus mattered: the origins of professional 
bureaucracies lay in the fragmented institutional design of patronage states. 
  The institutions which affected professionalization, however, were not 
those which prior studies had – without yielding robust findings – focused on. It was 
not broad variation in electoral institutions, territorial decentralization or executive-
legislative relations – parliamentary vs. presidential systems – which incentivized the 
transition towards good government (cf. Kitschelt, 2011). Instead, institutions 
allocating patronage control – which, arguably, shape reform incentives much more 
directly – mattered; and these institutions did not concur with the institutions prior 
studies had focused on. Contrary to scholarly convictions, presidential and 
parliamentary systems may each feature – as I show – centralized or fragmented 
institutional control over patronage, for instance. Valid insights into the impact of 
formal institutions in patronage states thus require nuancing and shifting the scholarly 
spotlight to political-institutional designs distinct from those prior scholars had 
narrowed in on. 
  In shifting this spotlight, this dissertation has also added a novel 
argument to the long-standing debate about the relative benefits of power centralization 
and fragmentation (Madison, 1787). It thereby comes in on the side of fragmentation. 
Contrary to other advocates, fragmentation is not posited to be conducive to good 
government due to, for instance, better checks-and-balances or bureaucratic oversight 
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from multiple principles. Rather, a more indirect mechanism is at work. Fragmentation 
incentivizes incumbents to shift towards good government to, among others, take away 
patronage from challengers and regain electoral competitiveness – which limited 
patronage control in a spoils system had cost them. Good government may thus 
originate from fragmented control over bad government. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The findings of this dissertation are derived in three parts. Part One lays out theory, 
method and literature; Part Two tests the theory through a case comparison; and Part 
Three examines its external validity and implications for the study of patronage, 
institutions and good government. Part One comprises three chapters. After this 
introductory chapter, chapter 2 critically reviews existing works on patronage and its 
reform. It finds that scholarly works have put forward a range of hypotheses, yet are 
marred by dissent. It showcases that this dissent stems in part from two conflations: of 
distinct patronage reforms and of distinct patronage states. Disaggregating distinct 
reforms into distinct dependent variables and incorporating institutional differences 
across patronage states remedies part of the scholarly dissent.  
 Chapter 3 draws on this insight to develop a theory of reform of 
patronage states. The theory posits that incumbents face greater reform incentives 
where institutions deprive them and their allies of patronage control. To enhance the 
theory’s robustness, the chapter details its causal mechanisms, scope conditions, 
assumptions and observable process implications. Theory development is succeeded by 
a discussion of the empirical strategy for theory testing. Data limitations preclude a 
large-n test. A comparative case study is, instead, relied upon. Via a most similar system 
design, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic (DR) are selected as cases.  
 In Part Two of the dissertation, I undertake the case comparison. To 
measure the dependent variable, chapter 4 compares public personnel reforms and 
bureaucratic professionalization in Paraguay and the DR. The chapter finds that 
bureaucratic professionalization – operationalized as meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion – advanced in Paraguay, yet not the DR. It also demonstrates that this 
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cross-case variation contrasts with cross-case variation in legal reforms. The DR 
enshrined meritocracy in a new public service law, constitution and presidential decrees 
– yet did not advance in practice. Bu contrast, legal reforms stalled in Paraguay – yet 
meritocracy advanced in practice. The Latin America region as a whole mirrors this 
pattern: professionalization in law and practice are poorly correlated. Drawing on this 
finding, I show that civil service legislation is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
professionalization of patronage states.  
Chapter 5 goes on to test the explanatory power of the patronage control 
theory. It does so in three steps. The chapter shows, first, that institutions depriving 
the incumbent of patronage control incentivized reform (Paraguay), while institutions 
concentrating patronage control in the incumbent had the opposite effect (DR). 
Subsequently, it demonstrates that reform support (DR) and opposition (Paraguay) of 
electoral challengers are consistent with theoretical predictions. Finally, it shows that 
the factors originating distinct institutional allocations of patronage control are distinct 
from those incentivizing professionalization. Institutions allocating patronage control 
thus exerted independent causal effects. The origins of Paraguay’s professionalization – 
and the DR’s patronage persistence – thus lay in institutional differences of their 
patronage states. 
To forestall spurious inferences, chapter 6 examines whether rival 
hypotheses explain part or most of the observed cross-case variation. It finds that, from 
a demand-side perspective, professionalization should have proceeded, if at all, in the 
DR rather than Paraguay. Supply side rival explanations in turn account for why 
professionalization in Paraguay advanced only incrementally – yet not why it advanced 
in Paraguay, but not the DR. Institutions allocating patronage control were thus a 
decisive cause of cross-case variation in bureaucratic professionalization.  
In Part Three, I provide evidence for the generalizability of the theory 
and generalize about the study of patronage, institutions and good government. I 
undertake the first task in two steps. In chapter 7, I move beyond professionalization 
to show that an empirical implication of the patronage control theory may shed light 
on a second Weberian reform: tenure. Prior studies had argued that incumbents gift 
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tenure to their appointees in a range of contexts. The patronage control theory may 
account for why many patronage states nonetheless lack tenure: incumbents resist 
tenure as it shifts patronage benefits to public employees. I provide empirical evidence 
for this theoretical extension by examining tenure reform attempts in the DR – a ‘most 
likely’ reform case according to prevalent theories.  
 In chapter 8, I move beyond Paraguay and the DR to provide evidence 
for the external validity of the patronage control theory. The scope of the qualitative 
inquiry is extended to patronage reforms in the U.S. and UK under Theodore Roosevelt 
(1901-1909) and William Gladstone (1868-1874). Subsequently, cross-country expert 
survey data on the structure of government is drawn on to tentatively test the theory 
in a large-n setting. Both the qualitative and quantitative tests lend credence to the 
generalizability of the theory. Confidence in its external validity is thus much enhanced. 
 Chapter 9 concludes with a discussion of the dissertation’s implications 
for the study of patronage, institutions and good government. The chapter sets out by 
recapping the dissertation’s contributions to studies of patronage and its reform. It goes 
on to detail what the dissertation’s findings hold in stock for the global prospects of 
patronage reform and donor approaches to reform. The chapter concludes by detailing 
the broader implications of the thesis for studies of institutions in good government. 
These implications challenge scholarly convictions about the ephemeral nature of formal 
institutions in patronage states, the set of institutions which matter for good 
government and the role of power fragmentation in good government. 
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2 
 
When Do Incumbents Professionalize Patronage States?                                 
Contributions and Limitations of the Literature  
 
The study of patronage is almost as old as the study of politics itself. It has taken centre 
stage in works in history, public administration, sociology, anthropology, politics and 
economics. Rather than seeking to cite and detail the range of these works, this chapter 
pursues two more modest objectives: to lay the groundwork for theory development and 
testing in the subsequent chapters, and to point to several prevalent, yet unwarranted 
assumptions and omissions in existing works; these have contributed to a literature 
characterized more by dissent than by consolidation. It does so by critically reviewing, 
first, the conceptualizations of patronage put forward; second, prominent factors posited 
in scholarly works to explain the persistence of patronage; and third, prominent factors 
posited to underlie the replacement of patronage with a professional bureaucracy.  
  Several conclusions stand out. To begin with, there is dissent regarding 
the precise meaning of patronage: different authors conceptualize it in different terms. 
Despite conceptual ambiguity, however, scholars agree that reforms of patronage 
bureaucracies are rare occurrences: patronage persistence is often over-determined. As 
a corollary, the reform rather than resilience of patronage is the major conundrum to 
be explained. Despite the infrequency of reforms, scholars have posited a surprising 
multitude of (often) competing demand- and supply-side hypotheses to resolve this 
conundrum. Valid empirical analyses thus need to test a range of potential explanations 
to forestall omitted variable biases. Notwithstanding this multiplicity of factors, though, 
studies share two common limitations: they seek to explain the reform of patronage 
bureaucracies without taking into account differences in either the type of reform 
pursued or the underlying patronage bureaucracy.  
  Yet, not all reforms are the same, and neither are all patronage 
bureaucracies. By taking issue with this unilinear view of patronage and its reform, this 
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chapter makes four contributions to the literature. The chapter addresses, first, an 
important omission in previous conceptualizations of patronage: patronage powers over 
personnel may extend to not only appointment, but also other parts of the bureaucratic 
career, including pay, promotion and dismissal. Second, the chapter shows that 
conflating the reform of distinct personnel decisions – in particular tenure protections 
from dismissal (tenure) and meritocratic recruitment and promotion (merit) – into a 
single dependent variable is unwarranted. The political incentives for reforming these 
distinct personnel decisions differ; when disaggregating them into distinct dependent 
variables, part of the dissent in the literature is resolved. Moreover, when seeking to 
account for – as in this dissertation – professionalization, merit rather than tenure is 
shown to be the appropriate dependent variable. Lastly, the chapter underscores that 
the conflation of patronage bureaucracies – the common practice to account for their 
reform without taking into account differences across patronage bureaucracies – has 
added to omitted variable biases in prior studies. This omission mirrors a neglect in the 
study of clientelism at-large: formal institutions typically figure as a consequence of 
clientelist decline, yet are rarely identified as causes. Yet, patronage bureaucracies differ 
across cases, in particular in the institutional allocation of control over patronage. As a 
result, they also differ in the electoral utility they provide to incumbents. Chapter 3 
will build on this insight to develop the patronage control theory of reform of patronage 
states. 
 
What is Patronage? 
Patron-client relations were, in early works by anthropologists and sociologists, analysed 
at the micro-level of social interactions (see, among many, R. Fox, 1969). A reflection 
of patterns of social exchanges between the powerful and powerless in traditional 
societies – in particular between landlords and peasants – patronage was conceptualized 
as a durable, hierarchical and asymmetric face-to-face exchange relation, often 
underpinned by strong societal norms. Electoral enfranchisement came to challenge 
these patron-client relations and their scholarly conceptualization. With 
democratization, patron-client networks expanded from the personalistic local level to 
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national networks of political machines. These linked party leaders and office seekers 
(i.e. patrons) at the top to electoral clients through various levels of brokers organized 
in a pyramidal fashion (Scott, 1972). As a result, patron-client relations became more 
broker-mediated and instrumental-rational (Weingrod, 1968). Concomitantly, scholarly 
works took an economic turn, beginning to conceptualize patron-client relations in 
benefit-maximizing rather than cultural terms. With this turn, the unit of analysis 
shifted from the micro-level of social interactions to the meso- or macro-level of political 
systems (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007a; Piattoni, 2001). Research on patron-client 
relations thus became tied in to concerns about democratic governance and interest 
representation.  
Nevertheless, conceptual consolidation was not forthcoming. Instead, 
terminological confusion was furthered by, first, the proliferation of regional variants of 
patron-client relations – such as ‘caudillismo’ and ‘caciquismo’ in Latin America, 
‘neopatrimonialism’ and ‘big men’ in Africa, and ‘bossism’ in South-East Asia (Bechle, 
2010; Sidel, 1997; Van de Walle, 2007) – without systematic attention to substantive 
differences between these variations; and, second, by the interchangeable usage of, in 
particular, patronage and clientelism to refer to patron-client relations, frequently 
without any explicit attempt to define and differentiate these concepts (Hicken, 2011). 
As a result, the concept of clientelism became “one of those social science concepts 
almost unmatched when it comes to ambiguous usage” (Gordin, 2002, p. 516), with 
entire articles devoted to its conceptual stretching (Hilgers, 2011).  
In this chapter, I do not purport to lay to rest these conceptual 
ambiguities in the literature. What I wish to do instead is to avoid conceptual confusion 
in the dissertation by offering conceptualizations of patronage and clientelism which 
draw on – and thus relate to – the most common approaches to conceptualizing the two 
concepts; differentiate them clearly from each other and neighbouring concepts; and 
address an important omission in prior conceptualizations of patronage. At the same 
time, the conceptual ambiguities in existing works should serve as a reminder that the 
literature on the determinants of patronage frequently – implicitly or explicitly – builds 
on insights from scholarly works on the determinants of clientelism – and vice versa. In 
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reviewing the literature on the politics of reform of patronage bureaucracies, I will take 
this overlap into account, drawing on arguments from the wider literature on the 
persistence and decline of clientelism where applicable to the reform of patronage 
bureaucracies. 
With that in mind, I follow in my conceptualization of clientelism what 
Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichte (2010, p. 3) term “electoral clientelism” and Kitschelt 
and Wilkson (2007a, p. 2)  “clientelistic accountability:” clientelism is equated with one 
type of patron (office seekers or holders) seeking one type of benefit (political support, 
in particular votes) from one type of client (political supporters, in particular voters); 
in return, patrons provide a range of material and non-material benefits directly or via 
an intermediary network of brokers (see, among many comparable conceptualizations, 
Roniger, 2004; Stokes, 2007). Clientelism as a form of particularistic exchange politics 
thus contrasts with political mobilization concepts higher up the interest aggregation 
ladder, in particular pork barrel spending (at the level of localities or constituencies 
rather than individual voters) and corporatism (at the level of interest groups) 
(Piattoni, 2001).  
To clearly differentiate the key concept of interest in the dissertation – 
patronage – I largely follow the public administration literature which equates 
patronage with what Weingrod (1968, p. 379) deems its “folk meaning:” public sector 
positions are discretionarily allocated. Discretion thereby refers to the possibility 
frontier for public personnel decisions at will in practice, based not only on formal but 
also on informal powers. One modification is made to address an important omission in 
virtually all2 scholarly works to-date (see, among many, Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Grindle, 
2012; Kopecky, Mair, & Spirova, 2012; Page & Wright, 1999; Robinson & Verdier, 
2013). Discretionary power over personnel may extend to not only appointment, but 
also pay, promotion and (protection from) dismissal – among other personnel decisions. 
These powers crucially affect patronage. To illustrate, powers over dismissal define 
                                        
2 Note that scholarly works on patronage occasionally, albeit unsystematically, refer to personnel powers 
beyond recruitment. Reid and Kurth (1988, p. 256), for instance, purport that “formally, the power of 
patronage is no more than the power to hire and fire an employee at will.”  
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whether all or only open public sector positions are available for appointment; and 
powers over pay and promotion may affect, among others, whether clients in the 
bureaucracy remain loyal after the initial appointment. When restricting patronage to 
appointment power, the lion share of patronage may thus go unnoticed. In this 
dissertation, I thus treat patronage as the: 
Discretionary – i.e. not constrained by major de jure or de facto 
procedures – power over public personnel decisions, including 
recruitment, promotion, pay and dismissal. 
In this conceptualization, patronage is a type of patron-client relation with a clearly 
defined good provided by the patron: public employment benefits, be those initial 
recruitment, promotion, pay rises or protection from dismissal. The type of patrons and 
clients, the benefits sought from these and the motivations for engaging in patronage 
are not delimited, however. Note that this departs from a variety of previous studies 
which had assumed that patronage is solely used in electoral exchanges in developing 
countries, as reward for votes and/or campaign support (see, for instance, Calvo & 
Murillo, 2004; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Remmer, 2007). Instead, the conceptualization 
follows recent research which emphasizes the panoply of uses of patronage (Grindle, 
2012; Kopecky et al., 2012). This is not to say that patronage does not prioritize loyalty 
of clients. In fact, in patronage bureaucracies, the contract between the employer and 
the employee rests on the principle of personal and/or political reciprocity – the duty 
of an employee-client is to his or her patron, not the state (see Weber, 1978). Why 
patrons seek loyal staff, whether they apply partisan or other criteria when selecting 
staff, and what they expect from staff in exchange for their patronage is not 
conceptually circumscribed, however. Patronage may thus – but need not be – a form 
of clientelist exchange. When it is, patronage frequently stands – not least due to the 
large share of public sector budgets which wages tend to claim (O'Dwyer, 2006) – “at 
the center of analysis” of studies of clientelism (Remmer, 2007, p. 364). 
Patronage thus also overlaps but does not coincide with politicization, 
the “substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, 
promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service” (Peters & Pierre, 
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2004, p. 2). Contrary to politicization, patronage need not put a premium on political 
criteria in discretionary personnel decisions. Instead and as I detail in chapter 3, patrons 
may prioritize technical criteria in discretionary personnel decisions and thus rely on 
what I term meritocratic patronage. 
  With patronage and clientelism conceptualized, the next section turns 
to the determinants of the persistence of patronage. Fortunately, scholarly works are 
less divided about the durability of patronage than about its precise definition: 
patronage persistence is generally deemed to be over-determined.  
 
Why is Patronage So Resilient to Reform Attempts? 
Understanding the determinants of the professionalization of patronage bureaucracies 
requires, in the first place, an understanding of the determinants of patronage 
persistence. As noted in chapter 1, patronage remains prevalent in most developing 
countries and frequently resilient in the face of reform attempts. As Grindle (2012, p. 
9) puts it eloquently for the case of Latin America: 
“Across authoritarian and democratic regimes; across conservative, 
liberal, and revolutionary governments; across unitary and federalist 
systems; across no party, one-party, and multi-party systems—
patronage systems proved durable and adaptive.”  
Why then does patronage persist so frequently in developing countries despite the 
“technical superiority” of professional bureaucracies and the ready availability of 
international financial and technical assistance for those who seek to advance 
professionalization (Weber, 1978, p. 973)? Scholars have put forward thirteen major 
complementary explanations for the persistence of patronage (table 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Table 2.1 Key Explanations for Patronage Persistence 
 Democratization prior to bureaucratization 
 Politicians’ and voters’ dilemmas 
 Collective action challenges of reform movements 
 Self-enforcing nature of patronage contracts  
 Instrumental value of patronage for (other) clientelist exchanges  
 Self-enforcing nature of patronage systems 
 Principal-agent problems in low capacity bureaucracies  
 Organization challenges of nascent parties  
 Lacking credibility of programmatic promises in young democracies 
 Reform implementation dilemmas  
 Durability of cultural norms underlying patronage 
 Flexibility inherent in the usage of patronage 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Note that some of these factors are specific to patronage; others apply 
to both patronage and clientelism. The sheer number of factors, however, goes a long 
way in explaining the attractiveness and persistence of patronage. The rationales for 
power holders to prefer patronage are manifold. The durability of patronage is thus 
frequently over-determined; as a corollary, reform is a rare occurrence. To substantiate 
this conclusion, each of the aforementioned factors underlying the resilience of patronage 
shall be briefly delineated. 
To begin with, note that patronage tends to be available to power 
holders in democracies in developing countries. In an influential article, Shefter (1977) 
has argued that the sequence of democratic enfranchisement relative to the 
consolidation of professional bureaucracies impinges upon parties’ reliance on patronage. 
Where a professional bureaucracy is consolidated prior to democratization, parties may 
not mobilize mass support on the basis of patronage and instead turn to programmatic 
appeals; where bureaucratic autonomy is lacking and ‘insiders’ may access patronage, 
parties turn to the particularistic distribution of public resources to mobilize political 
support (see, for administrative legacy arguments with similar logics, Kitschelt, 1999; 
Kopecký & Spirova, 2011).3 Yet, few of the new democracies in today’s developing world 
                                        
3 Most prominently, a range of scholars have examined the legacy of British colonial rule for good 
government (see, for instance, Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008). 
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inherited professional bureaucracies; patronage was thus available for political 
mobilization. 
Why incumbents then choose to utilize patronage is, most prominently, 
encapsulated in Geddes’ (1996, p. 18) “politician’s dilemma.” Incumbents may hold a 
longer-run interest in economic and social improvements via the professionalization of 
patronage bureaucracies. Yet, this interest runs counter to and is superseded by a desire 
for immediate political survival – not the least as incumbents can, generally speaking, 
only achieve longer-term objectives by retaining office. Patronage can facilitate political 
survival by providing incumbents with the ability to share government – by placing 
groups or individuals in key positions in state agencies – and trade jobs and other public 
employment benefits for political support from legislators, social elites, interest groups 
and other key constituents. As a result, patronage is often at the core of the 
government’s ability to regulate intra-elite competition, and build and maintain a viable 
governing alliance and support base (North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2007; Van de 
Walle, 2007). Empirical evidence for patronage-induced governability abounds. Arriola 
(2009), for instance, shows that patronage reduces the risk of coups to African leaders. 
Kenny (2013) illustrates that patronage was instrumental in maintaining the integrity 
of British colonies in the decolonization process; and Geddes (1996, p. 152) finds that, 
in Latin America, patronage is “the glue that holds coalitions together.”  
Somewhat less prominently in the literature, the “voter’s dilemma” 
further adds to the resilience of patronage and clientelism (Lyne, 2008, p. 21). Its 
rationale is simple. Even if voters would prefer a candidate promising public goods 
through bureaucratic professionalization over an incumbent providing individually 
targeted (private) goods through patronage, the excludability of private goods implies 
that rational voters will not support the programmatic candidate. Voters benefit from 
public goods provision in case the programmatic candidate gets elected irrespective of 
whether they voted for him. Yet, they can only access patronage in case of incumbent 
re-election if they voted for him (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estevez, 2007). Voters 
thus find themselves in an n-person prisoner’s dilemma with its well-known coordination 
problem. Defeating the patronage candidate is in the voters’ collective interest, yet 
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individual voters pay the cost if the attempt fails (Stokes, 2005). As an insurance policy 
to avoid the ‘sucker’s payoff,’ voters hence opt for the patronage candidate (Lyne, 2008).  
A similar dilemma revolves around collective societal organization to 
demand reform of patronage bureaucracies itself. Most members of society would be 
better off if they organized for reform. Yet, as benefits are diffuse in the sense that they 
advantage the citizenry as a whole rather than a specific sub-group, collective action 
will not occur. Instead, rational individuals will seek to free ride to enjoy the public 
goods benefits of reform, and organizations to demand reform will not form (Heredia & 
Schneider, 2003). Moreover, patronage as a vertical and asymmetric relationship 
inhibits the formation of collective, horizontal organizations by isolating and atomizing 
clients (Auyero, Lapegna, & Poma, 2009).  
Such disincentives for collective societal action for reform are paralleled 
by incentives for individual clients to support incumbents in patronage bureaucracies. 
As public jobs are credible, selective and (frequently) reversible rents to clients – i.e. 
public employees – they tie the continuation utility of these clients to the electoral 
success of their political patron (Robinson & Verdier, 2013). As such, patronage is a 
self-enforcing form of clientelist exchange (Oliveros, 2013). Public employees provide 
votes, campaign support and other political services to incumbents as it tends to be in 
their best interest to do so: their fates are tied to incumbents remaining in power. Even 
where these self-enforcing incentives are insufficient to engender political support, such 
support may be forthcoming. Patrons may monitor observable client behaviour – such 
as participation in campaign rallies – and withdraw public employment or pay where 
clients fail to provide political support. 
Beyond electoral support, patronage facilitates the personalization of 
public administration between elections – or, to put it in starker terms, “patronage is a 
necessary condition for both clientelism and corruption.” (Kopecký & Spirova, 2011, p. 
906) Control of public sector positions facilitates control of public resources and service 
provision (Blondel, 2002; Scherlis, 2010). Public employees as clients may constantly 
transform administrative tasks into personal favours, be these basic administrative 
services to citizens at the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy or discretionary 
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governmental regulations, procurement contracts and subsidies – among other rents – 
to business elites at the top (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007a; Oliveros, 2013). This 
personalization incentivizes citizens with connections to public employees to vote for 
incumbents to retain access to public services.  
This holds all the more where citizens may monitor the receipt of private 
goods from governments – such as jobs in the public sector and administrative services 
framed as personal favours – yet, due to information asymmetries, lack the ability to 
do the same for public goods. Low levels of education and (unbiased) newspaper 
circulation conspire against electoral accountability for public goods provision (Geddes, 
1996); this further incentivizes incumbents to provide private goods, in the form of both 
patronage and political services provided by loyal patronage employees. Note also that, 
as a result, patronage may perpetuate the societal conditions which make patronage 
viable. The under-provision of public goods due to patronage stymies economic and 
human development which in turn enhances the dependence of voters on patronage 
(Robinson & Verdier, 2013). This is all the more true where patronage serves as a 
second-best welfare policy, with the public as an employer of last resort in contexts of 
high unemployment (Spanou & Sotiropoulos, 2011). 
Beyond facilitating the provision of political services by clients, 
patronage enables incumbents, more generally, to resolve principal-agent challenges in 
contexts of weak formal oversight mechanisms. In a system of cascading patronage, 
incumbent patrons appoint as brokers lower-level officials; these may, in turn, appoint 
as brokers in their own right; this brokerage chain then extends to the bottom of the 
hierarchy (Meyer-Sahling & Jager, 2012). The ensuing loyalty of staff to patrons is of 
particular value in developing countries where weak administrative, control and 
information systems complicate formal supervision. 
To ensure that private goods provision translates into electoral support, 
incumbents need not only assure that public employees target private goods provision 
to potential supporters, but also monitor that recipients vote for incumbents in return. 
Patronage is useful for the latter task, as well. It fuels party organization by, first, 
facilitating party funding: loyal clients in the bureaucracy may strip state assets for 
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party coffers (O'Dwyer, 2006). Moreover, employees in many patronage bureaucracies 
are required to kick back a percentage of their salaries to incumbent parties (see, for 
instance, R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Scherlis, 2010; World Bank, 2000). Not less 
important, patronage puts at the service of parties “armies of loyal party workers:” 
partisan networks of activists incentivized by the promise of “jobs for the boys.” 
(Kopecký & Spirova, 2011, p. 897; Skowronek, 1982, p. 53) Extensive and well-funded 
partisan networks in turn are key for power holders to monitor electoral behaviour. 
Stokes (2005), for instance, shows that parties attempt to bypass the secret ballot and 
infer individuals’ votes by exploiting their insertion into social networks. The party 
“with the most decentralized and tentacle-like organizational structure” is the one most 
able to do so (Stokes, 2005, p. 323).  
The provision of patronage and private goods is, in particular in new 
democracies, also attractive to incumbents as electoral campaigns based on public goods 
promises frequently lack credibility. Lacking credibility stems in part from weak 
bureaucratic capacity, reinforcing voters’ beliefs that programmatic promises may not 
be delivered on (O'Dwyer, 2006). The credibility of public goods promises may also be 
constrained as the building of policy reputations with broad segments of the electorate 
tends to take time. In new democracies, parties can often make credible promises only 
to small segments of the electorate, in particular by relying on established local patrons. 
Once credibility for narrow private goods provision – rather than public goods provision 
– has been established, reliance on clientelism and patronage to court political support 
may perpetuate (Keefer, 2007; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008). This perpetuation is further 
reinforced by the skills of the resulting group of partisan activists: they are capable of 
mobilizing votes with private goods, yet lack programmatic commitments (Keefer, 
forthcoming).  
Beyond these political factors, patronage also persists because of 
technical and cultural factors. Reform of patronage involves, first, an implementation 
dilemma. Reform is meant to reduce bureaucratic capacity constraints, yet these very 
constraints complicate reform design and implementation. Qualified personnel to design 
a technically-sound reform is lacking; and public employees with limited qualifications 
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and frequent turnover lack incentives to apply reform legislation, recognizing their 
limited ability to fully comply with it (Huber & McCarty, 2004). Moreover, the inertia 
inherent in societal norms underpinning patronage – as epitomized by, for instance, 
societal acquiescence to ascriptive rather than merit-based accumulation – delinks 
informal practices from formal norms, complicate reform implementation and thus 
extend the requisite time horizon for reform to deliver public goods benefits (Peters, 
2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). The inter-temporal cost-benefit incidence of patronage 
reforms thus becomes further misaligned with electoral cycles: patronage losses are 
accrued today, while reform benefits become more uncertain and distant (Blum, 2014).  
Lastly – and as hinted at by the range of factors underlying the resilience 
of patronage – patronage persists because of its flexibility. As Grindle (2012) details, 
patronage may be employed not only to construct clientelist machines, ensure the 
hegemony of class elites or extract state resources for private wealth accumulation, but 
also to bring in technocrats to modernize the state. As such, patronage is an instrument 
of power adaptable to diverse incumbent needs – a characteristic relished by power 
holders. 
As this overview of the panoply of rationales for relying on patronage 
should make ample clear, patronage tends to be an attractive proposition for power 
holders in developing countries. Concomitantly, it also tends to be a winning strategy 
in electoral contests. Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011), for instance, find that patronage 
provided incumbents with large electoral advantages in U.S. state elections. The 
political odds thus tend to favour patronage persistence. Unsurprisingly, practitioners 
conclude that the reform of patronage bureaucracies “has proven among the most 
difficult of developmental reforms to sustain” and professional bureaucracies remain in 
scarce supply in the developing world (Shepherd, 2003, p. 2). At the same time, 
however, starting in the 19th century, all of today’s developed economies began 
introducing and consolidating professional civil service systems, as have more recently 
a range of developing countries. Why incumbents would forego discretionary control of 
public personnel in patronage bureaucracies in favour of professionalization is discussed 
next.  
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Under What Conditions Do Incumbents Professionalize Patronage 
Bureaucracies? 
Despite the infrequency of reform, scholars have developed an astonishing multitude of 
hypotheses to account for it. I critically review below the key hypotheses posited in the 
literature with four objectives: first, to highlight the range of, at times, competing and, 
at times, complementary explanations for reform – which the empirical tests in chapters 
four to eight of the dissertation need to consider to avoid omitted variable bias; second, 
to underscore that theory construction most usefully takes place from the viewpoint of 
incumbents weighing the political costs and benefits of reform – professionalization has 
rarely resulted from demands from collective actors outside the state; third, to 
underscore the dissent in the literature regarding both the explanatory relevance and, 
at times, signs of causal effects of key hypotheses; and fourth, to underscore three 
prevalent limitations in existing scholarship; theories frequently account for either the 
incentives for or the ability to reform, yet not both; moreover, scholars explain reform 
without considering differences in either the type of reform pursued or the underlying 
patronage bureaucracy. When addressing these limitations – as I do in theory 
construction in chapter 3 – some of the dissent in the literature is resolved.  
  To structure the literature review, I follow a range of previous studies 
and heuristically categorize the explanatory variables stylized in table 2.2 into demand 
and supply-side factors (see for similar heuristics, among others, Calvo & Murillo, 2004; 
Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009; Piattoni, 2001; Shefter, 1993).4 Note that, due to 
interaction effects, this is but a descriptive categorization: supply side factors may affect 
demand for reform and vice-versa. The categorization is nonetheless useful, both to 
facilitate an overview of scholarly hypotheses and to derive the aforementioned 
generalization – namely that, with the exception of voter preferences, supply rather 
than demand-side hypotheses are foremost in explaining reform.  
 
                                        
4 Demand-side factors refer to political (dis)incentives to professionalize bureaucracies emanating from 
collective or individual demand for (lack of) reform from actors outside the state. Supply-side factors refer 
to political conditions (dis)incentivizing governments to professionalize the bureaucracy when facing a given 
level of demand for (lack of) reform. 
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Table 2.2 Key Explanatory Factors of Bureaucratic Professionalization5 
Demand-Side Factors Supply-Side Factors 
 Demand from civic reform 
coalitions 
 Demand from businesses 
 Demand from public employees 
 Demand from donors and 
international organizations 
 Voters’ public goods demand 
 Democratization 
 Party competition 
 Party organization 
 Electoral institutions 
 Political institutions 
 Wars and external conflict 
 Growth in patronage budgets 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
The Demand for Reform of Patronage Bureaucracies 
Demand side studies account for reform by looking at collective reform 
demand sources – be those civil society, the private sector, public employees or donors 
– or shifts in voter preferences in favour of public goods. Early historic accounts of, in 
particular, the U.S. case focused on civic reform coalitions mobilizing opposition to the 
allegedly inefficient and corrupt patronage system and working to secure the election of 
Congress Members sympathetic to reform (see, for instance, Van Riper, 1958). Societal 
organizations for reform were complemented by massive public education campaigns to 
sway public opinion against patronage (Theriault, 2003). The non-partisan press, civil 
society associations, unions and the middle class all stand to gain from more than a 
strengthened state with reform: reform advantages the middle (and, at times, upper) 
class in the competition for public employment while the crumbling of patronage-based 
party organizations enhances the power of media and collective societal actors in 
political decision-making (Shefter, 1993). Collective societal actors may be particularly 
effective in contexts of elite divisions. Societal actors may then ally with reformist 
governmental factions in power (J. Fox, 1994).   
                                        
5 Note that this review is deliberately mute on the explanatory power of ideas. The idea of a meritocratic 
civil service has existed since at least the Han Dynasty in China in the 2nd century BC (Fukuyama, 2011). 
While changes in the prominence of the idea of a professional bureaucracy may challenge the legitimacy of 
patronage systems (see Fukuyama, 2014), such changes are likely to be triggered by factors, such as civic 
reform coalitions, which are included in the review in this chapter.  
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Business demand may complement civic mobilization for reform. 
Particularly in nationalizing or globalizing economies, private sector associations may 
face incentives to demand professionalization to ensure the delivery of basic public 
services required for business operations; enhance consistency in policy implementation 
– for instance in regards to business regulations – to facilitate open market competition; 
reduce the transaction costs of doing business, for instance in customs or courts; and 
enhance macroeconomic transparency to shore up confidence in investments (Heredia 
& Schneider, 2003; Kuo, 2013; Skowronek, 1982). Professionalization may thus advance 
as a response to demands stemming from industrialization or private sector development 
more broadly (Weber, 1978).   
Inside the state, studies focus on public employees as a third source of 
collective reform demand. A professional bureaucracy tends to be in public employees’ 
self-interest. The discretion inherent in patronage bureaucracies jeopardizes their job 
stability, introduces uncertainty into their career paths and diminishes their societal 
legitimacy and reputation (Silberman, 1993; Weber, 1978). Against this backdrop, 
entrepreneurial bureaucrats may, in one account, seek autonomy by establishing ties 
with interest groups and the media which in turn provide them with political legitimacy 
and protection (Carpenter, 2001); and, in another account, seek favourable legislation 
– including bureaucratic autonomy – by exploiting executive-legislative rivalries over 
the control of bureaucracy (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994).   
Lastly, studies look to international influences – in particular from 
development assistance organizations and international financial institutions (donors) – 
as sources of demand. Donors are major reform stakeholders in most of today’s 
developing countries. The World Bank, for instance, supports public sector reform in 
roughly 140 countries, while other bilateral agencies and regional development banks 
intervene in public sector reform in over 100 countries (Andrews, 2013). Donors may 
bring about reform through at least four channels: by conditioning development aid or 
other inducements – such as European Union accession – on reform; by covering the 
initial financial costs of reform; by providing external legitimacy to reform champions; 
and by facilitating mimetic isomorphism – the imitation of more advanced professional 
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bureaucracies – through policy transfers (see, among many, M. Johnson, 2009; Laking 
& Norman, 2007; Mavima, 2008; Meyer-Sahling, 2004; Page, 2006; Ramio & Salvador, 
2008).  
Note, though, that while each of these collective demand sources may 
plausibly impinge upon reform in a given case, most studies attribute little explanatory 
power to them. While collective societal demand may have added to reform incentives 
in a few prominent cases – in particular the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Britain (see 
chapter 8) – collective action challenges mostly precluded the successful mobilization of 
societal coalitions for reform. As a result, the “broad mobilization of citizens … in reform 
[of patronage bureaucracies is] an anomaly rather than a constant.” (Grindle, 2012, p. 
29)  
As businesses face fewer collective action challenges and may vitiate part 
of the need for patronage through campaign contributions, they may expected to step 
in. Yet, the private sector tends to lack incentives to seek reform of the state as a whole. 
Instead, business demands tend to revolve around a narrow set of institutions central 
to business transactions, including central banks, tax and customs administrations, 
regulatory agencies and courts (Heredia & Schneider, 2003). When embedded in patron-
client networks and benefiting from skewed policy implementation, businesses may also 
oppose rather than demand reform (see, for instance, Nickson & Lambert, 2002). 
Concomitantly, Silberman (1993, p. 37) concludes that “industrialization … was neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient cause for bureaucratization.” 
 Public employees are unlikely to act as a remedy. Vertical patron-client 
networks often preclude the collective organization of public employees ahead of reform. 
It is, hence, only after a reduction of political control of bureaucratic careers through 
initial reforms that public employees tend to rise as an interest group in favour of 
further bureaucratic autonomy (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). Moreover, public 
employees are – reminiscent of businesses – partial in their reform demands, focusing 
on issues of particular salience to them: protection from dismissals, demotions or 
unfavourable transfers; automatic promotions and generalized pay rises (Grindle, 2012; 
Schultz & Maranto, 1998). Unionization may thus strengthen autonomy from political 
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interference, yet not necessarily professionalization understood as meritocracy in 
recruitment and promotion. As a result then, “few scholars have treated the 
bureaucracy as a serious political force in its own right.” (Zelizer, 2003, p. 61) 
In contrast, donors are, as aforementioned, present as stakeholders in 
most of today’s developing countries. Yet, their reform demands rarely translate into 
professionalization. Against the backdrop of project approval cultures, lending pressure 
and coordination difficulties among donors, conditionalities are often weak (Bauhr & 
Nasiritousi, 2012; De Renzio, 2011). Moreover, they frequently lead to the formal 
mimicry of international best practices beyond the administrative reach of recipient 
countries. These isomorphic formal façades then do little to undermine the informal 
prevalence of patronage (Andrews, 2010, 2013). To the contrary, they may, at times, 
enable patronage-enhancing reforms (O'Dwyer, 2006). A variety of perverse incentives 
further add to the risk of undermining professionalization through aid. Technical 
assistance by donors may reduce pressure to build up domestic bureaucratic capacity; 
donors at times poach skilled staff from public sector institutions (Bräutigam, 2000); 
reliance on foreign aid to meet fiscal needs disincentivizes building up bureaucratic 
capacity to collect tax revenue, while softening budget constraints for patronage 
(Moore, 2004; Mwenda & Tangri, 2005); and public service provision by donors lessens 
voters’ public goods demands and thus pressure for professionalization to supply such 
goods (Van de Walle, 2001). Consequently, even in the case of successful reforms, the 
role of donors “is often quite marginal” despite the prevalence of their financial support 
(Andrews, 2013, p. 209).  
In sum then, while collective sources of demand for reform are frequently 
present in reform cases, most studies de-emphasize their relevance in tilting incentives 
towards reform. Yet, this is not to say that actors outside the state do not matter for 
reform. Voter preferences may shape the reform rationales of (re)election-seeking power 
holders even where collective mobilization is not forthcoming. Such preferences tend 
not to translate directly into demands for patronage and its reform, however, but rather 
into demands for public and private goods provision – which in turn shape the political 
payoffs of patronage and professionalization. Scholarly works suggests that voter 
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preferences may shift from private goods to public goods due to increases in income, 
education, private sector employment, urbanization and ethnic fractionalization. 
Most prominently, studies have linked higher per capita incomes to 
fewer patronage demands. Greater incomes tend to coincide with lower future discount 
rates, with voters more willing to forego immediate private goods receipts in the form 
of patronage in favour of longer-term public goods benefits through reform (Charron & 
Lapuente, 2010). Similarly, higher incomes reduce voters’ risk aversion and thus 
enhance their willingness to forego a certain private goods benefit in favour of a 
probabilistic public goods benefit (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). 
Perhaps most important, higher incomes reduce the marginal utility to voters of a given 
public sector wage premium while enhancing the utility voters derive from self-
expression in the polls. As a result, the reservation wage required to obtain electoral 
support through patronage increases and patronage becomes a more expensive electoral 
mobilization strategy6 (see, among many, Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Reid & Kurth, 1988, 
1989; Stokes, 2005; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012).  
The higher levels of education, private sector employment and 
urbanization which frequently coincide with higher incomes may further reduce the 
electoral utility of patronage. Higher skill levels enhance voters’ ability to both monitor 
incumbent public goods provision and obtain employment outside a patronage 
bureaucracy (Geddes, 1996; Oliveros, 2013). They also raise the opportunity costs of 
patronage systems in terms of foregone bureaucratic efficiency due to rising skill levels 
of those marginalized by the system (Hollyer, 2011b). As a caveat, though, increases in 
educational equality rather than education itself may have the opposite effect. Where 
educational opportunities are unequally distributed, professionalization may buttress 
class privileges: only elites count on the education to successfully compete in 
meritocratic personnel selections; they thus push for reform to safeguard their privileged 
access to public employment (Grindle, 2012). Greater private sector employment 
                                        
6 As a caveat, where higher incomes augment the state resources available for patronage, higher incomes 
will only incentivize reform where, proportionally speaking, the increase in voters‘ reservation wages exceeds 
the increase in patronage budgets (Lyne, 2007). 
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opportunities in turn tend to reduce the electoral utility of frequently insecure patronage 
jobs (Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009; Sorauf, 1960).7 And urbanization, by enhancing 
the spatial mobility of voters, complicates the construction and monitoring of patron-
client relations – and thus the value of patronage (Kitschelt, 2000). 
Lastly, ethnic fractionalization may shape voter preferences for public 
and private goods. Ethnicity-based cleavages may complicate the definition of 
programmatic left-right issue spaces and facilitate the construction of cohesive 
ethnicity-based patronage networks (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007a; Ruhil, 2003). They 
may, however, also lead to excessive patronage demands and attempts by ethnic 
outsiders to push for reform (Ruhil & Camões, 2003; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). 
 In conclusion, while scholars rarely find professionalization to be the 
result of demand from collective actors, shifts in citizen preferences towards public goods 
– caused by a variety of socio-economic factors – are frequently identified as proximate 
causes of bureaucratic professionalization. This puts a premium on incorporating 
citizens’ public and private goods preferences in theory development and testing. At 
the same time, political systems aggregate such preferences in distinct ways. In other 
words, whether incumbents face incentives to respond with professionalization to citizen 
preferences for public goods, or to professionalize despite citizen preferences for private 
goods will depend on supply-side factors; concomitantly then, these factors have taken 
centre stage in the bulk of scholarly works and are discussed next. 
 
The Supply of Reform of Patronage Bureaucracies 
At the most aggregate level, supply side scholars have argued whether 
incumbents in democracies or autocracies face greater reform incentives (see, among 
many, Acemoglu, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2011; Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Egorov & Sonin, 
2011). The competing values of responsiveness and autonomy stand at the centre of 
this debate. Thanks to increased electoral competition, press scrutiny and civic 
                                        
7 As a caveat, limited private sector employment opportunities may also have the opposite effect. Ruhil 
(2003) argues that enhanced unemployment may incentivize reform where incumbents face too many 
patronage seekers in the context of limited patronage supply. 
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association, democracies are argued to foster responsiveness to societal demands, 
including for bureaucratic professionalization (Heredia & Schneider, 2003). On the other 
hand, thanks to the insulation of incumbents from the distributional and immediate 
consumption demands of citizens, autocracies are deemed more capable of imposing 
short-term patronage reductions in favour of longer-run public goods provision 
(Haggard, 1990).  
  In this dissertation, I am concerned with the patronage or 
professionalization choice of incumbents in democratic regimes; I thus make no attempt 
to resolve the democracy vs. autocracy debate. The debate is nonetheless helpful to 
illustrate an often neglected limitation in supply-side studies. Theories frequently 
explain, without explicit recognition, either the incentives for or the ability to reform, 
yet not both. I explicitly address this limitation in the theory I develop in the next 
chapter. Moreover, the debate underscores that democratization is not an unmitigated 
blessing or curse for bureaucratic professionalization. Instead, its effect will hinge upon 
both voters’ public goods preferences and more specific characteristics of the democratic 
regime. Six factors have been argued to be of particular relevance: patterns of party 
competition; party organization; electoral institutions; political institutions; war and 
conflict; and growth in patronage budgets.  
  Both most prominently and most controversially in the literature, 
distinct patterns of electoral competition have been linked with the reform and resilience 
of patronage bureaucracies. In an influential argument, Geddes (1996, p. 190) has 
argued that electoral competition is the “principal incentive” for professionalization, 
albeit only in party systems where parties have equal access to patronage. In such 
contexts, reform imposes similar patronage losses on parties while allowing incumbents 
to claim small electoral gains from improved public goods provision and reputation. 
Parity among two parties may also facilitate professionalization by enabling reformist 
factions to “play balance of power politics,” offering their pivotal electoral support in 
return for reform (Shefter, 1993, p. 73).   
In the prominent accounts of O’Dwyer (2006) and Grzymala-Busse 
(2007), it is not party parity but robust and institutionalized competition which 
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incentivizes reform. In O’Dwyer’s (2006) account, such competition occurs where no 
party is dominant, and a manageable number of stable parties with familiar coalition-
building preferences compete for office. As a result, a credible opposition offers voters a 
clear alternative to punish incumbents seeking excessive patronage. In contrast, volatile 
and fractionalized party systems with unfamiliar patterns of coalition-building militate 
against professionalization by putting a premium on patronage to maintain governing 
coalitions; by enhancing the number of partisan veto players with narrow and thus 
potentially less public-regarding constituencies (see, for similar arguments,  Gordin, 
2002; Kitschelt, 2000); by complicating the accountability of any specific governing 
party for public goods provision; and by shortening political time horizons and thus 
incentivizing the extraction of state resources. Grzymala-Busse (2007, p. 1) in turn 
argues that competition is robust where opposition parties “offer a clear, plausible and 
critical governing alternative.” Critical oppositions place a check on patronage by 
publicizing incumbent’s exploits. At the same time, clear and plausible oppositions 
enhance the threat of replacement of incumbents. Anticipating a potential exit from 
office, incumbents face incentives to co-opt the opposition through power-sharing 
arrangements and to construct formal institutions – including professional bureaucracies 
– as safeguards for electoral losers against the incumbent use of patronage and other 
state resources for electoral advantage (see, for a similar insurance argument, Ting, 
Snyder, Hirano, & Folke, 2013). In accordance with this logic, a variety of studies find 
patronage to be lowest where electoral margins are smallest (Benitez-Iturbe, 2008; 
Magaloni et al., 2007; Remmer, 2007). 
Political uncertainty about maintenance in power features more 
generally as an inducement for bureaucratic professionalization in a range of other 
studies. When facing electoral defeat, incumbents may pursue reform to “blanket in” 
patronage appointees to secure continued employment for their clients and deprive 
hostile successors of patronage (Ruhil & Camões, 2003, p. 34; Van Riper, 1958); to 
enhance the durability – and thus value – of legislative benefits by assuring that public 
employees broadly sympathetic to their interests remain in office, thus limiting the 
extent to which future (hostile) incumbents may shape administrative outcomes (Horn, 
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1995); or to both lock in the incumbent’s political agenda – by preventing successors 
from replacing politically-loyal bureaucrats – and maintain bureaucrats’ incentives to 
invest in competence as electoral uncertainty thwarts credible future patronage 
employment guarantees (Mueller, 2009). Silberman (1993) in turn argues that political 
uncertainty affects not only whether but also what kind of professional bureaucracy is 
constructed. Absent institutionalized leadership succession, incumbents prioritize closed 
civil services to assure continuity in public services; where rules for succession are 
institutionalized, incumbents favour more open labour markets in public service.  
A second set of studies has been less sanguine about electoral 
competition and uncertainty, arguing that these may disincentivize rather than foster 
reform. A variety of causal mechanisms have been suggested. Most important, electoral 
uncertainty may reduce the time horizons of incumbents and thus their ability to claim 
the long-term economic gains induced by professional bureaucracies; as a result, they 
face fewer incentives to professionalize and greater incentives to predate state resources 
through private goods extraction (Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009). Electoral uncertainty 
may also incentivize incumbents to limit the state capacity available to hostile 
successors to pursue policies detrimental to the incumbent (Besley & Persson, 2010); 
and may incentivize incumbents to forego professionalization in favour of enhancing the 
political control of bureaucracies staffed with untrusted appointees of preceding 
incumbents (Meyer-Sahling, 2006c). Studies associating increases in patronage with 
enhanced electoral competition thus abound (see, among many, L. Beck, 2008; Lindberg 
& Morrison, 2008). 
The literature thus remains in dissent regarding the incentive effects of 
electoral competition and uncertainty for bureaucratic professionalization. This dissent 
may, in part, be resolved by locating the studies in their socio-economic context. As 
may be expected, electoral competition is more likely to incentivize professionalization 
where voters prioritize public over private goods (Charron & Lapuente, 2010; Kitschelt 
& Wilkinson, 2007a; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). As I shall argue in the next section, however, 
part of the literature dissent may also be resolved by taking into account how electoral 
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competition interacts with distinct patronage bureaucracies and distinct reforms of 
patronage bureaucracies. 
Prior to doing so, the remnant range of supply side explanations for 
professionalization shall be delineated. Next to party competition, the organization of 
parties has been argued to impinge upon reform incentives. According to Cruz and 
Keefer (2013), party organizations which enable collective action by politicians facilitate 
reform. Individual patron-politicians with small constituencies command neither 
incentives nor ability to make good on broad public goods promises – whose delivery 
would be facilitated by a professional bureaucracy. Reform is thus more likely under 
programmatic and, to a lesser extent, centralized machine parties than under parties 
consisting of loose agglomerations of patron-politicians. In a similar vein, Geddes (1996) 
argues that incumbents heading more disciplined parties are more likely to 
professionalize as they are less in need of patronage concessions to secure party cohesion. 
Other scholars see an inverse relation, however. Well-organized and disciplined parties 
may be better positioned to administer patronage to its maximum advantage, as 
organization and discipline are key to monitor and enforce patronage contracts aimed 
at maximizing party support (Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Sorauf, 1959). Less 
controversially, the socio-economic characteristics of party members are argued to 
impinge upon professionalization. Parties with more skilled constituents face fewer 
incentives to rely on patronage. Employment alternatives of party members enhance 
the public sector wage premiums required to obtain their electoral support; patronage 
thus becomes a more costly electoral strategy (Benitez-Iturbe, 2008; Calvo & Murillo, 
2004). 
Lastly, the lack of party organization or, more precisely, the election of 
political outsiders to power has been argued to either incentivize or thwart 
professionalization. In the more sanguine accounts, Presidents rising to power 
independent of a particular party or in spite of the opposition of established party 
leaders face incentives to reform to undercut the patronage power base of their 
opponents in the legislature (Geddes, 1996); when such Presidents rise to power in the 
context of a long-standing fusion between the bureaucratic and political elite, they may 
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face additional incentives to reform as they are not beholden to bureaucratic elites in 
the executive intent on opposing reform (Gault & Amparan, 2003). At the same time, 
however, a range of political outsiders acceding the Presidency have opted for patronage 
rather than professionalization (Philip & Panizza, 2011). In other words, incumbent 
outsiders do not necessarily choose to professionalize; instead, they may find it in their 
advantage to construct parties and mobilize electoral support through patronage. As I 
shall argue below, their choice critically depends on the institutional allocation of 
control over patronage, a hitherto omitted explanatory variable. 
Studies looking to institutions – understood as the rules of the game – 
as causes of bureaucratic professionalization have, to-date, narrowed in on, first, 
electoral institutions and, second, broad differences in systems of democratic 
governance: presidential vs. parliamentary and unitary vs. federal systems. The evidence 
for any exogenous causal effect of these institutions is mixed at best, however. Electoral 
institutions have been argued to incentivize patronage where they personalize electoral 
contests and facilitate monitoring of patronage contests. Single-member districts may 
facilitate personalization by enabling voters to unequivocally identify patronage receipts 
with incumbents (Müller, 2007); open-list systems may incentivize patronage as 
incumbents compete against not only candidates from other parties – from which they 
can distinguish themselves through programmatic appeals – but also candidates from 
their own party; private goods provision, including patronage, then becomes a key 
differentiation strategy (G. Cox & McCubbins, 2001; Geddes, 1996). Where secret 
ballots are absent, monitoring that such patronage provision is reciprocated with 
electoral support becomes particularly feasible (Lehoucq & Molina, 2002). While some 
case evidence for each of these arguments is available, however, larger-n studies tend to 
find no causal effect of electoral institutions, be these open-list systems, district 
magnitudes or secret ballots (see, for instance, Cruz & Keefer, 2013; Gingerich, 2013a; 
Kitschelt, 2011). 
Similarly, the causal effect of broad differences in political systems – be 
these presidential or parliamentary and unitary or federal systems – is contested. As 
Gerring and Thacker (2004) point out, parliamentarism may facilitate reform by, among 
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others, reducing the number of veto actors and clarifying lines of accountability of 
bureaucrats to a single principal (the executive); moreover, as legislators carry the 
responsibility of sustaining the government, they may less credibly threaten defection 
unless granted special benefits, including patronage (see also Gerring, Thacker, & 
Moreno, 2009). The aforementioned politician’s dilemma may thus be less severe under 
parliamentarism. At the same time, however, Presidential systems feature heads of state 
elected in national constituencies and thus in need of courting broad-based rather than 
localized support (Shugart, 1999). They thus provide a counter force to personalized 
politics and patronage. Against the backdrop of countervailing incentives, several larger-
n studies find no effect of these distinct political systems on clientelism or the reform 
of patronage bureaucracies (Cruz & Keefer, 2013; Kitschelt, 2011). 
The effect of the second broad variation in political systems – unitarism 
vs. federalism – has similarly not seen unequivocal findings. As with parliamentarism, 
unitarism, by centralizing political power, has been argued to reduce the number of 
veto points and thus facilitate reform (Gerring & Thacker, 2004). Kenny (2013), in 
particular, has suggested that decentralized patronage polities complicate bureaucratic 
professionalization as reform has to proceed across multiple subnational sites, each with 
their own set of veto actors (see also Grindle, 2012). In contrast, federalists have argued 
that the concentration of power in unitary states fosters malfeasance – including reliance 
on patronage – as incumbents face fewer checks and watchdogs keeping patronage at 
bay (see, for instance, Asare, 2012). A third group of scholars in turn finds no effect of 
unitarism or federalism (see, for instance, Treisman, 2007). Note that, as with the 
democracy vs. autocracy debate, diverging scholarly predictions stem in part from 
diverging (implicit) assumptions about whether ability or incentives underlie reform. To 
simplify, in more fragmented polities, incumbents may be less able to reform; in more 
centralized polities, they face fewer incentives to do so. Note that the theory I develop 
in the next chapter favours a fragmentation perspective – albeit focused on hitherto 
omitted causal mechanisms and sources of fragmentation.  
Rather than on political institutions as such, a further set of studies has 
focused on the threat of their demise through wars and conflicts. Most prominently, 
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Tilly (1990) has argued that incumbents facing a threat of war choose to professionalize 
their bureaucracies to enhance their tax capacity and military administration. Conflict, 
however, has produced institutional demise at least as often as institutional 
development (Kurtz, 2013). Irrespective of their causal effects, however, inter-state 
conflicts are unlikely to incentivize reform or patronage in today’s developing economies. 
Wars have been largely absent in most developing regions (see, for instance, Centeno, 
2003).  
Finally, scholars have posited competing hypotheses regarding the role 
of fiscal pressures in inducing professionalization. In Johnson and Libecap’s (1994) 
prominent account, rising patronage budgets rather than fiscal pressures incentivize 
professionalization. Increasing government workforces lead to, first, principal-agent 
problems as clients (such as local patronage workers) became further removed from 
patrons at the top of the pyramid (such as Presidents and legislators); and, second,  
rising transaction costs of patronage appointments which come to consume an 
increasingly unmanageable share of the time of top patrons. Geddes (1996) in turn 
argues that larger patronage budgets enable incumbents to secure governability through 
patronage concessions while, at the same time, retaining appointment powers which 
may be professionalized.  
In contrast, a range of scholars have argued that fiscal crises induce 
professionalization by, most notably, curtailing the power of actors with vested 
patronage interests, reducing the availability of patronage resources and thus 
complicating patronage-based electoral competition (Bunse & Fritz, 2012; Kitschelt, 
2007).8 As a caveat, note that fiscally-induced reforms frequently focus on payroll cuts 
rather than professionalization (Heredia & Schneider, 2003). In a last set of studies, the 
incentive effect of increases in patronage budgets is argued to hinge on the source of 
revenues for the increase. Where such revenues stem from windfalls such as natural 
resources or development assistance, rentier theorists argue that patronage is fostered. 
                                        
8 Note that some scholars have argued for an opposite effect. Levitsky (2003), for instance, links economic 
crises to enhanced reliance on clientelist offerings, with crises undoing other electoral linkages. 
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Incumbents face fewer incentives to construct professional tax administrations and 
command greater budgets to meet voters’ patronage demands (Ross, 2001).9 
  In sum, the literature has put forward an impressive array of supply and 
demand-side factors to account for professionalization. In the next section, I will 
critically assess the contributions and limitations of this body of works and derive 
guideposts for the research in the dissertation.  
 
Lessons from the Literature: Unilinear Insights and their Limitations 
Several guideposts for the study of the politics of reform of patronage 
bureaucracies may be derived from the literature. First, the persistence of patronage is 
frequently over-determined. Professionalization rather than patronage is thus the major 
conundrum to be explained.  
Second, despite the infrequency of bureaucratic professionalization, 
scholars have found evidence for the explanatory power of a broad range of factors. The 
U.S. case is paradigmatic. Scholars have put forward evidence that professionalization 
was caused by, among others, civic reform movements, principal-agent problems in 
patronage networks, parity among the two large parties and the desire of lame-duck 
Presidents to insulate appointees from dismissals (see chapter 8). Professionalization is 
thus frequently the outcome of, not, single causes, but the interaction of multiple ones. 
Consequently, valid empirical tests need to incorporate a wide range of explanatory 
variables to forestall omitted variable biases; in the comparative case study in this 
dissertation, chapter 6 is thus solely concerned with examining rival explanations.  
  Notwithstanding the range of potential explanatory variables, 
professionalization has rarely resulted from demands from collective actors outside the 
state. The most powerful theories may thus be constructed from the viewpoint of 
incumbents choosing to supply patronage or professionalization; both supply-side 
variables and voter preferences have been found to shape the utility of patronage and 
                                        
9 Note, though, that this explanatory factor is not without contention, either. Many states with natural 
resource endowments have utilized them to support development – including of the bureaucracy – rather 
than for rentier purposes (Kurtz, 2013). 
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professionalization and should thus be incorporated in theory construction. Theory 
development in the next chapter reflects this lesson. 
On a related note, most studies account for professionalization – 
explicitly or implicitly – through shifts in the political costs and benefits of private and 
public goods respectively. Where the electoral utility of public goods increases or the 
utility of private goods decreases – be these due to supply or demand-side factors – 
seeking a more professional bureaucracy to provide more public and fewer private goods 
becomes more incentive-compatible. To ensure comparability, I will develop the theory 
in the next chapter based on a similar explanatory approach. 
  Fifth, theories frequently limit themselves, without explicit recognition, 
to accounting for either the incentives for or the ability to reform. Diverging scholarly 
predictions then stem in part from diverging assumptions about whether ability or 
incentives underpins reform. It is axiomatic to note that both are needed. Having said 
that, I will argue, in the next chapter, for the primacy of executive incentives in theory 
development. The rationale is simple. Executives facing incentives to professionalize 
tend to count on a legal ability to do so without consent from other government 
branches; their political ability to professionalize may thus limit the expansion of 
professionalization across the state, yet – bar exceptional circumstances – not its 
occurrence.  
  Beyond the conflation of incentives and ability, studies share a further, 
and potentially even graver limitation: they seek to explain the reform of patronage 
bureaucracies without taking into account differences in either the type of reform 
pursued or the underlying patronage bureaucracy. Yet, not all reforms are the same, 
and neither are all patronage bureaucracies. As I shall detail below, moving beyond this 
unilinear view of patronage and its reform clarifies the appropriate dependent variable, 
resolves competing hypotheses in the literature, reduces omitted variable biases and 
forms the basis for theory development in the next chapter. I shall make this case for, 
first, variation in reforms, and, second, variation in patronage bureaucracies. 
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Not all Reform Roads Lead to Weber: Diverging Reforms with Diverging Politics  
With few exceptions (see, in particular, Silberman, 1993), scholars have 
presented reform as a dichotomous choice, termed as, for instance, patronage vs. 
professionalization or politicization vs. insulation (see, among many, Lapuente & 
Nistotskaya, 2009; Ting et al., 2013). Professionalization or insulation then coincides 
implicitly or explicitly with “Weberianness.” (Evans & Rauch, 1999, p. 748) Note that 
Weberianness, as understood in these scholarly works, refers not to the broader rational-
legal organizational and normative structure of government, but more narrowly to the 
institutions regulating public personnel. This is not least as “employment relations are 
at the theoretical core of the concept of Weberian bureaucracy,” with Weber assigning 
“overwhelming importance to public staff policy.” (Dahlström et al., 2012, p. 42) The 
Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy thereby consists of three stylized components 
(Dahlstroem et al., 2011; Weber, 1978). First, lifelong careers with bureaucratic tenure 
protected from arbitrary dismissal (henceforth: tenure) permit the creation of closed 
bureaucracies which, through long-term socialization, are thought to generate an ‘esprit 
de corps’ around impartial, committed and non-corrupt behaviour (Rauch & Evans, 
2000). Second, competitive wages coupled with detection mechanisms and sanctions for 
illicit behaviour are deemed to shift bureaucrats’ incentives away from the temptation 
of corruption towards public goods provision (Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). And 
third, meritocratic rather than politicized recruitment and promotion (henceforth: 
merit) provide for qualified bureaucrats with interests and accountability chains 
separate to elected officials; as a result, bureaucratic behaviour is oriented towards 
public goods provision rather than private interests (Alesina & Tabellini, 2007; 
Dahlstroem et al., 2011).   
In most scholarly works, these distinct components of a Weberian 
bureaucracy are implicitly or explicitly assumed to occur together in practice with 
reform.10 This assumption mirrors the literature on state building at-large which, as 
Silberman (1993, p. 1-2) astutely noted, 
                                        
10 In a somewhat separate literature, scholars construe ‘enclave civil service systems’, ‘pockets of 
effectiveness’ or ‘islands of excellence’ – the presence of Weberian bureaucracies in some parts of the state, 
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“appears to take for granted that rationalization of state authority 
must take on the particular structural characteristics Weber so acutely 
observed in Western European societies.”  
Yet, this conflation assumption of distinct components of Weberian 
ideal-type bureaucracies tends to be empirically unwarranted. A juxtaposition of merit 
and tenure may serve to underscore this claim.11 According to data from a global expert 
survey – the 2008-2012 Quality of Government (QoG) Survey – merit and tenure are 
only weakly correlated (r=0.34) (Dahlberg et al., 2013; see chapter 8).12 Regional 
evidence further substantiates the asynchrony of merit and tenure. To illustrate, in 
Latin America, a range of countries lack meritocracy in recruitment and promotion, yet 
feature rigid tenure protections from dismissal (Grindle, 2010). 
If merit and tenure reforms do not coincide, however, then their 
determinants will not do so either. In other words, the politics of merit reforms and the 
politics of tenure reforms tend to differ. Importantly, part of the dissent in the literature 
regarding the explanatory role of key variables may be resolved by incorporating this 
insight; or, in other words, by disaggregating whether scholarly theories account for 
merit or tenure reforms as their dependent variable. This applies to both supply and 
demand-side studies.  
Consider, on the supply side, several of the competing hypotheses 
surrounding the role of electoral competition – the variable which has seen most studies 
and most controversy to-date. In one set of studies, electoral competition is, by 
introducing political uncertainty, argued to foster reform by incentivizing incumbents 
to “blanket in” patronage appointees to both secure their continued employment and 
                                        
yet not others – as intermediate stages in the continuum from patronage to Weberian bureaucracies (see, 
for an overview, Leonard, 2010).  
11 Note that I omit competitive wages as a third Weberian ideal-type characteristic from the discussion. 
With few exceptions (see, in particular, Horn, 1995), the scarce studies touching upon the politics of public 
wage reforms in patronage states have concentrated on fiscal rather than professionalization reform 
rationales. As such, they have contributed principally to scholarship on fiscal austerity rather than 
professionalization (see, for instance, Navia & Velasco, 2003). 
12 Scholars of bureaucracy have, of course, noted that meritocracy and tenure protections may not coincide, 
not least by identifying open and closed systems in developed economies (see, for instance, Dahlström et 
al., 2012; Olsen, 2008). Yet, how this lack of concurrence of merit and tenure may affect the determinants 
of reform of patronage bureaucracies has not been considered. 
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reduce the amount of patronage available to successors; to enhance the durability of 
legislative benefits by assuring that sympathetic bureaucrats remain in office; or, beyond 
locking in the incumbent’s political agenda, to maintain bureaucratic incentives to 
invest in competence where electoral uncertainty thwarts credible future patronage 
employment guarantees (see, among others, Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Horn, 1995; 
Mueller, 2009; Ruhil & Camões, 2003; Ting et al., 2013; Van Riper, 1958). 
 In a second set of studies, electoral uncertainty is argued to thwart 
reform by reducing the time horizons of incumbents and thus their ability to claim the 
long-term state capacity benefits and economic gains induced by professional 
bureaucracies. As a result, the inter-temporal cost-benefit incidence of reforms becomes 
particularly misaligned: patronage losses are accrued today, while reform benefits 
become more uncertain (see, among others, Blum, 2014; Bunse & Fritz, 2012; Lapuente 
& Nistotskaya, 2009).  
Note, though, that these are not competing hypotheses, even if they are 
framed as such (see, for instance, Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009); instead, they are 
hypotheses to account for distinct dependent variables. Locking in political agendas and 
legislative deals, blanketing in partisans, providing long-run employment guarantees to 
incentivize bureaucratic competence investments and constraining the patronage 
budgets of successors all require, principally, tenure protections for patronage 
appointees rather than meritocratic recruitment and promotion. Instead, reaping the 
long-term public goods benefits of bureaucratic professionalization requires, principally, 
skilled bureaucrats through meritocratic recruitment and promotion rather than tenure.  
Similarly, on the demand-side, the causal role of collective actors may 
be better understood by disaggregating merit or tenure. To illustrate, bureaucrats are 
more likely to focus on tenure protections from dismissal as a tangible and immediate 
benefit to them (Grindle, 2012). In contrast, civic reform coalitions, businesses and 
donors may be expected to prioritize a more professional bureaucracy through 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion. One donor report, for instance, went as far as 
terming the hijacking of merit reforms to produce benefits for bureaucrats – including 
tenure – the “merit trap.” (Shepherd, 2003, p. 16) 
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Part of the dissent in the literature is thus resolved by disaggregating 
merit and tenure into two distinct dependent variables. Following this logic, I will 
examine the politics of merit and tenure reforms separately in the dissertation. At the 
same time, theory development and testing in chapters 4 to 6 will focus on merit 
reforms; the determinants of tenure reforms are solely discussed as an extension of the 
theory in chapter 7. The rationale for focusing on the determinants of merit is 
straightforward: merit rather than tenure is statistically associated with enhanced 
public goods provision and development at-large. More specifically, merit has been 
associated with better service delivery quality, lower corruption and economic growth 
(Dahlstroem et al., 2011; Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen, 2014; Rauch & Evans, 2000; 
World Bank, 2003). By contrast, the cross-country studies find no consistent effect of 
tenure protections on positive development outcomes.13  
Intuitively, the differential development impacts of merit and tenure 
may be very much expected. Both merit and tenure reduce patronage powers, by doing 
away with discretion over recruitment and promotion (merit) and dismissal (tenure). 
Yet, tenure is unlikely to enhance bureaucratic capacity or reduce corruption without 
merit; instead, it simply perpetuates in their positions patronage appointees who are 
often only partially qualified for their positions and owe loyalty to political patrons. 
Instead, merit may be expected to both de-politicize and professionalize bureaucracies. 
Merit not only promises the recruitment and promotion of personnel with the requisite 
professional qualifications for their positions (Evans & Rauch, 1999). It also alters the 
bureaucratic chain of accountability. Bureaucrats become less committed to political 
patrons – to whom they no longer owe their positions – and more committed to rules 
of performance (Dahlstroem et al., 2011; Grindle, 2012). I thus use the terms merit and 
professionalization interchangeably in this dissertation. 
Note that this should not be understood as an unconditional eulogy for 
a neutral bureaucracy. It is, of course, natural and legitimate that politicians direct 
state institutions (Ingraham, 1995). In this context, patronage appointments at the top 
                                        
13 Similarly, the effect of competitive wages is either nil or contested in statistical studies (Dahlstroem et 
al., 2011; U. Panizza, 2001; Rauch & Evans, 2000; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). 
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offer a democratic form of institutionalised political control (Page & Wright, 2007); and 
Western countries have expanded rather than constrained patronage in the last two 
decades (Kopecky et al., 2012; Peters & Pierre, 2004). Yet, in the patronage 
bureaucracies of interest in this dissertation, patronage is the “generalized rule of the 
game for holding non-elected government positions,” be it legally recognized or 
established by custom (Grindle, 2010, p. 3). In other words, patronage is the principal 
route to public jobs across all hierarchies – rather than only at the top where democratic 
control may legitimize it. 
As such, patronage bureaucracies also do not offer themselves to New 
Public Management (NPM)-inspired reforms – such as the decentralization of personnel 
functions – as a competing path to professionalization (Kellough & Selden, 2003). 
Typically characterized by weak rule of law, patronage bureaucracies lack a critical 
precondition to implement NPM reforms (Schick, 1998). Unsurprisingly then, statistical 
studies find that more flexible, NPM-inspired recruitment schemes do not contain 
patronage where risks of abuse are high (Sundell, 2014). In the words of Gaebler, “you 
have to invent government before you can reinvent it.” (Heredia & Schneider, 2003, p. 
8)  
At the same time, however, not all un-invented governments are the 
same. Next to conflating distinct Weberian reforms into a single dependent variable, 
studies have also conflated distinct patronage bureaucracies. How this conflation has 
added to dissent in the literature and forfeited an opportunity for theory development 
is discussed next.  
 
Not all Patronage Bureaucracies Share Spoils Identically: Diverging Patronage 
Control and Diverging Reform Incentives 
As the second key repercussion of the literature’s unilinear view of 
patronage and professionalization, patronage bureaucracies are assumed to not vary. In 
other words, all patronage bureaucracies are thought to provide incumbents with, 
ceteris paribus, the same incentive structure for professionalization or patronage. 
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  Patronage bureaucracies may, prima facie, be expected to provide 
homogenous incentive structures: they each facilitate the provision of private rather 
than public goods (see chapter 3). At the same time, however, they vary in the 
institutions allocating control over these private goods benefits. This has, of course, 
been recognized in studies of patronage, which emphasize conflict of competing patrons 
over patronage control (see, among many, Grindle, 2012; Scherlis, 2010); and the role 
of institutions in biasing control over patronage (Calvo & Murillo, 2004). Moreover, 
competition of control over the bureaucracy has, more generally, been central to, in 
particular, theories of delegation in U.S. scholarly works. In these accounts, executive-
legislative conflicts are argued to have induced reforms to, among others, introduce 
extensive formalization and reduce bureaucratic shirking (see, among many, 
McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987; Moe & Caldwell, 1994).   
  Yet, perhaps surprisingly, scholars have not put forward theories linking 
institutional structures allocating patronage control with the professionalization of 
patronage bureaucracies (but see Grindle, 2012; Kenny, 2013). This lack of 
consideration of the explanatory power of institutional variation mirrors an omission in 
the study of clientelism at-large. To-date, as reviewed above, scholars have limited 
themselves to examining the causal effect of electoral institutions and broad differences 
in political systems: presidential vs. parliamentary and unitary vs. federal systems. 
Causal effects, however, have either not been identifiable or contested. These 
institutions are then found to be “not particularly useful” in accounting for clientelism 
and its demise (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007a, p. 44). At the same time, “whether other 
democratic institutions may have an impact … has been less well specified and explored” 
(Kitschelt, 2011, p. 1). Note that this reflects a more general omission: “it is striking 
that the question of executive organization and its effect on the quality of governance 
has received so little … analysis.” (Gerring et al., 2009, p. 328) 
Intuitively, we may expect the more fine-grained, hitherto omitted 
variation in institutions allocating patronage control to shape executive reform 
incentives much more immediately than the broad variation in political systems or 
electoral institutions scholars have focused on to-date. Where institutions shift 
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patronage benefits to electoral challengers in control of other government branches or 
public employees – rather than incumbents and their allies – the electoral utility of 
patronage bureaucracies to executive incumbents is much reduced – and their incentives 
to replace it with a professional bureaucracy enhanced. In the next chapter, I develop 
this intuition into a full-fledged theory of reform of patronage bureaucracies and detail 
the method to test it. 
Prior to doing so, a brief note on how variation in the institutional 
allocation of patronage control resolves competing hypotheses in the literature reviewed 
in this chapter is due. Consider, first, the case of electoral competition which, as 
aforementioned, incentivizes professionalization in some studies, yet thwarts such 
reform in others. Intuitively, we may expect electoral competition to incentivize 
professionalization where institutions deprive incumbents – yet not their competitors – 
of patronage control. Where incumbents monopolize control over patronage, however, 
electoral competition thwarts reform by incentivizing incumbents to utilize this 
disproportionate control to their advantage in the mobilization of votes.  
Similarly, the patronage or professionalization choice of the increasing 
number of political outsiders coming to power, in particular in Latin America (see 
Carreras, 2012), is shaped by their ability to claim the spoils of the state. As 
aforementioned, studies have yielded contradictory results as to whether we may expect 
outsider Presidents to professionalize to deprive opponents of patronage control, or 
politicize to develop their own patron-client networks. Contradictory findings are 
resolved when considering the interaction of political outsiders with institutions 
allocating patronage control. Where institutions monopolize control in the Presidency, 
political outsiders face incentives to utilize this control to their advantage in the 
construction of a political support base; where institutions shift patronage control away 
from the Presidency towards electoral challengers, outsiders face incentives to 
professionalize to undercut challengers’ patronage access. 
With these linkages clarified, a much more precise delineation of the 
theory and the underlying conceptualization of the institutions allocating patronage 
control is due. It is to this task that I turn in the next chapter.  
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3  
 
Institutional Incentives for                                    
Professionalizing Patronage States:                                              
Theory and Method 
 
To conclude part 1 of this dissertation, this chapter lays out its theory and method. 
The chapter, first, develops a theory which links institutions allocating patronage 
benefits with incumbent reform incentives; second, shows that a comparative case study 
is the most appropriate method for theory testing; and third, details the case selection 
and data collection underlying the comparative case study in part 2 of this dissertation.  
 
Theory Development: Institutional Incentives for                 
Professionalizing Patronage States 
For theory development, I borrow from rational choice institutionalism (RCI) and 
conceptualize actors as self-interested utility-maximizers, deploying strategic behaviour 
to attain a set of goals determined by an exogenously-specified preference function 
(Shepsle, 2010). Institutions – the rules of the game – shape actors’ incentives and 
constraints (Hall & Taylor, 1996); they affect the availability and utility of patronage 
and professionalization. Contrary to many RCI accounts, I will, however, probe into 
the empirical validity of the assumptions underlying the theory, test rival explanations 
and clarify the theory’s causal mechanisms and scope conditions (see, among others, 
Weyland, 2002 for a corresponding critique of RCI). Given the diversity and nuance of 
the theorized causal mechanisms (see table 3.2), I will similarly – and contrary to many 
RCI accounts – not rely on a simplified formal model. Beyond borrowing from RCI, 
theory development will take an important cue from prior works (see chapter 2): centre 
stage is given to incumbents opting for patronage or professionalization as a function 
of voter preferences for private and public goods on the one hand, and supply side 
variables on the other.  
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The overall theoretical argument I will develop with these building 
blocks is straightforward: institutions which shift patronage control away from 
incumbents in the executive enhance their incentives to professionalize. Three causal 
mechanisms are at play. When institutions deprive incumbents of patronage control, 
they face incentives to (1) professionalize to cut off patronage access of electoral 
challengers; (2) shift electoral competition towards public goods provision; and (3) elicit 
cooperation from tenured appointees of preceding incumbents.  
The theory thus suggests that differences across patronage bureaucracies 
and, in particular, across institutions allocating patronage control may shape reform 
incentives. As I will demonstrate, institutions thereby exert an independent causal 
effect: the factors originating them differ from those originating professionalization. 
Moreover, the scope conditions and assumptions underlying the link between 
institutions and reform are plausible in a range of contexts. The institutional origins of 
professional bureaucracies may thus lie in patronage states. 
The patronage control theory thus adds an important and previously 
overlooked explanatory variable – institutions allocating patronage control – to studies 
of patronage reform. Not less important, it helps resolve scholarly dissent regarding the 
causal effect of key variables such as electoral competition and the rise to power of 
political outsiders (see chapter 2). To develop this theory, I proceed in two steps. I, 
first, discuss the theory’s assumptions, main hypothesis and causal mechanisms; 
subsequently, I detail the theory’s observable process implications and scope conditions, 
and justify the underlying assumptions.  
 
Institutions Allocating Patronage Control and the Reform Incentives of an Electoral 
Utility-Maximizing Incumbent 
Theory development is undertaken from the view point of an electoral 
utility maximizing incumbent President or Prime Minister (henceforth: incumbent). As 
a prerequisite to achieve other long-run objectives in office, the incumbent is assumed 
to seek re-election for himself and/or his party in a competitive democracy. To mobilize 
electoral support and fend off intra-party or inter-party challengers, an incumbent may 
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utilize the state to provide public and private goods to voters. Public goods are 
understood as collective and non-excludable benefits. In contrast, private goods are 
excludable benefits restricted and targeted to specific constituents. The receipt of 
private goods may be conditioned on the provision of electoral support to the incumbent 
(see, among others, Reid & Kurth, 1988; Remmer, 2007; Shefter, 1993 for similar 
distinctions). As electoral utility-maximizers, incumbents will supply the mix of private 
and public goods which maximizes electoral support in light of voter demands and 
budget constraints. 
Professional and non-professional (patronage) bureaucracies are 
assumed to differ in the amount of private and public goods they provide. Statistical 
evidence suggests that professional bureaucracies count on more bureaucratic capacity 
(Dahlstroem et al., 2011; Rauch & Evans, 2000). Consequently, public service delivery 
is strengthened, and the amount of public goods states provide to voters is enhanced. 
This link between professionalization and enhanced public goods provision is 
corroborated empirically by, among others, Rauch (1995) and Nistotskaya (2009). In 
contrast, non-professional bureaucracies, in which personnel decisions are based on 
patronage guided by political or personal considerations, enhance the private goods 
incumbents may supply to voters.14  
In patronage bureaucracies, patronage – jobs, promotions and pay rises 
– is frequently the major private good to court electoral support.15 In Latin America, 
for instance, personnel spending claims 41 percent of central government tax revenues 
(IDB, 2014). Moreover, public sector wage premiums exist for all but the most qualified 
personnel (Mizala, Romaguera, & Gallegos, 2011). Non-wage benefits – free housing, 
moonlighting and opportunities for corruption, for instance – further augment these 
premiums (Emrich-Bakenova, 2009; Gorodnichenko & Sabirianova Peter, 2007; 
Grzymala-Busse, 2007). By contrast, in professional bureaucracies, incumbents may 
                                        
14 As a caveat, where private goods are impartial rather than clientelist transfers conditioned upon 
reciprocal electoral support, professional bureaucracies may increase their provision.  
15 As noted in chapter 2, patronage appointees may, at least in a subset of positions, also control and 
facilitate the private goods-oriented provision of state services. 
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mobilize electoral support through public goods: better public services provided by more 
qualified and performance-oriented bureaucrats. 
I shall show that, whether incumbents face incentives to rely on private 
or public goods for electoral mobilization is shaped by whether institutions empower 
them to control patronage. If prior scholarly works were taken at face value, this 
argument should have little relevance. In Latin America, for instance, “the tendency to 
… assume … as a given … that the president should be the custodian of administrative 
authority … is deeply rooted.” (Ferraro, 2008, p. 121) Yet, the resulting belief that 
presidents “monopolize” patronage – as Geddes (1996, p. 13) and many others suggest 
– is empirically not well-founded. In patronage bureaucracies in Latin America and 
elsewhere, incumbents face two types of institutions which allocate patronage benefits 
to other institutional actors.16  
First, institutions may shift control over (parts of) patronage to other 
government branches – and, as a result, to electoral challengers when these control non-
executive branches; and second, institutions may shift (part of) the private goods 
benefits of a patronage bureaucracy towards public employees – without obligating 
them to provide reciprocal political support to the incumbent. As I demonstrate below, 
both of these institutions deprive incumbents of patronage; and neither professionalizes 
the bureaucracy. Incumbent public goods provision thus remains unaltered. The 
dissertation’s main hypothesis builds on these insights: 
Institutions depriving incumbents of patronage control reduce the 
electoral utility of patronage bureaucracies to them and enhance their 
incentives to professionalize. 
Prior to linking them with reform incentives, each of the institutions depriving 
incumbents of patronage control shall be outlined (table 3.1). Recall to this end that I 
defined patronage as discretionary power over recruitment, promotion, pay and 
dismissal. 
                                        
16 Note that, in this dissertation, the inability of incumbents to control patronage does not refer, as in R. 
Johnson & Libecap (1994), to principal-agent problems in the control of appointees but rather to an 
inability to take charge of discretionary personnel decisions. 
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With this in mind, institutions may shift control over recruitment, 
promotion and pay as well as the setting of the patronage budget at-large to the 
legislature.17 Most intuitively, legislatures may be empowered to define the personnel 
budget – and thus the patronage budget. Legislators count on such faculties in budget 
approval in roughly two-thirds of 97 countries surveyed (International Budget 
Partnership, 2013).18 Moreover, legislatures may be empowered to control the creation 
of individual positions. In Latin America, for instance, 2 of 15 legislatures surveyed 
count on these faculties (Manning & Lafuente, 2010).19 When holding powers over 
patronage budgets or the creation of positions, legislatures may – when controlled by 
challengers – withhold patronage budgets or the creation of positions unless incumbents 
grant them in return powers to fill some of the new vacancies. Alternatively, challengers 
may shift patronage budgets and new positions to non-executive branches under their 
own control. Additionally, institutions may assign legislatures direct control over 
appointments to, for instance, the diplomatic corps and public enterprises.  
Next to recruitment, institutions may shift control over the 
determination of remuneration and promotions to the legislature. In five of fifteen 
surveyed Latin American countries, for instance, legislatures may approve pay increases 
beyond executive proposals; in two of the countries, legislatures are empowered to assign 
individual pay as well as promote personnel de facto through salary re-categorizations 
(Manning & Lafuente, 2010). 
Beyond the legislature, institutions may shift patronage control to other 
government branches. To illustrate, according to the Political Constraints Index, over 
30 percent of 183 countries counted on independent judiciaries with, concomitantly, 
proper authority over public personnel decisions; and roughly 8 percent of countries 
                                        
17 Note that this assumes that institutions depriving incumbents of patronage control are binding: 
incumbents may not informally circumvent or ignore them through, for instance, off-budget recruitment 
or the creation of new institutions under incumbent control (see, for instance, Grzymala-Busse, 2007). I 
demonstrate the plausibility of this assumption under the theory’s scope conditions further below. 
18 Based on counting a dummy variable which assumes the value of one where all expenditures in the 
budget are presented by economic classification and the value of zero where none or only some expenditures 
are presented by economic classification.  
19 Large-n data on legislative faculties to create individual positions and assign individual pay is regrettably 
unavailable. 
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counted on independent sub-federal units imposing substantive constraints on national 
spending (Henisz, 2010). In some of these countries, the lion share of patronage budgets 
is transferred to sub-national governments (Calvo & Murillo, 2004).  
   
Table 3.1 Institutions Depriving Incumbents of Patronage Control20 
 Institutions Shifting 
Patronage Control to Other 
Government Branches 
Institutions Shifting 
Private Goods Benefits 
to Public Employees 
Determination 
of patronage 
budget 
 Legal regulations allocate control 
over determination of personnel 
budget and/or creation of 
positions to legislature 
 Legal regulations grant centralized 
and de-centralized government 
branches independent authority 
over patronage budgets  
 
Recruitment  Legal regulations allocate control 
over recruitment in executive 
and/or non-executive institutions 
to legislature or other non-
executive institutions  
 
Remuneration  Legal regulations allocate control 
over determination of individual 
or collective pay to legislature  
 Legal regulations such as 
pay rises indexed to inflation  
 Collective pay rises through 
union21 bargaining 
Promotion  Legal regulations allocate control 
over promotions to legislature 
 Legal regulations such as 
automatic promotions based 
on seniority 
Dismissal   Legal regulations protecting 
tenure of employees, 
including those appointed by 
prior incumbents 
 De facto protections through 
union action against 
dismissals  
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
                                        
20 For analytic simplicity, these institutions are stylized. Several lesser dimensions of patronage control – 
such as discretion over pensions, sanctions or horizontal transfers – are excluded. While this exclusion 
leaves the overall theoretical argument unaffected, empirical analyses which exclude these dimensions may 
be incomplete. In particular cases, these dimensions can be important (see, for instance, Smith, 1979; Wade, 
1985). The case comparison in chapters 4 to 6 will thus take them into account.  
21 Note that some professional groups – such as doctors and policemen – may be organized in associations 
other than unions. For terminological simplicity, I refer to any collective organization of public employees 
as ‘union’. 
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Beyond allocating patronage control to government branches beyond the 
executive, institutions may shift part of the benefits of patronage bureaucracies to 
public employees. First, institutions may protect the tenure of employees. With their 
tenure protected, employees can claim the patronage bureaucracies’ wage premiums 
until retirement without reciprocal bureaucratic or electoral service provision.22 While 
a greater share of the private goods benefits of patronage bureaucracies thus accrue to 
public employees, patronage budgets of incumbents are reduced. They are unable to 
dismiss patronage appointees of preceding incumbents and replace them with appointees 
of their own.  
Tenure protections are not uncommon in patronage bureaucracies. They 
may arise from de jure reform: the introduction of tenure laws, their judicial 
enforcement and legislative opposition to undo them; and de facto reforms: the 
emergence of unions with sufficient collective action capacity to forestall dismissals. 
Tenure introductions thereby often represent “frustrated attempts … to develop a classic 
Weberian bureaucracy: public servants enter via more political than meritocratic 
criteria, but … have stability.” (Echebarría, 2006, p. 8) According to expert survey data, 
public employees enjoy such job stability in 63 percent of the 54 countries in which 
political criteria trump merit criteria in personnel selection (Dahlström, Lapuente, & 
Teorell, 2011).23,24 
Lastly, public employees may benefit from formal (de jure) and informal 
(de facto) institutions constraining incumbent power over pay and promotions. Legal 
                                        
22 Note that I conceptualize tenure protections as rigid job stability except for cases of grave misconduct. 
The weak rule-of-law contexts characteristic of patronage bureaucracies preclude flexible tenure protections 
which condition job stability on, for instance, satisfactory performance and conduct; incumbents may utilize 
this flexibility to dismiss personnel discretionarily. As a result, unions and, at times, courts protect rigid 
job stability. They resist dismissals except where demonstrated grave misconduct de-legitimizes resistance. 
23 Based on counting a dummy variable which assumes the value of one (and zero otherwise) where average 
country expert responses exceed the mean of the scale for the survey question “Once one is recruited as a 
public sector employee, one stays a public sector employee for the rest of one’s career?” 
24 Next to benefiting employees, tenure may enhance electoral support for predecessors of incumbents – 
and, thus, potentially electoral challengers. As Grindle (2012, p. 23) notes, “the initial [recruitment] 
contract implies obligations to the personal and the political, even if tenure is regulated through collective 
agreements or regulatory mechanisms.” As a result, “a waning party … will still be able to call upon loyalists 
in the bureaucracy for a number of years.” (Geddes, 1996, p. 105); and incumbents inheriting tenure-
protected employees “feed the supporters and organization of their political competitors.” (Meyer-Sahling, 
2006c, p. 278) 
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regulations may, for instance, index salaries and promotions to seniority – and be 
binding where legislatures and courts sustain and enforce them (see also Meyer-Sahling, 
2006b). Collective action by unions may bring about further salary increases. In 
conjunction, these institutions enhance wage premiums of public employees and 
decrease incumbent patronage budgets – without a reciprocal increase in employee 
support to the incumbent.25 As with the previous institutions, such constraints vary 
across patronage bureaucracies. To illustrate, roughly 30 percent of countries in which 
political criteria trump merit criteria in the selection of personnel have signed the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 151 which provides public 
employees with legal guarantees to organize and bargain collectively (Dahlström et al., 
2011; ILO, 2013).26   
In sum, patronage bureaucracies vary widely in the institutional 
allocation of patronage control. The extent to which incumbents, challengers and public 
employees benefit from patronage bureaucracies thus varies no less. Where institutions 
deprive incumbents and their allies of patronage control, incumbents count on less 
patronage to mobilize electoral support; challengers count on more patronage; and/or 
public employees derive greater benefits without reciprocal support.  
For incumbents, the loss of electoral utility from institutions depriving 
them of patronage control is unambiguous. Such institutions deprive them of patronage, 
yet do not professionalize the bureaucracy – and thus do not increase the amount of 
public goods incumbents can provide to court electoral support. The criteria for 
appointing personnel are no more likely to prioritize professional qualifications when 
challengers control appointments. Public employees are thus no more qualified. At the 
same time, institutions benefiting public employees – such as tenure protections and 
more competitive salaries – are not statistically associated with enhanced public goods 
provision in cross-country studies (see, among others, Dahlstroem et al., 2011).  
                                        
25 Two assumptions underlie this claim. First, collective salary increases are not granted by the incumbent 
in exchange for electoral support; and second, incumbents may not undermine generalized salary increases 
by discretionarily adjusting other salary components – such as base pay or salary complements. 
26 This is, of course, but a proxy for collective bargaining. The ILO Convention may not always be enforced; 
non-signature countries may still count on domestic legislation authorizing collective bargaining; and 
collective bargaining may take place de facto without supporting legal frameworks. 
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Institutions which deprive incumbents of patronage control thus also 
deprive them of part of their electoral mobilization capacity. As I shall argue next, this 
enhances the incentive compatibility of professionalization: professionalization enables 
incumbents to reclaim part of the lost electoral mobilization capacity.  
 
Causal Mechanisms: From Institutions Allocating Patronage Control to 
Bureaucratic Professionalization  
Three causal mechanisms are at play (table 3.2). Institutions depriving 
incumbents of patronage control incentivize them to professionalize patronage 
bureaucracies to: first, deprive challengers of patronage control; second, elicit public 
goods provision from tenured employees and sever their loyalties to preceding 
incumbents; and, third, compete electorally based on public goods where challengers 
disproportionally control patronage – and the incumbent may thus not secure electoral 
victory based on patronage alone.  
 
Table 3.2 Causal Mechanisms  
 Institutions Causal Mechanisms 
I Institution shifting patronage 
control to other government 
branches 
 Professionalization to deprive challengers of 
private goods provision and enhance public 
goods provision associated with incumbent 
II Institution shifting private 
goods benefits to public 
employees 
 Professionalization to elicit public goods 
provision from tenured employees and deprive 
preceding incumbents of electoral support 
from their tenured appointees 
III Institutions (I and/or II) 
depriving incumbent of 
patronage control  
 Professionalization to compete electorally 
based on public goods where challengers 
disproportionally control patronage 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Most axiomatically, where institutions shift patronage control to 
challengers, incumbents face incentives to professionalize the personnel decisions 
controlled by challengers. Reform would cut off challengers’ patronage access, while 
enhancing the state’s public goods provision. With a national constituency, incumbents 
may disproportionately claim credit for enhanced public goods provision with voters 
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(see, among many, Mayhew, 1974; Moe & Wilson, 1994). Reform is thus unambiguously 
electoral utility-maximizing for incumbents. 
 Nonetheless, the scope condition of this mechanism may appear to be 
relatively restrictive: professionalization proceeds when incumbents are unable to 
appropriate control of patronage, yet able to reform. This scope condition is met in 
multiple contexts, however. To illustrate, incumbents are, at times, unable to claim 
legislative patronage powers, but able to impose generalized conditions of employment 
– including meritocratic recruitment and promotion. They may also be unable to reclaim 
local patronage powers, but able to mandate nationwide examinations (see chapters 5 
and 8). 
Where institutions shift the benefits of patronage bureaucracies to public 
employees, a second causal mechanism may be activated: professionalization to elicit 
public goods provision from tenured employees and to deprive preceding incumbents of 
electoral support from their tenured appointees. With tenure, the amount of patronage 
relative to public goods which incumbents could provide through patronage and 
professional bureaucracies respectively declines. This is as, under tenure, patronage is 
constrained to new recruits. The ‘bureaucratic stock’ is off limits: incumbents may no 
longer dismiss and replace appointees of predecessors.27 Yet, with professionalization, 
public goods provision may be courted from new recruits and a fraction of the 
bureaucratic stock. Even when patronage is the rule of the game, a fraction of tenured 
employees will count on professional qualifications. Assuming this fraction is motivated 
by career concerns, meritocratic contests may elicit performance and public goods 
provision from it.28 As Meyer-Sahling (2004, p. 76) puts it, “an incoming government 
can benefit from taking advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise if it chooses to 
work with inherited bureaucrats … it will only be able to tap their expertise if it can 
credibly commit itself not to meddle with bureaucratic careers, that is, not to exercise 
                                        
27 More accurately, patronage powers extend beyond new recruits also to pay rises and promotions. This 
simplification does not detract from the argument, however. 
28 Tenured employees may face a further incentive to compete in examinations: a perception of enhanced 
neutrality. Career advancement under distinct administrations increases “their acceptability to differing 
political factions and thus their prospects for promotion over the longer haul.” (Horn, 1995, p. 98) 
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political discretion over personnel policy.”29 This does not imply that professionalization 
is invariably utility-maximizing. It entails a patronage loss to incumbents. Yet, this loss 
is smaller than without tenure – while, as noted, a relatively larger amount of public 
goods may be provided through professionalization. Professionalization thus becomes 
more incentive-compatible.   
This incentive compatibility is further enhanced where 
professionalization reduces incentives of tenured appointees to electorally support the 
prior incumbent who had appointed them; professionalization provides tenured 
appointees with an alternative means to secure career advancement. Professionalization 
may thus both sever patron-client linkages of challengers and enhance incumbent public 
goods provision. To illustrate, Geddes (1996, p. 145) finds that “performance as the 
basis for promotion … gives bureaucrats incentives to work hard and may even persuade 
those with opposing party loyalties (hired by previous administrations) to direct their 
efforts toward goals set by the current president.” 
The third causal mechanism builds on and complements the first two. 
Where institutions deprive incumbents to such an extent of patronage control that 
challengers may outspend them on patronage in electoral campaigns, incumbents are, 
ceteris paribus, unable to compete electorally solely based on patronage. As a 
consequence, they face greater incentives to professionalize to mobilize electoral support 
based on public goods provision.30 Challengers controlling most patronage may outspend 
incumbents on private goods in a “bidding war dynamic” (Stokes, 2005, p. 324) – yet 
not on public goods. As aforementioned, voters identify broad public goods 
disproportionately with incumbents, granting incumbents “a virtual monopoly on this 
weapon in the political game,” not least where such public goods are provided through 
new Presidential programs (Geddes, 1996, p. 141). As with the second causal 
mechanism, however, this does not imply that professionalization is invariably utility-
                                        
29 As a result, the professionalization of promotions to elicit performance from appointees of predecessors 
is unlikely to be credible unless recruitment is similarly professionalized. Only absent new patronage recruits 
will appointees of predecessors perceive a level playing field for merit-based promotions.     
30 In the first two causal mechanisms, by contrast, institutions may add to incumbent reform incentives 
even when incumbents still control most patronage.  
 69 
maximizing. Seeking to compete electorally based on public goods presupposes a 
marginal electoral utility of the latter. Where voters do not value public goods receipts, 
the mechanism will not be activated.31 
Also note that this mechanism is reminiscent of – but differs from – 
Shefter’s (1977, p. 415-417) prominent account of the effect of democratization on 
professionalization: “Leaders … [who do] not enjoy access to governmental … sources of 
patronage … will find it necessary to rely upon other appeals to mobilize their 
supporters;” in contrast, “elites … in a position to use the resources of the state to 
acquire a mass base … will have every incentive to make use of that advantage.” 
Reminiscence notwithstanding, Shefter’s argument is fundamentally distinct. Shefter 
argues that leaders lack patronage access as they either do not occupy office or 
bureaucracies are professionalized. By contrast, I show that incumbents may occupy 
office in patronage states and still be deprived of most patronage control. Moreover, 
Shefter explains why professionalization is maintained with democratization. By 
contrast, I explain why professionalization is introduced in democratic regimes. As most 
countries in the world did not count on professional bureaucracies in their democratic 
transitions, the latter explanandum is arguably the more relevant one. 
   
Observable Process Implications: Locus and Sponsors of Professionalization 
To enhance the theory’s robustness (see Collier, 2011; King, Keohane, 
& Verba, 1994), observable process implications shall be made explicit about where 
professionalization should occur, and who should support it.  
For the reform locus, we may expect incumbents to seek 
professionalization where electoral utility gains due to increases in incumbent public 
goods provision and decreases in challenger patronage powers outweigh electoral utility 
                                        
31 Note that the causal mechanism does not imply that incumbents who monopolize patronage control 
would not find patronage to be the vote-maximizing strategy. What it presupposes instead is that, when 
unified challengers disproportionately control patronage, the electoral utility gains incumbents reap from 
enhanced public goods provision thanks to professionalization can be sufficiently large to offset electoral 
utility reductions from patronage losses.  
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losses due to decreases in incumbent patronage powers.32 With this in mind, predictions 
for each of the causal mechanisms can be derived. 
Most axiomatically, the first causal mechanism suggests that 
professionalization will narrow in on positions controlled by challengers. For the second 
mechanism, predictions are more nuanced. Professionalization will focus on institutions 
with the greatest share of: tenured appointees relative to new recruits to minimize 
incumbent patronage losses;33  qualified tenured appointees to maximize incumbent 
public goods gains; and tenured appointees likely to sever loyalties to prior incumbents 
to maximize challenger losses. Within these institutions, tenure protections will 
incentivize professionalization principally for mid-level officials. These officials are most 
likely to seek career advancement through examinations; count on competencies to 
provide public goods; and occupy technical positions with limited rent access. In 
contrast, few public goods gains may be expected from examinations for assistants, 
cleaners and other low-level staff (Gault & Amparan, 2003). Similarly, 
professionalization of top-level staff runs into disincentives: trust concerns vis-à-vis top-
level appointees of preceding incumbents in conjunction with greater private goods 
losses due to access to larger rents (Ferraro, 2006; Scherlis, 2010).  
Analogous predictions for the third mechanism can be made. An 
incumbent unable to compete electorally based on patronage faces incentives to focus 
professionalization on mid-level positions in institutions offering the electorally most 
useful public goods gains for the smallest patronage losses – be these economically 
                                        
32 As a flipside, incumbent reform incentives will also be shaped by where in the bureaucratic hierarchy 
incumbents are institutionally deprived of patronage control. Ceteris paribus, higher-level positions will 
implicate greater patronage losses and greater public goods gains with professionalization. An analogous 
argument to the one in the text may thus be posited. The first causal mechanism will be activated at any 
level of the hierarchy; the second principally when institutions deprive incumbents of patronage control 
over mid-level officials; and the third when incumbents retain the ability to professionalize (some) mid- 
and high-level positions with electorally-relevant public goods gains - even though institutions deprive them 
of most patronage control.  
33 As a caveat, note where tenure protects almost all employees, professionalization could be disincentivized. 
The few remaining patronage powers may be required to secure control of a bureaucracy permeated by 
appointees of predecessors (see Meyer-Sahling, 2008). The theorized causal mechanism thus does not apply 
to contexts where patronage is a prerequisite for bureaucratic control rather than a means for electoral 
mobilization. 
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crucial public finance institutions (Geddes, 1996) or institutions delivering public 
services highly valued by voters, for instance (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994).34  
One further observable reform process implication may be derived. As 
Benjamin Buder, one of the great U.S. spoilsmen, put it: “civil service reform is always 
popular with the ‘outs’ and never with the ‘ins’.” (quoted in Hoogenboom, 1961, p. ix) 
As a consequence, “members from the president’s party [are] the demanders of 
patronage while those from the opposition [are] more interested in restricting it.” (R. 
Johnson & Libecap, 1994, p. 50) Where institutions deprive incumbents of most 
patronage control, however, we should expect this prediction to be turned upside down: 
incumbents will seek professionalization while challengers in the opposition will resist 
it.  
 
Scope Condition: Political Fragmentation 
Two scope conditions are implicit in the theoretical framework: 
patronage is central to electoral mobilization and the electoral context is competitive. 
One further scope condition needs to be made explicit: political fragmentation.35 
Institutions allocating patronage control to other government branches only deprive 
incumbents of patronage control where challengers rather than allies of the incumbent 
are in control of these branches (inter-institutional political fragmentation). In the case 
of the legislature, for instance, this scope condition is frequently met. To illustrate, in 
Latin America, 46 percent of governments from the late 1970s to 2000 held a legislative 
minority position (Neto, 2006). Institutions shifting the benefits of patronage 
bureaucracies to (tenured) employees in turn deprive incumbents of patronage in 
particular where challengers appointed (most) employees. Incumbent turnover is a 
prerequisite for this (inter-temporal political fragmentation). 
                                        
34 As the three causal mechanisms are complementary, incumbents may advance professionalization in all 
of the specified loci when institutions deprive them of patronage control. 
35 Note that the theory makes no attempt to endogenize the causal factors bringing about these scope 
conditions. Instead, change – for instance the election of a minority President – is exogenous. What the 
theory does account for are the institutional conditions under which such change is more likely to 
incentivize professionalization.  
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Theoretical Assumptions: Validity and Plausibility 
While the case comparison in chapters 4 to 6 will examine the validity 
of theoretical assumptions, the external validity of any theory hinges on the plausibility 
of its underlying assumptions for a wider range of cases. Thus, the theory’s key 
assumptions shall be made explicit and justified.  
The theory, first, places its analytic focus on executive incumbents 
choosing patronage or professionalization – to the detriment of other institutional 
actors. As such, the theory presumes that incumbents are able to professionalize when 
facing incentives to do so. The rationale is straightforward. While incumbents differ in 
their ability to professionalize personnel decisions controlled by challengers, incumbents 
are usually legally empowered to professionalize personnel decisions under their own 
control without authorization from other government branches. All Latin American 
countries, for instance, count on civil service legislation which permits meritocratic 
personnel selection (Grindle, 2010). As I detail in chapter 4, even where such legislation 
is inexistent, the absence of directives tends to provide incumbents with unilateral 
residual decision rights on how to select personnel (see also Moe & Wilson, 1994). 
Incumbents thus tend not to face institutional veto36 players when seeking to 
professionalize personnel decisions under their own control. As a result, incumbents 
share a (legal) ability to introduce professionalization, yet may differ in their ability to 
expand professionalization across all of the state when facing incentives to do so. 
This assumption is important not least as it yields a theory with a 
prediction juxtaposed to prior work. Kenny (2013, p. 5), in particular, attributes the 
prevalence of patronage to “decentralized patronage systems [in which] there are veto 
players at multiple points who can all stymie the professionalization of the 
bureaucracy.” Yet, while the institutional allocation of patronage control to the sub-
national level may limit the ability of incumbents to expand professionalization across 
the state, it does not thwart the professionalization of central governments under 
incumbent control. Moreover, Kenny (2013, p. 18) does, explicitly, not consider  reform 
                                        
36 Veto players are actors whose agreement is necessary, yet insufficient for institutional change (Tsebelis, 
2011). 
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incentives: “there is nothing in the theory that implies that centralized states will 
necessarily attempt reform.” As such, he overlooks that institutions depriving 
incumbents of patronage control may incentivize them to professionalize. 
A second important theoretical assumption is the re-election motive of 
incumbents and/or their parties.37 Personal goals of Presidents – such as ideological 
commitments to professional states – may, of course, shape professionalization 
incentives irrespectively (see Grzymala-Busse, 2008; Weyland, 2002). As elections tend 
to “weed … out” incumbents pursuing such goals, however, the electoral motive looms 
large among most incumbents (Geddes, 1996, p. 87).  
The re-election motive also presupposes that incumbents survive in 
office until the next election. In Presidential systems characterized by strong separations 
of power, incumbent tenure may be secured (largely) irrespective of legislative support 
(Hayo & Voigt, 2013). In parts of Latin America in particular, however, impeachment 
by the legislature may occur (Llanos & Marsteintredet, 2010; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). 
Similarly, prime ministers falling short of legislative majorities may face votes of no 
confidence. To safeguard political survival, incumbents may thus concede patronage for 
legislative governability (see chapter 2). At the extreme, “presidents whose governments 
hover on the edge of ouster will … exchange everything at their disposal.” (Geddes, 
1996, p. 194) This is the exception rather than the rule, though. In presidential systems, 
under strong separation of power, incumbents may not be impeached at all; under weak 
separation of power, proactive presidential powers as well as other selective punishments 
and inducements may secure legislative governability, with patronage only needed to 
“secure any necessary marginal votes.” (Gary Cox & Morgenstern, 2001, p. 171) Even 
in parliamentary systems, prime ministers may count on powers beyond patronage – 
such as control over the list place of a legislator in elections – to discipline party 
members.38 With that in mind, the theory accounts for reform incentives after patronage 
                                        
37 Note that I extend incumbent electoral concerns to the fate of their parties. In particular where immediate 
re-election is prohibited, parties provide incumbents with organizational bases for later Presidential bids 
(Geddes, 1996). Where re-election is prohibited indefinitely, parties offer Presidents the opportunity to 
continue their political careers as party leaders. 
38 Having said that, the lack of mutual independence in parliamentary systems implicates that a key 
theoretical scope condition (political fragmentation) and assumption (incumbent survival in office) are less 
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concessions to secure immediate political survival have been made – or, in other words, 
seeks to derive the electorally optimal usage of public employment given that political 
survival until the next election has been secured.  
Furthermore, I assume that institutions allocating patronage control are 
“sticky.” They are complied with and may not be altered by incumbents or challengers. 
In developing countries, this assumption may appear implausible. The causal standing 
of institutions is frequently epiphenomenal in the context of low enforcement and 
durability (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013; Weyland, 2002); and even in the industrialized 
world, institutional alterations to pad electoral advantages are frequent (B. Weingast 
& Marshall, 1988). Nonetheless, “any discussion about the efficacy of an institution is 
predicated on its existence.” (Grzymała-Busse, 2006, p. 3) More importantly, stickiness 
is a plausible assumption for institutions depriving incumbents of patronage control. 
Such institutions tend to be, first, “self-referencing.” (Miller, 2000, p. 539) In other 
words, the institutional actors benefiting from these institutions are also those in control 
of their enforcement and revision. Challengers in control of parliament, for instance, 
face incentives to retain and enforce regulations granting the legislature patronage 
powers39; and, in contexts of political fragmentation, incumbents tend to be unable to 
unilaterally alter institutions to reclaim patronage control. Moreover, reversing 
institutions shifting benefits to public employees is frequently impossible without the 
consent of public sector unions – who in turn are the main beneficiaries of these 
institutions (see also Rinne, 2001; chapter 5). 
Second, institutions allocating patronage control are frequently of higher 
legal ranking, requiring super-majorities to overturn them. Tenure protections are often 
constitutionally mandated (see, for instance, Rinne, 2001; Spiller & Tommasi, 2009); 
and institutions allocating patronage control to non-executive branches are frequently 
enshrined in constitutions or organic budget laws, which are similarly protected by 
                                        
likely to hold. The theory’s explanatory power thus extends principally – albeit not solely (see chapter 8) 
– to presidential systems. 
39 By contrast, enforcement of civil service legislation lacks this invariable incentive compatibility. Whether 
incumbents face incentives to apply civil service legislation depends on the electoral utility of (non-
)enforcement. 
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super majority requirements (Hallerberg, Scartascini, & Stein, 2009). Absent such 
supermajorities, neither incumbents nor challengers are able to alter these institutions 
in their favour.40 Some scholars then find that such institutions may persist “at least 
into the medium term of several decades.” (Kenny, 2013, p. 24) This is, of course, not 
to say that constitutional assemblies and other radical reforms may not alter them 
(Levitsky & Murillo, 2009); but rather to note that, in most cases, such alterations are 
the exception. Under the theoretical scope conditions, institutions allocating patronage 
control are likely to be stable and binding.  
Also note that the theory accounts for the causal effects of institutions 
allocating patronage control, yet not for their causal origins. Institutions allocating 
patronage control could, of course, merely reflect as intervening variables deeper causes 
of professionalization. For institutions to exert independent causal power, the causal 
factors which originated them would need to differ from those incentivizing 
professionalization. Incentives to professionalize would then constitute unintended 
consequences of institutional design choices of prior power holders.41 This is precisely 
what the theory assumes; and this assumption may be substantiated empirically.  
First, the cases studied in chapters 4 to 8 will each evidence reform 
incentives as unintended consequences of prior institutional choices. Second, the 
determinants of professionalization and tenure protections – a key institution shifting 
benefits to public employees – differ (see chapter 2). Third, the determinants of 
institutions shifting patronage control to other government branches do not generally 
appear to be deeper causes of professionalization. To sustain this assertion, one would 
ideally draw on theories explaining variation in institutions allocating patronage 
control. Yet, with the partial exception of Kenny (2013), no such theory exists. This 
                                        
40 Departing from RCI accounts, a third cause for the stickiness of institutions is their gradual ossification 
into social norms. A ‘logic of appropriateness’ surrounding, for instance, the sharing of patronage powers 
with other government branches may develop which enhances normative obstacles to displacement (J. 
March & Olsen, 1989). 
41 It may appear disingenuous to argue that professionalization results from both the rational choice of an 
incumbent and the unintended consequence of an institutional choice of a previous incumbent. Rather than 
to disingenuity, however, it points to a further and, arguably, plausible underlying assumption: incumbents 
lack either the foresight to grasp or discount the utility of the long-run unintended consequences of their 
institutional choices. 
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may not come surprising: the diverse origins of such institutions – ranging from 
decolonization to democratic transitions (see chapters 5 and 8) – complicate theorizing. 
One partial remedy is available, though: studies of the broader determinants of 
constitutional forms of government – presidential or parliamentarian, consensual or 
majoritarian and centralized or decentralized. A first set of studies finds socio-economic 
factors such as income inequality and ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization 
to be the key determinants (Aghion, Alesina, & Trebbi, 2004; Kenny, 2013; Ticchi & 
Vindigni, 2010); in a second set of studies, political system and political leadership 
variables instead take centre stage (Hayo & Voigt, 2013). This dissent suggests that 
causal determinants differ across cases. Moreover, many determinants (such as 
incumbent leadership) are unlikely to incentivize professionalization under subsequent 
incumbents. 
The theory also rests on several ceteris paribus assumptions about 
incumbent and challenger abilities to mobilize electoral support. It assumes, first, that 
patronage control correlates with control over other private goods. Where other private 
goods are significant – for instance due to privatization rents (Grzymala-Busse, 2007) 
– and may be extracted irrespective of patronage control, incumbents may compete 
electorally based on private goods even when deprived of patronage control. Similarly, 
non-state resources – such as campaign donations – are assumed to not privilege 
incumbents to such an extent that they regain their ability to compete through private 
goods even when deprived of patronage control. Second, the theory assumes an 
instrumental vote based on private and public goods receipts. Incumbents may, of 
course, rely on “expressive” appeals: the formation of bonds of social identity through 
charisma, collective histories and shared traits (Kitschelt, 2011, p. 3). Ideological 
differentiation on a left-right spectrum may reinforce partisan bonds. Constituencies of 
distinct parties thus count on differential private and public good preferences (Calvo & 
Murillo, 2004). Professionalization could then result from the election of parties whose 
constituencies value private goods less (Gordin, 2002).  
In the empirical analysis, I thus incorporate prior partisan linkages and 
expressive appeals as rival explanations (see chapter 6). At the same time, “most studies 
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of clientelism assume an instrumental vote” and so does the patronage control theory 
(Calvo & Murillo, 2004, p. 745). The left-right divide provides limited reform incentives: 
left and right policies may be pursued through public and private goods (Shefter, 1977). 
Moreover, instrumental appeals trump where citizens have immediate socio-economic 
needs – as characteristic of patronage states. Countries in which political criteria trump 
merit in public employment count on average monthly incomes of US-$44542 (Dahlström 
et al., 2011; World Bank, 2013b). As a result, “politician’s in many of the world’s new 
polyarchies … mobilize votes through the selective distribution of particularistic goods 
… [while offering] voters more or less the same vague promises of less corruption, better 
social services, a stronger economy, and so on.” (M. Johnson, 2009, p. 43) 
Finally, I assume that the time lag between professionalization and 
public goods provision is negligible. The rationale is simple. Meritocratic personnel 
selection requires limited state capacity compared to technically more complex reforms 
such as public financial management modernization. China instituted such procedures 
during the Han Dynasty as early as the 2nd century BC, for instance (Fukuyama, 2011); 
and today, countries willing to professionalize count on readily available international 
assistance to overcome capacity limitations. Moreover, as I detail in chapter 5, 
meritocratic personnel selection can augment public goods provision relatively quickly. 
The patronage control theory – as any parsimonious explanation – thus 
hinges on a range of assumptions. As I showed, however, these assumptions are likely 
to hold in a wide range of cases. The conclusion is clear. Contrary to a prevalent 
scholarly assumption, not all patronage bureaucracies are the same: they differ in the 
institutional allocation of patronage control. These institutional differences in turn 
affect incumbent incentives to reform patronage bureaucracies. They do so by exerting 
an independent causal effect: the factors originating them differ from those originating 
professionalization. Reform is thus an unintended consequence of prior institutional 
choices. In other words, the institutional origins of professional bureaucracies can lie in 
                                        
42 Based on average per capita incomes of countries for which the value of survey responses to: “When 
recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job?” 
exceeds the value of survey responses to “When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of 
the applicants decide who gets the job.” 
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patronage states. We may expect them to do so in a range of cases: the scope conditions 
and assumptions underlying the three causal mechanisms which link institutions to 
reform are plausible in a number of contexts. Prior studies thus suffer from omitted 
variable bias: they fail to take these institutions and their interactions with other 
explanatory factors into account. 
With the theory and its contributions thus clarified, an outline of the 
method to test it is due.  
 
Methodological Approach 
The theory will be tested through a comparative case study: the “use of a combination 
of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study.“ (George & 
Bennett, 2005, p. 18) Causality in the within-case analyses will be inferred through 
pattern-matching (see Gerring, 2004). In the within-case analyses, the validity of 
theoretical assumptions and rival explanations shall also be examined. Chapter 8 will 
complement the comparative case study with a tentative statistical test to gauge the 
generalizability of the theory. Data limitations thwart more than a plausibility probe, 
however. These data limitation could be remedied through in-depth field research for a 
small-n study, yet not for a large-n sample. The primary explanatory burden for the 
theory thus rests on the case comparison; the remainder of this chapter will detail the 
case selection and data collection procedure. 
  
Most Similar Case Selection: Paraguay and the Dominican Republic 
Following Lijphart (1975, p. 164), “cases are selected in such a way as 
to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the variance of 
the control variables.” In this ‘most similar system’ research design, cases are most 
different in institutions allocating patronage control, yet most similar in rival causes of 
professionalization. To this end, the case universe is circumscribed to, first, democracies; 
second, presidential systems; third, countries in which patronage is the rule of the game; 
and fourth, Latin America.  
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As the theory accounts for professionalization as an electoral utility-
maximizing choice, its external validity is limited to polyarchies (Dahl, 1973). 
Presidential systems are more likely to meet an important theoretical scope condition: 
incumbents and their allies are not in control of institutions controlling patronage 
powers.43 Limiting the universe to states in which patronage is the rule of the game 
adds to comparability: a critical mass of professional civil servants seeking to expand 
reform is absent.  
Lastly, a circumscription of cases to Latin America offers three 
important advantages. First, professionalization of Latin America’s “paper leviathans” 
is particularly relevant for the region’s development (Centeno & Ferraro, 2013, p. 399). 
As Grindle (2012, p. 141) puts it,  
“At the outset of the twenty-first I century, nowhere in the world, 
except perhaps in mid-nineteenth century U.S. experience, was 
patronage more fully embedded in political reality than in Latin 
America; nowhere had it proved itself more durable and flexible; and 
nowhere had it been more fully decried as a hindrance to development, 
competence, and probity.” 
Second, it implies a focus on a region which had undergone a flurry of 
reform attempts in the early 21st century which provide “a contemporary palette of 
opportunities to consider why […] changes in the public service happen.” (Grindle, 2012, 
p. 7) According to an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) diagnostic, the majority 
of countries progressed towards professionalization – albeit incrementally and from a 
low base – in the last decade (IDB, 2014).  
And third, a circumscription to Latin America implies that several 
controls are held relatively constant. Countries tend to share, to name a few, similar 
administrative cultures and legacies of patrimonialism and hyper-legalism from Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial institutions (Hopkins, 2010); a similar sequence of 
democratization preceding bureaucratization; similar electoral institutions, in particular 
proportional representation (Geddes, 1996); a lack of inter-state wars (Centeno, 2003); 
                                        
43 This is not to say that the external validity of the theory may not extend beyond presidential systems. 
In fact, I as I evidence in chapter 8, the theory can have explanatory power in parliamentary systems.   
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and a similar policy blueprint: the 2003 Carta Iberoamericana de la Función Pública 
(Latin American Civil Service Charter). 
These criteria yield a universe of ten cases. Of the eighteen independent 
Latin American Presidential democracies, ten feature patronage as the rule of the game 
according to an IDB (2006) diagnostic (figure 3.1).44  
 
Figure 3.1 Civil Service Professionalization (2003-4)                       
relative to Latin American Average45 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration; data from IDB (2006) 
 
In these countries, the diagnostic finds discretion in recruitment and 
promotion to be the norm. In contrast, meritocratic recruitment and promotion is either 
the rule of the game or coexisting with patronage in the remainder of countries 
(Echebarria & Cortazar, 2007). To foster comparability, cases are further circumscribed 
to electorally competitive countries at similar levels of human development. To ensure 
practical feasibility, countries which did not permit meaningful field research are, 
furthermore, ruled out. As detailed in Annex A.1, Paraguay under President Lugo and 
                                        
44 The IDB diagnostic was relied upon as it not only is the most comprehensive regional civil service 
assessment but also considers - contrary to other indices - both formal norms and actual practices.  
45 Country scores are compared to the Latin American average as this average coincides with the 
differentiation between patronage states and states in which patronage is no longer the sole rule of the 
game. 
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the Dominican Republic (DR) under President Fernandez were selected following these 
criteria.   
Paraguay and the DR feature comparable levels of human development, 
electoral competition and patronage in the bureaucracy, next to similar administrative 
legacies, electoral institutions and reform blueprints (Annex A.2). As I detail in part 2, 
Lugo and Fernandez also both came to power in countries in which patronage is central 
to electoral mobilization despite not controlling significant patronage powers – that is 
due to factors exogenous to the theory; enjoyed comparable reform support from donors; 
and held, initially, legislative minority positions, with their parties controlling 1 of 45 
(Lugo) and 1 of 30 (Fernandez) Senate seats.46 Institutions allocating patronage control 
to parliament would thus deprive them of patronage control.  
At the same time, Paraguay and the DR are most dissimilar in regards 
to institutions allocating patronage control. The DR features a “hyper-presidentialist” 
system in which Presidents monopolize patronage control (Marsteintredet, 2010b, p. 
85). By contrast, Paraguay is a “quasi-parliamentarian” system in which institutions 
shift important patronage benefits to the legislature and public employees (UNDP, 
2009, p. 39).47 Identifying the causal role of institutions allocating patronage control is 
thus facilitated. 
The two cases also point to a low risk of over-determination of  
dependent variable variation (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). Rival explanations would, 
contrary to the patronage control theory, predict professionalization in the DR. To cite 
two examples: the DR’s per capita income exceeds Paraguay’s by more than a factor of 
two; and the DR is – with its much longer democratic trajectory – classified as ‘free’ in 
the combined Freedom House score. By contrast, Paraguay only ranks as ‘partly free’ 
                                        
46 As I detail in chapter 5, 2004-2012 coincided with Fernandez’ second and third Presidential terms. In 
2004, as in his first election in 1996, Fernandez was elected due to factors exogenous to the patronage 
control theory and with a legislative minority position. Yet, for the purpose of theory testing – which 
assumes electoral utility maximization – the 2004-2012 Presidencies are more insightful. Until 2000, 
Fernandez’ Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) operated as a cadre party with restricted 
membership (Hartlyn, 1998). As subsequent membership growth attests to, the party thus de facto deprived 
itself of both membership and electoral support ahead of 2000. 
47 Note that “quasi-parliamentarian” refers here to legislative authority over (patronage) powers usually 
held by the executive – and, as such, to more executive-legislative fragmentation of patronage control.  
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(Annex A.2). Societal public goods demands in the DR are thus, ceteris paribus, more 
pronounced. With rival factors tilting incentives against theoretical predictions, the case 
comparison serves as a particularly robust test. Against this backdrop, data collection 
for the cases is discussed next. 
 
Data Collection and Triangulation 
Theory testing demands data on professionalization, institutions 
allocating patronage control, rival causes and reform processes. Prior scholarly works 
are of limited use. Neither Paraguay nor the DR count on significant academic literature 
on patronage and its reform. This reflects a larger scholarly bias. Scholars have studied 
Latin America’s more professional bureaucracies, yet – with few exceptions – neglected 
its less developed ones (see, for instance, Bresser Pereira, 1999; Dussauge Laguna, 2011; 
Ferraro, 2008; Gaetani & Heredia, 2002; Gault & Amparan, 2003; Geddes, 1996; 
Grindle, 2012; F. Panizza, 2004; F. Panizza & Philip, 2005; Rinne, 2003).  
This puts a premium on primary data collection and non-conventional 
secondary sources. Data collection thus comprised reviews of not only legal regulations 
but also media, donor, consultancy, NGO and government reports; data requests to 
civil service agencies and human resource (HR) departments of state institutions; and, 
most importantly, 130 semi-structured face-to-face interviews – 65 in each country – 
with high-level counterparts. These Spanish-language interviews were in-depth: they 
lasted on average over 70 minutes and yielded roughly 160 hours of interview material. 
With the permission of respondents, 90 percent of the interviews were – except for 
sensitive passages – recorded and transcribed.  
Three distinct interview protocols covered, first, the reform process (33 
percent of interviews); second, patronage and the institutions allocating patronage 
control at the country level (12 percent of interviews); and, third, via coded expert 
responses, estimates of patronage and professionalization at the institutional level (55 
percent of interviews). Measuring the independent variable, causal process and 
dependent variable through distinct protocols and respondents serves to forestall 
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perceptual biases: respondents may otherwise construct subjective causal accounts (J. 
G. March & Sutton, 1997). 
To identify respondents for the first protocol, I employed a purposive 
sample. I, first, contacted the visible elements of the population of interest – publicly 
known reform participants and observers. Chain referral then led to less visible 
stakeholders. Interview protocols were adapted to the background of each respondent. 
Sampling was repeated until interview data covered the reform process and was 
triangulated through responses from distinct stakeholders: politicians, bureaucrats and 
actors outside the state (figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2 Respondent Types across Interview Protocols48 (n=130) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
The second protocol measured professionalization, operationalized as the: 
Replacement of political and personal criteria with technical criteria 
in recruitment and promotion, where technical criteria aim at 
selecting the most competent candidate available for a vacancy.  
This operationalization deliberately conflates recruitment and promotion. The rationale 
is simple. Patronage bureaucracies are characterized by position- rather than career-
based systems (Silberman, 1993). As a result, vacancies may be advertised publicly at 
                                        
48 As respondent careers may comprise several respondent types, figure 3.2 is based on the respondents’ 
most relevant position for the interview protocol. See Annex B for a list of all respondents. 
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any level: internal candidates thus frequently compete with external applicants when 
seeking upward mobility. Promotions are thus, de facto, recruitments into new 
positions. With this in mind, I subsume recruitment and promotion under ‘personnel 
selection’.  
Moreover, the process and criteria to select the most competent 
candidate are left unspecified - so long as technical criteria are prioritized. Professional 
bureaucracies vary in whether they emphasize academic credentials, skills or experience, 
among others, to assess competence; and they vary in their reliance on written exams, 
interviews or other tests in assessments (Sundell, 2014). Consequently, “meritocratic 
recruitment can be achieved through a variety of means.” (Evans, 1998, p. 71) 
Patronage as the flipside of professionalization is a phenomenon of 
“covert politics;” as such, it may not be measured precisely (Müller, 2000, p. 141). As 
a second-best approximation, I measure it by triangulating expert estimates with official 
data.49 The rationale for not solely relying on official data to measure patronage and 
professionalization is three-fold. Not all institutions register the share of vacancies filled 
through examinations; examinations may not translate into professionalization in 
practice, constituting instead a façade for patronage (see chapter 4); and 
professionalization may proceed informally. Incumbents may discretionarily recruit and 
promote technocrats to modernize the state, rather than party affiliates or family 
members (Grindle, 2012; Schneider, 1992) – and thus rely on what I term meritocratic 
patronage.50 
                                        
49 Five prominent alternative patronage measurements are offered in the literature, yet were discarded. 
Public employment statistics as proxies for patronage – such as growth in public sector jobs – may be 
affected by a range of factors unrelated to patronage (see, for such proxies, Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 
2005; Gordin, 2002; Grzymala-Busse, 2003; Remmer, 2007). Bureaucratic turnover as a patronage proxy 
risks conflating the lack of tenure protections with patronage (see, for such proxies, Buckley, Garifullina, 
& Reuter, 2013; Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012). Career pathway analyses do not measure patronage below 
the level of high-level officials (see, for such analyses, Geddes, 1996; Meyer-Sahling, 2008). The approval 
of civil service legislation or commissions as proxy indicators for professionalization is frequently 
uncorrelated with professionalization in practice (see chapter 4); and survey experiments with bureaucrats 
were unlikely to be practically feasible: survey frames of bureaucrats in 30 state institutions in two countries 
would have been unlikely to exist and be made available by governmental authorities (see, for such 
experiments, Gingerich, 2013b; Oliveros, 2013).  
50 Note that meritocratic patronage is proximate to but distinct from the concept of “responsive 
competence” (Aberbach & Rockman, 1994, p. 461). Meritocratic patronage is a professionalization strategy, 
while responsive competence is a strategy for competent bureaucratic control.  
 85 
Expert estimates address these eventualities. To detect meritocratic 
façades, coded questions inquired about the share of vacancies filled through formally 
and substantively competitive examinations; and to account for meritocratic patronage, 
coded expert estimates were obtained for the criteria prioritized when selecting 
personnel discretionarily. Annexes C and D provide further detail on the expert survey 
protocol and coding scheme.  
Moreover, limited coverage of official data could be overcome through 
expert estimates. Adapting Kopecky, Mair et al.’s (2012) delineation of the state, the 
survey covered fifteen typical central government institutions in five policy areas: 
finance, education, health, economic development and justice (see Annex E). At least 
five experts were surveyed in each policy area. Measurement validity demands such 
institutional-level estimates: within-country variation in professionalization often 
exceeds cross-country variation (see, for instance, Gingerich, 2013b; Leonard, 2010; 
Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen, 2014). Institutions included covered the range of state 
functions and patronage interests – from ‘mass-jobs-for-votes’ ministries such as 
education to rent-seeking ministries such as public works to economically-crucial 
ministries such as finance.51  
These institutions accounted for 74 percent (Paraguay) and 51 percent 
(DR) of public employment (see annex E). Weighted institutional means were 
aggregated to obtain country-level estimates of professionalization and meritocratic 
patronage.52 With respondents, at times, providing estimates for multiple institutions 
in their policy area of expertise, 103 institutional-level estimates of professionalization 
in Paraguay and the DR were obtained.  
These estimates are, of course, not without limitations. Poor recall, 
judgment error or strategic bias on the part of respondents could all threaten estimate 
validity. Several duties of care were taken to address these concerns. To counteract 
                                        
51 I exclude sub-national governments for the same reason: professionalization varies across localities (see, 
for instance, Calvo & Murillo, 2004). Obtaining expert estimates for each local government would have 
been practically infeasible. 
52 Country-level estimates were calculated as the weighted average of mean institutional estimates; the 
weights were determined by the contribution of an institution to the total number of public employees in 
the fifteen institutions covered.  
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biases, varied respondent types were sampled through quotas and chain referral: former 
and current (vice-)ministers, directors and advisors in the bureaucracy, NGO analysts, 
academics, union leaders, journalists, legislators and judges (figure 3.2). In each policy 
area, experts with distinct professional and political53 backgrounds were surveyed. 
Adding confidence in validity, estimates varied little across respondent types. Estimates 
of the share of vacancies filled through substantively competitive examinations featured 
linearized standard errors of 0.02 (DR under Fernandez) and 0.05 (Paraguay under 
Lugo). 
As a further duty of care, expert estimates were triangulated with official 
data whenever possible. At least a fraction of judgment error or strategic bias could 
thus be detected, for instance where examinations were inexistent, yet experts claimed 
the contrary.54 Lastly, estimates were triangulated with data from a third, country-level 
expert interview protocol. The protocol probed not only into institutions allocating 
patronage  control,   but  contained   an   open-ended   question   about   variation   in 
professionalization across institutions. Responses proved consistent with institutional-
level expert estimates. These duties of care enhance confidence that expert estimates 
triangulated with official data yield valid approximations of patronage and 
professionalization.   
With theory and method thus clarified, theory testing may proceed. Part 
Two will pursue this endeavour.   
                                        
53 Note that many of the high-level officials interviewed were appointees with publicly-known technical 
credentials who often served successive administrations headed by different parties. As such, they tended 
to count on both patronage expertise and a lack of strong incentives to misrepresent it. 
54 In conjunction with experts who were unable or unwilling to provide estimates, detection of bias or error 
reduced the number of experts whose estimates were coded from 71 to 62.  
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4  
 
Measuring the Dependent Variable:                           
Public Personnel Reforms and Bureaucratic 
Professionalization in Paraguay and the DR 
 
The comparative case study of Paraguay and the DR is undertaken in three steps. To 
measure the dependent variable of interest, I compare in this chapter public personnel 
reforms and bureaucratic professionalization in Paraguay and the DR. Chapter 5 goes 
on to test the explanatory power of the patronage control theory for the observed 
variation in professionalization. To forestall spurious inferences, I conclude the 
comparative case study by ruling out rival explanations in chapter 6.55 
  As context for the principal task of this chapter – the measurement of 
bureaucratic professionalization in Paraguay and the DR – recall from chapter 3 that I 
had operationalized professionalization as the replacement of political and personal 
criteria with technical criteria in the recruitment and promotion of public personnel. As 
I note in chapter 3, this is not the only operationalization utilized in scholarly works. 
Most prominently, a wave of recent large-n studies has relied instead on the formal 
adoption of civil service legislation or boards (Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Hollyer, 2011b; 
Kostadinova, 2012; Neshkova & Kostadinova, 2012; Rauch, 1995; Ruhil, 2003; Ruhil & 
Camões, 2003; Ting et al., 2013). As I detail below, reliance on this alternative 
operationalization would turn the observed cross-case variation in professionalization 
upside down. This, of course, raises the concern that the observed dependent variable 
variation is driven by my operationalization choice rather than professionalization at-
large. To rule out this concern, I, first, embed the measurement of professionalization 
in a broader discussion of the cases’ public personnel reforms; and, second, examine the 
                                        
55 Note that I reverse the conventional order of ruling out rival explanations before theory testing. The 
reason is purely presentational: the empirical evidence drawn on in theory testing serves as context for 
chapter 6. Chapter 6 may thus be presented more succinctly by placing it after chapter 5. 
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extent to which the adoption of civil service legislation is a valid competing 
operationalization of professionalization in the two cases and patronage bureaucracies 
at-large. 
  For the purpose of theory testing in chapters 5 and 6, this chapter’s key 
conclusion is straightforward. Bureaucratic professionalization – operationalized as 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion – advanced in Paraguay, yet not the DR. 
Moreover, Paraguay’s professionalization was selective. It extended not to the public 
sector as a whole, but instead to technical-level positions in, in particular, social service 
delivery institutions.  
This cross-case variation in meritocratic recruitment and promotion 
contrasted with cross-case variation in legal reforms. The DR saw a “calligraphic 
revolution,” enshrining meritocracy in a new public service law, constitution and 
presidential decrees. Implementation, however, was circumscribed to measures which 
did not affect patronage and professionalization. In contrast, legal reforms stalled in 
Paraguay – yet professionalization advanced in practice. As I shall detail, the Latin 
America region as a whole mirrors this pattern: professionalization in law and practice 
are poorly correlated. Drawing on this finding, a more general conclusion may be 
derived: civil service legislation is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
professionalization of patronage bureaucracies. Outlawing the spoils is an illusion – and 
scholars would be mistaken to operationalize professionalization with civil service laws 
rather than meritocracy in practice. As a corollary, confidence in the validity of the 
observed cross-case variation in professionalization is enhanced: professionalization 
advanced in practice in Paraguay, yet not the DR.  
  To construct this argument, the chapter begins by comparing legal 
reform objectives and implementation trajectories in the two cases. It then measures 
their impact on bureaucratic professionalization as the key explanandum for theory 
testing in chapters 5 and 6. To conclude, the chapter builds on the case comparison to 
generalize about the relationship between professionalization in law and practice.  
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Public Personnel Reforms in Paraguay and the DR:                              
Similar Objectives, Dissimilar Results in Law and Practice 
The campaigns of both Lugo and Fernández had included calls for state reforms to 
address corruption and clientelism. Unsurprisingly then, civil service reforms took centre 
stage in Lugo’s ‘National Strategic Plan’ and Fernández’ ‘National Development 
Strategy’. The key objectives of Lugo’s ‘Plan’ included “bequeathing Paraguayan 
society in 2013 an ethical, professionalized, efficient and effective civil service, capable 
of producing the transformation which our society needs and deserves.” (cited in UNDP, 
2009, p. 7) Fernández’ ‘Strategy’ in turn sought, among others, to “strengthen the civil 
service and administrative career to endow the public administration with suitable 
personnel which acts with commitment to ethics, transparency and accountability.”  
(Secretaria De Estado De Economía Planificación y Desarrollo, 2009, p. 18) 
 Similarities in broad reform objectives were paralleled by similarities in 
reform design. As noted in chapter 2, both incumbents relied on the Latin American 
Civil Service Charter as their policy blueprint. The Charter lays out “a set of common 
bases upon which to articulate the design and functioning of different national civil 
service systems.“ (CLAD & United Nations, 2003, p. 4) It understands civil service 
professionalization as the “possession by civil servants of a series of attributes such as 
merit, capacity, service vocation, efficiency in performance, responsibility, honesty and 
adhesion to the principles and values of democracy.” (CLAD & United Nations, 2003, 
p. 3) These attributes then conform a meritocratic system which safeguards 
professionalization from arbitrariness, nepotism and clientelism.  
 Moreover, reforms in both countries emphasized similar measures to 
achieve reform objectives. Both incumbents sought legal professionalization through, 
among others, reforms of public service and public pay laws; and professionalization in 
practice through meritocratic recruitment and promotion, the extension of tenure 
protections, a public personnel management and information system, and the 
institutional strengthening of the civil service ministry. 
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   Similar reform objectives, design and measures notwithstanding, reform 
results diverged. As I shall detail in this section, the DR, yet not Paraguay, achieved 
its legal reform objectives. In contrast, Paraguay, yet not the DR, advanced towards 
professionalization in practice. Implementation progress in the DR did not extend to 
measures which affected patronage and professionalization in practice.  
 
Comparing Legal Professionalization: Normative Revolution vs. Legal Standstill 
 Prima facie, legal regulations prior to the Lugo and Fernández 
Presidencies placed the countries’ bureaucracies firmly on Weberian grounds. In 
Paraguay, a public service law had seen approval in 2000. The law mandates, among 
others, a transparent, merit-based and competitive system for recruitment and 
promotion; grants job tenure after two years in service and positive performance 
evaluations; introduces an eight-hour work day; and creates a Ministry of Civil Service 
(Secretaría56 de la Función Pública, SFP), tasked with supervising the implementation 
of the law (SFP, 2012b). The law’s coverage extends to the executive, legislature and 
judiciary as well as departmental and municipal governments; and, within these, to 
administrative and health personnel.57  
 The DR’s civil service and administrative career law in turn dated from 
1991. As in the Paraguayan case, it mandated merit-based recruitment processes; 
performance evaluations and competitive examinations for promotions; and tenure 
protections for personnel incorporated into an administrative career, among others. 
Moreover, it assigned responsibility for supervising the implementation of the law to 
the National Office for Administration and Personnel (Oficina Nacional de 
Administración y Personal, ONAP) (World Bank, 2004); and covered all central 
                                        
56 As Secretarías rank legally at the ministerial level, I employ the term Ministry for both Secretarías and 
ministries throughout this dissertation. 
57 The Constitution establishes separate careers for teachers, judges, diplomats, researchers, the police and 
the military; moreover, temporary and service personnel are regulated by the Civil and Labor Code 
respectively (Congreso de la Nación Paraguaya, 1992). 
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government institutions. Some officials then considered the law to be “of European 
standard.” (cited in Sánchez-Ancochea, 2005, p. 715) 
 Yet, as a popular Latin American saying goes, “every law has its 
loophole” (Hecha la ley, hecha la trampa). With concessions to smooth passage in the 
face of opposition from patron-politicians, public service legislation in the two countries 
was no exception. To illustrate, in Paraguay, the law fails to clearly delimit the reach 
of political appointments (cargos de confianza) in the bureaucratic hierarchy or the 
responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and the SFP in public pay setting (Interview, 
SFP Director; Interview, NGO Analyst). Moreover, the law complicates the legal 
selection of the SFP Minister, thus undermining his/her authority. A commission with 
representatives from the executive, legislature and judiciary is put in charge. Yet, the 
legislature and judiciary claim autonomy from the law and refuse to participate 
(Interview, SFP Director). Not less important, the law tasks the SFP with supervising 
examinations for personnel selections, yet fails to provide it with means to sanction 
non-complying institutions (Interview, SFP Director). Compliance with the law is thus 
de facto left at the discretion of state institutions.  
 In addition, the law saw an estimated 800 to 1,000 – the precise number 
remains unknown (Interview, Judge) – constitutional appeals (World Bank, 2005b). A 
trade union coalition argued that 40 articles violated the Constitution – and, in 
particular, the constitutional figure of ‘acquired rights’ of public servants (Nickson, 
2009). In parallel, key institutions – including the Supreme Court, Attorney General, 
Central Bank and public universities – appealed the law, arguing it violated their 
autonomy (Ramírez Osorio, 2008). The Supreme Court responded by temporarily 
suspending the law – without, however, passing judgment on most of the appeals to-
date.58 Yet, this suspension is only in effect for the institutions or individuals presenting 
the appeals and for the articles appealed; the prior 1970 Civil Servant Statute of the 
Stroessner dictatorship is then in force (Sosa Arrua, 2011). As a complete register of 
                                        
58 To illustrate, it took until 2013 for the Court to rule on an appeal presented in 2002 by the country’s 
capital Asunción (Ultima Hora, 2013).  
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the appeals does not exist, which law applies to whom is thus often uncertain (Interview, 
Judge).  
 The DR’s 1991 civil service and administrative career law came with its 
own set of shortcomings. First, the administrative career was undermined by articles 
which established job stability for career employees, yet permitted unjustified dismissals 
of career employees provided compensation was paid. This prompted some analysts to 
conclude that “so long as article 28 [permitting unjustified dismissals] remains in force, 
the consolidation of a career system will be … impossible.” (Delmas, 2007, p. 60) The 
1991 law was, furthermore, but a framework: it contained fundamental civil service 
principles, yet left most personnel regulations to legally lower-ranking decrees and 
resolutions. Moreover, as in Paraguay, the DR’s civil service agency – ONAP – lacked 
the requisite authority to assure compliance with the law on the part of line institutions 
(Ventura Camejo & Montero, 2008). 
 On the face of it, legal reform thus held great potential for bureaucratic 
professionalization in both countries – and was, accordingly, sought. In Paraguay, the 
incumbent pursued a four-pronged strategy. First, modifications of individual articles 
of the public service law were submitted to Congress, for instance to do away with the 
requirement for legislative and judicial participation in the selection of the SFP Minister 
(Interview, SFP Director). In parallel, the Ministry created a dialogue forum with 
legislators and unions to discuss a more comprehensive reform of the public service law 
(Lafuente, forthcoming). Moreover, the Ministry of Health and the SFP developed a 
specialized law to regulate health personnel careers which had been, hitherto, covered 
by the public service law (Interview, Health Minister). And, finally, the Ministry of 
Finance and the SFP each developed a public pay reform proposal which sought to 
rationalize public pay and clarify overlapping mandates. None of these four reform 
efforts yielded congressional approval, however. Instead, Congress approved, in response 
to union demands, a reform which – rather than strengthening the public service law – 
reduced working hours from 8 to 6. Lugo responded by vetoing the reform (Lafuente, 
forthcoming). 
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 The DR’s legal reform trajectory could not be more different. When 
coming to power in 2004, the Fernández administration inherited from the preceding 
administration a draft of a new public service law. With minor modifications, it 
presented and discussed the law in the National Dialogue, where, as I detail in chapter 
6, the country’s main societal actors convened. Subsequently, the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies – a member of the governing Partido de la Liberación Dominicana 
(PLD) – introduced the law in Congress and sought for leaders of all parties to become 
signatories – even though the PLD could have passed the law with its own majority. In 
his own words, “this enabled that all legislators and party leaders understood that this 
was their topic – so there was no dispute about the topic” (Interview, Legislator). The 
law saw unanimous approval in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.  
 The 2008 public service law remedied several limitations of its 1991 
predecessor. First, it elevated the civil service agency ONAP to a Ministry of Public 
Administration (Ministerio de Administración Pública, MAP). Second, it strengthened 
MAP competencies. To illustrate, human resource (HR) directorates in state 
institutions were now MAP technical dependencies; and MAP approval of the 
classification of a position in organizational charts was required before vacancies could 
be filled (Congreso Nacional de la República Dominicana, 2008). Third, coverage of the 
law was expanded beyond the central government. Fourth, political party activities by 
civil servants were prohibited, including organizing campaign rallies and obligating 
subordinates to participate in them. And fifth, tenure protections of career employees 
were strengthened. Unjustified dismissals of career employees were now prohibited; and 
all eligible public employees were to be evaluated for career incorporation until 2016. 
As a result of these and other modifications, the 2008 public service law became 
“recognized as one of the most solid laws in the region,” according to the Secretary 
General of the Latin American Center for Development Administration (Centro 
Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo) (Interview).  
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To fortify the law, the principles of meritocracy and job stability for 
career employees were, moreover, incorporated in a new 2010 Constitution.59 In the new 
Constitution, presidential appointment powers were restricted to political appointees – 
rather than, as previously, all public servants; merit and capacity established as 
requirements for access to public service; sanctions introduced for those providing 
advantageous treatment to family and friends; and the dismissal of career employees in 
violation of the public service law declared an act against the Constitution (Congreso 
Nacional de la República Dominicana, 2010). As a result, career employees dismissed 
illegally could hold authorities personally responsible for dismissals and claim damages 
from them (Interview, MAP Advisor). Concomitantly, the President was no longer 
constitutionally empowered to dismiss any public servant at will. In sum, the new 
Constitution provided strong de jure protections against patronage and for meritocracy 
and tenure of career employees. 
To complement merit and tenure protections with rational pay setting, 
the MAP also developed a law to regulate public salaries. The law established salary 
ceilings and empowered the MAP to establish – subject to Presidential approval – salary 
scales for state institutions across the three branches of government. It was submitted 
to Congress during the Fernández administration (2004-12) and promulgated in 2013 
under the subsequent Medina administration (also PLD). Concurrently, laws on careers 
for teaching and medical personnel were being debated. 
 In sum, both Lugo and Fernández inherited public personnel laws with 
a range of shortcomings – and sought to address these through legal changes. Lugo was 
unsuccessful in doing so: reforms stalled. In marked contrast, legal and constitutional 
reforms amounted to a “normative revolution” in public service under Fernández 
(Interview, MAP Director). The next section will juxtapose this legal reform pattern 
with reforms in practice in the two countries.  
                                        
59 Note that constitutional reform at-large responded, principally, to a more immediate incumbent interest: 
it introduced indefinite Presidential re-elections after one period of recess; the previous Constitution would 
have barred Fernández from further office after his 2012 term came to an end (Benito Sanchez, 2010b). 
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Comparing Reforms in Practice: Pro Forma vs. Pro Professionalization   
   Professionalization in practice advanced in Paraguay, yet not the DR. 
Paraguay’s professionalization progress was incremental. Public sector-wide measures 
stalled; yet, a subset of institutions introduced meritocratic recruitment and promotion. 
In contrast, meritocratic recruitment and promotion did not advance in the DR. Only 
pro forma reform measures which did not affect patronage and professionalization in 
practice proceeded.  
 
The DR’s Professionalization Trajectory in Practice: Façade Modernization 
   Regulation of the 2008 public service law appeared to bode well for 
professionalization in practice. The MAP issued, in 2009, a series of regulations and 
instructions on the law. These covered, among others, merit-based recruitment and 
promotion, performance evaluations, the creation and classification of positions, salary 
policy, and training and capacity building (Strazza, 2012; Ventura Camejo, 2010). The 
MAP resolutions built on presidential decrees of preceding incumbents to implement 
the 1991 law; and were, subsequently, in part encapsulated in – and thus fortified by – 
presidential decrees passed by Fernández. Despite this legal backing, however, the 
Ministry lacked powers to unilaterally sanction institutions not complying with public 
personnel regulations. Collaboration from other institutions in charge of sanctioning 
legal violations – including the General Audit Institution (Contraloría General de la 
República) and the judiciary – was not forthcoming.  
   Moreover, institutions were apt at finding an “escape” in the new 2008 
public service law (Interview, MAP Vice-Minister). The law only mandated competitive 
examinations for recruitment into permanent career positions; institutions responded 
by recruiting personnel discretionarily into confidence posts, temporary positions or 
permanent positions in hierarchies below the career – such as janitors, doormen and 
other general services – covered by a simplified statute (Montero, 2010b). A fraction of 
temporary personnel was subsequently incorporated into tenured career positions – 
despite a legal prohibition to do so without competitive examinations for post-2008 
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recruits. As a MAP Vice-Minister (Interview) laments, “no competitive examinations 
were undertaken, but nonetheless they contracted personnel extra-officially … personnel 
which [then] stays for 10 years.“  
   In the resulting context of de facto voluntary compliance with the new 
public service law, implementation only proceeded where it was compatible with the 
patronage interests of the incumbent – even if this led to “a not very rational way to 
implement the law” (Interview, Donor Official). Minimal progress in meritocratic 
recruitment and promotion thus contrasted with pro forma advances in other public 
personnel decisions. As I shall detail further below, examinations supervised by the civil 
service agency – ONAP and, subsequently, MAP – extended to less than 1 percent of 
vacancies between 2004 and 2012. In other words, patronage remained the 
overwhelming rule of the game in personnel selection.  
   In contrast, more than 310,000 performance evaluations were carried out 
in 95 state institutions in the same period, with 5 to 15 percent of all public servants 
evaluated every year (based on MAP data). There is no evidence linking these 
evaluations to enhanced meritocracy in promotions or pay rises, however. According to 
a MAP advisor (Interview), “imagination” has dominated the determination of 
performance objectives, lending evaluations to “manipulations and arrangements 
between superiors and subordinates.” (Gallup Republica Dominicana, 2010, p. 49) As a 
result, over 96 percent of public employees were ranked between good and excellent in 
performance evaluations between 2005 and 2012 – despite the DR’s low public service 
delivery quality (based on MAP data). With recruitment still based on patronage, this 
outcome may not surprise. Political performance rather than bureaucratic performance 
tended to be the yardstick for success. As a result, line institutions repeatedly notified 
the MAP that “evaluations of personnel were not necessary as staff had already 
confirmed they were good when they had done political campaign activities” (Interview, 
MAP Director). Consequently, performance-based promotions remain, according to a 
large majority of public employees surveyed (63 percent), infrequent (cited in Iacoviello, 
2009). On the flipside, repeated unsatisfactory evaluations similarly “seem not to have 
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important repercussions for the future of the public servant.” (Gallup Republica 
Dominicana, 2010, p. 49) Some HR directors in line institutions then go as far as 
concluding that the “evaluation system … does not contribute anything.“ (Interview)  
Evaluations were complemented by enhanced training for public 
employees. The National Institute for Public Administration trained 16,600 public 
servants in 2010, up from 2,100 in 2000  (Iacoviello, 2009; MAP, 2013b). At the same 
time, the Fernández administration funded university degrees for roughly 10,000 public 
servants (Interview, Controller General).  
   Pro forma progress was also made in organizational structures. In 100 
state institutions, organizational charts were established, followed by position structures 
and descriptions, including required competencies for posts (MAP, 2012). Compliance 
in practice was partial at best, however. As a Vice Minister of Finance (Interview) puts 
it, “the MAP is always one or two steps behind the institutions. While the 
organizational structure which institutions present may be approved by the MAP, the 
real structure could be totally different.”  
   Organizational structures also served as an input for a public personnel 
management information system (Sistema de Administración de Servidores Públicos, 
SASP). Inaugurated in 2007, SASP coverage is impressive. By mid-2013, it had 
expanded to almost 150 institutions and 240,000 public employees (MAP, 2013c). SASP 
provides data on staff location, age, gender, contract type and salary, among others. 
Moreover, it strengthens payroll control by linking line institutions, the MAP, the 
General Audit Institution and the Ministry of Finance (Collado, 2012). As a result, 
SASP permitted the government “understanding and taking control of the payroll of 
public servants: where are they, what is their position, how much do they earn?” 
(Interview, Donor Official). Yet, while strengthening incumbent control, SASP did little 
to professionalize the bureaucracy or curtail patronage. In its design, it contemplated 
other public personnel modules, in particular one to ensure merit-based recruitment and 
promotion (Interview, MAP Director). These modules were not finalized under the 
Fernández Presidency, however. 
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   Perhaps most importantly, a gross of 59,300 public servants had, by 
2012, been incorporated in an administrative or special career – roughly 30 to 37 percent 
of the estimated 160,000-200,000 eligible public employees. As aforementioned, career 
incorporation provided public employees with constitutional protections from 
dismissals. In chapter 7, I examine this tenure extension and its political determinants 
in-depth. For the purpose of this chapter, it suffices to note that tenure protections did 
not add to professionalization. Two pieces of evidence substantiate this conclusion. 
First, career incorporations were based overwhelmingly (96 percent) on evaluations of 
personnel rather than competitive examinations (4 percent) (MAP, 2013d). These 
evaluations were in practice only conditioned on formal compliance with minimum 
educational and experience requirements of a position (Interview, MAP Analyst). 
Second, despite 18 years of “career” incorporations, career paths still have to be defined. 
As such, the career to-date is limited to enhanced job stability in an employment system 
– rather than merit-based promotion opportunities in a career system (Castillo Lugo, 
2012).  
   Reform thus advanced in practice in the DR where it, as a MAP Vice-
Minister (Interview) put it, did not “frontally run into the question of clientelism.” 
MAP authorities were keenly aware of the resulting differential political feasibility of 
distinct reform elements. As a MAP Director (Interview) notes, “the Minister 
established the strategy that one works as a technical personnel … but also thinks about 
the situation of the politicians … and seeks a technical solution to [political] realities.” 
As a result, in line ministries, “we have to appoint these politically recommended 
[candidates], but we search for a position that they can carry out … and we evaluate 
them.” (Interview, Economy Director) As a result, party recommendations of personnel 
now also, in contrast to previous decades, came to include a curriculum vitae (Interview, 
Legislator). In the more optimistic interpretation of a MAP advisor (Interview), reform 
thus contributed to “a more competent clientelism.” In the more pessimistic 
interpretation of an NGO analyst (Interview), the primacy of clientelism implied that 
“the public service law until now remains a myth. It is constitutional and administrative 
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poetry.” Further below, I will demonstrate that poetry is closer to reality than 
competent clientelism: professionalization advanced only marginally in the DR. Prior 
to doing so, the DR’s reform implementation shall be contrasted with the Paraguayan 
case. 
 
Paraguay’s Professionalization Trajectory in Practice: Selective Meritocracy 
    As aforementioned, legal reforms stalled in Paraguay. Implementation 
thus needed to be based on a seemingly unsolid legal foundation: the 2000 public service 
law. Despite the deficiencies and constitutional challenges of the law, however, lack of 
legal reform presented a lesser challenge to professionalization than what could be prima 
facie assumed. As one of Lugo’s SFP Ministers (Interview) explains, “seeing that the 
law permits the process of professionalization … I saw … very few problems with the 
law.” In other words, the law enabled the SFP to support professionalization in line 
ministries – even while not empowering it to sanction non-compliance. The SFP then 
sought to “work with a lot of force with those institutions willing [to professionalize], 
while later moving to oblige compliance from those who were not willing.” (Interview, 
SFP Minister)  
   As a result, compliance with competitive examinations was de facto as 
voluntary for line institutions in Paraguay as it was in the DR. Contrary to the DR, 
however, such examinations were expanded in Paraguay. As I detail in the next section, 
roughly 26 percent of vacancies were filled through examinations under Lugo. They 
focused on select institutions, particularly in social service delivery. Selective 
professionalization through meritocracy was complemented by incremental tenure 
extensions. This was not at the initiative of Lugo, however. To shield their appointees 
from dismissal, legislators added permanent positions in the budget when Lugo was 
elected (see chapter 5).  
    While professionalization advanced in select institutions, measures 
applying to the public sector as a whole stalled. The SFP developed, between 2008 and 
2011, a comprehensive policy to cover the range of HR functions, from personnel 
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selection to pay, evaluation, transfers and dismissals, to name a few. Parts of the policy 
– such as performance evaluation – were piloted in the SFP, the Presidency and the 
Ministry of the Interior (SFP, 2011c). To legally require all institutions to apply the 
policy – and thus seek professionalization of the public sector as a whole – the SFP 
encapsulated the policy in three successive Presidential decree drafts. Without a decree, 
state institutions could argue that they were not legally obligated to comply with the 
2000 public service law and, thus, SFP policies (Interview, SFP Director); the law 
stipulated that its implementation was to be based on a Presidential decree proposed 
by the SFP. Yet, all three versions of the decree failed to obtain Presidential approval. 
As I will detail in chapter 5, Lugo faced incentives to professionalize select institutions 
– including by appointing reformers as SFP Ministers – yet not the public sector as a 
whole. The SFP responded to lack of decree approval by issuing a non-binding 
ministerial resolution to regulate the personnel policy. 
   The policy also served as a basis to develop a public personnel 
management, information and control system (Sistema Integrado de Control de la 
Carrera Administrativa, SICCA). SICCA was, in design and objectives, highly similar 
to the DR’s SASP. The system was to register the work trajectory of each public 
servant, from recruitment to performance evaluations, promotions, remuneration, 
transfers and dismissal, among others (SFP, 2011c). Most important, it was to allow 
the SFP to gradually enforce compliance with competitive examinations by linking 
SICCA with Paraguay’s public payroll system. As Lugo’s second SFP Minister 
(Interview) explains, “the idea was to [initially] allow entry without competitive 
examinations, but to be able to see the movement [of staff]; … then to continue 
stimulating examinations … until … we can push a button [in the system] and make 
impossible entries [without examinations].” In other words, SICCA would have enabled 
the SFP to enforce professionalization in the public sector as a whole. Suffering the 
same fate as the personnel policy, however, a Presidential decree to implement SICCA 
was not approved by Lugo (Interview, SFP Director).  
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   In sum, professionalization advanced in practice in Paraguay, albeit only 
in select institutions. In contrast, the DR saw standstill in meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion. Only pro forma reform measures which did not curtail incumbent patronage 
progressed. The next section will detail how these differential trajectories impinged upon 
bureaucratic professionalization. 
 
Measuring Professionalization in Paraguay and the DR 
As detailed in chapter 3, bureaucratic professionalization is measured in three steps. To 
begin with, official data on competitive examinations is presented. As the data is 
incomplete and patronage may still reign when examinations are manipulated, official 
data is triangulated with expert estimates of substantively competitive examinations. 
Moreover and as noted, incumbents may professionalize bureaucracies informally 
through meritocratic patronage. Expert estimates of the criteria prioritized in 
discretionary personnel selections are thus also provided. Findings across data sources 
are consistent: professionalization advanced in select institutions in Paraguay, yet – 
with one minor exception – not in the DR. 
 
Official Data: Competitive Examinations in Paraguay and the DR 
 Until Lugo’s rise to power, the SFP had, in the country’s history, 
supervised competitive examinations to fill 7 vacancies. Between 2008 and 2012, this 
number rose to 24,325, with 76,885 unique applicants. Except for the second half of 
2008 – when budgetary and administrative capacity constraints limited it to 434 – the 
number of vacancies filled through competitive examinations oscillated between 2,321 
and 11,173 per year until 2012 (figure 4.1). 
 In the DR, Fernández inherited a civil service agency with somewhat 
more experience in competitive examinations. ONAP had supervised 406 competitive 
personnel selections in the last year of the preceding Mejia Administration 
(Participación Ciudadana, 2007). Yet, competitive examinations supervised by ONAP/ 
MAP remained minimal during the 2004-12 Fernández Presidency. Cumulatively, they 
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accounted for 1,820 vacancies – an average of 228 per year. 4,890 unique candidates 
applied for these positions. 
 
Figure 4.1 Number of Vacancies Filled through Formally Competitive 
Examinations (Supervised by the SFP and MAP/ONAP) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration, based on data provided by MAP (2013a), SFP (2013a) and 
in Participación Ciudadana (2007) 
 
 In the DR, examinations supervised by ONAP/MAP then filled, 
according to limited available data60, only 1 percent of vacancies during the 2004-12 
Fernández Presidency. In contrast, in Paraguay under Lugo, they amounted to roughly 
26 percent of vacancies (figure 4.2).  
Despite the low overall number of competitive examinations in the DR, a range 
of institutions – 65 in 2012 – undertook them (MAP, 2013a). In other words, authorities 
frequently put a premium on the existence of competitive examinations in their 
institutions, albeit not on their use to fill a significant number of vacancies; on average, 
they were utilized for fewer than five vacancies per year per institution. With 50 
                                        
60 Note that these figures are rough estimates. In the DR, the denominator utilized is public workforce 
growth rather than vacancies as data on the latter was unavailable. Workforce growth overestimates the 
share of vacancies filled competitively as it does not account for vacancies arising from substitutions of 
existing personnel. Moreover, the numerator refers to the number of vacancies advertised for competitive 
examinations rather than the number of vacancies filled through such examinations. The data thus risks, 
again, overestimating professionalization in the DR. In Paraguay, data on vacancies is self-reported by line 
institutions to the Ministry of Civil Service, and the number of reporting institutions increased over time 
– from 43 in 2008 to 106 out of 113 in 2012. The denominator of the calculation thus shifts. Moreover, 
cross-checks of the identities of personnel recruited by institutions and the identities of personnel selected 
through competitive examinations showed inconsistencies (Interview SFP Minister).   
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participating institutions, Paraguay also saw widespread usage of competitive 
examinations (SFP, 2012a). As in the DR, window dressing – the ability to point to 
existence of examinations – motivated participation by a range of institutions: 44 of 
them cumulatively accounted for only 5 percent of examinations.  
 
Figure 4.2 Share of Vacancies Filled through Formally Competitive 
Examinations (Supervised by the SFP and MAP/ONAP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration, based on data provided by MAP (2013a), SFP (2013a) and 
Contraloría General de la República (2013) 
   
 Contrary to the DR, however, select institutions relied heavily on 
examinations. The Ministries of Health, Social Action, Children and Adolescents, 
Agriculture and Public Works as well as the General Directorate for Statistics and 
Census jointly accounted for 95 percent of vacancies filled through examinations 
supervised by the SFP (SFP, 2012a). Examinations in these institutions were either an 
important or the dominant method to select personnel. The Minister of Health, for 
instance, instructed staff to utilize examinations except when contingencies such as 
epidemics required immediate recruitment (Interview, Health Minister); virtually all 
personnel selections in the Ministry of Children relied on examinations; and roughly 30 
percent of personnel in the Ministry of Social Action were recruited through this means 
(SFP, 2013a).  
 Beyond focusing on select institutions, examinations in Paraguay were 
also selective in the positions they focused on. An overwhelming share narrowed in on 
technical-level positions (81 percent), rather than service (13 percent) or managerial (6 
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percent) positions.61 Moreover, vacancies were roughly evenly divided between 
permanent (55 percent) and temporary (45 percent) positions as well as between those 
open to all candidates (48 percent) and those restricted to internal candidates (52 
percent) – that is candidates already in the public sector or the recruiting institution 
(SFP, 2011a).62 In contrast, examinations under Fernández in the DR focused 
overwhelmingly (91 percent) on internal candidates.63 In other words, examinations 
supervised by the MAP were not only minimal in number, but also narrowed in on the 
promotion or career incorporation of employees discretionarily recruited by the 
incumbent.   
 As a caveat, examinations supervised by the civil service ministries were 
not the only ones undertaken in Paraguay and the DR. Examinations also took place 
in institutions and professional groups not covered by public service laws, including for 
teachers, professors, judges, prosecutors, diplomats, the military and the police. 
Moreover, Paraguay’s Central Bank and the DR’s tax administration, among others, 
recruited via exams. Table 4.1 lists the number of vacancies filled through examinations 
in the DR for key professional groups. Corresponding data requests in Paraguay were, 
with the exception of the Central Bank, unfortunately not heeded.64  
 In the DR, as table 4.1 illustrates, examinations outside the scope of the 
MAP had, numerically, much greater weight than those supervised by the MAP. Most 
important, almost 24,000 teachers – roughly 30 percent of teacher vacancies – were 
selected through examinations in 2006-2012. These and other examinations without 
MAP supervision had frequently been initiated prior to Fernández. Examinations for 
teachers and judges had been undertaken since 2002, for instance (Interview, Education 
Director; Supreme Court data). Moreover, examinations to recruit professional groups 
                                        
61 Based on the author’s classification and counting of the job titles of each vacancy filled through 
examinations between August 2008 and August 2011, as reported by the SFP to Congress. As pro forma 
and de facto positions in the hierarchy may, at times, diverge, this represents a rough estimate. 
62 Based on an analysis of the list of vacancies filled through examinations between August 2008 and August 
2011, as reported by the SFP to Congress. 
63 Based on MAP data for 2011 and 2012. 
64 In the Central Bank, 123 vacancies – 97 percent of the total – were filled through examinations during 
the Lugo administration (based on Central Bank data). 
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were frequently not void of manipulations. Against this backdrop, the extent to which 
these and other examinations substantively professionalized the DR’s and Paraguay’s 
bureaucracies is discussed next. 
 
Table 4.1 Examinations in the DR without MAP Supervision 
 Ministry 
of 
Education 
Ministry 
of Health 
Supreme 
Court 
Public 
Ministry 
(Attorney 
General) 
General 
Directorate for 
Internal 
Taxation (DGII) 
Examinations: 
number of 
vacancies 
23,881 529 248 749 1,223 
Examinations: 
share of  
vacancies 
30%65        
(of all teacher 
vacancies) 
NA 5%       
(of all 
Supreme 
Court 
vacancies) 
NA 85% 
(of technical and 
managerial positions; 
for years with data 
availability) 
Focus of 
examinations 
Teachers Medical 
residencies 
Judges Prosecutors Technical (1,119) 
and administrative 
(104) staff 
Years of data 
availability 
2006-12 2011 2002-2011 2004-2012 2006-2011 
Source: data provided by the Ministry of Education, Supreme Court, MAP, DGII and in 
Observatorio de la Salud para América Latina (2012) 
 
Expert Estimates: Substantively Competitive Examinations in Paraguay and the 
DR 
   Manipulation of formally competitive examinations has a long history in 
patronage states (Key, 1935). Against this backdrop, both the SFP and MAP sought 
to reduce the margin for undue interferences in the examinations supervised by them. 
To name a few, applicants were assigned numerical codes to safeguard initial anonymity 
in candidate evaluation; examinations required contemplation of a variety of sources of 
evidence, ranging from curriculum vitae evaluations to technical exams, personality 
questionnaires, presentations and interviews; distinct stakeholder composed the juries 
                                        
65 This is represents a rough estimate. The numerator refers to the number of teachers who passed the 
examination – rather than those were actually recruited. The denominator is calculated by summing 2006-
2012 teacher growth with an approximation of the number of teachers replaced due to natural fluctuation 
(assuming a 4 percent replacement rate as in World Bank, 2005a). 
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for examinations, including, for instance, representatives of both the hiring institution 
and of public employees (MAP, 2009; SFP, 2008). Moreover, SFP and ONAP/MAP 
ratification of examinations was required at the end (Paraguay) or at every stage of the 
selection process (DR) (Strazza, 2012; Interview, SFP Director). This was more than a 
formality. In the DR, for instance, ONAP rejected 46 percent of selected candidates in 
2005-06 (cited in Participación Ciudadana, 2007). As a MAP Director (Interview) 
explains, “of course we are overloaded with [revision] work, but this is a guarantee that 
the selection is made adequately … we do not accept irregularities in the process.” 
(Interview, MAP Director) To some extent then, ONAP/MAP and SFP ratifications 
served as seals of approval of technically sound processes. 
   Yet, vulnerabilities in a subset of examinations remained, in particular 
where SFP and ONAP/MAP supervision was absent. According to participants and 
observers of examinations, interview evaluations were, at times, skewed; exam materials 
leaked; terms of reference tailored to the profiles of preferred candidates or, 
alternatively, framed sufficiently vague to permit discretionary evaluations; vacancy 
dissemination restricted to party members and friends; and competing candidates 
excluded due to lack of compliance with minute application requirements, the removal 
of supporting documentation or the “loss” of their applications. Authorities could also 
simply recruit candidates other than the ones coming first in competitive examinations 
(Paraguay: Interview, Union Leader; Interview, Presidency Advisor; Interview, SFP 
Director; DR: Interview, NGO Analyst; Interview, MAP Director; Interview, Health 
Director).  
   Expert estimates confirm these vulnerabilities in both cases, albeit with 
great variation in the extent of them. Recall from chapter 3 that these estimates are 
based on coded responses of experts assessing professionalization in fifteen typical public 
sector institutions in Paraguay and the DR; weighted averages of mean institutional 
estimates then yield country-level estimates. According to these estimates, the share of 
vacancies filled through substantively competitive examinations rose from 4 percent to 
22 percent in Paraguay under Lugo – yet only from 5 percent to 8 percent in the DR 
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under Fernández (figure 4.3).  In the DR, the minor increase under Fernández is not 
statistically significant when applying an adjusted Wald test (at the 10 percent level). 
In contrast, the increase in substantively competitive examinations under Lugo is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.66   
 
Figure 4.3 Country-Level Expert Estimates: Share of Vacancies Filled                              
through Substantively Competitive Examinations 
Dominican Republic Paraguay 
  
Source: author’s expert survey 
    
Note also that the increase in Paraguay (22 percent) is smaller than the 
aforementioned share of vacancies filled through formally competitive examinations 
supervised by the SFP (26 percent). In other words, vulnerabilities existed but were, in 
contrast to the DR, limited to a small minority of examinations.67 This cross-case 
variation may not surprise: civil service ministry supervision extended to an important 
number of examinations in Paraguay (as aforementioned: 26 percent of all vacancies), 
yet not the DR (1 percent of all vacancies).  
In Paraguay, other evidence confirms expert estimates of relative SFP 
success in insulating examinations from undue interference. First, parties took 
                                        
66 The Paraguayan test yielded a p-value of 0.001 with 86 degrees of freedom (df); the DR test yielded a 
p-value of 0.374 with 98 df. Note that these statistical results and the confidence intervals in figures 4.3 
and 4.6 should be interpreted with great caution: they assume an approximate normal distribution. As 
noted in chapter 3, experts were not sampled randomly and independently, but rather purposively and 
through chain referral; as such, the normal distribution assumption may not hold.  
67 As a caveat, these differences may also stem from imperfect overlap between the sample of institutions 
surveyed and those covered by the public service law as well as expert judgment error or bias. 
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examinations seriously as job opportunities for their affiliates even when not in control 
of the selection process. To illustrate, the opposition Colorado Party (Asociación 
Nacional Republicana – Partido Colorado, ANR) offered training courses in its party 
offices to prepare members to partake in exams for positions (Interview, Education 
Vice-Minister). The Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico, PRLA) in turn 
assisted party members in preparing the supporting documentation for their 
applications (Interview, Agriculture Vice-Minister). Second, formal complaints were 
filed against less than 0.5 percent of examinations supervised by the SFP (Interview, 
SFP Director). 
   In contrast, in the DR, such evidence is missing. Instead, even 
Fernández’ Director of the National Council for State Reform (Consejo Nacional de 
Reforma del Estado) (Interview) concluded that “they undertake competitive processes, 
but at the end the position is awarded to whom the incumbent wants, or who the 
selection team decides for – and, at the moment of decision-making, the party criteria 
are of weight … it is a disgrace.” As a result then, “citizens, generally speaking, do not 
trust this selection process. They understand that it is a politicized process. When state 
institutions seek to recruit via public examinations, they often have to repeat the 
process two or three times as they frequently do not receive applications, because people 
say: ‘ah, they call for an examination, but already have whom to select there.” 
(Interview, NGO Analyst) This is reflected in the low number of applicants: on average, 
each vacancy counted with only 2.7 candidates – despite a high public sector wage 
premium (based on 2007-12 data provided by MAP). It is also reflected in low trust of 
public employees in examinations: only 36.7 percent of employees surveyed consider 
that examinations comply with all procedural requirements (Gallup Republica 
Dominicana, 2010). Not less important, it is also reflected in Fernandez’ own assessment 
of bureaucratic professionalization. In an exchange with a university audience, he 
reportedly noted that professionalization was a pending task, with ‘particracy’ – 
democracy based on party affiliations – at fault for the lack of quality of public officials 
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(Mitchell, 2009). In short, examinations appear to a façade for patronage in an 
important number of cases in the DR, yet not Paraguay.  
   For the Paraguayan case, expert estimates also confirm the finding from 
official data that professionalization focused on select institutions. As illustrated in 
figure 4.4, most progress was made in the Ministry of Health and, to a lesser extent, 
the Ministries of Education, Finance and Agriculture. The paradigm shift from 
patronage to professionalization in the Ministry of Health stemmed, as aforementioned, 
from a ministerial instruction to rely on examinations whenever possible. Progress in 
Education stemmed from perceived improvements in the meritocracy of teacher 
recruitment (Interview, Education Vice-Minister); and, in Agriculture, from competitive 
examinations for the staffing of a ‘family agriculture’ Presidential flagship program 
(Interview, Agriculture Vice-Minister). As aforementioned, smaller social service 
delivery institutions outside the scope of the expert survey – such as the Ministries of 
Social Action and Children and Adolescents – mirrored this shift. Except for the 
Ministry of Finance – which continued on a professionalization trajectory initiated in 
2003 – professionalization thus focused on social services.  
 
Figure 4.4 Expert Estimates (Paraguay): Increase in Share of Vacancies 
Filled through Substantively Competitive Examinations 
 
Source: author’s expert survey 
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   In the DR, as illustrated in figure 4.5, only the tax administration agency 
(DGII) saw an important increase in the share of vacancies filled through substantively 
competitive examinations under Fernández.  
 
Figure 4.5 Expert Estimates (DR): Increase in Share of Vacancies Filled 
through Substantively Competitive Examinations  
 
Source: author’s expert survey 
  
 In terms of the prior generalization – lack of reform where it curtailed 
incumbent patronage – tax administration is the exception which proves the rule. It 
accounted for less than 1 percent of total public employment in the DR (annex E.2); 
its contribution to professionalizing the public sector as a whole was thus minimal. At 
the same time, tax administration is one of the few state institutions in which 
professionalization may be patronage-enhancing. In part thanks to professionalization 
(see DGII, 2007), the country’s tax revenues increased from 12.9 percent of GDP in 
2004 to 15.9 percent in 2007 (World Bank, 2013b). Forsaking patronage in tax 
administration thus increased the overall patronage budget available to Fernández. As 
this particular reform rationale – increasing patronage through professionalization – 
was, with few exceptions, not replicable in other institutions, professionalization outside 
taxation stalled.68 
                                        
68 As a caveat, enhancing patronage was one of several motivations for the professionalization of tax 
administration. IMF conditionalities to reduce public debt in the aftermath of the fiscally costly 2003 
banking crisis and reform pressure from business groups also incentivized reform (Guzman, 2008; Lozano, 
2012). Beyond tax administration, several institutions not covered by the expert survey – in particular the 
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 As detailed next, a similar pattern – advances in Paraguay, yet not the 
DR – is observable in professionalization through meritocratic patronage. 
 
Expert Estimates: Meritocratic Patronage in Paraguay and the DR 
   In both Paraguay and the DR, personnel selection was, as laid out above, 
largely based on discretion. Discretion, however, need not translate into lack of 
professionalization. Incumbents may rely on meritocratic patronage: the prioritization 
of professional criteria in discretionary personnel selection.  
   As a means for professionalization, meritocratic patronage is, of course, 
not a perfect substitute for competitive examinations. Rather than ensuring equal 
opportunity, it limits candidacies to members of the networks of institutional 
authorities. Precluding delegation to HR directorates, it diverts scarce time of top-level 
officials from strategic tasks to the operative task of personnel selection. And with 
appointees owing their positions to transient incumbents, it creates doubts among 
future incumbents about the allegiance of personnel – who may prioritize loyalty to 
their appointer over loyalty to the state.  
   Incumbents seeking to professionalize the state may, nonetheless, 
rationally choose meritocratic patronage over competitive examinations in certain 
instances. In Paraguay, in particular, reformist authorities were concerned that 
examinations risked selecting candidates who were formally the most qualified, yet loyal 
to unions, parties or personal networks rather than the state (Interview, Finance 
Advisor); or candidates who were suspected of yet – in the context of weak judicial 
systems – not proven to be corrupt (Interview, Finance Minister). Moreover, the 
presence of bureaucratic actors – such as unions or nepotist groups – potentially able 
to manipulate examinations was feared to thwart objective selections (Interview, 
Finance Vice-Minister). And lastly, authorities were anxious to lose the ability to lure, 
                                        
Banking Superintendency in the aftermath of the banking crisis – were also partially professionalized to 
protect or enhance patronage, and to respond to IMF and business pressure (Interview Finance Director). 
As an NGO analyst (Interview) concludes: “they worked with a certain rigor in all [institutions] which had 
to do with revenues.” 
  
113 
through direct appointment, candidates with skill sets for which private sector 
competition was fierce (Interview, Finance Director). In these instances, meritocratic 
patronage enabled authorities to professionalize without incurring the costs of 
examinations. As an advisor in the Ministry of Education in Paraguay (Interview) puts 
it then, “the majority of politicians trust selective meritocracy, not massive competitive 
examinations.”  
   With that in mind, meritocratic patronage advanced in Paraguay, yet 
not the DR (figure 4.6). Professional qualifications gained in relevance in discretionary 
personnel selection in Paraguay under Lugo, with a statistically significant increase at 
the 5 percent-level according to an adjusted Wald test. In contrast, professional 
qualifications did not see a statistically significant increase among personnel selection 
criteria in the DR.69  
 
Figure 4.6 Expert Estimates:                                                           
Criteria Prioritized in Discretionary Personnel Selections 
 
Dominican Republic 
 
Paraguay 
 
Source: author’s expert survey 
    
   In both cases, however, professional qualifications remained, on average, 
tertiary criteria. Party affiliation followed by personal connections was instead 
                                        
69 The Paraguayan test yielded a p-value of 0.048 with 81 df; the DR test a p-value of 0.503 with 98 df. 
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prioritized. To be selected, candidates frequently needed not only party membership 
but also personal links. As a former Minister of Education in the DR (Interview) 
explains, “in this country personal relations are a political party in themselves.” This is 
not least as the countries are “a very small setting where almost everybody knows each 
other. It is very easy to know who is friends with whom.” (Interview, NGO Analyst 
DR) In the DR, consideration of personal connections is institutionalized to such an 
extent that authorities, to avoid allegations of nepotism, engage in recruitment 
‘exchanges’. As a party official explains, “we help each other and do what we call ‘the 
exchange’: to avoid public allegations of nepotism in our institutions, I ask someone 
from another [institution] that he appoints one of mine … and I put his [in my 
institution].” (cited in Benito Sanchez, 2013, p. 10) 
   As with professionalization through examinations, professionalization 
through meritocratic patronage only proceeded in select institutions. In the DR, only 
the tax administration and the National Health Insurance (SENASA),70 which had been 
created under Fernández, featured meritocratic patronage (annex F.1). In Paraguay, 
professional qualifications only came to dominate in the Ministries of Health and 
Finance (annex F.2). The latter continued an informal professionalization trajectory 
initiated in 2003. To improve its technical capacity, it pursued a strategy of directly 
recruiting postgraduates from reputable international universities. As a result, the share 
of personnel with Master’s degrees in the Vice-Ministry of Economy and Integration, 
for instance, rose from 5 to 36 percent in 2003-2012 (Lafuente, Ramos, & Roseth, 2012).   
 
Explanandum for Theory Testing:                                       
Selective Professionalization in Paraguay, yet not the DR 
For the patronage control theory, professionalization in practice is the dependent 
variable of interest. This chapter’s corresponding conclusion is clear: professionalization 
                                        
70 SENASA only began operating in 2005. As such, comparing its level of professionalization with that of 
the preceding Mejia administration is precluded. Even if it was, SENASA’s contribution to 
professionalization would have been minimal: it accounted for less than 0.2 percent of public employment 
(annex E.2). 
  
115 
advanced in Paraguay, yet not the DR. Moreover, the reform locus – an important 
process observation to test one of the theory’s observable implications (see chapter 3) 
– may be specified. Professionalization advanced principally in technical-level positions 
in social service delivery; it thereby focused on both internal and external vacancies – 
and, as such, recruitment and promotion. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will also account for two further professionalization 
patterns identified in this chapter: failure of public sector-wide professionalization in 
Paraguay and reform progress in measures which did not curtail patronage in the DR 
– most notably its “calligraphic revolution” in public service legislation (Interview, NGO 
Analyst).71 Accounting for these patterns does not add to the test of the patronage 
control theory per se. By showcasing how prominent rival explanations account for 
explananda other than professionalization in practice, however, it lends additional 
credence to the causal power of the theory. Moreover, it provides for a more complete 
account of the two cases’ bureaucratic reform trajectories. 
This chapter’s key conclusion – professionalization advanced in 
Paraguay, yet not the DR – is confirmed by several proxy indicators. In a regional civil 
service diagnostic which rewards both de jure and de facto professionalization, Paraguay 
increased its merit score from 13 to 40 (out of 100) (2004-13), while the DR only rose 
from 7 to 27 based on, principally, de jure progress (2004-12) (IDB, 2014). Another 
diagnostic then concludes that, in the DR, “recruitment to work in government is 
permeated by political recommendations and clientelism.” (Iacoviello, 2009, p. 60) 
Concomitantly, DR survey data finds that 80 percent of public employees – yet only 
52.5 percent of the populace – sympathize with a political party, with 83 percent of 
public employees with party memberships identifying themselves as members of the 
governing PLD (Morgan & Espinal, 2010). 
                                        
71 Note that this revolution was not limited to public service. In 2004-12, the Fernández administration 
passed 15 state reform laws. It did not seek more than their selective enforcement, however (Ministerio de 
Economía Planificación y Desarrollo & CONARE, 2010). The Fernández’ 2012 budget deficit, for instance, 
violated both the new constitution and 12 of the new laws (Bolivar Diaz, 2012).  
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Similarly, corruption indices – utilized by some scholars as a proxy for 
patronage (Kenny, 2013; Manow, 2002) – suggest that patronage improved under Lugo, 
yet not under Fernández. As illustrated in figure 4.7, Paraguay climbed from the 7th to 
the 25th percentile rank in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator72 under 
Lugo (2007-2011), while the DR fell from the 42nd to the 23rd percentile rank under 
Fernández (2004-2012).  
 
Figure 4.7 Control of Corruption in Paraguay and the DR 
 
Data source: World Bank (2013c) 
 
Lastly, note that while Paraguay’s professionalization progress may 
appear minor in magnitude, it is, in historic comparison, a substantive reform. In a 
context of no prior experience, competitive examinations were extended to roughly a 
quarter of vacancies within four years. To cite two comparative historic examples: in 
the United States, it took 21 years after the passage of the Pendleton Act to extend the 
merit service to 50 percent of the civilian labour force (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994); 
and, in Argentina, the country’s civil service system SINAPA (Sistema Nacional de la 
Profesión Administrativa) required eight years to reach its maximum coverage of 
roughly 25 percent of the public service (Grindle, 2012). Despite all its limitations then, 
professionalization in Paraguay was lauded by, for instance, a local journalist 
(Interview) as one of the “great achievements of the Lugo administration.” 
                                        
72 As the World Bank indicator mixes capacity, procedural and output measures, it is an imperfect 
corruption measure. The large shifts in the two cases nonetheless provide plausible evidence for important 
changes in corruption levels. 
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To account for why bureaucratic professionalization advanced in 
Paraguay – yet not the DR – chapters 5 and 6 will test, first, the patronage control 
theory and, subsequently, competing demand and supply-side explanations.  
Prior to doing so, a scholarly contribution of this chapter in its own 
right shall be delineated: the implications of the case comparison for our understanding 
of the relationship between professionalization in law and practice. 
 
Conclusion: The Illusion of Bureaucratic Professionalization       
through Legal Reform 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, scholars have increasingly operationalized 
bureaucratic professionalization via the adoption of merit-based civil service legislation. 
Similarly, practitioners seeking to advance professionalization in patronage 
bureaucracies frequently advocate legal reform among priority measures (see, for 
instance, OECD, 2009). In some instances, legal reform comes to constitute an 
“objective in itself.” (Verheijen, 2000, p. 26) This is not least as the support of external 
actors for professionalization is frequently characterized by “a bias toward formal 
institutions.” (Andrews, 2013, p. 8; see, among many, also Shirley, 2005) 
   Yet, as the case comparison in this chapter suggests, professionalization 
in law and practice may not correlate. The DR featured a normative revolution, yet 
Paraguay professionalized in practice. In Latin America, this finding reflects a region-
wide reality. As noted in chapter 3, all Latin American countries have enshrined merit-
based career public services in law and constitution. Yet, few Latin American countries 
count on professional public services. Moreover, as illustrated in figure 4.8, the length 
of time since which countries have counted on career civil services in law is only weakly 
correlated (r = 0.33) with their level of professionalization as proxied by the IDB’s 
Index of Civil Service Development.73  
 
                                        
73 The correlation of civil service legislation with professionalization in practice is particularly weak when 
considering that the IDB’s Index rewards professionalization not only in practice, but also in law. 
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Figure 4.8 Age of (first) Merit-based Career Service Legislation vs.      
Civil Service Professionalization in Latin America 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration, based on IDB (2006, 2014)  
 
This weak to non-existent relationship between civil service legislation 
and professionalization in practice may occur through four complementary channels. 
First, capacity shortfalls and design errors may lead to unintended implementation 
problems: putting new rules into practice is inevitably fraught with problems (see 
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). 
   Second, civil service legislation may leave incumbents with what Meyer-
Sahling (2006b, p. 693) terms “formal political discretion:” patronage permitted by law 
(see also, among many, Kopecky et al., 2012). As the DR case underscored, an 
incumbent intent on exercising patronage powers may identify loopholes even in good 
practice civil service laws. In the DR and elsewhere, incumbents make legal recourse to 
patronage by hiring through temporary contracts, hiring in parallel institutions not 
governed by civil service statutes or simply by not issuing decrees regulating public 
service laws, among others (Grindle, 2012; Scherlis, 2010; Sotiropoulos, 2004).  
   Even if detailed legal stipulations succeeded in closing loopholes for 
evading civil service laws, the resulting lack of de jure discretion would not forestall de 
facto discretion. In weak rule of law74 contexts, compliance with civil service legislation 
is de facto optional for incumbents; such (un)rule of law contexts are characteristic of 
                                        
74 I follow Weingast (1997, p. 245) in understanding the rule of law as the “set of stable political rules and 
rights applied impartially to all citizens.”  
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
In
de
x 
of
 C
iv
il 
Se
rv
ic
e 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
(2
01
1-
13
)
Years since approval of (first) merit-based civil service legislation
r = 0.33 
  
119 
patronage bureaucracies. As public employees – including those in charge of legal 
compliance – are appointed based on political-personal rather than professional criteria, 
their decision-making is frequently guided by political-personal rather than professional-
legal criteria. As Fukuyama (2014, p. 51) argues more generally, “the first and most 
important institution … is an administratively capable government … before a 
government can be constrained by … law.” Statistical studies of OECD countries largely 
corroborate this assertion empirically (Charron, Dahlström, & Lapuente, 2012).  
Similarly, in Latin America, rule of law is strongly correlated with civil 
service professionalization (r=0.86) (based on proxy indicators in IDB, 2014; World 
Bank, 2013c). Legal violations of civil service legislation thus tend to go unpunished in 
patronage bureaucracies. Examples in Paraguay and the DR abound (see chapters 4 to 
7). To cite one aforementioned example: in the DR, employees were, after the 2008 
public service law, recruited temporarily, yet subsequently incorporated into tenured 
career positions – despite a legal prohibition to do so without competitive examinations. 
Case evidence elsewhere confirms the resulting “dead letter” nature of civil service 
legislation in many patronage bureaucracies (see, among many, Emrich-Bakenova, 2009; 
Goetz, 2001, p. 1036). 
   And, fourth, even if horizontal accountability institutions forced 
incumbents to comply with formal requirements for merit-based recruitment and 
promotion, incumbents may retain patronage powers by resorting to façade 
examinations in weak institutional contexts. As the case comparison illustrated, 
incumbents may count on an array of covert manipulation measures to retain discretion 
while formally selecting candidates through examinations.  
   As a result of de jure and de facto discretion, civil service laws tend not 
to curb the possibility frontier for patronage. Unsurprisingly then, scholars have been 
virtually unison in concluding that, to name a few, “civil service laws have seldom been 
the expected catalysts for … professionalization”; ”the enactment of civil service 
legislation does not automatically lead to the institutionalization of merit”; “the fate of 
career civil service reform initiatives is generally determined after they have been 
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legislated”; and “the adoption … of civil service laws … does not necessarily lead to the 
de-politicization of civil services.” (Grindle, 2010, p. 2; Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009, 
p. 443; Meyer-Sahling, 2006b, p. 693; Verheijen, 2000, p. 29) 
   Civil service legislation is thus argued to bring about not 
professionalization, but rather a formal institution which, through its “activation,” 
permits incumbents to professionalize when they see fit (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013, p. 
103). According to these scholars then, the merit of merit laws lies in enabling merit. 
They are a necessary but insufficient condition for professionalization.  
   The case comparison in this chapter suggests an even more far-reaching 
conclusion is warranted: merit-based civil service laws are neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for professionalization.75 In other words, incumbents may 
professionalize irrespective of whether or not merit-based civil service legislation exists. 
The rationale for this conclusion is two-fold.  
   First, while public personnel laws differ in the extent of patronage they 
permit, they all allow for professionalization. The Paraguayan case provides a vivid 
illustration. Professionalization advanced despite legal confusion about whether the 
2000 public service law was applicable – or whether, instead, recourse to the 1970 Civil 
Servant Statute from the Stroessner dictatorship was necessary. For professionalization 
in practice, the difference was negligible. Even the 1970 Statute noted that recruitment 
into the administrative career was to be “subject to prior verification of … merit, 
capacity and aptitudes.” (Congreso de la Nación Paraguaya, 1970, p. 2) In other words, 
even in contexts adverse to professionalization, public personnel legislation did not 
explicitly forbid meritocratic recruitment and promotion. This is unsurprising: political 
legitimacy demands – the maintenance of a façade of a professional state – tend to 
forestall explicit legal prohibitions of professionalization (see, for similar façade 
rationales in other state reforms, Andrews, 2013). “Window dressing” in response to 
                                        
75 While Meyer-Sahling (2006a) puts forward a literally similar claim, he only accounts for why merit-based 
service legislation is insufficient for professionalization – yet not for why it is not necessary. 
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domestic and international demands thus safeguards leeway for professionalization 
(Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 118).  
   Second, even the absence of civil service legislation – be it for window 
dressing or otherwise – does not preclude professionalization. Labour and other 
legislation – which usually regulates public personnel absent civil service legislation – 
tends, similarly, not to contain bans on meritocratic recruitment and promotion. 
Professionalization thus may – and does – proceed without civil service laws – as in 
France until 1946, for instance (Grindle, 2012).   
   With or without civil service legislation, professionalization of patronage 
bureaucracies is thus de facto optional for incumbents in weak-rule-of-law patronage 
states. As a result, civil service legislation does not affect the incumbent’s possibility 
frontier for either patronage or professionalization in practice. The weak to non-existent 
correlation between professionalization in law and practice in the two cases and Latin 
America at-large is thus unsurprising. Incumbents professionalize in practice when 
facing political incentives to do so – irrespective of legal requirements. Outlawing the 
spoils – as the title of a prominent account of the U.S. Pendleton Act reads 
(Hoogenboom, 1961) – is thus an elusive objective.     
   This finding has implications for both scholars and practitioners. For 
practitioners, it puts a premium on prioritizing professionalization in practice. As the 
discussion above underscored, civil service laws are likely to contribute to 
professionalization only once a modicum of respect for the rule of law has been 
established. Tepid professionalization – which does away with patronage as the 
predominant rule of the game – is likely to be a requirement for this modicum. The 
traditional practitioner approach to civil service reform – seeking professionalization in, 
first, law and, then, practice – should thus be reversed. Professionalization in law is an 
ineffective conduit for professionalization in practice. Moreover, donor support for legal 
professionalization may, in fact, incentivize more patronage in practice. Such support 
provides legitimacy to ‘window dressing’ incumbents who, concurrently, exploit 
patronage in practice to the maximum (see chapter 6).  
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   From a scholarly perspective, the finding cautions against reliance on 
the adoption of civil service laws to operationalize professionalization. As argued, civil 
service laws are not only poorly correlated with professionalization in practice, but also 
neither sufficient nor – contrary to prior scholarly assumptions – necessary for 
professionalization. Moreover, the political determinants of civil service 
professionalization in law and practice are fundamentally distinct (see chapters 5 and 
6). As noted in the practitioner implications, legal reforms may be adopted without any 
implementation intent. Instead, such window dressing helps incumbents resolve an 
important dilemma: the need to concurrently demonstrate civil service reform progress 
to domestic and international actors and retain patronage powers. In other words, legal 
reforms make bureaucracies look more professional without professionalizing them in 
practice. Outlawing the spoils is thus an illusion. Consequently, the wave of recent 
scholarly works equating professionalization with civil service laws is likely to suffer 
from serious validity limitations. For future studies, this puts a premium on meritocracy 
in practice as the appropriate operationalization of professionalization.  
   As a corollary, confidence in the validity of the identified dependent 
variable variation is enhanced: de facto, professionalization advanced in Paraguay, yet 
not the DR.  In the next chapter, I will test whether the patronage control theory holds 
explanatory power for this outcome. 
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5  
 
Testing the Theory 
Institutional Incentives for Bureaucratic 
Professionalization in Paraguay and the DR 
 
In this chapter, I test and find empirical support for the patronage control theory. I do 
so by, first, showing how institutions allocating patronage control incentivized or 
disincentivized incumbents to advance professionalization in the two cases. 
Subsequently, I demonstrate that reform support and opposition of electoral challengers 
in the two cases are consistent with theoretical predictions. Finally, to rule out that 
institutions allocating patronage control merely reflect, as intervening variables, deeper 
causes of professionalization, I show that the factors originating these institutions are 
distinct from those incentivizing professionalization.  
   Recall from chapter 3 that the cases of Paraguay and the DR were 
selected following a ‘most similar system design.’ Consistent with this design, Presidents 
Lugo and Fernández greatly differed in their institutional control over patronage. As 
shall be detailed first, President Lugo was largely deprived of control over patronage in 
what the UNDP (2009, p. 39) terms a “quasi-parliamentarian system” which, at the 
same time, allocates important patronage powers to the legislature and shifts part of 
the remaining private goods benefits of the patronage bureaucracy to public employees. 
Thus unable to compete electorally based on patronage alone, Lugo faced incentives to 
pursue reform in order to enhance public goods provision; elicit cooperation from 
tenured bureaucrats inherited from prior Colorado administrations; and, to a lesser 
extent, deprive his electoral challengers of their patronage access.   
 In sharp contrast, President Fernández as “a kind of Republican 
monarch” (Collado, 2005, p. 60) monopolized control over patronage in a system of 
“excessive presidentialism” (World Bank, 2004, p. 104) with few institutional 
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constraints on Presidential patronage control. As a result, incentives to reform 
stemming from an inability to compete electorally based on patronage, from 
opportunities to deprive challengers of patronage control or from a necessity to elicit 
cooperation from tenured bureaucrats were largely inexistent. To the contrary, 
monopolized patronage control disincentivized reform as it greatly advantaged the 
incumbent in electoral contests with challengers. Keenly aware of this electoral 
advantage, Fernández did not support reform beyond normative and formalistic 
changes. 
 Consistent with theoretical predictions, incumbent support to 
professionalization contrasted with that of challengers. In the DR’s hyper-presidentialist 
system, the opposition readily supported professionalization; in Paraguay’s quasi-
parliamentarian system, it resisted it.  
 Incumbent incentives to advance professionalization were thereby an 
unintended consequence of prior choices about the institutional allocation of patronage 
control. In both Paraguay and the DR, patronage control was monopolized in the 
Presidency prior to democratization. In Paraguay’s post-1989 democratic transition, 
factional conflicts over access to patronage in an electorally dominant Colorado Party 
incentivized shifting patronage powers away from the Presidency. In contrast, the DR’s 
1994 transition introduced a range of constitutional guarantees against electoral fraud, 
yet – in the context of a President firmly controlling his party and facing fierce inter-
party competition – did not undo the country’s hyper-presidentialist system. The origins 
of Paraguay’s professionalization – and the DR’s patronage resilience – thus lay in 
institutional differences of their patronage states. 
 
A Victor without Spoils: Lack of Presidential Patronage Control and 
Bureaucratic Professionalization in Paraguay  
When President Lugo came to power in Paraguay in 2008, it was the country’s first 
alternation in governing parties since 1947. The Colorado Party (ANR) had been longer 
in power than any party in office in 2008 in the world. It had ruled for 61 years: 44 
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years in an authoritarian and 17 years in a democratic regime. The ANR lost its grip 
on power when a political outsider – former bishop Fernando Lugo – formed a ‘Patriotic 
Alliance for Change’ with the Liberal Party (PLRA).  
 Note that Lugo’s election – yet not his re-election prospects – was an 
outcome exogenous to the patronage control theory. As in the DR case, this source of 
exogeneity permits the identification of the causal effect of institutions allocating 
patronage control. Lugo assumed the Presidency despite lacking, relative to his 
competitors, control over patronage to mobilize electoral support. As of 2006, the ANR 
counted on 1.54 million members – a majority of registered voters – and held pluralities 
in Congress, the majority of subnational governments and the Presidency (Abente Brun, 
2007; Paredes, 2007). Lugo’s victory was possible thanks to support from the PLRA, 
the country’s second largest party in terms of both membership (0.6 million in 2006) 
and representation in Congress and subnational governments – and thus patronage 
control; thanks to support from a range of smaller left-leaning movements; thanks to 
his reputation as a ‘bishop of the poor’ which provided some credibility to his public 
goods promises (Abente Brun, 2009); and thanks to ANR divisions. By 2007, the ANR 
was fragmented into roughly 20 factions and had, in 2002, seen the formation of a 
splinter-off party, the National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE) (Zavala 
Zubizarreta, 2013). Cumulatively, the divided Colorado vote amounted to 52.5 percent 
in the 2008 election – far exceeding Lugo’s 40.8 percent (Abente Brun, 2009).  
 Lugo’s election also implied that an important scope condition of the 
theory would hold in the Paraguayan case: political fragmentation (see chapter 3). Lugo 
won the Presidency, yet not control of Congress. In the 2008 elections, parties 
supporting Lugo captured 18 out of 45 seats in the Senate. The PRLA accounted for 
15 of the seats, Lugo’s core support party, the Movimiento Popular Tekojoja (MPT), 
for one and other centre-left parties for two. A 23-seat Senate majority was then held 
by the ANR and the ANR-splinter off UNACE. In the 80-member Chamber of Deputies 
in turn, Lugo’s alliance had obtained 31 seats, with 29 held by the PRLA, one by the 
MPT and one by another centre-left party (Abente Brun, 2009; USAID, 2009).  
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 Moreover, while factors exogenous to the patronage control theory had 
brought Lugo to the Presidency, these factors were unlikely to enable him and his 
political movement to secure re-election. Renewed PLRA support was not forthcoming. 
The ‘Patriotic Alliance for Change’ had been brought together by the goal of removing 
the ANR from power, yet not a common policy platform. Only weeks after Lugo took 
office, Vice-President Franco from the PLRA reportedly noted that he expected to 
replace Lugo as President shortly (Interview, Journalist). In mid-2009, he formally led 
the PLRA out of the ‘Patriotic Alliance’, even though two majority PLRA factions 
continued in government (Lambert, 2011). When losing the support of these factions in 
June 2012, Lugo was impeached from office (Marsteintredet, Llanos, & Nolte, 2013). 
At the same time, ANR divisions became more muted, with the Colorado Party unifying 
around a common goal to reclaim the Presidency (ABC Color, 2011a). Lastly, voters 
were – as in the case of political outsiders elsewhere – likely to base their re-election 
decision on retrospective performance (see de Ferrari & Carreras, 2014). In other words, 
they were likely to vote based on public and private goods receipts – rather than 
prospective promises.  
To secure re-election, Lugo thus depended on the mobilization of an 
electoral support base of his own. That Lugo harboured such re-election ambitions for 
himself and his party is manifest. Lugo’s supporters unsuccessfully attempted to seek a 
constitutional revision of the prohibition of Presidential re-elections, and Lugo 
successfully secured a 2013 Senate seat, next to four more seats for his party (ABC 
Color, 2013a; Paraguay.com, 2011). As shall be argued, the mix of public and private 
goods Lugo relied on to mobilize support for re-election was decisively shaped by his 
limited control over patronage – in a context in which patronage is central to electoral 
mobilization.  
 
Institutions and Lack of Presidential Patronage Control in Paraguay 
Institutional constraints on Presidential patronage control in 
conjunction with minority representation in the legislature deprived Lugo of most 
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control over recruitment, pay, promotion, dismissals, the creation of positions and the 
determination of the patronage budget. 
Lugo’s control over recruitment was constrained both inside and outside 
the executive. As noted, Lugo had come to power with minimal legislative 
representation, with his MPT obtaining only one Senate and one Chamber of Deputies 
seat each. As a result, recruitment of legislative staff was dominated by the ANR and 
PLRA which had jointly obtained 29 of 45 Senate and 56 of 80 Chamber of Deputies 
seats. Moreover, recruitment in the executive was partially conceded to the PLRA. 
Lugo depended on PLRA support to secure the one-third legislative minority needed to 
avoid impeachment. As quid pro quo for legislative and prior campaign support, the 
PLRA obtained control of, among others, the Vice-Presidency, the hydro-electric dam 
Itaipú as well as the Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture and Industry. To construct 
legislative majorities, further patronage concessions to mobilize votes from the ANR or 
UNACE were needed.  
Institutional constraints added to governability concerns in limiting 
Lugo’s control of recruitment. Paraguay’s 1992 Constitution turned the country’s 
legislature into one of the region’s most powerful (World Bank, 2005b). It may, among 
others, appoint or approve Supreme Court Justices, the Judicial Council in charge of 
selecting judges, the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the Ombudsman, the 
Tribunal of Electoral Justice, the Central Bank directorate, ambassadors and high-level 
army and police officials. Since a 1993 Governability Pact, the legislature relied on 
quotas – based on legislative representation – for these high-level appointments. This 
led to ANR dominance in most non-executive bodies. To illustrate, five of eight Judicial 
Council members and six of nine Supreme Court judges were ANR-affiliated when Lugo 
came to power (USAID, 2009). 
Institutional constraints also deprived Lugo of control over the setting 
of the patronage budget, the creation of new positions as well as the determination of 
pay and promotions. The Constitution enables Congress to alter, with a simple majority 
vote, the executive budget bill at will – irrespective of constraints such as, for instance, 
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executive revenue forecasts (Congreso de la Nación Paraguaya, 1992). As such, Congress 
may also determine the ceiling for personnel expenditures discretionarily. Within this 
ceiling, the budget’s personnel annex empowers legislators to create positions and 
modify salary subcategories up to the detail of individual public servants. As salaries 
are linked as fixed points to hierarchical categories, promotions of public servants equal 
re-categorizations into higher salary categories. Positions, salaries and promotions may 
thereby be determined discretionarily by legislators.76 While a 2003 executive decree 
established a position classification, “Congress may do whatever it wants with the 
personnel annex” – and is thus free to disregard the classification (Interview, Finance 
Vice-Minister). Note, though, that while legislators may create individual positions and 
salary sub-categories, they may not legally enforce their assignment to specific 
individuals. As a result, budget negotiations are, in the words of a former Minister of 
Civil Service, followed by “calls from legislators to institutional authorities to tell them 
that a specific budget line is for a specific person.” (cited in Iturburu, 2013, p. 27) 
Institutional authorities respond by negotiating the inclusion of recruits of their own in 
the budget in exchange for recruitment of legislators’ appointees (Interview, Education 
Advisor). As a corollary of this negotiation practice, institutions frequently bypass the 
Ministry of Finance and Presidency, and negotiate annual budgets directly and 
individually with legislators. 
In conjunction, legislative powers over the creation of positions, 
recruitment, pay, promotion and patronage budgets turn “every parliamentarian [into] 
an employment agency.” (Interview, Health Director) This is well-recognized and 
publicized by legislators themselves. A Colorado Party Congressman, for instance, 
declared publicly that his job as a legislator has always been “to find spaces for … party 
members” and that he is “managing for all those who come to ask me for a job … in 
public institutions.” (cited in ABC Color, 2013b) 
                                        
76 The principal exception to this generalization are allowances. These amounted to roughly 14 percent of 
personnel expenditures when Lugo assumed office and may, within an expenditure ceiling, be determined 
by the authorities in charge of an institution rather than the legislature (Arrobio & Lafuente, 2008). 
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During the Lugo Presidency, legislators made ample usage of their 
patronage powers. When Lugo assumed the Presidency, Congress increased the number 
of salary subcategories from 435 in 2007 to 1,400 in 2010 (Green & Lafuente, 2010; 
Manning & Lafuente, 2010). In parallel, legislators approved rapid salary and position 
increases. The public wage bill rose roughly 15 percent annually between 2008 and 2011 
and 35 percent in 2012 (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2012). Many of the salary subcategories 
and positions created lay outside Lugo’s control. To illustrate, the legislature increased, 
in real terms, its own budget for current expenditures by 121 percent and the 
corresponding judiciary budget by 113 percent in 2008-2012 – compared to a 69 percent 
increase in the executive (calculated from Congreso de la Nación Paraguaya, 2007, 
2011). Most conspicuously, the Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice (TSJE) saw, by 
2010, a staff increase to over 20,000 in a non-electoral year (SFP, 2011b), and a 2012 
budget expansion contemplated the recruitment of 5,000 additional TSJE staff – 
compared to, roughly, 8,000 to 13,000 executive recruitments per year (2008-11) (based 
on SFP, 2013b data). TSJE staff increases narrowed in on recruiting party operators 
for electoral campaigns which – as publicly acknowledged by TSJE authorities – were 
divided among legislators in a quota system (La Nacion, 2011).  
 Institutions shifted not only patronage control to electoral challengers 
in the legislature, but also private goods benefits to public employees. In particular, 
tenure protections precluded Lugo from replacing most of the appointees of prior 
Colorado governments. Permanent public servants accounted for 87 percent of central 
government (executive) personnel, and 79 percent of personnel in the public sector as a 
whole (SFP, 2011b).  For these public servants, dismissals were largely impossible even 
in cases of non-performance or corruption. While the country’s public service law 
permits dismissals for poor performance and misconduct, unions categorically responded 
to dismissals with strikes to avoid precedents for future redundancies – thus enhancing 
de facto constraints. Moreover, administrative indictments for dismissals rarely held up 
in appeals in the ANR-dominated Supreme Court – thus enhancing de jure constraints. 
To illustrate, an advisor in the Ministry of Finance (Interview) noted that “dismissals 
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via a judicial process are minimal as, of the not even 15 ones I am aware of, all have 
been lost by the Ministry of Finance.” Upon Lugo’s assumption of office, the SFP thus 
issued an instruction to institutional authorities to respect the tenure of permanent 
personnel. As an SFP Minister (Interview) explains, “this was for a basic reason: 
[otherwise] we would have had a waterfall of appeals before the Supreme Court … that 
would have gained [public servants] compensation in the millions.” As a result, 
fluctuation of permanent public sector staff was low, at between 1 percent and 3.4 
percent77 per year during the Lugo Presidency (SFP, 2013b).78  
At the same time, Lugo did hold sway over dismissals of temporary 
personnel. Temporary personnel includes, for instance, confidence posts (cargos de 
confianza) and posts to address temporary necessities such as epidemics or elections. 
Temporary contracts run one year or less. With unions and courts usually not opposing 
dismissal or non-renewal of temporary personnel, their fluctuation was higher. In 2008-
2011, it stood between 10 percent and 34.9 percent (SFP, 2013b). Yet, relative to public 
employment at-large, discretionary dismissals of temporary personnel in the select 
executive institutions under Lugo’s control did not amount to major patronage powers: 
as noted, only 13 percent of executive positions were temporary, and Lugo only 
controlled a fraction of them. As a consequence, turnover in the public sector at-large 
– between 2.4 percent and 8 percent – was still limited compared to other countries (cf. 
Institute for Government, 2012). As a result, most public servants during the Lugo 
administration were appointees of prior Colorado administrations. 
                                        
77 These figures are rough estimates. Data on the number of public servants leaving public service 
voluntarily or involuntarily is self-reported by institutions to the SFP (that is without third-party 
verification). Moreover, not all institutions report: in 2012, the number reached 106 out of 113 central 
government institutions. 
78 Note that, next to dismissals, unfavorable transfers of public employees are, without their consent, 
precluded. To sanction employees, authorities may thus only make recourse to a paid leave in place, locally 
known as ‘freezers.’ (World Bank, 2005b) Freezers are spaces – ranging from separate buildings to 
ministerial hallways – where unwanted bureaucrats may be sent to. In some departments, they comprise 
over 30 percent of staff (Lafuente et al., 2012). From the viewpoint of the patronage control theory, 
however, freezer do not equal lack of tenure protections. As salaries are still paid, budgetary constraints 
forestall the mass substitution of “frozen” personnel with appointees of new incumbents. 
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As noted, a share of public servants – roughly 35 percent – were 
organized into unions (Lachi, 2012). Unionization was boosted, in particular, by Lugo’s 
victory. Between his election and assumption of office, public employees formed an 
additional 150, largely ANR-affiliated unions (Interview, SFP Minister). Note, though, 
that the mere proportion of unionized employees underestimates union pressure: non-
unionized public servants frequently participated in strikes and other pressure activities 
for generalized benefits. As one of the country’s few organized collective actors, ANR-
affiliated unions could utilize their collective action capacity to elicit generalized salary 
increases from ANR-affiliated legislators during the Lugo administration. As a result, 
real pay from 2008 to 2012 increased, for instance, by 59 percent for medical doctors 
and 14 percent for teachers in a context of stagnating private sector real pay – thus 
constraining Lugo’s budget for discretionary pay increases to clients of his own (Ultima 
Hora, 2012b). 
 In sum, institutions shifting patronage control away from the executive 
in conjunction with weak legislative support largely deprived Lugo of patronage control 
(table 5.1). Electoral challengers in the legislature controlled, both inside and outside 
the executive, most pay and promotion decisions, the patronage budget allocation, the 
creation of positions and a share of recruitment. In addition, tenure protections and 
generalized pay rises transferred part of the private goods benefits of the patronage 
bureaucracy to largely ANR-affiliated public servants.  
For Lugo, these institutional constraints on Presidential patronage 
control were ‘sticky’ and thus binding. In a country which, at Lugo’s assumption of 
office, ranked in the bottom 15th percentile in the World Bank’s Rule of Law Governance 
Indicator79, it may appear paradoxical to argue for a causal role of institutions (World 
Bank, 2013c). Other formal institutions – including merit-based civil service legislation 
(see chapter 4) – are routinely ignored or altered.  Nonetheless, durability and 
enforcement may be expected for institutions allocating patronage control.  
                                        
79 The indicator aggregates a range of measures capturing perceptions of both confidence in and compliance 
with the rules of society. Lower percentile ranks denote weaker rule of law. 
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Table 5.1 Institutions Shifting Patronage Control Away from Presidency 
(Paraguay) 
 
 Institutions Shifting 
Patronage Control to Other 
Government Branches 
Institutions Shifting 
Private Goods Benefits to 
Public Employees 
Determination 
of patronage 
budget 
 Legislature creates positions and 
determines ceilings for personnel 
expenditures 
 
Recruitment  Legislature appoints or approves, 
among others, Supreme Court 
Justices, the Attorney General, 
the Controller General, the TJSE, 
the Central Bank directorate, 
ambassadors and high-level army 
and police officials 
 
Remuneration  Legislature may determine 
salaries, up to detail of individual 
public employees 
 Legislature may grant collective 
salary increases  
 Strong union pressure to grant 
collective salary increases 
Promotion  Legislators may promote public 
employees de facto through salary 
re-categorizations 
 
Dismissal   87% of executive personnel 
enjoy strong de jure and de 
facto tenure protections  
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Durability resulted from the coincidence of vested interests and veto 
power: those benefiting from institutions allocating patronage control could veto their 
undoing. Legislative (super-)majorities were required to deprive legislators of their 
patronage powers in law and constitution. Consistent with the theory’s scope condition, 
Lugo lacked such majorities. Moreover, both legislative and union acquiescence were, 
in practice, required to deprive public employees of the generalized benefits of tenure 
and collective pay rises. Beyond strikes, unions were able to threaten paralysis in key 
public services, for instance via electricity blackouts; next to paralysis in key procedures, 
for instance in courts. In addition, unions could incriminate political authorities through 
control of sensitive information, for instance about corruption (Interview, Education 
Director; Interview, Finance Advisor). As a result, Lugo was unable to undo the 
institutions which deprived him of patronage control. 
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  Lugo was also unable to avoid their enforcement. The aforementioned 
union pressure assured not only the durability but also the enforcement of institutions 
shifting benefits towards public employees. Legislators in turn had a vested interest in 
applying legislation granting them patronage powers, for instance by submitting a 
personnel annex with each budget or by disproportionally increasing personnel budgets 
of institutions outside executive control. As legislative appointment powers also 
extended to budget control institutions – including the Comptroller General – and the 
judiciary at-large, Lugo faced oversight and judiciary institutions bent on enforcing the 
institutions depriving him of patronage control.  
  In sum, despite a context of generally weak institutions, institutions 
allocating patronage control were ‘sticky’ and deprived Lugo of patronage control 
relative to his competitors. This limited incumbent patronage control incentivized 
professionalization through all of the three theorized causal mechanisms.  
 
Causal mechanism I: Professionalization due to Inability to Compete Electorally 
Based on Patronage80 
Lugo’s limited patronage control implicated, first and foremost, an 
inability to compete electorally based on patronage. Electoral challengers – in particular 
the ANR and, to a lesser extent, the PLRA – could outspend Lugo on patronage. As I 
shall argue, Lugo’s inability to compete based on patronage incentivized him to advance 
professionalization to seek public goods-based electoral competition.81  
As aforementioned, Lugo’s patronage control was limited in an electoral 
context in which patronage was central to vote mobilization. The mere jobs-for-votes 
exchange secured a substantial electoral base: public officials and their families 
represented over 20 per cent of the electorate (Casals & Associates, 2004). Moreover, 
public employment permitted the recruitment of political party operators (punteros). 
                                        
80 For presentational reasons, I inverse the order in which the causal mechanisms are presented in the case 
comparison relative to their order in theory development in chapter 3.  
81 To further substantiate this conclusion, chapter 6 will, as noted, rule out a range of rival explanations 
– including, for instance, Lugo’s personal convictions – for Paraguay’s incremental professionalization. 
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Frequently non-attending public employees, punteros were key for clientelist vote 
mobilization. They provided pre-electoral, door-to-door social assistance in 
neighbourhoods, helping with late payments of bills, providing pharmaceuticals to the 
sick or facilitating interactions with public entities, to name a few – always with the 
expectation of a quid pro quo vote in elections (Morínigo, 2008). On voting day, punteros 
shuttled voters to polls. To illustrate, in 2008, ANR and PLRA punteros transported 
between one-fourth and one-third of the electorate (USAID, 2009). Moreover, punteros 
facilitate vote buying, with 27 percent of the electorate having sold their vote according 
to survey data (cited in Morínigo, 2008). Unsurprisingly, the use of punteros is 
prevalent. As a proxy indicator, surveys suggest that 15 percent of voters have done 
campaign work – the third highest share in Latin America (Morgan & Espinal, 2010). 
Even when patronage is extended to positions requiring attendance, electoral support 
is expected. To illustrate, those who receive jobs through the ANR are expected to kick 
back 10 per cent of their pay (Casals & Associates, 2004). 
Patronage is also dominant in budget expenditures and among clientelist 
exchanges at-large. Personnel expenditures claimed over 75 percent of tax revenues in 
2011 – the highest proportion in Latin America (IMF, 2012). The dominance of spending 
on public personnel to mobilize electoral support as a raison d'être in itself – rather 
than to, for instance, facilitate public or clientelist service delivery – is reflected in 
stagnation in spending on non-labour inputs (Lafuente, forthcoming). As a result, as 
one department director (Interview) put it, “they sent me whatever quantity of public 
servants and I had them crammed and did not know where to put them, nor did they 
have anything to do.” 
In other words, patronage was the central currency of clientelist 
exchange in a context where such exchanges were central to electoral mobilization. 
Within this context, Lugo was deprived of control over most patronage. Lugo and his 
allies then faced, according to his first Minister of Civil Service, “the question … how 
do we compete with the Colorado Party if we do not have what they have which is 
political operators through public employment.” (Interview, SFP Minister) 
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Seeking electoral support through public goods provision via 
bureaucratic professionalization was perceived as an avenue out of this problem. This 
was recognized early on by Lugo. In his inaugural speech, he noted that “[party] 
affiliations to obtain a job in public service have ended.” (cited in Ultima Hora, 2008a) 
Accordingly, Lugo enabled space in his cabinet for bureaucratic professionalization and 
public goods provision. In line with this logic, Lugo’s cabinet was, despite the 
aforementioned governability concessions, the most technical since the democratic 
transition. Key posts – including the Ministers of Health, Education and Finance – were 
occupied by non-partisan technocrats or reformist politicians with strong technical 
credentials. With few exceptions, Lugo shielded these Ministers from patronage 
demands. As a Minister of Health (Interview), for instance, noted: “the President never 
called me to give [public] positions to anybody … he always respected my [merit-based] 
personnel choices ... when we had a conflict with people … who wanted me to appoint 
another … director and I opposed it … and there was a demonstration of 5,000 people 
and road blocks … the President stood by my side and we overcame the conflict.”  
The locus of professionalization reflects this attempt to shift towards 
public goods-based electoral competition. The SFP received an instruction from the 
Presidency and ministerial authorities to accompany and supervise competitive 
examinations in Presidential flagship programs. With a social policy focus, these 
included the primary health attention program in the Ministry of Health, the family 
agriculture program in the Ministry of Agriculture, child and adolescent support in the 
Ministry of Children and, in the latter part of Lugo’s mandate, the conditional cash 
transfer program in the Ministry of Social Action (Interview, SFP Director). As noted, 
competitive examinations were also strengthened in the selection of teachers, yet not 
administrative personnel in the Ministry of Education. These programs and institutions 
shared a high visibility of results – and, thus, enhanced electoral benefits of public 
goods. Health and education were the most frequently used public services in the 
country (Congreso de la Nación Paraguaya & UNDP, 2009); much of the personnel 
selected through competitive examinations – as for the primary health attention, family 
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agriculture and children and youth programs, for instance – was field-based and thus 
in direct contact with the electorate (Interview, SFP Analyst); public goods provision 
through presidential flagship programs implied that the electorate could clearly identify 
the services received with the Lugo administration; many of these programs focused on 
the poor, one of Lugo’s core constituencies: surveys evidence a disproportionate 
appreciation for improved public health services under the Lugo administration by 
poorer strata (Interview, NGO Analyst); and media exposure enhanced the electoral 
utility of transparent personnel selections in Presidential flagship programs (Interview, 
Agriculture Vice-Minister). The focus of competitive examinations in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy is, similarly, consistent with the objective to compete electorally based on 
public goods: examinations narrowed in on technical-level positions (81 percent of 
advertised positions).  
This hierarchical focus suggests, at the same time, that the private goods 
losses of most competitive examinations were limited. Only 13 percent of examinations 
were at service levels with relatively higher wage premiums (Otter, 2005). Moreover, as 
illustrated by the limited number of unique admitted applicants for each position – 
roughly three – positions frequently required educational qualifications in short supply. 
As a Director in the Institute for Social Provision (Interview) recounts from efforts to 
fill such positions through patronage, “without competitive examinations … we needed 
to create the intensive therapy unit [with] 92 people … A party official came and … 
smashed his hand on the table: ‘I gave you a list and none of them entered.’ … [I 
responded:] ‘None of them is specialized in intensive therapy’.” Lastly, the positions for 
which competitive examinations were introduced or strengthened – doctors, nurses, 
teachers, agronomists, social workers and other “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 2010) 
– tended to involve few opportunities for corruption. Their professionalization thus 
implicated few losses of private goods beyond patronage derived from these positions. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions of the causal mechanism, 
professionalization thus advanced foremost where public goods results were most visible; 
and patronage losses reduced – or, to put it more generally, where the electoral utility 
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of public goods increases exceeded the electoral cost of forsaking patronage in the 
context of an inability to compete based on patronage alone.82  
 
Causal mechanism II: Professionalization to Elicit Public Service Provision and 
Cooperation from Tenured Appointees of Prior Incumbents 
In addition to shifting towards public goods-based electoral competition 
due to an inability to compete based on patronage, Lugo faced incentives to 
professionalize to elicit public goods provision and cooperation from tenured public 
servants recruited by prior Colorado administrations. As noted, the majority of public 
servants under the Lugo administration were Colorado appointees. In institutions with 
limited staff growth, this precluded the running of institutions by (small) reform teams 
only. The electoral utility of seeking cooperation from tenured public servants through 
professional personnel management – including meritocratic promotions – then 
outweighed the utility of patronage. As a Director in the Institute for Social Provision 
(Interview) put it: “we could not generate clientele. We needed to seek loyalty from the 
existing staff … I could not bring only people from my party … because fundamentally 
I depended on [tenured] staff so that the product would be good … I needed them to be 
productive so that I could be of value.”  
In other words, with small reform teams unable to run entire Ministries, 
eliciting cooperation from inherited bureaucrats was critical for institutional 
performance. Such cooperation also brought the collateral benefit of potentially severing 
staff loyalty – and thus electoral support – to the Colorado Party. At the same time, 
not seeking such cooperation could thwart any public goods provision. To illustrate, the 
head of the Institute for Rural Welfare under Lugo declared all Colorado appointees in 
his institution to be corrupt. They responded by ceasing cooperation and the entire 
bureaucracy came to a halt (Hetherington, 2011). 
                                        
82 Note that this argument also applies to Lugo’s continuation of the professionalization trajectory in the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank (see chapter 4). In both institutions, the concurrence of limited 
patronage opportunities and heavy public goods costs of bureaucratic performance failures contributed to 
a tacit agreement among parties to refrain from excessive impositions of non-qualified appointees in key 
positions (Interview NGO Analyst; Interview Finance Director). 
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The resulting importance of professionalization to elicit cooperation and 
public goods from tenured appointees – and sever their loyalty to the ANR – is reflected 
in the large share of competitive examinations focused on candidates from within the 
public sector only (52 percent). This share is large not least when considering that such 
examinations granted promotion opportunities to, principally, ANR appointees – and 
were thus resisted by, in particular, the PLRA leadership (Interview, Health Director). 
Meritocratic promotion opportunities were complemented by a broader policy to seek 
cooperation from public employees recruited by previous Colorado administrations. To 
illustrate, the SFP established, in its first months in office, a department for union 
relations, a dialogue roundtable with unions representing 85 percent of unionized public 
servants and a forum about human rights and quality public services with over 500 
union representatives (SFP, 2009). Unable to substitute tenured Colorado appointees 
and in need of their cooperation for public goods provision, the Lugo administration 
thus extended them a “qualified vote of confidence,” including via meritocratic 
promotion opportunities (Interview, Health Director).   
  
Causal mechanism III: Professionalization to Deprive Challengers of Patronage 
Control 
 Lastly, Lugo’s limited patronage control incentivized professionalization 
where he was unable to control patronage, yet able to professionalize. This constellation 
was, first, prevalent in the case of de-concentrated staff in the Ministries of Education 
and Health. Due to tenure protections, the Lugo administration was unable to replace 
most – and thus control – de-concentrated personnel in charge of local recruitment. As 
a Director in the Ministry of Education (Interview) explains: “a decentralization process 
took place in 2003 … [in 2008] we found many irregularities at the local level… school 
directors had their candidate, unions had their candidate, parents had their candidate 
… there are schools everywhere, so control was impossible … therefore we established 
[competitive selections] at the … national level.” This reform rationale was echoed in 
health. As a Vice-Minister of Health (Interview) puts it, “the political decision to 
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undertake competitive personnel procedures … was a central-level instruction … many 
of the regional directors were … Liberals as it was a coalition party… and many continued 
to be Colorados. So at the local level there were small fiefdoms.”  
 The Lugo administration also sought to substitute legislative patronage 
over pay rises and promotions with professionalization. As noted, the budget’s personnel 
annex provides the legislature with powers to create and re-categorize public sector 
positions. Legislators, however, depend on the executive to assign these re-
categorizations to the legislators’ beneficiary of choice. As a Minister of Planning under 
Lugo (Interview) outlines, “normally what the [head of institution] does is take this for 
a fact. [Employees] came to me and told me: ‘I obtained this salary category, this 
Senator got it for me’ … I told him: ‘I cannot give it to you as your salary would exceed 
that of your boss. There has to be … internal coherence. So … what I did is to publicly 
adjust the entire structure to the new category … [through a ladder of promotions for 
public servants based on] performance evaluations.” This reflected a more general SFP 
policy. A SFP Minister recounts: “what we did was to send a note to each institution, 
telling them that they had the competency to define the budget line. And if [legislators] 
had re-categorized a line, [authorities] did not have to assign it to the person … 
recommended [by legislators]. They could assign the recommended person the original 
amount in the budget bill, and organize a competitive examination for the higher 
amount.” (cited in Iturburu, 2013, p. 27) 
 Legislators responded by sending notes to institutions to inform them 
that budget lines were not generic, but assigned to specific individuals. The SFP in turn 
responded by filing, with the Attorney General, influence trafficking accusations against 
legislators, including the President of the Chamber of Deputies. These were 
complemented by SFP filings of accusations with the Office of the General Prosecutor 
against patronage-based personnel selections in state institutions, whenever public 
employees or other sources informed it accordingly. Under the sway of electoral 
challengers in the legislature, however, neither the General Prosecutor nor the Attorney 
General took action. These accusations did, however, place patronage in the media 
  
140 
spotlight, with news outlets beginning to report about patronage (see, among many, 
ABC Color, 2011b). This put some professionalization pressure on non-complying 
institutions (Interview, SFP Minister).  
  The locus of professionalization, however, suggests that the attempt to 
professionalize to deprive challengers in the legislature of patronage control had only 
limited success: competitive examinations outside the executive branch and outside 
executive institutions controlled by Lugo’s allies were minimal in number.  
 
Conclusion:  Paraguay’s Patronage-Deprived Presidency and Bureaucratic 
Professionalization 
In conclusion, institutional constraints on Presidential patronage control 
in conjunction with weak legislative support deprived Lugo of patronage control. 
Limited patronage control incentivized Lugo to professionalize via all three theorized 
causal mechanisms. Lugo advanced professionalization to, first, compete electorally 
based on public goods in the context of an inability to compete based on patronage 
alone; second, elicit cooperation from tenured bureaucrats where such cooperation was 
crucial for public goods provision; and, third, deprive electoral challengers of their 
patronage control. While the complementarity and mutual reinforcement83 of the three 
causal mechanisms complicate the disentanglement of their respective causal weights, 
the locus of professionalization suggests that the first two causal mechanisms carry the 
principal explanatory burden. As noted, professionalization focused principally on 
meritocratic recruitment in presidential flagship programs in institutions controlled by 
Lugo’s allies and meritocratic promotions for tenured staff. Professionalization to 
deprive challengers controlling other institutions of their patronage powers was sought 
by Lugo, but progressed only to a very limited extent. 
                                        
83 To cite one example of this complementarity: professionalization to elicit cooperation from tenured 
appointees of predecessors – the second mechanism – also serves to enhance the incumbent’s ability to 
compete based on public goods in the context of an inability to compete based on patronage alone – the 
first mechanism.  
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As shall be argued next, monopolization of patronage control in the DR’s 
Presidency led to an opposite set of incentives for Fernández: to resist rather than 
advance professionalization. 
 
The Victor Takes All: Presidential Patronage Control and Reform 
Resistance in the Dominican Republic 
The DR’s civil service reform episode under study from 2004 to 2012 coincided with 
Fernández’ second and third term in office. Both Fernández’ initial election to the 
Presidency in 1996 and his second-term election in 2004 were, as in the case of Lugo, 
outcomes exogenous to the patronage control theory. At the time of his first election, 
Fernández’ Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) was the country’s third 
political force and had never won the Presidency. In the 1994 Presidential elections, it 
had obtained only 13 percent of the vote (Duarte & Espinal, 2008). Fernández himself 
“had been a virtual unknown until the election.” (Sagas, 2001, p. 496) Backlash to 
electoral fraud in 1994 forced long-time incumbent Balaguer of the Partido Reformista 
Social Cristiano (PRSC) – who had ruled for 22 of the preceding 30 years – to concede 
to constitutional reforms. These called for Presidential elections in 1996 and prohibited 
immediate incumbent re-election. Unable to stand and seeking to retain PRSC 
leadership, Balaguer did not provide more than scarce access to state resources to 
support the PRSC’s presidential candidate; instead, he informally backed Fernández. 
As a result, the PRSC only came in third in the first round (Hartlyn, 1998). To forestall 
victory of the PRSC’s main competitor in 1996 – the Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano (PRD) – the PRSC forged a ‘National Patriotic Front’ with the PLD in 
the run-off elections (Espinal, 2008). As a result and similar to the Paraguayan case, 
support from one of the two main parties in control of patronage enabled Fernández to 
rise to the Presidency.  
As in Paraguay, however, the principal factor enabling Fernández’ rise 
to power – PRSC support – was unlikely to recur to secure PLD re-election. In fact, in 
the 2000 Presidential elections, the PRSC was unwilling to support the PLD (Sagas, 
  
142 
2001). To secure PLD re-election, Fernández thus depended on the mobilization of an 
electoral support base of his own. Until 2000, however, the electoral support 
maximization assumption underlying the patronage control theory did not hold for the 
PLD. The PLD was a cadre party of pseudo-marxist origin with restricted membership 
which was, in particular, conditioned on the completion of a study program (Hartlyn, 
1998). Even after Fernández’ first full term in government, PLD membership thus did 
not come to exceed 33,000. As a corollary, the popular perception of the PLD was that 
it “did not share the spoils of power” with citizens (Sagas, 2001, p. 500). This 
contributed to defeat in the 2000 Presidential elections, with the PLD securing less than 
a quarter of votes.   
In response, the PLD transited towards a mass-based party, with 
unconditional party membership. In part as a result of this decision, the number of 
affiliates rose to 2.7m after the completion of two further terms by Fernández in 2013 
(Listin Diario, 2013). Concurrently, the PLD’s ideological differentiation from other 
parties – as measured by parliamentarians’ self-identification – virtually vanished 
(Benito Sanchez, 2013). For the purpose of testing the patronage control theory – which 
assumes electoral utility maximization – the examination of Fernández’ second and 
third Presidency is thus more insightful. During these terms, the PLD sought to 
maximize party affiliates and electoral support irrespective of ideological constraints. 
Fernández’ 2004 re-election resulted, as in 1996, from an unexpected 
concatenation of factors exogenous to the patronage control theory. The country’s three 
historic contenders for the Presidency and long-time PRSC, PRD and PLD leaders – 
Balaguer, Peña Gómez and Bosch – died between 1998 and 2002 (Benito Sanchez & 
Lozano, 2012). The party in power – the PRD – suffered a major rift as President Mejía 
sought re-election despite a long-standing PRD tradition of opposing Presidential re-
election (Sagas, 2005). And, most important, a massive banking crisis – which cost 
roughly 60 to 80 percent of the national budget and accelerated inflation to 42 percent 
in 2004 – discredited the electoral campaign of Mejía and strongly constrained his 
patronage budget in the election year (CEPAL, 2009; Singer, 2012). 
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Both in 1996 and 2004, Fernández’ Presidential elections were thus 
exogenous to the patronage control theory. As in the Paraguayan case, they also met 
an important theoretical scope condition: political fragmentation. Fernández’ PLD held 
only 3 percent of Senate seats (1996 and 2004), and 11 percent (1996) and 28 percent 
(2004) of Chamber of Deputies seats. Moreover, the PLD only controlled 6 percent of 
the country’s municipalities in 2004 (Benito Sanchez, 2010c). Institutions shifting 
patronage control away from the Presidency would thus deprive Fernández of patronage 
control. As in the Paraguayan case, Fernández also harboured clear re-election 
ambitions for himself and his party. Fernández himself was re-elected in 2008, while 
PLD candidate Medina won the 2012 Presidential elections. 
As shall be argued, the mix of public and private goods Fernández relied 
on to mobilize votes in these elections was decisively shaped by the concentration of 
patronage control in the Presidency – in a context in which patronage is central to 
electoral mobilization. 
 
Institutions and the Presidential Patronage Monopoly in the Dominican Republic 
Concentration of patronage control in the Presidency extended to the 
creation of positions, recruitment, pay, promotion, dismissals and the patronage budget 
determination. 
As in the case of Lugo, Fernández was elected to office with support 
from coalition parties which expected, in return for their support, control of public 
sector institutions. In 2004, Fernandez’ presidential bid was supported by 6 “satellite” 
parties: minority parties allying alternately with distinct majority parties to access state 
resources and jointly accounting for 8 percent of the vote (Espinal, 2010a). In 2008, the 
number and vote share of satellite parties rose to 11 and 9 percent respectively (Benito 
Sanchez, 2013). Power sharing appointments with these parties extended to more than 
10 institutions, including smaller ministries such as Foreign Relations, Labour and 
Youth. Moreover and as in the case of Lugo, the construction of legislative majorities 
required further patronage concessions to electoral challengers. Yet, the majority of 
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recruitment in the executive remained under PLD control, with one estimate putting 
the share of cabinet members which are also members of the PLD central committee at 
65 percent (Interview, MAP Director). 
Institutions empowered Fernández to control recruitment inside the 
executive and, to some extent, in other government branches. In the executive branch, 
the country’s 1966 Constitution – imposed under the authoritarian Balaguer 
government – concentrated recruitment power in the Presidency. Presidential 
authorization was required for the appointment of every single permanent public 
servant in the executive, from ministers to bottom-level service personnel.84 Contrary 
to the Paraguayan case, the President rather than Congress was thus also in control of 
high-level recruitment in the diplomatic corps, the police and the armed forces (Duarte 
& Espinal, 2008). While, for middle and bottom level appointments, Presidential control 
was a routine seal to authorize ministerial appointment requests, Fernández utilized his 
recruitment control at higher levels to not only assure the appointment of loyalists, but 
also fragment ministerial power and thus complicate the emergence of intra-party 
challengers. Between 2004 and 2008, he appointed 56 ministers and 320 vice-ministers, 
next to a much larger number of departmental directors (Benito Sanchez, 2010a). As a 
result, “there are many islands within a Ministry, so the Minister does not necessarily 
have total control.” (Interview, Economy Director) 
 Outside the executive, Fernández’ legislative minority position when 
coming to power largely forestalled – as in the case of Lugo – control over recruitment 
of legislative staff. At the same time and in contrast to Lugo, Fernández was 
constitutionally empowered to appoint to a range of non-executive positions. These 
included the General Controller, the Attorney General and the Attorney’s prosecutors 
(World Bank, 2004). Moreover, the President suggests the shortlist from which Senate 
must select the Head of the Audit Chamber and presides over the National Judicial 
                                        
84 A 2010 constitutional reform sponsored by Fernández de-concentrated recruitment of bottom and 
medium-level personnel to line institutions (see Benito Sanchez, 2010b). As Presidents still appointed those 
in control of de-concentrated recruitment, however, the 2010 Constitution did not substantially curtail 
Presidential powers in practice (see Marsteintredet, 2012).  
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Council in charge of selecting Supreme Court judges (Marsteintredet, 2010b). At the 
decentralized level, the President was empowered to appoint all 31 provincial governors 
(United Nations, 2005). In municipalities – which accounted for 10 percent of public 
employment when Fernández came to power (Artana et al., 2006) – the Constitution 
conferred Fernández the right to select council members in certain circumstances 
(Duarte & Espinal, 2008). Lastly and again contrary to the Paraguayan case, 
recruitment in schools and hospitals was not de-concentrated. Instead, appointment of 
medical and teaching staff was centralized and subject to Presidential authorization 
(World Bank, 2014a).  
 In short, with the assumption of the Presidency in 2004, Fernández was 
constitutionally empowered to control most public sector recruitment. These powers 
were complemented by Presidential control of the determination of patronage budgets. 
The DR is one of the few countries in Latin America in which Congress requires a two-
thirds majority to alter budget bills introduced by the executive. At the same time, the 
President was, when Fernández took office, empowered to spend 75 percent of 
unbudgeted revenues at will. As a result, legislative failure to approve budgets 
enhanced, contrary to most other countries, Presidential discretion. While the previous 
year’s budget took effect, any increase in government revenues could be spent 
discretionarily by the executive (Keefer, 2002). Fernández thus retained the power to 
set the patronage budget even when seeing legislative rejection of his budget.85 
Moreover, he monopolized control over patronage budgets within the executive. When 
Fernández took office, the Presidency – rather than the Ministry of Finance – was in 
charge of budget preparation and, moreover, undertook an important share of 
expenditures – 12.9 percent in 2003 – itself (World Bank, 2004).  
 Similarly, Fernández was vested with authority to create new public 
sector positions at will. In sharp contrast to Paraguay’s budget bills – which enabled 
                                        
85 Several additional Presidential prerogatives further augmented Fernández’ discretion. To illustrate, fiscal 
revenues may be underestimated and the cost of activities overestimated to ensure budget surpluses which 
incumbents may spend discretionarily. Moreover, Presidents may keep spending off-budget. During 
Fernández’ second Presidency, off-budget spending amounted to roughly 5 percent of central government 
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legislators to determine salaries and promotions of up to individual public servants – 
budget bills in the DR prescribed, in practice, only ceilings for personnel expenditures. 
Organizational charts and position structures in the budget as well as a position 
classification system were absent.86 As a Vice-Minister of Finance (Interview) puts it 
elegantly, “Congress has, in its preoccupations, not yet descended to a level of 
disaggregation beyond the spending per chapter [i.e. institution].” Fernández and his 
ministers were thus empowered to create and eliminate positions at will, so long as the 
overall ceilings on personnel expenditures and expenditures per institution were not 
breached. Executive discretion is reflected in the proliferation of positions. By the end 
of Fernández’ third term, 4,620 uniquely-denominated posts were registered (Telson, 
2012). 
 Likewise, Fernández was empowered to set salaries and pay rises via 
Presidential decrees. While, historically, the Presidency had approved salary scales for 
each institution as per the 1968 budget law, this practice had fallen into disuse 
(Interview, MAP Advisor). Unconstrained de jure, salary setting of administrative 
personnel instead tended to be guided by the salary requests that came attached with 
party or personal recommendations.87 Discretion in salary setting is reflected in one of 
Latin America’s highest public sector wage premiums (68 percent) (Marconi, Carrillo, 
& Cavalieri, 2003); strong horizontal inequities, with remunerations for the same 
position varying by a factor of 3.5 across personnel (Participación Ciudadana, 2012); 
the breaking of the salary hierarchy, with salaries of employees in the fourth level of 
the hierarchy at times exceeding those in the top level (Marconi et al., 2003); and 
excessive compensation at the very top, with salary decompression ratios over 60 – by 
far the highest in Latin America and in a global sample of 34 countries (Schrank, 2010; 
                                        
86 While the country’s Organic Budget Law requires the inclusion of organizational charts with the structure 
and number of positions, annual budget bills during the Fernández Presidency simply waived this 
requirement.  
87 Despite a constitutional prohibition, presidential discretion in pay setting was further enhanced in 
practice by recruitment into multiple jobs. As a former Controller General of the Republic (Interview) 
explains, “another mountain I was confronted with was the duplication, triplication, quadruplication, 
quintuplication of personnel ‘working’ in two, three, four, five institutions [at the same time].”    
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World Bank, 2014b). Discretion in salaries was complemented by discretion over 
pension payments and salary complements. The latter ranged from credit cards to car 
fleets of up to 11 vehicles for institutional authorities (Interview, NGO Analyst; 
Interview, Journalist).  
 Presidential discretion in salary setting was complemented by discretion 
in promotions. Per the 1991 and 2008 public service laws, promotions were to be limited 
to career employees and conditioned on successful examinations or performance 
evaluations. Yet, most employees were not incorporated into career positions and, even 
for those who were, career paths remained undefined (see chapter 7). Promotions thus 
equalled instead – and as in Paraguay – pay rises accompanied by increases in de facto 
responsibilities (IDB, 2006). Contrary to the Paraguayan case, however, the President 
controlled the discretionary power to determine such promotions.88    
 In sum, institutions shifting patronage control to electoral challengers 
were virtually absent in the DR. The same held largely for institutions shifting private 
goods benefits to public employees. First, constraints on dismissals were – with the 
exception of select professional groups – absent. De jure, Fernández was, when coming 
to power, constitutionally empowered to dismiss any public servant at will. This 
constitutional power also extended to permanent contracts – which covered roughly 90 
percent of all public employees at the end of Fernández’ third term – and the small 
share of permanent employees incorporated into the administrative career (MAP, 
2013e). As a result, government changes brought mass public employee turnover, locally 
known as ‘steamrolling’ (aplanadora). To illustrate, in 2008, 60 percent of surveyed 
public servants had been in the public sector for four years or less – that is since 
Fernández’ 2004 election (cited in Iacoviello, 2009). Even of the few career employees, 
                                        
88 A partial exception to this generalization are teachers, medical personnel, policemen and army officials. 
Policemen and army officials count on career paths with defined salary scales. Promotions are formally 
based on seniority, formal qualification requirements and examinations, among others. In practice, however, 
discretionary considerations frequently override formal requirements in promotions (see, for instance, 
Cuevas Castillo, 2010). Teachers and medical personnel in turn count on defined base salaries and 
complements for, for instance, seniority, geographic area and university education. Yet, compliance with 
salary complements is partial, with their award frequently subject to political discretion (Interview 
Education Director; Interview NGO Analyst). 
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over 3,000 were cancelled in 2004 and 2005 alone (Oviedo, 2005). As a high-level 
technical advisor (Interview) explains, “when the PRD government won in 2000, it 
searched for who entered between 1996 and 2000, and dismissed them summarily … and 
afterwards when the PLD won in 2004 … it did the same. So you can see how absurd 
this is … I worked as an advisor in … 2003 … but later resigned knowing that there would 
be a change of government months afterwards and that in this change of government 
they would dismiss high-level people ... so I returned to the private sector … [After the 
change of government] they came and searched for me and I returned … but, at the 
same time, all those that had entered between 2000 and 2004, were dismissed, and if I 
had not left, I would have been dismissed as well.” Such dismissals were not only 
constitutionally but also fiscally feasible: employees lost their pension rights with 
dismissals and the legally-mandated redundancy compensation was frequently not 
complied with. 
 Next to the absence of de jure tenure protections, administrative 
personnel lacked de facto union protection. The 1991 law permitted the creation of 
associations of public servants in the administrative realm, yet did not include 
safeguards which impeded discretionary dismissals of association leaders. Collective 
action by bureaucrats was thus not forthcoming. Instead, as a donor official (Interview) 
put it, “the party is the union of bureaucrats.”  
 The sole exception to this generalization are professional groups outside 
the administrative realm.89 Teachers – which, at the end of Fernández’ third term, 
accounted for roughly 77,000 of 480,000 public servants (Contraloría General de la 
República, 2013; Ministerio de Educación, 2014b) – were automatically affiliated with 
the Dominican Association of Professors (ADP). With the ADP reacting almost 
categorically to dismissals with strikes, teacher redundancies were de facto precluded, 
except in cases of grave misconduct (Interview, NGO Analyst). Thanks to unionization, 
doctors and, to a lesser extent, other medical personnel – which jointly amounted to 
                                        
89 Next to teachers and medical personnel, several smaller professional groups – such as the, as of 2004, 561 
judges – enjoyed strong tenure protections (Consejo del Poder Judicial, 2013). 
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roughly 32,000 employees (Ministerio de Salud Pública, 2014) – similarly enjoyed strong 
de facto tenure protection (Observatorio de la Salud para América Latina, 2012).90  
 As a corollary, pressures for collective pay rises were limited to health 
and education. During the Fernández Presidencies, the PLD was apt at defusing these 
pressures by capturing union leadership positions. As a legislator (Interview) put it, 
“union struggles here are party struggles.” Consequently, “in the electoral process of 
the union, the Ministry … puts all of its employees to work … so that the union leadership 
is won by one of the party.” (Interview, Union Leader) To illustrate, two Presidents of 
the teacher union during Fernández’ second and third term were also PLD 
Congressmen. In control of union leadership, Fernández was able to demobilize demands 
during his Presidencies. By the end his third term, teacher salaries, for instance, stood 
in real terms below their levels a decade earlier (Ministerio de Educación, 2014b). 
 In sum, contrary to Lugo, Fernández faced few institutions depriving 
him of patronage powers. Fernández concentrated control over most recruitment, pay 
and promotion decisions within a patronage budget he could freely determine (within 
an overall budget constraint), and which was largely unconstrained by union pressures 
for collective pay rises. Moreover, the absence of tenure protections outside select 
professional groups – which accounted for less than a quarter of public employees – 
implicated that Fernández was able to dismiss and substitute most public servants 
appointed by prior incumbents. Despite minority legislative support, Fernández thus 
largely monopolized patronage control (table 5.2). 
 
 
 
                                        
90 Fernández could, however, still resort to sanctions short of dismissals, including unfavorable transfers, 
early pensions, late wage payments and, as in Paraguay, “freezing.” (Interview Education Director; 
Interview Academic) 
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Table 5.2 Institutions Shifting Patronage Control Away from Presidency 
(Dominican Republic) 
 Institutions Shifting 
Patronage Control to Other 
Government Branches 
Institutions Shifting 
Private Goods Benefits to 
Public Employees 
Determination 
of patronage 
budget 
 Legislature requires 2/3 majority 
to alter budget bills 
 Budget bills contain only 
expenditure ceilings 
 
Recruitment  Legislative recruitment power 
largely limited to legislative staff 
 Municipalities employ only 
roughly 10% of public personnel 
 
Remuneration    Occasional collective action by 
largely co-opted unions 
Promotion   Partially enforced careers for 
army officials and policemen 
Dismissal   De facto tenure protections for 
teachers and medical staff (23% 
of all public employees) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Note that, as in the Paraguayan case, the institutions allocating 
patronage control were ‘sticky’ – that is durable and enforced. At first sight, this may 
appear paradoxical. If the opposition controlled the legislature in 2004, why did it not 
simply vote to strip the President of his patronage powers?  
   As in Paraguay, durability of institutions resulted from the coincidence 
of vested interests and veto power: those benefiting from institutions allocating 
patronage control could veto their undoing. Not only were many Presidential patronage 
prerogatives constitutionally protected; the President was, furthermore, legally 
empowered to stall legislation. As in several other Latin American countries, the 
Constitution conferred the President the power to observe laws; two-thirds legislative 
majorities were required to override these observations. More exceptionally, however, 
the Constitution failed to empower Congress or the Supreme Court to act if the 
President did not promulgate laws. As a result, Fernández could “shelve” new laws, 
including those targeted at curtailing his patronage powers (Duarte & Espinal, 2008, p. 
874).  
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   In addition, Fernández controlled the enforcement of institutions 
allocating patronage powers to the Presidency. Presidential patronage powers extended 
to the budget control system, including, as aforementioned, the General Controller (in 
charge of internal control), the Audit Chamber (in charge of external control) and the 
Attorney General (in charge of judicial control). As a result, Presidents in the DR had 
historically been able to ignore budget provisions in execution. To illustrate, the Office 
of the Presidency spent on average almost three times the approved budget amount in 
1967-2009 (Marsteintredet, 2010b).  
   Moreover, with most legislators depending for re-election on patronage 
access controlled by the President, buying off legislative support to avoid opposition 
majorities is “straightforward” in the DR (Keefer, 2002, p. 9).91 As a legislator 
(Interview) puts it, “on a daily basis, the relationship of legislators with the executive 
is frequently not to raise matters of public policy or supervision, but rather to position 
personnel.” In view of legislative subordination to the President’s “pharaonic” powers 
(Duarte & Espinal, 2008, p. 872), one MAP advisor (Interview) then concludes that “in 
practice, countries [like the DR] could perfectly live without Congress.”  
 This monopoly control over patronage incentivized the DR’s President 
to resist – rather than support as in Paraguay – bureaucratic professionalization.  
 
Causal Mechanism I Upside Down: Reform Resistance due to an Ability to Compete 
Electorally based on Monopolized Patronage Control 
 While the DR differed from Paraguay in Presidential patronage control, 
it resembled Paraguay in that patronage was central to clientelism – and clientelism 
central to successful electoral mobilization.  
 Clientelism has been “the dominant linkage strategy since the 
authoritarian period.” (Singer, 2012, p. 65) As a legislator of a PLD coalition party 
(Interview) admits, “here elections are not won with programmatic proposals, … political 
                                        
91 Next to patronage, Presidents may woo legislative support through, among others, geographically 
targeted works or outright cash bribes (Keefer, 2002). 
  
152 
debates, … values or ethical principles. Elections are won by buying … the most votes 
on election day … and by mobilizing towards the polling stations.” This is reflected in 
cross-country comparisons. In an expert survey of 88 countries, the DR ranks as the 
third most clientelist country in the world – in only two countries make parties greater 
efforts to distribute material goods in exchange for political support (Kitschelt, 2014); 
and in a regional citizen survey, the DR ranks first in terms of the share of respondents 
reporting that they were offered a material benefit in exchange for their vote (18.4 
percent) (Morgan & Espinal, 2010).  
 Public sector staffing reflects the centrality of patronage in these 
clientelist exchanges. Fernández’ successor in the Presidency, Danilo Medina, publicly 
noted that “if you asked me with how many employees the state could work, I would 
say 125,000 or 150,000. The remaining [300,000] ones are in excess.” (cited in El Caribe, 
2012) That an electoral purpose looms large in their employment is manifest in non-
salary-inputs. For many public employees, “there was no office space to receive them.” 
(Interview, Finance Advisor) Thus available for use as an electoral resource, public 
employment was central to clientelist exchanges in three ways: as a good to be 
exchanged; to distribute other clientelist resources; and to enforce clientelist contracts. 
First, mere jobs-for-votes exchanges provide important electoral support 
from beneficiaries and their families. As the Director of the National Council for State 
Reform (Interview) under Fernández put it bluntly, the DR’s electoral “context has, at 
its centre, employment offers from the state.” Public employment accounts for 15 
percent of total employment and over 35 percent of total formal employment (calculated 
from Contraloría General de la República, 2013; Organización Internacional del 
Trabajo, 2013). This represents an important fraction of the voting population. In 2004-
2010, only 56-58 percent (legislative elections) and 71-73 percent (presidential elections) 
of voters went to the polls (Espinal, 2010b). 
 Beyond votes, public employees provide electoral campaign support. To 
support campaigns, “parties routinely ask public officials to donate a percentage of their 
salary back to the party” (Singer, 2012, p. 68). Moreover, public employees participate 
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in campaign events during working hours and distribute “among the electorate all kinds 
of goods, such as food, electoral appliances and construction materials” – despite a 
concomitant prohibition in the public service law (Meilán, 2014, p. 348). This has 
contributed to the participation of almost 20 percent of Dominicans in electoral 
campaign work – the highest share in Latin America (Morgan & Espinal, 2010). In 
addition, public employees help – as in the Paraguayan case – with bribes to buy votes 
and turnout. Non-attending public employees, locally known as botellas, thereby often 
run neighbourhood-level political machineries – the base committees – tasked with 
building local followings through clientelist social assistance and with monitoring quid 
pro quo electoral support from them (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2009). The Minister of the 
Interior and Police under Fernández, for instance, “insisted to say again and again that 
they had a system to determine who voted and for whom they voted.” (Interview, 
Journalist)  
 Patronage also facilitated the targeting of other clientelist goods 
provided through the bureaucracy (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2009). Almost 39 percent of 
Dominican households are beneficiaries of either public employment or social transfers 
(Espinal, 2013). Political targeting by politically loyal employees is manifest: PLD 
membership enhances the possibility of receiving clientelist offerings, and beneficiaries 
are twice as likely to sympathize with the PLD than with the opposition PRD (Espinal, 
2013; Morgan & Espinal, 2010).  
 In sum, patronage was central to clientelism, and clientelism central to 
electoral mobilization. In this context, the Presidential patronage control monopoly 
greatly advantaged Fernández in electoral contests. Fernández used this control to, as 
noted, replace inherited personnel en masse with appointees of his own in 2004; increase 
the number of public personnel by almost 50 percent until 2012; and virtually double 
personnel expenditures in real terms in the same period (Banco Central de la República 
Dominicana, 2014; Contraloría General de la República, 2013). Prior to the 2008 
election alone, personnel expenditures increased by 40 percent (Benito Sanchez, 2010a). 
With 13 out of 16 ministries – next to dozens of other state institutions – incorporated 
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into the PLD campaign command during the 2008 elections, public employees 
continuously mobilized for PLD campaign activities (Participación Ciudadana, 2008). 
In 2012, state access enabled the PLD and its allies to outspend its main challenger – 
the PRD and allies – by a factor of 3 to 1 in campaign expenditures in the four months 
prior to the election (Diario Libre, 2012). With “the state in campaign,” “any vision of 
equilibrium in the electoral campaign was eliminated” (Interview, Journalist; Von 
Ruster, 2012, p. 24). 
 The electoral advantage provided by incumbent patronage control is 
reflected in part in PLD election victories and PLD membership growth. PLD 
representation increased, in the Senate, from 3 percent (2002) to 69 percent (2006) and 
97 percent (2010); in the Chamber of Deputies, from 28 percent (2002) to 54 percent 
(2006) and 57 percent (2010); and, in municipalities, from 6 percent (2002) to 44 percent 
(2006) and 59 percent (2010). As a consequence, the PLD increasingly monopolized 
control over other state institutions (Espinal, 2010b). Fernández himself was re-elected 
in 2008 with close to 54 percent of the vote. In parallel, PLD membership increased 
from 33,000 in 2000 to 2.7m in 2013, thus coming to represent close to 27 percent of 
the DR’s population (Listin Diario, 2013). Next to advantaging him in electoral contests 
with other parties, concentrated patronage control also enabled Fernández to fend off 
internal challengers. Current President Medina, for instance, noted after losing the 2007 
PLD primaries against Fernández that “this was a competition against the state and 
the state defeated me” (Diario Libre, 2007). 
 Keenly aware of the electoral advantage monopolized patronage control 
provided, Fernández and his ministers forestalled reform beyond formalistic changes. 
At the ministerial level, the MAP Minister (Interview) notes that “I am certainly not 
always well-received … sometimes they [my ministerial colleagues] tell me, ‘well, 
afterwards you go and search who will campaign for us.” Concomitantly, a MAP 
Director (Interview) laments that “politicians are simply not interested in undertaking 
competitive examinations” – or, to put it in the starker words of a former MAP Vice-
Minister (Interview): “many of those who opposed [reform] … said that they had the 
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right to position their people [in the public sector] and nobody will prevent them from 
doing so.”  
 Ministerial reform resistance was accompanied by “incomplete 
Presidential support” (Interview, MAP Vice-Minister). As noted, Fernández signed off 
normative changes, including a new public service law and several presidential decrees 
in support of bureaucratic professionalization. Yet, he “did not concede” to the MAP 
the “power to enforce it.” (Interview, MAP Advisor) Moreover, he did not facilitate 
sufficient resources to the MAP to enable substantive implementation (Interview, 
Presidency Advisor). 
 A PLD Senator (Interview) close to Fernández then concludes elegantly: 
“who makes himself strong for this reform is the Minister [of Public Administration] – 
not the President.” Presidential reform resistance in turn was motivated by the electoral 
advantages provided by monopolized incumbent patronage control. As a legislator of a 
PLD coalition party (Interview) put it, “the political force which wins elections in this 
country considers that the state belongs to it completely, 100 percent … That is why it 
is so difficult to apply the [2008 public service] law.” As a corollary, “civil society cannot 
have an impact [in its professionalization demands] if the President has too much 
control.” (Interview, Donor Official) A donor official (Interview) then concludes: “how 
can you implement civil service reform in an … environment like this? I would be 
shaking.”  
 In sum, institutions concentrated patronage control in the Presidency 
and thus greatly advantaged Fernández over challengers in electoral contests. The first 
causal mechanism was thus turned upside down. With Fernández monopolizing 
patronage control, Fernández was fully able rather than unable to compete electorally 
based on patronage. To retain this electoral advantage, Fernández resisted 
professionalization despite, as I shall detail in chapter 6, vocal civil society demands. 
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Causal Mechanisms II and III: Limited Tenure Protections, Challenger Patronage 
Access and, hence, Incumbent Reform Incentives 
   As a corollary of Fernández’ monopolized patronage control, the two 
additional causal mechanisms through which limited patronage control had incentivized 
professionalization in Paraguay were not activated, either. Contrary to Lugo, Fernández 
did not need to seek cooperation and public goods provision from appointees of prior 
incumbents. Instead he could – and did – simply replace them with appointees of his 
own. Similarly, Fernández did not face incentives to professionalize to deprive 
challengers of patronage control. Personnel management of even the, usually, most 
decentralized institutions – schools and hospitals – was centralized in the Dominican 
state, and Fernández could freely replace employees – and thus assure loyalty – at all 
levels. In contrast to Lugo, Fernández thus did not suffer from an inability to take 
control of patronage.  
 Consistent with theoretical expectations, the institutions monopolizing 
patronage control in the Presidency thereby incentivized not only Fernández but also 
his predecessors to resist reform. To illustrate, the Director of ONAP (Interview) – the 
MAP predecessor – under the 2000-2004 Mejía administration reported from his 
professionalization attempts that “the Presidency called me and told me ‘when you 
were in the party, you did not demand any requirements from comrades to work in 
politics and send them to the interior.” In the context of presidential resistance to 
professionalization, patronage has, unsurprisingly, remained historically the rule of the 
game in the DR.  
 In conclusion, case evidence suggests that variation in institutions 
allocating patronage control contributed to variation in incumbent incentives to 
professionalize in Paraguay and the DR. To enhance the robustness of the test of the 
patronage control theory, one further causal process implication of the theory shall be 
examined: the relationship between institutions allocating patronage control and 
professionalization support from electoral challengers.   
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‘Outs’ vs. ‘Ins’? Challenger Patronage Control and their Reform 
Support and Opposition 
As noted in chapter 3, “civil service reform is always popular with the ‘outs’ and never 
with the ‘ins’” (quoted in Hoogenboom, 1961, p. ix). In other words, challengers support 
it while incumbents resist it. Where institutions deprive incumbents of patronage 
control, however, we should expect the opposite: presidents will seek professionalization 
while legislative challengers will resist it. The actions of electoral challengers in 
Paraguay and the DR are consistent with this theoretical expectation.  
 In the DR, reform resistance by the incumbent was paralleled by reform 
support from electoral challengers. Opposition parties had both initiated the 1991 civil 
service legislation and unanimously supported the approval of the 2008 public service 
law. As the ONAP Director during the Mejía administration (Interview) explains, 
“opposition parliamentarians viewed the law in a favourable light as … if there is no 
public service law … all public servants will be contracted via the clientele of the 
[governing] party. If there is a law that says that … recruitment is to be based on 
competitive exams, then all can participate, my people and yours.” In other words, 
lacking patronage control, challengers supported reform to deprive the incumbent of his 
monopolized patronage control and enhance employment opportunities for their own 
affiliates.  
 In marked contrast, challengers in Paraguay resisted the incumbent’s 
professionalization attempts. The ANR and PLRA-dominated legislature stalled 
attempts to strengthen professionalization in law through a reform of the 2000 public 
service legislation (see chapter 4). A bill regulating careers for medical personnel in the 
public sector faced a similar fate. In addition, legislators sought to sabotage 
implementation. The Minister of Health – one of the key reformers – was interrogated 
by Congress four times, with reporting requirements exceeding those “of the last ten 
governments combined.” (Interview, Health Minister) Harassment was paralleled by 
“permanent complaints that [the Minister of Health] ignored [personnel] 
recommendations of legislators.” (Interview, Health Director) For lack of acceding to 
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such pressures, the Minister of Finance in turn received “legislative sanctions,” with 
ministerial projects stalling in parliament (Interview, Finance Minister). Lastly, the 
SFP Minister was – in retaliation for her filing of influence trafficking accusations 
against legislators – cited in front of Congress, with the request to report the name of 
each applicant selected through competitive examinations – data the Ministry was 
unlikely to, yet managed to gather in time (Interview, SFP Director).  
 In sum and consistent with theoretical expectations, challengers in 
Paraguay’s Congress – who benefited from important patronage powers – resisted 
professionalization. In contrast, challengers in the DR’s Congress – who were largely 
deprived of patronage control – supported it. While this finding provides further 
confirmatory evidence for the patronage control theory, it does not rule out that 
institutions allocating patronage control merely reflect, as intervening variables, deeper 
causes of professionalization. I briefly rule out this possibility next.  
 
Reform as an Unintended Consequence of Prior Institutional Choices: 
The Origins of Presidential Patronage Control in Paraguay and the DR 
Historically, the institutional allocation of patronage control in Paraguay and the DR 
was highly comparable: patronage control was monopolized in the Presidency. As I shall 
briefly delineate in this section, the countries’ democratic transitions represented a 
critical juncture for Presidential patronage control in Paraguay, yet not the DR. In 
Paraguay’s democratic transition in 1989-1992, an electorally dominant Colorado Party 
fragmented patronage powers with a view to resolving intra-party conflict over 
patronage access. In the DR’s democratic transition in 1994, fierce inter-party 
competition in conjunction with top-down party control by the incumbent precluded 
similar incentives to shift patronage powers away from the Presidency.  
In other words, institutions allocating patronage control were not merely 
intervening variables: the factors which had originated them were distinct from those 
incentivizing professionalization. Moreover, path dependency explanations as 
conceptualized by most legacy accounts of administrative reform – where current 
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administrative set-ups retain characteristics of previous ones (see Meyer-Sahling, 2009) 
– fall short. Instead, professionalization was an unintended consequence of institutional 
choices made roughly one-and-a-half decades prior to the reform episodes studied.  
  Paraguay and the DR inherited, as many other Latin American 
countries, Spanish colonial administrations which sought centralized authority and top-
down rule (see, among others, Wiarda & Kryzanek, 1982). In the 20th century, both 
countries underwent periods of prolonged dictatorships in which rulers concentrated 
patronage control. During the DR’s 31-year-long Trujillo dictatorship (1930-1961), the 
dictator “sought to make all political and administrative decisions in person” in the 
context of a state which employed 45 percent of the active labour force by the time of 
Trujillo’s assassination (Kearney, 1986, p. 147; World Bank, 2004). The Trujillo 
dictatorship was, starting in 1966, succeeded by twelve years of authoritarian rule by 
Balaguer. Balaguer replicated Trujillo’s centralized decision-making style in regards to 
patronage (Cuello, 2008). This is epitomized in, first, his 1966 Constitution which, as 
aforementioned, monopolized patronage control in the Presidency; and, second, the 
repression of unions, including in the public sector (Espinal, Morgan, & Hartlyn, 2010).  
Similarly, in Paraguay’s 35-year-long Stroessner dictatorship (1954-
1989), “the judiciary and legislature were, in effect, appendages of the executive, which 
exercised power in a totally arbitrary manner.” (Nickson, 1997, p. 25) To illustrate, the 
country’s 1967 Constitution enabled Stroessner to, among others, suspend all 
constitutional guarantees and dissolve Congress at will (Setrini, 2011). Moreover, unions 
were subordinate to the government and public employees prohibited from striking 
(Alexander & Parker, 2005). Contrary to Balaguer and Trujillo, however, Stroessner 
ruled through – and tightly controlled – a vertically organized Colorado Party, with 
obligatory membership for all army and state officials. The Colorado Party administered 
executive patronage through 240 local party branches (seccionales). In the process, it 
became “one of Latin America’s most powerful and best organized political movements” 
(Sanders, 1989, p.3). 
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During Paraguay’s democratic transition, it was this party – and its 
concurrent electoral dominance and factionalization – which augured fragmentation of 
patronage powers. Paraguay’s democratic transition had originated from ANR elite 
divisions over the succession question of an aging Stroessner – and the corresponding 
question of who would control the patronage system. Stroessner was couped out of office 
in 1989 by his second in command, General Rodriguez, when a hardliner faction sought 
to side-line Rodriguez and his faction and secure the Presidential succession of 
Stroessner’s son. After the coup, Rodriguez pointed to ANR reunification as one of the 
main objectives of the coup (Nolte, 2010). Instead, however, the post-Stroessner vacuum 
led to power struggles which divided the party into a “federation of competing factions” 
seeking access to patronage (Powers, 1992, p. 34). Intra-party conflict was recurrent 
between both central-level ANR elites and central and local party leaders (Zavala 
Zubizarreta, 2013). This conflict occurred during limited inter-party competition: the 
ANR had won overwhelming majorities in the 1989 Presidential and congressional 
elections. As such, ANR leaders did not need to maximize patronage control for the 
ANR to stay in power. 
  In this context, ANR “intraparty division fostered a demand by elites 
for institutional elements that deal with the succession problem” and resolve intra-party 
conflicts over access to patronage (Petrova Rizova, 2008; Zavala Zubizarreta, 2013, p. 
21). These institutional elements included not only a 1990 electoral law which 
introduced primaries and elections of sub-national governments. An absolute majority 
in Paraguay’s constitutional assembly also enabled the ANR to dictate a 1992 
Constitution which, as aforementioned, shifted patronage control away from the 
Presidency towards subnational governments and, in particular, the legislature. With 
patronage powers fragmented, ANR factions in the legislature and subnational 
governments could secure access to patronage even when losing the intra-party contest 
for the Presidency. This fragmentation did not translate into massive immediate ANR 
patronage losses: the party was, at the time, dominant in most central and local level 
institutions. 
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The institutions shifting patronage control away from the Presidency 
thus resulted from ANR attempts to institutionally resolve intra-party conflicts over 
access to patronage in a context of limited inter-party competition.92 Unintendedly, 
these institutions incentivized professionalization in 2008, when Paraguay’s electoral 
context had shifted towards inter-party competition and the election of a President 
largely without parliamentary representation. 
  In contrast, in the DR’s democratic transition, similar incentives to 
fragment patronage powers were lacking. Starting in 1978, the DR’s democratic 
transition proceeded in two steps. The 1978 elections brought the first alternation in 
power, with the PRD securing the Presidency. Constitutional change was not 
forthcoming, however. In 1986, Balaguer was re-elected to the Presidency. Electoral 
fraud by Balaguer in 1990 and, more massively, in 1994 led to a post-electoral crisis 
with opposition threats of national strikes and international backlash against the 
incumbent. Under pressure, Balaguer conceded to a ‘Pact for Democracy’ and a 
concomitant constitutional reform (Hartlyn, 1998). The reform fortified an independent 
electoral commission, enhanced the autonomy of the Supreme Court, shortened 
Balaguer’s term to two years and prohibited Presidential re-election93, among others. 
As such, it transitioned the country from a hybrid regime to an electoral democracy: 
since then, no serious electoral fraud has occurred (Marsteintredet, 2010a).  
The 1994 reforms did not undo Presidential patronage powers, however 
(Duarte & Espinal, 2008). Balaguer – who could, to some extent, veto the 1994 reform 
                                        
92 ANR intra-party competition also facilitated the unionization of ANR-affiliated public employees. Public 
sector unionization rapidly expanded after the democratic transition, as epitomized by successful collective 
bargaining for higher pay – up 60.25 percent by 1996 – and collective action against privatization (Ferreira, 
1997; Nickson, 2009). ANR factions encouraged the emergence of union leaders supporting their primary 
campaigns against other ANR challengers and their election campaigns against other parties through votes 
and other campaign contributions from unionized public employees (Interview NGO Analyst). This is 
reflected in the emergence of both unionization and union factionalization. By 2008, seven distinct union 
umbrella federations across the public and private sector existed, and unions rarely recognized the 
leadership of the federations they were members in (Villalba, 2009). The origins of institutions shifting the 
private goods benefits of the patronage bureaucracy to public employees are thus, in part, also found in 
ANR intra-party competition. 
93 When Fernández was re-elected in 2004, a 2002 constitutional reform had replaced this prohibition with 
a single consecutive re-election rule. 
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(Marsteintredet, 2010a) – lacked incentives to shift patronage powers away from the 
Presidency. The PRSC was an electoral vehicle for Balaguer rather than a modern party 
with an organic structure (Lozano, 2002). As such and in contrast to the Paraguayan 
case, high-ranking PRSC officials – such as PRSC legislators – could not pressure 
Balaguer into ceding institutional control over patronage to other government branches 
controlled by them. Moreover, such a shift would have likely led to enhanced patronage 
powers of the opposition – which held a majority in the legislature. In the context of 
close electoral contests, fragmenting patronage powers could have thus – again in 
contrast to the ANR in 1989-1992 – jeopardized the re-election prospects of the PRSC 
as a whole.94  
  Incumbent incentives to maintain Presidential patronage powers during 
the democratic transition were thus over-determined in the DR. Incumbents tightly 
controlled their parties95 and faced competition from opposition parties with strong 
representation in other government branches – and thus potential access to patronage 
should patronage powers shift away from the Presidency.  
In sum, the institutions which deprived Lugo – yet not Fernández – of 
patronage control originated from factors distinct of those incentivizing bureaucratic 
professionalization. Intra-party divisions in the Colorado Party persisted until Lugo, 
yet did not incentivize professionalization. Instead, Lugo’s efforts to replace patronage 
with a professional bureaucracy were an unintended consequence of institutions 
designed sixteen years earlier to resolve conflicts within the Colorado Party over access 
                                        
94 Note that these incentives also applied to institutions shifting the private goods benefits of patronage 
bureaucracies to public employees. Until 1978, unions were systematically persecuted (Espinal et al., 2010). 
Subsequently, public sector unionization was dissuaded through, among others, (threats of) dismissals of 
union leaders and members. Teachers and medical personnel were, starting in 1970 and as early as 1891, 
the only professional groups able to maintain a collective organization despite this adverse context. At the 
time, they represented, first, scarce resources with few qualified peers in the country; and, second, services 
which were, due to their geographic dispersion, hard to control and in close contact with beneficiary 
communities. Particularly in the case of medical personnel, these communities held a strong stake in 
uninterrupted service provision (Interview Union Leader; Interview NGO Analyst). Presidents thus shifted 
to co-opting rather than repressing them.  
95 Bar the 1990s under Peña Gomez’ leadership, the PRD was an exception to this generalization (Espinal, 
2008). 
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to patronage. Institutions allocating patronage control thus exerted causal power of 
their own – rather than merely reflecting deeper causes of professionalization. 
 
Conclusion: Institutions, Patronage Control and Professionalization 
In conclusion, the case comparison provides strong confirmatory evidence for the 
patronage control theory. Variation in institutions allocating patronage control shaped 
incumbent and challenger incentives to advance or resist professionalization in 
Paraguay and the DR as predicted by the theory. Where institutions deprived the 
Presidency of patronage control, the incumbent sought to advance – and challengers 
resisted – professionalization. Vice versa, where institutions monopolized patronage 
control in the Presidency, the incumbent resisted – and challengers supported – 
professionalization (table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3 Matching Cases and Theory 
 Institutions Allocating Patronage Control 
Presidency Monopolizes 
Patronage Control 
Presidency Deprived of 
Patronage Control 
P
ro
fe
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n
 
In
c
e
n
ti
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e
s Resist DR Incumbent Paraguay Challengers 
Reform DR Challengers Paraguay Incumbent 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Moreover, empirical evidence was found for all three causal mechanisms 
theorized to link limited patronage control with incumbent incentives to professionalize, 
albeit with differing weights. Paraguay’s incumbent advanced professionalization to 
compete electorally based on public goods and to elicit cooperation from tenured 
appointees of his predecessors; to a lesser extent, professionalization also enabled him 
to deprive electoral challengers of patronage control. Finally, the institutions which 
allocate patronage control were found to be determinants of professionalization – rather 
  
164 
than merely intervening variables reflecting deeper causes. The factors which originated 
these institutions were distinct from those incentivizing professionalization. 
Professionalization was thus an unintended consequence of prior choices about 
institutional design. As theorized, the origins of professional bureaucracies may thus lie 
in institutional differences across patronage states. 
   While this chapter thus evidenced that the patronage control theory 
added to professionalization incentives in the two cases, it left unanswered the question 
whether the institutions allocating patronage control were the only – or even decisive – 
determinants of variation in professionalization. To answer this question, the next 
chapter turns to ruling out rival explanations. Underscoring the causal power of the 
patronage control theory, these do not account for the observed variation in 
professionalization. At the same time, they do explain two important conundrums: why 
professionalization in Paraguay did not expand state-wide; and why the DR saw 
concurrently a legal revolution and standstill in practice.  
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6 
 
Supply and Demand 
Ruling out Rival Explanations for Bureaucratic 
Professionalization in Paraguay and the DR 
 
In this chapter, I explain whether rival hypotheses – rather than the patronage control 
theory – explain part or most of the observed variation in bureaucratic 
professionalization between Paraguay and the DR. Following the structure of the 
literature review in chapter 2, I do so by testing, first, demand-side rival explanations 
and, second, supply-side rival explanations. I conclude the chapter by discussing the 
implications of the (lack of) impact of these rival explanations for the literature on 
bureaucratic professionalization. 
   As I shall argue, neither demand-side nor supply-side rival explanations 
account for cross-case variation in professionalization. On the demand side, public 
employees lacked, in both cases, either the ability or incentives to demand 
professionalization; donors supported reforms in both cases, yet their limited financial 
leverage and contentment with formal reforms deprived them of the ability to bring 
about professionalization; similarly, most voters in the DR and Paraguay lacked, in the 
context of limited formal employment and prevalent poverty, incentives to seek 
professionalization rather than patronage access. At the same time, a civil society-
business coalition funded by donors demanded professionalization in the DR, yet not 
Paraguay. From a demand-side perspective, professionalization should have thus 
proceeded, if at all, in the DR rather than Paraguay. Yet, as detailed in chapter 4, 
Fernandez responded to – and sought to placate – these demands with legal and 
constitutional reforms rather than professionalization in practice. With most voters 
preferring patronage and the President monopolizing patronage control, incentives to 
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retain patronage powers and the corresponding electoral advantage overwhelmed 
professionalization incentives emanating from the societal coalition for reform.  
   Similarly, supply side rival explanations do not account for cross-case 
variation in incumbent professionalization incentives – and, as a corollary, diverging 
professionalization outcomes. They do, however, shed additional light on within-case 
outcomes and, in particular, the incremental – rather than state-wide – 
professionalization in Paraguay. Supply side variables undermined both Lugo’s ability 
and his incentives to professionalize state-wide. In the DR, Fernandez faced the opposite 
constellation. His ability to professionalize was relatively unconstrained. Moreover, 
several supply side factors tilted incentives towards professionalization. These 
professionalization incentives, however, were overwhelmed by incentives to retain 
monopolized patronage control and the concomitant electoral advantage. 
With rival explanations unable to account for cross-case variation in 
professionalization, confidence in the validity of the patronage control theory is 
enhanced. Moreover, evidence for the strength of the theory’s causal effect is provided. 
Variation in incumbent patronage control was a decisive – rather than only contributing 
– cause of cross-case variation in bureaucratic professionalization. This causal effect was 
substantively strong. Deprived of patronage control, Lugo professionalized even though 
other supply and demand side variables curtailed his ability and incentives to reform. 
For Fernandez, the opposite was true. 
Beyond the patronage control theory, two general conclusions about the 
politics of bureaucratic professionalization may be drawn from the analysis. On the 
demand side, professionalization due to collective actors will remain a rare occurrence. 
Patronage states militate, by their very nature, against both the incentives and the 
ability of collective actors to push for professionalization. As a result, the scope 
conditions of collective action explanations become highly restrictive. On the supply 
side, scholarly hypotheses appear to hold greater explanatory power for incumbent 
ability than incentives to reform. Yet, the Paraguayan case suggests that incentives are 
the key explanandum of interest. Lugo was able to professionalize part of the state 
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despite a highly adverse governability and technical capacity context. When facing 
incentives to professionalize, incumbents thus tend to be able to do so – even if only 
incrementally.  
 
Ruling Out Demand-Side Rival Explanations 
As shall be argued in this section, variation in demand-side variables does not account 
for cross-case variation in professionalization. Demand from public employees for 
professionalization was absent in both cases; donors supported reforms in both cases, 
yet their limited financial leverage precluded them from bringing about reform; at the 
same time, a broad civil society-business-donor coalition demanded reform in the DR, 
yet not Paraguay. Ceteris paribus, professionalization should have thus proceeded in 
the DR. Yet, these reform incentives were overwhelmed by incentives to retain 
patronage in response to voter prioritization of patronage over professionalization in 
conjunction with a Presidential patronage control monopoly.  
 
Demand from Public Employees for Patronage and Professionalization 
As detailed in chapter 2, bureaucrats may push for professionalization 
to protect themselves from patronage-induced career and tenure uncertainty and to 
enhance their societal legitimacy and reputation (see, for instance, Carpenter, 2001; 
Silberman, 1993). Yet, in Paraguay and the DR, such bureaucratic demand for 
professionalization was not forthcoming: public employees either lacked incentives 
(Paraguay) or incentives and the ability (DR) to demand reform. Demand from public 
employees thus does not account for the cross-case variation in professionalization.  
 Paraguay’s public sector unions could have, prima facie, been expected 
to count on both ability and incentives to seek professionalization under Lugo. As 
detailed in chapter 5, public sector unions counted on great capacity to press for their 
demands as one of the few collectively organized actors in the country. Overwhelmingly 
ANR-affiliated, union members could, prima facie, benefit from professionalization: 
discretion by the executive was unlikely to favour them under Lugo. Yet, despite 
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resentment of bureaucrats not benefiting from discretionary practices by the executive 
(UNDP, 2009), union demand for professionalization was mute. To illustrate, when 
asked about their objectives, none of the six union leaders interviewed mentioned 
competitive recruitment or promotion procedures – despite a sampling bias towards 
relatively progressive union leaders. As one union leader (Interview) put it rather 
starkly: “professionalization seems to unions a bit irrelevant.”  
At least two factors disincentivized unions from demanding 
professionalization. First, the competencies of most union members reduced their 
chances of competing successfully in examinations (Interview, SFP Director). As a 
result, union members and leaders had a marked preference for automatisms – such as 
across-the-board salary increases, pay for seniority or pay for educational credentials – 
detached from individual performance and benefiting union members collectively. 
Second, ANR unions needed not fear patronage. Their members were protected from 
dismissal through strong tenure protections. At the same time, their patrons in the 
legislature were still in office. With institutions allocating patronage control to the 
legislature, union members could thus still access patronage.  
As a result, union demand does not account for the occurrence of 
professionalization. This is not to say that unions did not affect the professionalization 
process, however. The SFP’s regulation of competitive examinations granted unions 
representation in selection commissions (SFP, 2008). This empowered unions to become 
“incomplete reform allies” (Interview, SFP Minister). In support of professionalization, 
unions acted as watchdogs, adding an external control to examinations (Interview, 
Education Vice-Minister). More significantly, they lodged formal complaints with the 
SFP when authorities selected personnel beyond the strata of political appointments 
without examinations – albeit only when such appointments were not benefiting union 
leaders or members (Interview, SFP Minister). At times, unions also resisted 
professionalization. In institutions with strong union patronage control or ANR 
militancy, unions resisted professionalization precedents which could, in the future, 
threaten their control of patronage or the electoral linkages of the ANR at-large 
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(Interview, SFP Minister). Moreover, unions resisted – at times even with hunger strikes 
– examinations for positions which ANR legislators had created for union members 
(Interview, Health Minister). The aggregate union impact on expanding 
professionalization in Paraguay was thus ambiguous at best. 
 In the DR, public employees were not only largely unwilling, but also 
largely unable to demand professionalization. As noted in chapter 5, public employees 
in the administrative realm are collectively unorganized. While the recently-founded 
Associations of Public Servants are to participate in ad hoc juries supervising 
competitive examinations for civil servants (MAP, 2009), the Associations’ inexistence 
or, where founded, lack of independence from the party in power precludes them from 
adding an autonomous control to examinations. Moreover, where the (few) competitive 
examinations did take place, “these were not well-received [by public employees]. They 
felt they had political rights. There was discontent among part of the personnel who 
felt that they were no longer worthy … So they boycotted the new personnel.” 
(Interview, Finance Director)  
In the case of teachers and medical personnel, interview respondents 
coincided, as one MAP Director writes, that their “objectives are directed at preserving 
the rights and prerogatives of their professional class, not … at safeguarding the quality 
of public services and the professionalization of public employment.” (De La Cruz 
Hernández, 2011, p. 4) As a result, “the main fights [of unions] are for salary increases 
… other important topics are disregarded.” (Interview, NGO Analyst)96 The lack of 
demand for professionalization stemmed in part from political capture of unions (see 
chapter 5). Mobilization for objectives antagonistic to the interests of the incumbent 
was thus largely pre-empted. As in Paraguay, lack of union demand also stemmed in 
part from limited professional competencies of members – and thus a preference for 
                                        
96 In education, one caveat to this generalization applies. Demands from the non-partisan ‘Juan Pablo 
Duarte’ ADP faction did extend to professionalization (Interview Union Leader). The faction’s membership 
draws in great part on teachers without party affiliations. As such, its own success in the electoral 
competition for the ADP Presidency hinges partially on the recruitment of non-partisan teachers. While 
the faction held the presidency under the Mejia Presidency (2000-04) – during which competitive 
examinations for teachers were introduced – it did not occupy it during the Fernandez Presidency.   
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collective benefits detached from individual performance – in conjunction with 
continued access to patronage. To illustrate, “when vacancies appear in education, they 
[the union] immediately put pressure on the selection process so that union members 
can accede. When one wants to establish higher technical standards which could exclude 
part of their members, the union immediately pressures so that these standards are not 
as strong.” (Interview, MAP Advisor) 
In conclusion, demand from public employees does not account for 
diverging professionalization outcomes in Paraguay and the DR. Whether donor 
demand commanded greater explanatory power is examined next. 
 
Donor Demand for Bureaucratic Professionalization 
Donor organizations such as USAID and international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank are, as detailed in chapter 2, major reform 
stakeholders in many developing countries. They provide, among others, technical and 
financial assistance as well as international legitimacy to domestic professionalization 
efforts (see, among many, Andrews, 2013; Laking & Norman, 2007).  
Paraguay and the DR were no exception. Technical and financial 
support facilitated, in both cases, reform expansion. In the DR, donors additionally 
brought together a broad societal coalition to demand professionalization and counted 
on greater financial leverage to induce state reforms. Yet, it was Paraguay which 
professionalized. Donor demand may thus be ruled out as a rival explanation.  
In Paraguay, donors have demanded professionalization since at least 
the democratic transition. In the 1990s, they funded, among others, the drafting of the 
2000 public service law (Interview, NGO Analyst). Under Lugo as under his 
predecessors, however, limited financial leverage – 2008-2012 net official development 
assistance stood at 0.6 percent of GNI (World Bank, 2013a) – deprived donors of the 
ability to bring about professionalization through conditionalities. To illustrate, the six 
donor officials interviewed were unanimous in noting that it was government rather 
than donor action which underlay professionalization. Several further pieces of evidence 
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substantiate this assessment. A $4.2m IDB loan to fund civil service reform had been 
approved under the previous Duarte government, yet was largely “forgotten about” 
until the Lugo government took office (Interview, Donor Official). Donor- rather than 
government-driven reform elements – such as the regulation of allowances controlled by 
the executive – in turn often failed to make progress (Interview, Donor Official). Donors 
were also uninvolved in key reform negotiations. The discussion of the Presidential 
decree draft in support of professionalization at the Council of Ministers (see chapter 
4), for instance, was not accompanied by a socialization of the decree with donors to 
solicit their support (Interview, SFP Director). 
While thus not causing professionalization, donor support did facilitate 
reform implementation through technical and financial assistance. The public personnel 
management policy and the management information system SICCA developed under 
Lugo, for instance, were designed by donor-funded consultancies and based on an 
external policy blueprint – the Latin American Civil Service Charter. Donor funding 
was also instrumental in recruiting a reform team in the SFP, with its staff size 
doubling; and in strengthening the SFP institutionally, with its budget growing by 77 
percent in 2008-2011 (SFP, 2011c).  
In the DR, donors were comparatively more involved. As in Paraguay, 
they provided financial and technical support which facilitated reform implementation. 
The drafting of the 2008 public service law, for instance, was explicitly based on the 
Latin American Civil Service Charter and supported by a range of donor-funded 
consultancies, as was the development of the management information system SASP. 
Donor funding was, moreover, instrumental in assuring the MAP’s capacity to act. The 
MAP’s government-funded budget covered only fixed costs such as salaries and 
electricity. Donor funds – which accounted for 25 percent of MAP’s total budget – made 
the Ministry operational (Interview, MAP Director).  
More so than in Paraguay, however, donors also counted on financial 
leverage – and thus a seemingly enhanced ability – to press for state reforms. In the 
context of recurrent economic crises, “38 World Bank agreements (1970 – 2004), six 
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IMF agreements (1982 – 2005) and numerous USAID, IDB and UNDP projects leverage 
the policy interests of multilateral lenders.” (Mitchell, 2009, p. 204) As a result, the 
“Dominican external exposure rivals extreme cases found in Latin America.” (Mitchell, 
2009, p. 204) To illustrate, during the Fernandez Presidency, most state reform laws 
(albeit not the 2008 public service law) formed part of IMF, World Bank and IDB 
conditionalities (Contreras, 2009; Interview, Finance Vice-Minister).  
At the same time, international actors counted on a “paradoxical 
inability … to shape specific political outcomes” in practice (Espinal & Hartlyn, 1999, 
p. 469). As elsewhere in the developing world (see Andrews, 2013), this stems in part 
from a donor practice to reward tangible formal institutional reforms over informal 
change and to measure project success by project disbursements. As a consequence, 
public service reform stemmed in part “from this simulation game how the political 
system works … ‘What do you [an international organization] want? You want … a 
Ministry [of Public Administration]? How much do you give me for that? A loan or 
whatever possible is fine. Hand it over. Let’s create a Ministry.’” (Interview, Economy 
Vice-Minister)  
More exceptionally compared to other developing countries and the 
Paraguayan case, however, donors in the DR also assembled – and funded – a broad 
societal coalition in support of state reforms. In 2009, donors set up – and funded 95 
percent of the costs of – a multi-stakeholder Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative 
(IPAC). In 2010-2012, IPAC brought together 260 societal stakeholders in ten working 
groups, including one on civil service reform. As part of IPAC, public accountability 
workshops to measure implementation progress took place every three months (World 
Bank, 2012a). While progress on some reform measures was made in this period – 
including the expansion of SASP and the administrative career (see chapters 4 and 7) 
– professionalization was not forthcoming. 
In conclusion, donors acted as “trampolines” for professionalization in 
both cases, facilitating reform expansion through technical and financial assistance 
(Interview, Donor Official DR). They did not cause professionalization, however. 
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Beyond providing technical and financial support, donors in the DR – rather than 
Paraguay – were involved in key reform negotiations and the creation of a coalition for 
professionalization. Donors in the DR also counted on greater financial leverage. Yet, 
it was Paraguay which saw professionalization.  
In sum, donor demand does not explain cross-case variation in 
professionalization. As shall be argued next, this conclusion applies as well to civil 
society and business demand. 
 
Collective Societal and Business Demand for Patronage and Professionalization 
Collective societal actors may face a variety of incentives to demand 
professionalization (see chapter 2). They gain, for instance, political decision-making 
power with the decline of patronage-based party organizations (see, among many, 
Shefter, 1993). Business demand may complement civic mobilization. 
Professionalization offers the promise of reduced business transaction costs and 
enhanced investment confidence, among others (see, among many, Weber, 1978). In the 
two cases studied, societal and business mobilization for reform contrasted with 
professionalization outcomes. It occurred in the DR rather than Paraguay. Civil society 
and business demand may thus be ruled out as rival explanations. 
In Paraguay, collective societal and business demand for 
professionalization was, except for one isolated incident, muted. Collective societal 
actors lacked the ability and/or incentives to demand professionalization. Next to public 
sector unions, peasant federations were, with roughly 40,000 members, the foremost 
collective societal actor (Paredes, 2007). Yet, they attributed higher priority to other 
grievances, in particular land reform (Coordinadora de los Derechos Humanos de 
Paraguay, 2012). Private sector unions in turn lacked a mobilization base: only roughly 
7 percent of employees worked in businesses with more than 50 people (Abente Brun, 
2007).  
Against this backdrop, the Lugo administration saw only one collective 
societal mobilization against patronage. In April 2012, the legislature sought to overturn 
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a Presidential veto against a US$35m budget expansion to fund 5,000 additional 
political operators. In response, several thousand young professionals mobilized in front 
of Congress in a ‘Revolutionary After Office’. Facing this unusual resistance, legislators 
abandoned their attempt to override the Presidential veto (Nickson, 2012). This was 
but an isolated societal action, however. To illustrate, when a budget expansion to fund 
political operators found legislative approval six months later, society did not mobilize 
(ABC Color, 2012a). 
The economic elite – which consisted, principally, of former Colorado 
and military elites – lacked incentives to step in. As Nickson (2009, p. 288) puts it, “the 
fortune of virtually every millionaire businessman in Paraguay was developed through 
illicit contracts with the state.” As such, business interests were antagonistic to 
bureaucratic professionalization and other state reforms which would complicate access 
to clientelist arrangements with state officials (Nickson & Lambert, 2002).  
As a result, societal support for professionalization was largely limited 
to public opinion incidence by NGOs – in particular watchdog organizations and think 
tanks. Rather than representing broader societal actors, however, NGOs were largely 
funded – and responding to – donors (Lachi, 2009; USAID, 2009). Moreover, NGO 
support during the Lugo administration was complicated by their absorption in 
government: a large fraction of civil society activists joined Lugo’s government (Setrini, 
2011). In this context, NGOs were uninvolved in key reform decisions, such as the 
negotiation of the Presidential decree in support of professionalization (Interview, SFP 
Director). Their public opinion incidence in turn was curtailed by media partisan biases. 
Six of seven major media outlets were controlled by individuals with former ties to 
Stroessner (USAID, 2009). Unsurprisingly, the media had – except for blatant cases of 
nepotism – not reported about patronage prior to Lugo. Lack of coverage was reversed 
in response to public patronage accusations by the SFP (see, among many, ABC Color, 
2011b). Reports remained sporadic and without follow-up, however. As such, they did 
not exert major professionalization pressure. Civil society and business demand thus do 
not account for professionalization.  
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In the DR, collective societal action had a more prominent role. 
Professionalization was fomented by pressure from a polycentric coalition formed by 
donors, NGOs and business associations (see Schuster, 2014 for a more detailed 
account). To illustrate, the formulation of the 2008 public service law was accompanied 
by discussions of every single article in the National Dialogue – an entity which brought 
together most of the major business and civil society actors. Moreover, ONAP – the 
MAP’s predecessor – held repeated bilateral discussions with the country’s principal 
NGOs and business associations: Participación Ciudadana, FINJUS, CONEP and 
ANJE. In parallel, ONAP periodically informed media outlets about the reform to sway 
public opinion (Delmas, 2007). After the approval of the 2008 public service law, 
implementation was, as noted, monitored in IPAC working groups with broad societal 
participation. Subsequent to IPAC, multi-stakeholder working groups with roughly 200 
participating societal organizations accompanied the reform at the national and 
provincial level (Interview, NGO Analyst).  
This civil society, private sector and donor coalition was central to 
putting public opinion pressure on Fernandez. As an NGO analyst puts it, “many times 
[our] positions are convenient to the Ministry of Public Administration, because they 
have internal battles. And many times the Minister has to swallow things, but when 
we voice it [the positions], this helps him open doors.” (Interview) The MAP Minister 
himself put it even more starkly. According to him, the societal alliances are “what 
makes that one can survive.” (Interview) 
To respond to this pressure, Fernandez supplied legal reforms and 
implementation progress where it did not curtail patronage (see chapter 4). These had 
“a lot of political added value: a public opinion effect.” (Interview, MAP Advisor) For 
Fernandez then, “formality was a way to safeguard my image … And if I can do it 
without it affecting me, well then why don’t we do it?” (Interview, Presidency Advisor)  
Societal pressure was insufficient to tilt incentives towards 
professionalization in practice, however. Donor- and private sector-funded civil society 
organizations were frequently disconnected from a broader societal base. The society 
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at-large was demobilized. Private sector unions “have always had a minimal presence.” 
(Singer, 2012, p. 74) Middle and upper classes have adopted individual, private sector 
solutions to solve collective problems such as electricity or health (M. E. Sánchez & 
Senderowitsch, 2012). In poorer neighbourhoods in turn, local associations frequently 
seek access to clientelist state resources rather than state reform. The government 
provides funding to over 3,000 NGOs and NGO participation is statistically associated 
with the receipt of clientelist goods. As a result, “civil society is not external to parties.” 
(Espinal et al., 2010, p. 50) 
Businesses similarly face disincentives to demand professionalization. 
Prima facie, we could expect them to be important reform demand sources. The DR 
has seen rapid private sector development, with an average growth rate of 5.3 percent 
in 1967-2007 – second only to Chile in Latin America (World Bank, 2014a). Moreover, 
businesses cite corruption and an inefficient bureaucracy among the three most critical 
business obstacles (World Bank, 2012b). At the same time, however, businesses “do not 
want to see themselves on the black list of the government” (Interview, Donor Official) 
– not least as many of them secure preferential treatment through personal relations 
with the government (World Bank, 2014a).  
Likewise, the media is only a partial conduit for public opinion pressure. 
Most journalists lack political independence: over 5,000 are allegedly on the 
government’s payroll (Von Ruster, 2012). At the same time, even journalists critical of 
the government did not denounce patronage. As a journalist (Interview) explains, “this 
is like a battle that one understands is lost beforehand … if they can make a 
[procurement] contract for $20mn or $200mn without a competitive selection, how will 
you fight for them to make a competitive examination for one employee in a ministry.” 
Lastly – and as detailed in the next section – collective societal demand was insufficient 
to tilt incentives towards professionalization as voters continued to prioritize access to 
patronage over professionalization.  
Against this backdrop, civil society and business demand may be ruled 
out as rival explanations. 
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Voter Preferences for Patronage and Professionalization 
As detailed in chapter 2, voter preferences may shape incumbent 
incentives even in the absence of collective mobilization. Such preferences tend not to 
translate directly into demands for patronage and professionalization, but rather into 
demands for private and public goods provision – which in turn shape the political 
payoffs of patronage and professionalization. Voter preferences are hypothesized to shift 
towards public goods as a result of changes in income, education, private sector 
employment opportunities, urbanization and ethnic fractionalization97 (see chapter 2).  
 Yet, neither Paraguay nor the DR saw major shifts in these variables 
prior to or during the Fernandez and Lugo Presidencies. Instead, most citizens in the 
two countries continued to put a premium on access to private goods. 
Paraguay was, as the DR, characterized by relatively rapid economic 
growth when Lugo came to power, with real GDP increases of 3.9 percent per year in 
2002-2012. In parallel, net secondary school enrolment rates increased from 52 percent 
to 63 percent and urbanization advanced, with the urban share of the population 
increasing from 57 percent to 62 percent in the same period (World Bank, 2013b). As 
a result, Paraguay saw the gradual rise of independent “new democrats:” students and 
urban professionals demanding public goods provision (Hetherington, 2011). As a former 
Senator (Interview) put it, however, “there was this growth … but no realignment so to 
speak.” In other words and as evidenced by socio-economic indicators, the ‘new 
democrats’ remained a small minority.  
Instead, a largely impoverished and poorly educated population met an 
agrarian economic structure with constrained demand for low-skilled labour. 32.4 
percent of Paraguay’s population lived under the national poverty line in 2011, a figure 
that had fallen by only 3.7 percent since 1998; 62.9 percent of the urban labour force 
was employed in the informal sector (World Bank, 2012c); and 35.4 percent of the 
                                        
97 As ethnicity is prominent as an explanatory variable for patronage in regions beyond Latin America (see, 
for instance, Berman, 1998), I do not examine it in detail for the two cases. Having said that, ethnic 
devisions may have added to patronage incentives in the DR in particular (Morgan, Hartlyn, & Espinal, 
2011). 
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population was either unemployed or under-employed (Dirección General de Estadística 
Encuestas y Censos, 2006). Not surprisingly then, the lack of employment was rated as 
the most pressing problem by voters (Consejo Impulsor del Sistema Nacional de 
Integridad, 2005). In this context, Paraguay’s government was the country’s largest 
employer.  
Rather than collectively seeking state reform, voters thus tended to 
individually demand access to public sector jobs. In the resulting “country without 
citizens,” Lugo faced such patronage demands despite having run on a public goods 
platform (Rodríguez, 2012, p. 5). To illustrate, when the only Senator of Lugo’s MPT 
returned to communities where he had campaigned based on public goods promises, 
these same communities now demanded from him access to jobs, noting: “now it is our 
turn … it is our moment to enter [the government].” (Interview, SFP Minister)  
Similarly, in the DR, most citizens demanded individually access to 
public employment rather than collectively reform – even though, as in Paraguay, a 
socio-economic transformation took place when Fernandez came to power. Between 
2000 and 2012, net secondary school enrolment rates increased from 40 percent to 62 
percent and urbanization from 62 percent to 70 percent. In parallel, per capita incomes 
increased in real terms by 53 percent to reach over US$11,000 in 2012 – roughly 58 
percent more than in Paraguay (World Bank, 2013b).  
This socio-economic transformation was not accompanied by reduced 
unemployment or poverty, however. At 34 percent, the DR’s moderate poverty levels 
in 2009 exceeded those in 1997 (27 percent). Likewise, informality in employment 
remained high, at 57 percent in 2010 compared to 53 percent in 2000. Concurrently, 
unemployment averaged 16 percent in 2000-2011 (Organización Internacional del 
Trabajo, 2013). Against this backdrop, citizen demand for and acquiescence to 
patronage remained large. To illustrate, over 75 percent of surveyed voters considered 
it either not corrupt or justifiable if politicians use their influence to provide public 
sector jobs to unemployed relatives (Morgan & Espinal, 2010). A MAP advisor 
(Interview) explains: “who comes to a public sector position has a social obligation to 
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help his friends, [party members, family members … and followers] which is so strong 
that in society it is frowned upon [if he does not].” In reference to citizen demands for 
jobs and other private goods, even Fernandez himself noted that “in [the DR] the 
government falls if it cannot incorporate citizens in some survival mechanism. In Spain, 
the government falls if this is revealed, here it falls if it is not done.” (cited in Benito 
Sanchez, 2010a, p. 754)  
Consequently, voter preferences in both cases maximized the electoral 
utility of private goods provision. Unsurprisingly, patronage had historically been the 
rule of the game in the countries’ bureaucracies. An important scope condition of the 
patronage control theory was thus met: control over patronage provided important 
electoral advantages. At the same time, however, public and private goods preferences 
of voters may be ruled out as rival explanations: they did not undergo major shifts in 
either of the two cases.  
In conclusion, demand-side variables do not account for why 
professionalization advanced in Paraguay, yet not the DR. Whether supply-side 
variables command greater explanatory power is examined next.  
 
Ruling Out Supply-Side Rival Explanations 
Drawing on the scholarly hypotheses reviewed in chapter 2, the explanatory power of 
seven supply side variables shall be examined: patterns of electoral competition and 
political time horizons; party organizations, constituencies and ideologies; presidential 
beliefs and convictions; principal-agent problems in (growing) patronage networks; 
electoral institutions; technical capacity constraints; and governability concerns.98 As 
evidenced below, these factors do not account for variation in incumbent reform 
incentives – and, concomitantly, in professionalization outcomes. They do, however, 
add to explaining within-case outcomes and, in particular, the incremental – rather 
                                        
98 Note that the literature review in chapter 2 had pointed to several additional variables, such as 
administrative legacies. As these are – in line with the most similar system design – held largely constant 
across the two cases, they lack cross-case variation which could explain diverging professionalization 
outcomes. Consequently, they are not further discussed in this chapter. 
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than state-wide – professionalization in Paraguay. Both Lugo’s ability and his incentives 
to expand professionalization were curtailed by supply side factors. 
 
Electoral Competition and Political Time Horizons 
Despite their prominence in the literature, patterns of electoral 
competition do not explain diverging professionalization outcomes. Fernandez and Lugo 
both rose to power in electoral contexts characterized by manageable numbers of stable 
parties competing in closely contested elections and offering voters relatively clear 
governing alternatives. In Paraguay, the ANR and PLRA had, as the country’s two 
largest parties, jointly never obtained less than 71 percent of Chamber of Deputies seats 
in 1992-2008 (Georgetown University, 2014). In the DR, the same three parties – the 
PRSC, PLD and PRD – have alternated in the Presidency since the democratic 
transition in 1978. With the gradual implosion of the PRSC after Balaguer’s death in 
2002, the country’s party system evolved towards a “satellite bipartisanship” (Espinal, 
2010a), with the PLD and the PRD as the “two mainstream” parties (Benito Sanchez 
& Lozano, 2012, p. 199). According to O’Dwyer (2006), Grzymala-Busse (2007) and 
Geddes (1996, p. 190), among others, these patterns of predictable and stable electoral 
competition between parties of relatively similar size should have tilted incentives 
towards professionalization in both countries prior to the rise of Lugo and Fernandez. 
Parties, however, opted for patronage.  
Professionalization was also not incentivized by the anticipation of a 
potential or imminent exit from office, as hypothesized by, among others, Ting et al. 
(2013). Lugo commenced professionalization in his first month in office. At the same 
time, the ANR made no attempt at professionalization in the four months between 
losing the Presidential elections and Lugo’s inauguration in 2008.  
Similarly, hypotheses with less sanguine predictions about the effects of 
electoral competition do not account for professionalization. As argued by, for instance, 
Lapuente and Nistotskaya (2009), shorter political time horizons and political 
uncertainty diminish the expectation of incumbents to reap the long-term public goods 
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benefits of reform and thus militate against it. This hypothesis would have implicated 
professionalization in the DR rather than Paraguay, though. The implementation of the 
2008 public service law coincided with Fernandez’ third term in office; the PLD had 
come to progressively dominate all branches of government; and Fernandez as a 
“permanent candidate for the Presidency” (Interview, Education Minister) noted that 
the PLD “should prepare to govern after 2016 … for the next 20 years.” (cited in El 
Caribe, 2013) In other words, Fernandez and the PLD at-large operated under a long 
political time horizon. Yet, Fernandez resisted professionalization.  
In contrast, Lugo supported reform in a political context marked by high 
uncertainty and brief time horizons. As noted, Lugo faced constant impeachment 
threats starting virtually weeks into his Presidency, after Vice-President Franco’s 
conviction to replace Lugo was publicized. Lugo nonetheless proceeded with 
professionalization, underscoring the explanatory power of the patronage control theory: 
it incentivized professionalization despite the limited public goods gains to be reaped 
within a brief political time horizon. 
 
Party Organizations, Constituencies and Ideologies 
Differences in party organizations similarly fail to explain diverging 
professionalization outcomes. According to Cruz and Keefer (2013), cohesive party 
organizations facilitate reform by enabling collective action and thus credible public 
goods promises by politicians. Yet, this should have tilted incentives towards 
professionalization in the DR rather than Paraguay. Founded in 1973, the PLD was 
historically characterized by vertical leadership control and discipline among party 
members. Locally known as the ‘mini-cabinet’, a virtually tenured political committee 
with 27 members – all of which occupied high-level public offices – decided on all 
important party directives (Benito Sanchez, 2013). Concomitantly, data from a global 
expert survey indicates that PLD leaders are more in control of selecting candidates 
and setting electoral strategies than party leaders in the majority of developing 
countries (Singer, 2012). In contrast, Lugo did not count on a cohesive party 
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organization able to credibly commit to broad public goods delivery. In fact and as 
noted, Lugo “did not have a party [but rather] a conglomerate of independent people” 
(Interview, Finance Director).  
Grzymala-Busse (2007) and Sorauf (1959), among others, in turn argue 
that only parties with the organizational capacity to monitor and enforce patronage 
contracts may administer patronage to its maximum advantage. While this hypothesis 
was at play in the DR, it does not account for cross-case variation in professionalization. 
With a network of, by the end of Fernandez’ third term, 173,000 base committees (El 
Dia, 2013; Listin Diario, 2013), the PLD was, according to ethnographic studies, “by 
far the best organized [party in the DR] and thorough in keeping track of the supporters 
who fulfilled their part of the bargain.” (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2009, p. 163) This country-
wide presence, however, was mostly subsequent – rather than prior to – Fernandez’ 
choice to rely on patronage. When Fernandez came to power, the PLD still lacked – 
even if somewhat less so than Lugo in Paraguay – a broad organization (Keefer, 2002). 
In subsequent years, Fernandez expanded the PLD’s presence (largely) through 
patronage. This expanded presence in turn added to the electoral utility of patronage. 
In other words, when Fernandez came to power, the PLD’s party organization largely 
emanated from patronage – rather than patronage from the PLD’s party organization. 
In Paraguay, the lack of a party organization of the incumbent 
implicated, as its flipside, the lack of a pool of party affiliates to appoint to positions. 
None of the (centre-)left parties came to count on more than 41,000 affiliates (ABC 
Color, 2012b). In contrast, PLD membership stood at 1.4m after Fernandez initiated 
his second Presidential term in 2004 (Listin Diario, 2013). With Lugo yet not Fernandez 
lacking appointees, professionalization should – according to Geddes (1996) – have 
proceeded in Paraguay, not the DR. Note, though, that the lack of a pool of party 
affiliates for appointments preserves the ability yet not necessarily incentives for reform. 
It safeguarded Lugo’s ability as he did not face many demands from party affiliates 
expecting patronage in return for prior campaign support. This is echoed by one of 
Lugo’s Vice-Ministers of Agriculture (Interview): “I did not respond to any party … so 
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I did not have debts [to repay] … That gave me more possibilities [to professionalize].” 
The lack of patronage obligations to party affiliates, however, did not reduce patronage 
demands from voters – and, as such, affect whether professionalization rather than 
patronage was the electorally optimal choice to mobilize votes.  
At the same time, the presence of a pool of party affiliates in the DR 
did not forestall reform. As should be expected, party members did pressure for public 
employment. As the Director of the National Council for State Reform (Interview) put 
it, “you will always have the pressure of putting [into positions] people from your … 
committees ... They expect that.” As a result, “the party crucifies you if you undertake 
competitive examinations” (Interview, Presidency Advisor) – or, more specifically, 
“heats you [i.e. a minister] with the President” (Interview, NGO Analyst). Many 
ministers thus lacked the ability to professionalize. Fernandez, however, did retain this 
power. The PLD was characterized by “subordination to [Fernandez’] leadership,” not 
least as it had been Fernandez who had brought the PLD to the Presidency (Interview, 
Academic). As a result then “if [Fernandez] says we will professionalize, it will be done. 
But he would have to dismiss many of his party” (Interview, Donor Official). Even 
though Fernandez was thus able to professionalize despite patronage demands from 
party affiliates, he lacked incentives to do so. 
This is even though PLD members were, according to survey data, the 
most educated among the three major parties in the DR (Schrank, 2010). Originating 
from a middle-class base, many middle- and high-level party leaders counted on 
professional backgrounds (Interview, NGO Analyst). According to Benitez-Iturbe 
(2008) and Calvo and Murillo (2004), patronage should have thus been a particularly 
costly electoral strategy for Fernandez. With better private sector employment 
prospects, more educated party members were likely to demand greater wage premiums 
to provide electoral support.  
In Paraguay, Lugo faced an opposite set of incentives. ANR leaders and 
members had monopolized state-funded educational opportunities while in power. 
Competitive examinations were thus likely to favour them disproportionately. As a 
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Colorado Vice-Minister of Education (Interview) explains, “when [the Lugo 
administration] came to power, they realized that they would probably be able to fill 
some vacancies through competitive examinations with likeminded personnel. But they 
would hardly be able to win the other examinations over a party which was 60 years in 
government, with [access to] scholarships, opportunities, education.” As a result, 
competitive examinations limited access to public sector positions for Lugo’s 
constituency, in particular the poor. This, at times, engendered intra-party resistance 
to reform. As a Minister of Health (Interview) recalls, “in a meeting with social sectors, 
[one of our] political leaders complained that ‘there are ministers who demand 
curriculums from poor people’ in an … allegation to me and [Minister of Civil Service] 
Lilian.” The educational attainment of party constituencies thus shifted incentives 
towards professionalization in the DR and against it in Paraguay. Speaking to the 
explanatory power of the patronage control theory, professionalization outcomes were 
juxtaposed. 
Beyond their educational attainment, party constituencies may differ in 
their ideological orientation – and, as a corollary, in their prioritization of private and 
public goods receipts (Calvo & Murillo, 2004). Yet, the DR’s and Paraguay’s major 
parties were not characterized by significant ideological differences. In the DR, parties 
had originally formed around ideological cleavages. Due to a gradual “de-
ideologization,” however, “parties do not present distinct or ideologically cohesive 
[choices] to voters.” (Benito Sanchez, 2013; Singer, 2012, p. 66) In fact, when Fernandez 
came to power, there was no statistically significant difference in the ideological self-
placement of PRD and PLD legislators (Benito Sanchez, 2010a). Concomitantly, 
discussions about programmatic differences were absent in campaigns (Hartlyn & 
Espinal, 2009).  
Similarly, in Paraguay, both the ANR and PLRA were non-ideological 
catch-all parties, mobilizing a broad spectrum of groups (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997). 
This was reflected in overlapping party affiliations. In 2012, the ANR counted on 1.3m 
unique members, next to 0.7m members also affiliated with other parties. The PLRA 
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in turn counted on 0.61m unique members, in addition to 0.5m members with multiple 
affiliations (Ultima Hora, 2012a). Heading an alliance of left-wing parties, Lugo was the 
exception to this lack of ideological differentiation. Yet, left-wing ideology does not 
account for professionalization. Several smaller left-wing parties resisted 
professionalization of the institutions under their control (Interview, NGO Analyst). 
This is, in comparative perspective, unsurprising: a range of other left-wing incumbents 
in the region have pursued left-wing policies through private goods provision (Philip & 
Panizza, 2011).  
 
Presidential Beliefs and Convictions 
Next to party ideologies, personal convictions of the two incumbents 
could have been at play (see Grzymala-Busse, 2008; Weyland, 2002). In the case of 
Lugo – a former priest and adherent of liberation theology (O'Shaughnessy, 2009) – 
such convictions represent a particularly intuitive rival explanation. Lugo may have 
been willing to reform himself out of office: to professionalize even though reform was 
not electorally rational. Case evidence does not lend credence to this rival explanation, 
however. In fact, the personal aspirations of Lugo complicated professionalization. Well-
publicized in media outlets, President Lugo provided government jobs to allegedly more 
than 100 family members (Interview, Journalist). Noting that his family members also 
have the right to work in the public sector and that many did so, Lugo did not refute 
these accusations (Ultima Hora, 2008b). This presidential nepotism impaired state-wide 
professionalization. According to an advisor in the Presidency (Interview), the President 
was recommended to “better let [the Presidential decree regulating state-wide 
competitive examinations] go because it is a threat … a possible instrument of use 
against you … the first thing they will tell you is ‘look at the quantity of people you put 
[into positions]’ … [at worst] it could be [one of the] causes for an impeachment.”  
In the DR, personal – rather than electoral – concerns may, similarly, 
be ruled out as the cause for lacking professionalization. As an academic (Interview) 
explains, “Leonel Fernandez is a person with a high level of political rationality who 
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governs as a function of this rationality – not in the sense of rationalizing the state, but 
in the sense of using clientelism as a mechanism of power.” 
 
Principal-Agent Problems in (Growing) Patronage Networks 
According to Johnson and Libecap (1994), professionalization may result 
from growing patron-client networks – and, consequently, growing principal-agent 
problems in the control of appointees. At first sight, this hypothesis could have been at 
work in both cases. Paraguay and the DR’s public personnel spending grew rapidly in 
real terms under Lugo and Fernandez, at 14 percent (2008-12) and 12 percent (2004-
11) per year respectively (World Bank, 2013b). At the same time, there are more than 
twice as many public employees in the DR than in Paraguay, and a much larger share 
of public employees were incumbent appointees in the DR (Contraloría General de la 
República, 2013; SFP, 2011b). Contrary to Johnson and Libecap’s (1994) prediction, 
however, Paraguay rather than the DR professionalized.  
Within-case evidence in the DR confirms the lack of major principal-
agent problems in patronage networks. Fernandez counted on a range of instruments 
to resolve such problems. To cite a few: the President could assure more un-
intermediated patron-client links by selecting mid- and high-level officials who 
responded directly to him rather than the head of institution: “a minister has two or 
three [high-level appointees] that effectively work for him … The rest is politics of the 
President.” (Interview, Economy Vice-Minister) The President thereby, of course, does 
“not investigate every one of the persons to sign their appointments. Instead, they come 
with certain recommendations such as ‘they undertake political work in this locality, 
are party leaders at an intermediate level and similar things.” (Interview, NGO Analyst) 
Institutions, furthermore, regularly submitted payrolls to the Presidency which “contain 
a summary at the end which disaggregates all that you have done in the payroll … all 
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appointments, all departures, all salary increases.” (Interview, Economy Director) As a 
result, Fernandez could closely monitor ministerial patronage spending.99 
 
Electoral Institutions 
Relatively similar electoral institutions in Paraguay and the DR 
similarly fail to explain variation in professionalization outcomes. Electoral institutions 
are argued to incentivize patronage in particular when personalizing electoral contests 
(G. Cox & McCubbins, 2001; Müller, 2007). In this context, both Paraguay and the 
DR feature mandatory party primaries – which put a premium on patronage as a 
differentiation strategy in primary elections (Espinal, 2010b; Molinas, Pérez-Liñán, 
Saiegh, & Montero, 2011). Deputies in both countries are, moreover, elected through a 
D’Hondt proportional representation (PR) system. Contrary to Paraguay, the DR 
thereby switched from a closed-list to an open-list PR system in 2002. As “most voters 
vote for the party list as it is presented … it is unlikely that the shift to open-list 
competition has greatly changed the incentives facing politicians,” however (Singer, 
2012, p. 73). Professionalization incentives emanating from electoral institutions thus 
did not differ substantively across the two cases. 
 
Technical Capacity Constraints 
Next to political factors, technical concerns could have yielded diverging 
professionalization outcomes. As noted in chapter 2, professionalization involves an 
implementation dilemma: it is meant to reduce bureaucratic capacity constraints, yet 
these very constraints complicate reform. Such constraints were present in both 
countries: public personnel offices in line institutions had been but paper processors, 
without significant experience in competitive examinations prior to Lugo and Fernandez 
                                        
99 Tellingly, one of the DR’s major reform achievements – the implementation of the public personnel 
management and information system SASP (see chapter 4) – did not advance professionalization but rather 
principal-agent control. Prior to the SASP, the President lacked knowledge about “how many we [public 
employees] are, nor where we are nor what we do.” (Interview NGO Analyst) The SASP partially resolved 
the concomitant control problem. 
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(see, for instance, SFP, 2010). Yet, capacity constraints did not preclude 
professionalization. Both countries strengthened the capacity of their civil service 
ministries and public personnel offices under Lugo and Fernandez. To illustrate, the 
SFP roughly doubled its staff size (Interview, SFP Minister); likewise, the MAP more 
than doubled its staff expenditures (Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 2014).  
This is not to say that capacity limitations did not complicate 
professionalization. In the DR, a departmental director in a state institution (Interview) 
lamented: “You know how much time I have been waiting for four [staff] to be selected 
by a competitive examination? Seven months. What incentive does a public servant 
have to do the things the way they should be if I need these four staff yesterday and it 
has been seven months and I still do not have them. Because I am respecting all the 
steps at the pace at which the Ministry of Public Administration can go forward.” 
Similarly, in Paraguay, competitive examinations were, at times, a “suffering,” taking 
more than half a year (Interview, Finance Director). While technical capacity 
limitations resulted in part from lacking prior professionalization experience, they were, 
at least in the DR, also a function of lacking Presidential support. As an Advisor in the 
Presidency (Interview) puts it, “what the Ministry [MAP] needs is many more analysts, 
much more personnel, etc. but the President [Fernández] did not give it that … He did 
not empower … the Ministry of Public Administration to comply with its mandate.” In 
other words, technical capacity constraints were in part endogenous to political 
resistance to professionalization in the DR. Technical capacity thus constrained 
professionalization in both cases, yet does not exogenously account for diverging 
professionalization outcomes. 
 
Governability Concerns 
According to Geddes’ (1996, p. 18) “politician’s dilemma,” an 
incumbent’s longer-run interest in public goods provision via professionalization is 
superseded by an immediate interest in political survival through patronage. 
Governability concerns may thus undermine an incumbent’s ability to reform even when 
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facing incentives to do so. And, indeed, governability concerns loom large in explaining 
limited reform expansion in Paraguay. Virtually absent in the DR, however, the 
“politician’s dilemma” does not explain cross-case variation in professionalization 
outcomes.  
In the DR’s hyper-presidentialist system, Fernandez had every ability to 
professionalize, yet chose not to do so. As detailed in chapter 5, Fernandez ceded, in 
the executive, control over only a minority of institutions to satellite parties which had 
supported his presidential bid. In the majority of institutions – which remained under 
PLD control – Fernandez could have imposed professionalization. As an Advisor in the 
Presidency (Interview) put it, “we are a presidentialist country ... No Minister would 
say no to the President. But they felt that the [Presidential] commitment was not so 
great … in practical terms, the civil service was not [his] priority.” The 
professionalization of the tax administration (DGII) was the exception which proved 
the rule – or, in other words, Fernandez’ professionalization ability. The “brutal reform 
process … where everybody was fired … to afterwards evaluate based on technical criteria 
whom to contract” (Interview, Finance Advisor) was, in the words of a DGII Director 
(Interview), possible without the institution “ever needing … to search for support in 
the legislative sector [or elsewhere].” Presidential support sufficed (see also Lozano, 
2012).  
Governability concerns outside the executive were also unlikely to 
forestall reform. The DR’s constitution required 75 percent super-majorities in both 
chambers for Presidential impeachments.100 As a disciplined PLD held 29 percent of 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies when Fernandez came to power in 2004, it could 
thwart any impeachment attempts. Moreover and as noted, executive discretion to 
deviate from legislative norms – including budget bills – lessened executive dependence 
on legislative majorities to govern.  
                                        
100 The 2010 constitutional reform lowered – in a context of PLD dominance in both chambers – the Senate 
majority required for impeachment to two-thirds (Marsteintredet, 2010b).  
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In contrast, governability concerns did constrain Lugo’s ability to 
expand professionalization. As detailed in chapter 5, Lugo needed to cede patronage 
control to the PLRA to secure sufficient legislative support to ensure continuation in 
office. Paraguay’s legislature may impeach Presidents with two-thirds majorities in both 
chambers in cases of poor performance, granting it de facto a no confidence vote. To a 
lesser extent, Lugo was also in need of patronage concessions to the ANR and UNACE 
to secure legislative majorities for the passage of bills. The resulting governability 
concerns are reflected in cabinet appointments of not only reformers, but also “figures 
who epitomize traditional partisan interests.” (USAID, 2009, p. 29) Moreover, Lugo 
replaced several less partisan-based appointments, among others in the customs and 
ports administrations, “when he saw that this [their initial appointment] started to 
shake the wasp’s nest.” (Interview, Journalist)  
Due to governability concerns, Lugo thus could not expand 
professionalization beyond a minority of institutions. Moreover, professionalization 
measures applying to the public sector as a whole were bound to stall (see chapter 4).101 
The latter is illustrated by the fate of the Presidential decree legally obliging institutions 
to comply with the 2000 public service law and the SFP’s public personnel management 
policy. As a donor official (Interview) recalls from the presentation of the decree to the 
Council of Ministers headed by the President: “all the ministers applauded the 
presentation of the Minister of Civil Service Lilian Soto. So the President said literally 
in a sarcastic manner: ‘we are all in agreement then. Doctor Soto, send me the decree 
for my signature.’ … the Ministers jumped: ‘No, we are in campaign, the elections are 
coming...’ And they asked the President not to sign it … The President said: ‘well, I 
will go over this and think about it.’ He never signed.” Governability concerns thus 
curtailed the expansion of professionalization. Notably, however, Lugo was able to 
advance professionalization despite a highly adverse governability context.102 
                                        
101 This argument assumes that political actors expected the enforcement of these measures. 
102 To substantiate this claim, note that Lugo’s impeachment did not stem from professionalization. Instead, 
it resulted from Lugo’s handling of a violent clash between the police and landless peasants. In response to 
the clash, Lugo replaced his Interior Minister with a Colorado official. This “set off shock waves in both 
the government and opposition,” and united Colorados and Liberals in their opposition to Lugo 
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Confirmatory evidence for an important assumption of the patronage control theory is 
thus provided: incumbents tend to be able to professionalize at least part of the state 
when facing incentives to do so.  
In conclusion, supply side factors do not account for cross-case variation 
in bureaucratic professionalization: they fail to explain why Lugo – yet not Fernandez 
– faced incentives to professionalize. They do, however, shed additional light on within-
case outcomes and, in particular, the incremental – rather than state-wide – 
professionalization in Paraguay. Technical capacity challenges and, in particular, 
governability concerns constrained Lugo’s ability to expand professionalization. 
Moreover, other supply side factors – in particular a brief political time horizon and 
poorly educated party members – curtailed Lugo’s incentives to professionalize. Limited 
patronage control notwithstanding, professionalization thus expanded to only a 
minority of vacancies and institutions. As a corollary, government-wide 
professionalization measures were bound to fail. In contrast, supply-side factors left 
Fernandez’ ability to professionalize largely intact. Moreover, a long political time 
horizon and a well-educated party constituency added to Fernandez’ reform incentives 
relative to Lugo. As detailed in chapter 5, these professionalization incentives were 
overwhelmed by reform disincentives emanating from the Presidential patronage control 
monopoly, however. Fernandez thus chose to resist reform rather than utilize his ability 
to push for professionalization. 
 
The Inefficacy of Rival Explanations:                                     
Implications for the Politics of Bureaucratic Professionalization 
As detailed above, rival explanations on the supply and demand side do not explain 
variation in professionalization between Paraguay and the DR. To the contrary, they 
provide further evidence in support of the explanatory power of the patronage control 
                                        
(Marsteintredet et al., 2013, p. 113). The presumptive Colorado presidential candidate resented a perceived 
interference in the Colorado primaries, while the Liberals resented the appointment of a Colorado in what 
they perceived to be a preparatory move for the 2013 elections (Pérez-Liñán, 2014). The lack of Lugo’s 
political survival was thus the result of not bureaucratic professionalization, but a miscalculation in regards 
to the political repercussions of the appointment of a Colorado Minister.  
  
192 
theory. Professionalization advanced in Paraguay even though a panoply of supply and 
demand variables reduced Lugo’s ability and incentives to professionalize. Governability 
concerns, brief time horizons, a relatively less educated party constituency, presidential 
nepotism, technical capacity limitations, societal demand for patronage and a lack of 
collective mobilization for reform all militated against professionalization. Deprived of 
patronage control, Lugo nonetheless advanced professionalization. The DR case is 
juxtaposed. A variety of supply and demand factors enhanced Fernandez’ ability and 
incentives to professionalize. Limited governability constraints, a long political time 
horizon, a more educated party constituency, a disciplined party organization and a 
societal coalition for reform all favoured professionalization. Monopolizing patronage 
control, Fernandez nonetheless resisted professionalization. The case comparison thus 
represents a particularly robust test of the validity and causal power of the patronage 
control theory.  
The finding that rival explanations are unable to account for cross-case 
variation in professionalization does, of course, not necessarily imply that they lack 
explanatory power elsewhere. After all, previous scholars had pointed to their 
explanatory relevance in other contexts. The inability of rival hypotheses to explain 
variation in reform in the two cases studied does, however, offer more general insights 
into the strength and limitations of their causal effects. Generalizing from the cases 
suggests, in particular, that existing hypotheses either operate under relatively 
restrictive scope conditions (demand side) or command greater explanatory power for 
the ability rather than incentives of incumbents to professionalize (supply side) – even 
though incentives rather than ability turn out to be the principal explanandum of 
interest.  
On the demand side, confirmatory evidence is provided for the assertion 
of several prior works that collective action by bureaucrats, donors, businesses and civil 
society organizations tends to hold limited explanatory power for professionalization 
(see, among others, Grindle, 2012). Why that is the case may be clearly derived from 
the case comparison. Patronage states militate, by their very nature, against both the 
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incentives and the ability of collective actors to push for professionalization. As a result, 
the scope conditions of collective action explanations become highly restrictive for all 
four aforementioned collective actors. 
For bureaucrats, the case comparison points to at least three such 
conditions. Public employees must be able to organize collectively; unable to achieve 
their objectives through patronage access and generalized benefits (such as across-the-
board salary increases); and able – thanks to sufficient professional competencies – to 
compete successfully in examinations. In patronage bureaucracies which do not 
prioritize professional competencies, bureaucrats will thus lack incentives to demand 
professionalization. Where, as in Paraguay, the latter two scope conditions are not met, 
we may instead expect bureaucrats to resist professionalization. The fact that “few 
scholars have treated the bureaucracy as a serious political force in its own right” may 
thus come unsurprising in regards to the professionalization of patronage bureaucracies 
(Zelizer, 2003, p. 61). A modicum of prior professionalization is likely to be necessary, 
yet insufficient for bureaucrats to demand (more) professionalization. In other words, 
patronage bureaucracies must become no longer predominantly patronage-based for 
bureaucrats to demand the end of patronage. 
  For donors, the case comparison suggests equally restrictive scope 
conditions. In addition to providing technical capacity, donors must count on sufficient 
financial or political leverage to impose professionalization through conditionalities – a 
tall order for a reform which shifts the basis of electoral mobilization. Even where, as 
in the DR, such donor leverage could be occasionally present, donors must collectively 
focus conditionalities on professionalization in practice rather than the formal mimicry 
of international best practices. As donor support for the adoption of legal and 
constitutional reforms in the DR suggests, however, donors frequently face incentives 
to disburse against easier-to-measure and easier-to-obtain formal institutional reforms. 
The “often quite marginal” role of donors despite the prevalence of their financial 
support may thus be expected (Andrews, 2013, p. 209).  
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 The scope conditions for collective societal and business action to 
incentivize professionalization are no less demanding. Both broad mobilization capacity 
and autonomy to press for professionalization without jeopardizing access to state goods 
are required – yet tend to be absent in patronage states. Where discretion in the 
interaction with the state is, as in patronage bureaucracies, the rule of the game, the 
Paraguayan and DR cases suggest that businesses, civil society organizations and the 
media frequently depend and subsist on personal relations with the government. 
Collective demands for reform which could jeopardize these personal relations are thus 
discouraged. Even where, as in the DR, selective incentives – including the prospect of 
donor funding and media exposure – encourage societal mobilization, collective action 
beyond a small group of NGOs and business associations which respond to these 
selective incentives will not be forthcoming. Yet, without broader societal mobilization, 
incumbents lack incentives to supply more than formalistic reforms in contexts of voter 
demands for patronage.  
In conclusion, professionalization due to collective actors will remain a 
rare occurrence: the scope conditions for collective action in patronage states are highly 
restrictive. Similarly and as mentioned, most supply-side variables were found to have 
no impact on cross-case variation in professionalization. With the exception of the Lugo 
Presidency, patronage had historically reigned in Paraguay and the DR in one-party, 
two-party and three-party systems; in open and closed-list systems; under disciplined 
and fragmented governing parties; under large and small governing parties; with 
educated and less educated party constituencies; with and without governability 
challenges; and in contexts of fast growing and stagnating bureaucracies. In other words, 
where incumbents and their allies controlled patronage and voters demanded patronage, 
incumbents saw it in their interest to rely on patronage irrespective of the remnant 
political-institutional factors. It thus appears that the supply-side variables put forward 
in the literature may only marginally tilt incumbent incentives towards 
professionalization, if at all. 
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This is not to say that these variables do not affect incumbent ability to 
reform, however. Governability concerns, for instance, were found to greatly curtail it 
in Paraguay. This puts a premium on delineating clearly in future scholarly works 
whether an explanatory variable sheds light on incumbent incentives or ability to 
professionalize – a neglected differentiation in most prior studies. Consistent with a key 
assumption of the patronage control theory – yet contrary to a key assumption of 
several other works (see, for instance, Kenny, 2013) – the Paraguayan case also suggests 
that incumbent incentives rather than ability represent the explanandum of principal 
interest for future scholarly works. Lugo was able to professionalize part of the state 
despite facing one of the, arguably, most adverse governability and technical capacity 
shortfall contexts conceivable. When facing incentives to professionalize, incumbents 
thus tend to be able to do so – even if only incrementally.  
In conclusion, rather than shedding doubt on the strength of the causal 
effect of the patronage control theory, the discussion of rival explanations in this chapter 
strengthened confidence in the theory. Part 2 of this dissertation thus concludes: strong 
confirmatory evidence for the validity and explanatory power of the patronage control 
theory for bureaucratic professionalization in Paraguay and the DR is found. In the 
final part of the dissertation, I will move on to offering empirical evidence for the 
generalizability of the theory. 
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7 
 
Moving Beyond Meritocracy 
Patronage Control and the Introduction of Tenure 
Protections in the DR 
 
In part three of this dissertation, I, first, provide evidence for the generalizability of the 
theory and, second, derive generalizations about the study of patronage, institutions 
and good government. I undertake the first task in two steps. In this chapter, I move 
beyond bureaucratic professionalization – which I had equated with the introduction of 
meritocratic personnel selections – to show that the patronage control theory holds 
explanatory power for a related, but distinct Weberian characteristic: bureaucratic job 
stability. I do so by examining the case of recent tenure reforms in the DR. In chapter 
8, I provide suggestive evidence for the external validity of the patronage control theory 
in countries beyond Paraguay and the DR. The dissertation concludes in chapter 9 with 
implications of the findings for the study of patronage reform, institutions and good 
government.  
Extending the explanatory power of the patronage control theory to the 
politics of tenure reform may, at first sight, appear inconsistent. After all, chapter 2 
had shown that the political incentives underlying merit and tenure reforms differ. And, 
in chapters 4 to 6, I had found that the patronage control theory accounts for merit 
reforms – or their absence – in Paraguay and the DR. Explaining the introduction of 
tenure reforms with the same theory would thus contradict the finding that merit and 
tenure reforms feature distinct determinants.  
This contradiction is, of course, not sought. In fact, the patronage 
control theory is unable to account for the introduction of tenure reforms: there is 
nothing in it which hints at incumbent incentives to introduce tenure. A more modest 
ambition may, however, be pursued: to extend the theory to incumbent incentives to 
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resist tenure reforms. As I shall posit, incumbents resist granting tenure to their own 
appointees as tenure jeopardizes incumbent patronage control and electoral mobilization 
capacity: it disincentivizes bureaucratic performance and electoral campaign support 
while facilitating collective action for higher pay. The patronage control theory may 
thus be extended to account for the lack of tenure protections in patronage 
bureaucracies – yet, contrary to merit reforms, not for their introduction.  
If empirically validated, this extension would add confidence in an 
important underlying assumption of the patronage control theory: tenure protections 
decrease the electoral utility incumbents derive from patronage bureaucracies. 
Moreover, the extension would constitute an important contribution to scholarly works 
on tenure reforms. As I shall detail, prior studies of the determinants of tenure in 
patronage states have posited several scope conditions under which incumbents face 
incentives to introduce tenure. These conditions are frequently met. Yet, many 
patronage bureaucracies lack tenure protections. By accounting for incumbent 
incentives to resist tenure, the extension of the patronage control theory may resolve 
this conundrum. In short, extending the patronage control theory to tenure protections 
in this chapter pursues a two-fold objective: to enhance confidence in the theory while 
shedding light on the understudied puzzle of variation in tenure protections across 
patronage states. 
For the empirical test of the extension, I rely on a case study of tenure 
reforms under Fernández in the DR – rather than a case comparison with Paraguay as 
in part 2. The rationale is simple: tenure protections in Paraguay far preceded the Lugo 
administration (see chapter 5); field research based on stakeholder interviews would 
have thus been largely thwarted. At the same time, the DR is a particularly insightful 
case to study: tenure was most likely according to rival explanations, yet advanced only 
minimally. Fernández’ PLD faced, in 2012, uncertainty about re-election. In this 
context, donors and civil society demanded the extension of tenure – even if those 
tenured were overwhelmingly appointees of the incumbent. Tenure thus offered the 
promise of placating civil society and donor demand while securing longer-term state 
  
199 
employment for PLD appointees; continued control over (parts of) the state; and a 
tightened patronage budget constraint for a potentially hostile future incumbent. 
Nonetheless, tenure reforms did not advance substantively. Tenure-protected positions 
were extended to only a small minority of public servants and their unionization was 
resisted; sticky tenure protections would have required both de jure and de facto 
protections.  
The extension of the patronage control theory may account for this 
puzzle. The electoral advantages of maintaining patronage powers over dismissals – 
and, concomitantly, incentives for electoral campaign support, administrative 
performance and lack of collective action on the part of appointees – more than 
outweighed the pro-reform incentives prior theories had emphasized. To retain these 
electoral advantages, Fernández largely denied his followers in the bureaucracy the gift 
of long-term job stability.  
 
Presidential Patronage Control and the Puzzle of Tenure Resistance  
As evidenced in chapter 2, the political incentives for tenure103 and merit differ. At the 
same time, studies explicitly devoted to studying the emergence of tenure protections – 
be they de jure or de facto through public sector unionization – remain in scarce supply 
(cf. Moe, 2006). What the literature review in chapter 2 does permit, however, is the 
singling out of at least three sets of hypotheses with explanatory power for tenure 
reforms.  
Most prominently, electoral uncertainty may incentivize tenure 
protections. Several causal mechanisms have been put forward (see, among others, 
Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Ruhil & Camões, 2003; Van Riper, 1958). Anticipating a 
potential exit from office, incumbents may introduce tenure to secure long-run 
employment for their appointees – and thus increase the net present value of their 
                                        
103 Note that I conceptualize tenure protections as rigid job stability except for cases of grave misconduct. 
As detailed in chapter 3, tenure protections lacking such rigidity tend not to shield public employees from 
dismissals in weak rule-of-law contexts. 
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patronage appointments. As Geddes (1991, p. 387) argues, for instance, “extending … 
job guarantees to larger numbers of employees … posed no problem … since they bring 
electoral benefits from grateful employees.” Tenure also enhances the likelihood that 
bureaucrats sympathetic to incumbents remain in office. The durability of the 
incumbent’s political agenda and control of state institutions is thus enhanced (Horn, 
1995). Lastly, tenure also offers incumbents the opportunity to curtail patronage of 
potentially hostile successors: they may no longer replace the incumbent’s appointees 
with clients of their own (Ting et al., 2013). 
Second, bureaucrats are hypothesized to collectively demand tenure 
protections (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Pappas & Assimakopoulou, 2012); patronage 
bureaucracies without tenure protections diminish the likelihood of long-run public 
sector employment. Analogous to merit reforms, tenure is, lastly, posited to be 
motivated by enhanced public goods provision. Lifelong careers protected from arbitrary 
dismissals permit long-term bureaucratic time horizons and socialization. As such, they 
may facilitate the preservation of institutional memory, the emergence of an ‘esprit de 
corps’ around impartial, committed and non-corrupt behaviour, and enhanced 
bureaucratic incentives to invest in competence (Gailmard & Patty, 2007; Mueller, 
2009; Rauch & Evans, 2000).  
   Despite the presence of multiple hypotheses accounting for tenure 
reforms, however, tenure remains “a somewhat puzzling institution.” (Gailmard & 
Patty, 2007, p. 875) In patronage bureaucracies, the scope condition of the public goods 
hypothesis is unlikely to be met. As detailed in chapter 2, tenure protections for 
appointees not qualified for their positions are unlikely to add to public goods provision. 
At the same time, the scope conditions of the electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic 
demand hypotheses are met recurrently. In competitive electoral contexts, incumbents 
face potential or certain exits from office constantly. Bureaucrats in turn should find it 
consistently in their interest to seek to stabilize their positions through protections from 
dismissals.  
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Almost all competitive democracies with patronage bureaucracies should 
thus have introduced tenure protections. Yet, patronage bureaucracies are split in 
regards to the presence of tenure protections in contexts of electoral uncertainty. 
According to survey data, 22 of 41 patronage states with electoral uncertainty104 count 
on tenure protections; 19 of these countries lack such protections (Teorell, Dahlström, 
& Dahlberg, 2011).105 In other words, in roughly half of all patronage bureaucracies in 
competitive electoral environments, incumbents have not introduced tenure protections 
for appointees. The conundrum is thus clear. Why would incumbents resist an 
institution ostensibly benefiting their own followers and themselves while harming 
potentially hostile successors? 
  As I shall argue, an extension of the patronage control theory to the 
case of tenure reforms may resolve this conundrum. Recall from chapter 3 that tenure 
protections shift part of the private goods benefits of a patronage bureaucracy to public 
employees. This loss of incumbent patronage powers holds not only for hostile successors 
– who may no longer replace incumbent appointees with clients of their own – but also 
for incumbents themselves. Losing patronage control over dismissals may reduce the 
incumbent’s ability to mobilize electoral support – even if the beneficiaries are 
incumbent clients.  
Three complementary causal mechanisms may account for this outcome. 
First, with tenure, incumbent appointees are no longer required to provide electoral 
campaign support to retain their positions. Ironically, providing tenure as an additional 
benefit to patronage appointees may thus reduce their reciprocal electoral support – in 
contexts where incumbents lack other inducements and appointees affective ties of 
loyalty to incumbents. Prior studies provide empirical support for this assertion. 
                                        
104 I proxy electoral uncertainty by a score of 7 out of 7 in the Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness 
in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (T. Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001).   
105 I count as patronage states those in which political criteria trump merit criteria in the selection of public 
personnel according to the QoG Survey; I count as countries with tenure protections those for which 
average country expert responses exceed the mean of the scale for the QoG Survey question “Once one is 
recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector employee for the rest of one’s career?” (see 
chapter 8 for a justification of this operationalization of tenure protections) 
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Oliveros (2013), for instance, finds that public employees with tenure protections 
provide fewer political services (see also Robinson & Verdier, 2013; Wolfinger & 
Rosenstone, 1980). Second, absent the threat of dismissals, appointees may face fewer 
imminent incentives to perform their official duties in the bureaucracy – irrespective of 
whether these aim at public or private goods provision. Third, tenure facilitates 
unionization and collective action of appointees (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). Without 
tenure protections, the threat of dismissal would preclude collective action antagonistic 
to incumbent interests. In contrast, with tenure, bureaucrats may organize collectively 
to press for generalized salary increases detached from electoral support to the 
incumbent (see chapter 3). As a result, tenure may curtail the incumbent’s patronage 
powers over not only dismissals but also pay.   
In sum, tenure protections deprive incumbents of patronage powers which 
are crucial to mobilize electoral support. Juxtaposing this extension of the patronage 
control theory to prior theories suggests that incumbents face a trade-off when 
introducing tenure reforms. Tenure enables incumbents to deprive future incumbents 
of patronage control, increases the net present value of their patronage appointments 
and enhances the durability of the incumbent’s political agenda and control of state 
institutions – provided tenured appointees remain loyal to the incumbent.106 At the 
same time, tenure jeopardizes electoral campaign support and bureaucratic cooperation 
from tenured appointees and facilitates collective action for pay rises. Without 
patronage control over dismissals, the incumbent’s ability to provide private and public 
goods to mobilize electoral support is thus at risk.  
To test whether these patronage control incentives to resist reform 
outweigh incumbent incentives to introduce tenure in contexts of electoral uncertainty, 
I examine the case of tenure reforms under Fernández in the DR. The rationale for the 
case selection is straightforward. The DR under Fernández should have – if prior 
theories held true – represented a most likely case for tenure reforms. The case thus 
                                        
106 Note that this discussion assumes that tenure protections are ‘sticky:’ incumbents and their successors 
may not revert them. 
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serves as a particularly robust single-case test of the extension of the patronage control 
theory. 
 
The Extension of Tenure Protections in the Dominican Bureaucracy 
In the weak rule of law contexts characteristic of patronage bureaucracies, credible 
tenure protections tend to require both de jure and de facto protections. Legal 
protections alone are unlikely to suffice. Without legal enforcement, they may be 
violated at the incumbent’s behest.107 For tenure protections to stick, public employees 
thus require sufficient collective action capacity to defend job stability protections from 
encroachment by incumbents. In other words, both legal tenure protections and 
unionization – or what I call de facto protections – tend to be necessary conditions for 
the longevity of tenure in patronage bureaucracies in contexts of electoral uncertainty.  
Fernández’ differential compliance with tenure protections of doctors 
and administrative personnel in 2004 is illustrative. In both sectors, the tenure of 
personnel was legally protected. Yet, only for doctors were tenure protections – thanks 
to unionization – sticky: “especially at the beginning of governments, hundreds of 
doctors are – just like administrative career employees – dismissed ... with the Medical 
College [the doctor’s union] needing to undertake road blocks and strikes for them to 
be reinstated.” (Participación Ciudadana, 2007, p. 25) Not collectively organized, 
tenured administrative career personnel could, in contrast, not challenge dismissals. 
More than 20 percent were made redundant after Fernández came to power in 2004; 
only a fraction received due compensation (Participación Ciudadana, 2007).  
  With this in mind, this section seeks to gauge the extent to which both 
de jure and de facto tenure protections were extended to administrative personnel under 
Fernández in the DR. As shall be argued, legal changes boded – as with bureaucratic 
professionalization – well for bureaucratic stability. Rigid tenure protections for 
                                        
107 This generalization, of course, features an important exception. Where actors other than incumbent 
allies are in control of judicial enforcement and face incentives to protect tenure, de jure tenure protections 
may suffice as safeguards for the ‘stickiness’ of tenure in weak rule of law contexts. 
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administrative career personnel were introduced in law and constitution. Yet, only a 
small minority of public servants was incorporated into the career. The coverage of de 
jure protections was thus limited. At the same time, de facto tenure protections were 
not extended. While associations of public servants were formally created, they did not 
develop collective action capacity. As both de jure and de facto protections would have 
been needed for tenure to stick, tenure reforms in the DR did not enhance bureaucratic 
job stability in case of incumbent turnover in practice. 
  As detailed in chapter 4, the DR saw the approval of a new public service 
law in 2008 and a new constitution 2010. In conjunction, they provided strong de jure 
tenure protections for career108 employees. The 2008 law prohibited unjustified 
dismissals of career employees, granted dismissed personnel the opportunity for written 
appeal, established deadlines for severance payments to dismissed non-career personnel 
and mandated that all eligible public employees be evaluated for career incorporation 
until 2016 (Congreso Nacional de la República Dominicana, 2008). The 2010 
Constitution in turn declared the dismissal of career employees in violation of the public 
service law an act against the Constitution (Congreso Nacional de la República 
Dominicana, 2010). Career employees dismissed illegally could thus hold authorities 
personally responsible for dismissals and claim damages from their personal patrimony 
(Interview, MAP Advisor). Concomitantly, the President was no longer constitutionally 
empowered to dismiss public servants at will. This “battery of measures … aims at 
reverting the historic tendency of mass dismissals with changes in government.” 
(Iacoviello, 2009, p. 44) 
  Yet, the introduction of strong de jure protections from dismissals for 
career employees was not succeeded by a large-scale incorporation of public servants 
into the career. As illustrated in figure 7.1, Fernández incorporated roughly 2,300 public 
servants into the administrative career annually (2005-2012), with incorporations 
oscillating between 1,275 and 3,414. By the end of his third term, administrative career 
                                        
108 Note that I use the terms career personnel and tenured personnel interchangeably in this chapter. As 
noted in chapter 4, incorporation into the “career” implied but tenure protections: career paths remained 
undefined.   
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incorporations reached a gross total of 33,395 public servants – including 11,292 public 
servants incorporated prior to 2004. These gross incorporations overestimated the 
number of career personnel in office: they did not account for career personnel leaving 
the public sector. According to limited available data, such departures were significant. 
Between August 2004 and May 2007, for instance, 4,259 career employees were 
dismissed and sought subsequent judicial appeal (Participación Ciudadana, 2007). Even 
when disregarding such departures, the administrative career only extended to a 
minority of personnel: less than 7 percent of total public employment when Fernández 
left office (Contraloría General de la República, 2013).109 
 
Figure 7.1 Number of Administrative Career Incorporations 
 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration, based on data from MAP (2013d) 
 
In part as a result, the number of public employees not incorporated 
into a tenure-protected career increased during the Fernández Presidency. Public 
employment growth outpaced tenure expansion – even when considering tenure for 
teaching and special careers rather than only administrative careers. As illustrated in 
figure 7.2, the number of public personnel grew by over 120,000 between 2006 and 2012 
                                        
109 This figure excludes tenure for non-administrative careers. Special careers for diplomats, prosecutors 
and tax officials saw the incorporation of an additional 1,751 public servants. Moreover, at the end of 
Fernández’ third term, 24,154 of the roughly 77,000 teachers had been incorporated into a special teaching 
career (Ministerio de Administración Pública, 2013; Ministerio de Educación, 2014a). As teachers already 
enjoyed tenure protections, however, their incorporation was but a “bureaucratic formality.” (Interview 
NGO Analyst) It did not add to tenure protections in the Dominican state. Moreover, the 2008 public 
service law only determines as eligible for career incorporation roughly 175,000 to 200,000 of the DR’s 
480,000 public employees, including teachers and other special careers (Contraloría General de la República, 
2013; Montero, 2010a; Ventura Camejo, 2010); political appointees and low-level service employees are 
declared ineligible. Even against this metric, only a minority of administrative employees saw career 
incorporation: less than one third when special careers are excluded. 
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– while only roughly 27,000 public servants were incorporated into careers over the 
same period. As a corollary, career incorporation also fell short of the pace required to 
ensure compliance with the 2008 public service law. According to the law, the contracts 
of eligible employees not incorporated into the career within eight years were to be 
cancelled. Against this backdrop, Fernández had pledged to tenure at least 50 percent 
of eligible public servants by 2012 – that is within four years (Schrank, 2010). Yet, 
instead, only a minority of eligible personnel – and a small fraction of all public 
personnel – was tenured.  
 
Figure 7.2 Public Employment Growth vs. Career Incorporations 
 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration, based on data from MAP (2013d) and Contraloría General 
de la República (2013) 
 
Limited expansion of de jure protections was accompanied by a lack of 
organization for collective action – and thus de facto protections – on the part of public 
employees. On paper, public employees did organize in the DR under Fernández. 
Encouraged by the MAP’s labour relations department, 44 Associations of Public 
Servants were founded between 2005 and 2012; their total number thus reached 49 (De 
La Cruz Hernández, 2005; Interview, MAP Director).  
These associations assumed the formal roles formally signed to them by 
the 2008 public service law, such as the representation of public servants in 
reconciliation bodies. Associations did not, however, develop into unions with collective 
action capacity. As a Director in the Ministry of Education (Interview) put it, “In 
reality, the impact of [associations of public servants] in regards to actions or internal 
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activities has not been very relevant …they meet, participate with us in some events … 
and provide us with information about situations they observe.” Against this backdrop, 
a Director in the Presidency (Interview) concludes: “What have they done? … The 
President [Medina], when he took office, for example, said: ‘all public sector salaries are 
frozen.’ Have you heard that any associations has said anything about that? … If they 
were effective associations, the first thing they would have said to the President when 
he did the austerity decree is … why will you sacrifice us by not granting us a salary 
increase in the next two years … [Yet,] it passed without any type of complaint.”  
  Without unionization, however, even the job stability of personnel 
incorporated into the tenured career was in doubt. While the lack of turnover in the 
governing party since the 2008-2010 legal and constitutional reforms implicated that 
bureaucratic tenure “has not yet been put to the test” (Interview, Director Presidency), 
interview respondents were unison in doubting its longevity should the governing party 
alternate: “if there had been change and alternation [of the governing party] in 2008 
and now in 2012, I am sure the career [personnel] would have left as well.” (Interview, 
Director Economy) The rationale is simple. As detailed in chapter 5, Presidential 
patronage powers extend to the judiciary and audit institutions in the DR. As such, 
hostile future incumbents could, in practice, violate de jure tenure protections if they 
chose to do so. As a result, as a former legislator (Interview) put it, “here it does not 
matter if you are in the career or not to dismiss you … because where will you turn to 
afterwards? … This constitutional protection has no value.” With this in mind, even a 
former MAP Vice-Minister (Interview) noted that “you have to resolve the question of 
the judiciary for the guarantees which administrative career employees hold to 
materialize in court.” A local NGO analyst (Interview) then concludes: “even if 
somebody is incorporated in the career, if they want to dismiss him, they will do it. 
Even if they have to violate the law … the fact that a law prohibits it does not mean it 
will not be done.”  
One caveat to this generalization is due. De jure tenure protections did 
add to bureaucratic job stability so long as the PLD remained in power. As I shall detail 
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below, tenure was extended as a form of patronage to appointees. Selective tenure 
reversals by the PLD would have curtailed the value of this patronage concession: it 
would have curtailed all employees’ expectations about their job stability. Not less 
important, it would have undermined the credibility of the PLD’s patronage promises. 
Somewhat ironically then, the concurrent introduction of de jure – yet not de facto – 
tenure protections constrained only (to an extent) the PLD’s dismissals powers – yet 
not those of a hostile successor. Unsurprisingly then, tenure was protected in the 2012 
Presidential turnover from Fernández to Medina (both PLD). While several dozen 
career employees saw unjustified dismissals, the MAP Minister responded by publicly 
encouraging dismissed employees to appeal in (PLD-dominated) courts. Institutions 
responded by reinstating all illegally dismissed career employees (Collado, 2013).   
In conclusion, strong de jure – yet not de facto – tenure protections were 
extended to a small minority of public servants. Legal and constitutional reforms 
notwithstanding, public servants thus remained in doubt about the longevity of their 
tenure, in particular in case of a government turnover. Concomitantly, Fernández 
largely remained in control of patronage powers over dismissals. In the next section, I 
will juxtapose this outcome to the predictions of prior theories. As I shall show, these 
suggest that strong tenure protections in practice – rather than continued Presidential 
dismissal powers – should have been expected under Fernández. 
 
The DR as a Most Likely Case of Tenure Reforms 
As noted in chapter 5, Fernández’ third term in office ended in 2012. A constitutional 
prohibition precluded him from seeking re-election. Instead, the PLD fielded Danilo 
Medina who had, until 2006, served as Fernández’ Minister of the Presidency. In the 
election, Fernández’ wife ran as Vice-President. The 2012 election was closely contested. 
Medina won with 51 percent of the vote; the PRD’s candidate came in second with 47 
percent. In the run-up to the election, several polls had predicted a PRD victory 
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(Meilán, 2014).110 The key scope condition of scholarly hypotheses linking electoral 
competition with tenure reforms – the anticipation of a potential exit from office – was 
thus met.  
From the viewpoint of prior theories, tenure protections should have 
thus seen expansion in the DR. And, indeed, as I show in this section, each of the causal 
mechanisms posited by these hypotheses was activated in the Dominican case. 
Moreover, a civil society-business-donor coalition demanded not only bureaucratic 
professionalization (see chapter 6), but also bureaucratic stability in the DR. 
Consequently and somewhat ironically, tenuring PLD affiliates in the bureaucracy 
provided public opinion benefits to Fernández. According to the theoretical predictions 
of prior works, the DR thus represented a most likely case for tenure reforms – yet, as 
aforementioned, reforms occurred in practice hardly at all.   
  
Tenure at all Cost: Civil Society, Business and Donor Reform Demand 
The DR’s broad civil society-business-donor coalition for civil service 
reform sought not only bureaucratic professionalization, but also bureaucratic stability. 
To illustrate, the Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative (IPAC) contained 
quantitative targets on the number of public servants incorporated into the 
administrative career. Moreover, EU and IDB projects co-funded, among others, career 
incorporations and the formation of associations of public servants (De La Cruz 
Hernández, 2011; Oviedo, 2005). Societal demand thereby narrowed in on the quantity 
of public servants tenured – not their professional quality. As a donor official (Interview) 
noted, “we need to incorporate rapidly so that people see results.” An NGO analyst 
(Interview) adds: “the form in which the work of the Ministry [of Public Administration] 
                                        
110 The close election outcome could appear to contradict the assertion made in chapter 5 that monopolized 
patronage control greatly advantaged the incumbent in electoral contests in the DR. Note, though, that, 
first, it was not Fernández who ran; and, second, the PLD won despite well-publicized corruption scandals, 
failures in key public services and mounting macroeconomic instability, with DR’s debt to GDP ratio rising 
by over one-third between 2008 and 2012 (World Bank, 2013b, 2014a). In other words, PLD patronage 
control provided sufficient electoral advantage to secure victory even in an otherwise adverse electoral 
context.   
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has been measured … is quantitative … ‘How many did they incorporate this year? How 
many will they incorporate?’ … So when it comes to incorporating, let us incorporate. 
Let us incorporate everybody we can.”  
   The rationale for this indiscriminate support for bureaucratic job 
stability was three-fold. First, tenure was sought as a means to curtail incumbent 
patronage budgets. As a result – and in congruence with the patronage control theory 
– tenure was thought to complicate electoral competition based on patronage. As an 
NGO analyst (Interview) notes, “in countries like ours in which public employment 
forms part of the clientelist offers, it is important to reduce the extent to which the 
state and the civil service continue to represent a booty which is distributed in electoral 
processes.” Second, tenure was demanded as a means to improve the quality of 
bureaucracy. This was, of course, also MAP’s propagated objective: “Weber was right. 
You need the historical memory of a permanent body [of public servants] in the state 
which guarantees the continuity of public policies.” (Interview, MAP Minister) Without 
tenure, “an important portion of the accumulated experience is lost every time [there is 
turnover in power]; in addition, the total universe of the bureaucracy lives with a 
permanent threat to its stability and this reduces considerably its work potential.” 
(Moreta Arias, 2007, p. ix) And, third, civil society and donors shied away from 
criticizing a component of civil service reform – a reform which had been a long-standing 
demand. As an NGO analyst (Interview) explains, “This topic was completely 
abandoned … [It was] not even on the agenda. For a civil society which had cried out 
[about it] … and the government ignored it … to suddenly see that there is a will to 
incorporate public servants into the administrative career; that it is declared a national 
priority. It was like: ‘now we cannot criticize a process which we have sought for years’.” 
   For Fernández, societal demand for tenure protections implied – as in 
the case of bureaucratic professionalization – that public opinion benefits could be 
reaped from reform. As a Controller General under Fernández (Interview) put it, “a 
head of the institution is interested that every year the public opinion says: ‘ah, but 
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this official strengthened the institution, because look how many new employees he 
incorporated into the career.’”  
The societal focus on the quantity of personnel incorporated implicated 
that Fernández was – from a demand-side perspective – unconstrained in deciding which 
public employees to incorporate: “they had a free hand in implementing something 
which supposedly was good and which civil society supposedly demanded … they had a 
blank check without any opposition.” (Interview Academic) With Fernández thus able 
to prioritize tenure for PLD affiliates, the causal mechanisms linking electoral 
uncertainty with tenure reforms could – as I shall detail next – be activated.  
 
Gifting Tenure, Securing State Control, Depriving Successors: Supply-Side Reform 
Incentives  
As noted above, three causal mechanisms have been posited to link 
electoral uncertainty with tenure reforms. Incumbents introduce tenure protections to 
secure long-term employment for their appointees; enhance their long-term control of 
the state; and tighten the patronage budget constraint of potentially hostile successors. 
All three of these causal mechanisms were at play in the DR.  
In regards to the first two mechanisms, note that they presuppose that 
tenure protections are granted selectively to loyal party affiliates. The DR’s career 
incorporation process very much reflected this focus. Career incorporations narrowed in 
on select PLD affiliates with the requisite minimum formal qualifications for their 
positions – rather than the most qualified personnel. Several pieces of evidence 
substantiate this assessment. First, career coverage extended down to the mass of 
administrative support staff – despite the frequent lack of career potential in this group. 
As the Director of Fernández’ National Council for State Reform (Interview) put it 
bluntly “that you have a third-tier assistant in the career makes no sense … Because 
what does this assistant contribute to the state functioning with better quality? 
Nothing.”   
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Second, career incorporations were based overwhelmingly (96 percent) 
on evaluations of existing staff rather than competitive examinations (4 percent) – even 
though evaluations had only been contemplated as a transitory means of career 
incorporations in the 2008 public service law (MAP, 2013d). As a result, the process 
“obviated publicity, obviated the opportunity for all Dominicans to accede … it is 
limited just to your people but gives them stability.” (Interview ONAP Director)  
Third, evaluations of staff were, in practice, only conditioned on the 
occupation of a career position and compliance with the minimum educational 
requirements. Formally, five factors were considered in evaluations: educational 
qualification, professional experience, a technical test, the performance evaluation and 
occupation of a career position. Yet, virtually all employees who met minimum 
educational requirements, lacked disciplinary charges and occupied career positions were 
incorporated. To illustrate, career incorporations extended, at times, to personnel with 
less than two years of experience and could proceed despite a score of zero in the 
technical test – provided other factors scored sufficiently high (Collado, 2012; Interview, 
MAP Advisor).  
This is not to say that the evaluation was a mere formality, however. 
MAP-approved organizational charts – which restricted the number and type of career 
positions in otherwise overstaffed directorates – and minimum formal education 
requirements did constrain tenure expansion. According to some estimates, less than 20 
percent of public servants held university degrees, for instance (Morgan et al., 2011). 
At the same time, however, these requirements provided some protection to career 
personnel should a hostile future President seek to revert tenure: they would allow 
personnel to argue more plausibly for a legal career incorporation process. What these 
requirements did not safeguard was the incorporation of effectively qualified personnel, 
however. To illustrate, an Advisor in the Ministry of the Economy (Interview) found 
that “those in the career … have the least capacity … Many cannot even write a 
paragraph;” a Controller General under Fernández (Interview) recounted that “in the 
career there was a group of employees that did not even attend work;” and a MAP 
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Director (Interview) concludes: “many people are included who really should not be 
career public servants.” 
Fourth, authorities could determine which public servants would be 
evaluated for career incorporation. While the MAP sought to evaluate all eligible 
personnel to preclude undue interference, authorities were apt at circumventing this 
safeguard. To cite just one example: they could oblige personnel – with the threat of 
dismissal – to renounce from evaluation for career incorporation (Interview, Economy 
Advisor). As a result, “there are good people who cannot enter the career.“ (Interview, 
Economy Director)  
Able to select whom to incorporate, Fernández could narrow in on 
incorporating loyal PLD affiliates. Unsurprisingly, most public servants incorporated 
into the career under Fernández had been recruited by the Fernández administration 
since 2004. The corresponding percentage reached 86 percent in 2012, for instance 
(Collado, 2012; Ministerio de Administración Pública, 2013).  
The first theorized causal mechanism was thus activated: tenure was 
extended to secure long-term employment for incumbent appointees. As a Controller 
General (Interview) under Fernández put it, “in the Dominican Republic, the 
administrative career is a political resource to protect the governing party. What this 
is to say is that officials involved in the career, to protect their party comrades, place 
them in the career so that if a change in either the incumbent or the party in power is 
produced, the dismissal of these career employees is made more difficult.”  
In addition, selective incorporation implicated that tenure protections 
represented an additional form of patronage dispensed by Fernández. As an Advisor in 
the Ministry of the Economy (Interview) put it, career incorporation “is a concession 
they give you … a gift from the Minister.” An NGO analyst (Interview) adds: “In our 
reality, this can be sold … as a gift … I can tell a public servant: ‘look … I will incorporate 
you into the career … this means that you will have permanence here … and in some 
time you will have a pension.’ So this public servant, given how the matter is presented 
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… perceives the career incorporation not like a normal, legal, natural process but as a 
favour. So this favour I then owe to who made the offer.” 
As a corollary, the second causal mechanism was activated: the 
incumbent could secure longer-term control of parts of the state with tenure – even 
when voted out of office. As an NGO analyst (Interview) put it, “you are generating 
loyalties of people whom you guarantee this stability which transcends beyond the 
period in which you will be there … If you manage to concentrate these loyalties in 
distinct institutions, it can be a form of controlling the subsequent ones who come … A 
Minister would say ‘well, if I leave here the director of procurement as well as the 
directors of human resources and finance. Any new minister may come, but I am the 
one who is controlling … the key areas of the institution.”   
As a corollary, the third causal mechanism was activated: tenure 
protections would tighten the patronage budget of a potentially hostile future 
incumbent – that is, in the case of Fernández, a potential 2012-2016 PRD President. In 
fact, in the 2012 election campaign, the PRD candidate denounced that the 
administrative career sought to protect PLD affiliates and preclude PRD affiliates from 
appointment to public sector positions (El Día, 2012).  
In conclusion, all three causal mechanisms which prior theories had 
emphasized – securing long-term employment for incumbent party affiliates; long-term 
control of the state; and a tighter patronage budget of a potentially hostile successor – 
were present in the DR case. In conjunction with societal and donor demand, the DR 
thus represented a most likely case for tenure reforms from the viewpoint of prior 
theories. While these incentives propelled the initiation of de jure tenure reforms and 
the select career incorporation of PLD affiliates, they, as aforementioned, were 
insufficient to incentivize Fernández to forsake patronage powers over dismissals in 
practice. Why the DR’s most likely tenure reform occurred hardly at all is accounted 
for next. 
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Patrons against Clients? Presidential Patronage Control and Resistance 
to Job Stability for Patronage Appointees 
From a process perspective, the DR’s most likely tenure reform occurred hardly at all 
as it was thwarted by resistance in both the Presidency and in line institutions. As 
detailed in chapter 5, Fernández deprived the MAP of budget resources. This budget 
constraint also extended to tenure reforms. As a result, “the MAP lacked sufficient 
personnel to undertake the evaluation process of [career] candidates … ‘If you have two 
or three [MAP staff] with which to incorporate 1,000 people, in what time will these 
three MAP technical staff complete the dossiers of 1,000 people?’ (Interview, NGO 
Analyst) Next to limiting MAP’s budget envelope, Fernández did not provide political 
backing: “If there was a precise directive by the President of the Republic to all the 
ministers via a decree, things would be different. I will give you an example. The week 
of his inauguration, the new President Danilo Medina produced a decree in which he 
put restrictions on … expenditures for representation, gas, salary compensations. Why? 
Because he prioritized it. And all ministries are supposedly complying … So my question 
is: ‘Why does the President of the Republic not produce a similar decree for the 
administrative career?’ … Because of a political calculation obviously.” (Interview, NGO 
Analyst) 
Presidential reform resistance was paralleled by ministerial reform 
opposition. Institutional authorities rarely provided their personnel directorates with 
sufficient resources to facilitate the incorporation process. Consequently, these 
directorates “required that [the MAP] does all the work for them, so there the process 
loses speed.” (Interview, MAP Advisor) In the extreme, lack of capacity implied that 
incorporation “practically did not advance at all.” (Interview, MAP Vice-Minister) At 
times, authorities simply withheld or delayed approval of reform steps in their 
ministries: “obviously they put obstacles at some level … If you put forward an 
organizational chart for their approval and afterwards they take one year to approve it, 
there obviously is an inconvenience … the same when they approve the handbook for 
the classification of positions.” (Interview, MAP Vice-Minister)  
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Resistance extended not only to career incorporations – and thus de jure 
tenure – but also unionization – and thus de facto tenure. As a Director in the Ministry 
of Health (Interview) recalls, “if it was identified that they were forming a group, the 
leaders of the union would be dismissed.” A Vice-Minister of Finance (Interview) adds: 
“there were never efforts to unionize. I would have opposed it … The first one that 
speaks out, you give him a grave misconduct note and you dismiss him. I do not believe 
that people would dare.” Unsurprisingly, public servants did not unionize. In fact, there 
was not even “pressure by public servants to be incorporated into the career.” 
(Interview, Presidency Director) As an Advisor in the Ministry of the Economy 
(Interview) explains, “the Minister could have dismissed the people that complain.” 
In sum, lack of expansion of de jure and de facto tenure was caused by 
resistance from Fernández and his ministerial allies. This resistance in turn may be 
linked to a preference to retain discretionary patronage powers over dismissals. As the 
Director of Fernández’ National Council for State Reform (Interview) explains: “a 
minister prefers to retain the right he supposedly has … to dismiss. And the more career 
there is, the less he can do it. This dis-incentivizes the minister.” A Director in the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Interview) adds: “[Tenure] is a straightjacket … When you 
know that of approximately 8,000 staff, you cannot touch 2,500 [who are in the career]. 
That of these 8,000 people there are also I don’t know how many pensioned. … you ask: 
‘what is left?’ … So there are many people who prefer not to incorporate.”  
Consistent with the extension of the patronage control theory, this 
preference for discretionary power over dismissals may be accounted for by three causal 
mechanisms. Tenure disincentivized performance and cooperation on the part of 
bureaucrats; it disincentivized the provision of political services in support of the 
incumbent’s campaign; and it incentivized unionization and collective action 
antagonistic to the incumbent’s interest. In conjunction, the expansion of tenure 
protections thus risked depriving Fernández of electoral mobilization capacity in a 
highly competitive electoral context. Unsurprisingly, Fernández resisted reform in 
practice. 
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The first two causal mechanisms are closely connected: they largely 
hinge upon the effect of tenure on the loyalty and cooperation of public servants. 
Discretion over dismissals helped assure such loyalty and cooperation in the DR. To 
illustrate, one PLD official, “when assuming office, … assembled his personnel to demand 
loyalty to, solely, the President of the Republic, the party and himself as a condition 
for permanence in service.” (Scheker Ortiz, 2005, p. 50) The first causal mechanism at 
play in the DR built on this. By depriving institutional authorities of this threat of 
dismissal, tenure impaired bureaucratic cooperation and performance – and thus 
engendered reform resistance. To illustrate, a Controller General under Fernández 
(Interview) found that, “in my experience, the career servants sleep in the laurels. They 
believe that they have a protection from dismissals and don’t care about their 
professional quality.” A Director in the Ministry of Agriculture (Interview) adds: “the 
career is security for [the career servants], but a bottleneck as well. Why? Because, in 
the end, these people will be there, but without performing a task. Physically, they 
come … sit in a place and wait for eight hours. After eight hours, they go home. This is 
not a productive life.”  
Lack of performance and cooperation of tenured public servants in turn 
incentivized reform resistance. Most visibly, the Minister of the Presidency of the newly-
elected Medina administration notified the MAP of discontent with the tenure of career 
personnel which did not fulfil its designated responsibilities (Interview, MAP Director). 
Subsequently, career incorporations were suspended for two years (El Quisqueyano, 
2014).   
Concurrently, tenure protections activated the second causal 
mechanism: reform resistance due to the disincentives tenure provides for political 
service provision. As with bureaucratic performance in office, threats of dismissal had 
been instrumental in assuring bureaucratic performance in campaigns – that is in 
assuring the mobilization of public employees in favour of the incumbent in elections. 
Ethnographic studies, for instance, point to repeated dismissals of public employees 
failing to attend campaign events (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2009). As a MAP advisor 
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(Interview) explains, “the only thing that guarantees that you can mobilize the people 
around you is that these people know that only with you they can obtain a series of 
benefits. So the leader knows that if these people … may receive these benefits without 
him, they don’t have as many incentives.” Tenure thereby disincentivized electoral 
mobilization not only from tenured personnel, but also from potential public sector 
recruits: “Imagine a minister with all of his personnel protected with job stability, and 
he has political aspirations. ‘What do I offer the other [campaign workers outside the 
state] as an opportunity?’ And if those outside know that all those inside here are 
protected and that the minister cannot fire them, they lost the expectation of being 
able to obtain a job.” (Interview, Economy Advisor)  
Incentives to retain patronage powers over dismissals and thus secure 
electoral mobilization of personnel ran frontally into – and outweighed – incentives to 
protect party affiliates: “Putting into balance the freedom to decide and the freedom to 
protect … the freedom to decide weighs more than the freedom to protect my people … 
As his principal focus is on mobilization, [the Minister] is less concerned with stabilizing 
those he appointed.” (Interview, MAP Advisor) Moreover, “[career employees] can help 
[the incumbent] out of gratitude, but the gratitude will be lost. The expectation of 
clientelist political relations is more durable, because … you depend on me, maybe … I 
will help you obtain another job … For the minister, the one who is not in the career is 
better as he will always depend on him.” (Interview, Economy Advisor) 
Evidence for the third mechanism – reform resistance as tenure 
incentivizes unionization and collective action antagonistic to the incumbent’s interest 
– is less overt. As noted, unionization attempts were met with threats of dismissals. 
Neither unionization nor collective action – or the incumbent’s response to them – could 
thus be observed. At the same time, incumbent opposition to (patronage) power shifts 
towards appointees did appear to motivate resistance to unionization. As a Director in 
the Ministry of Health (Interview) put it, “everything which meant internal strength 
[by employees] was a threat to authorities.”  
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In conclusion, the loss of patronage powers associated with tenure 
protections disincentivized Fernández from expanding tenure. Tenure jeopardized 
bureaucratic performance, electoral campaign support and discretion over pay if tenured 
personnel unionized. While case evidence does not permit their precise disentanglement, 
we may expect the causal weight of the three mechanisms to have differed. The second 
and, to a lesser extent, third mechanism were of important weight; suggestive evidence 
points to a more limited weight of the first mechanism – jeopardizing bureaucratic 
performance. With personnel selection prioritizing political over professional criteria 
(see chapter 4), performance losses of only partially qualified personnel were likely to 
be limited – notwithstanding the laments of interview respondents.   
As detailed in the prior section, tenure, of course, also provided benefits. 
Consistent with prior theories, it offered the promise of an enhanced net present value 
of (longer-term) patronage appointments; control of parts of the state even after an 
electoral loss; and a tighter patronage budget for a hostile successor. In this trade-off, 
retaining patronage control over dismissals – and the concomitant electoral mobilization 
advantage – reigned supreme in the context of a tightly contested 2012 election. 
Fernández thus resisted a reform which would have counted his own clients as the 
primary beneficiaries: as with the introduction of meritocracy (see chapter 5), more 
than de jure reforms which did not protect public employees from dismissal in practice 
did not see Presidential blessing. 
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Conclusion: Patronage Control and the Politics of Tenure Reforms 
As noted at the outset, the patronage control theory and its empirical test were 
extended to tenure protections with a two-fold ambition: to enhance confidence in the 
theory and to shed light on the understudied puzzle of variation in tenure protections 
across patronage states. The DR case study served towards both of these ends. 
   First, empirical evidence was found for a crucial assumption of the 
patronage control theory: tenure protections decrease the electoral utility incumbents 
derive from patronage bureaucracies. According to prior theories, tenure protections 
would have brought Fernández a range of benefits: longer-run employment to his party 
affiliates, longer-term control of the state and a tighter patronage budget of a potentially 
hostile successor. Moreover, tenure offered the promise of placating civil society and 
donor demand. Nonetheless, tenure was not electoral utility-maximizing for Fernández: 
forsaking patronage control over dismissals would have implied fewer incentives for 
bureaucrats to support Fernández’ electoral campaigns and to perform on-the-job, while 
facilitating collective action for higher pay. Even in a ‘most likely’ case, an incumbent 
thus did not find it in his electoral interest to introduce tenure protections for his 
affiliates. Confidence in the corresponding assumption of the patronage control theory 
is thus enhanced.  
   Second, the case study makes an important contribution to scholarly 
works on the determinants of tenure by accounting for the prevalence of bureaucratic 
instability in patronage states. Prior studies did well to uncover the causal mechanisms 
linking electoral uncertainty with tenure protections. Yet, these studies omitted to 
consider the trade-off which tenure presents to incumbents. As detailed, tenure reduces 
the incentives of appointees to perform in office, support electoral campaigns and refrain 
from collective action for higher pay. Consequently, tenure protections may deprive not 
only future incumbents of electoral utility, but also incumbents introducing it. The 
conundrum of patronage states without job stability despite recurrent electoral 
uncertainty is thus resolved. Incumbents resist granting their appointees the gift of 
tenure to retain patronage control and the concomitant electoral advantages. 
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Consequently, the patronage control theory may account for not only bureaucratic 
professionalization but also bureaucratic instability. Tenure curtails patronage control 
and thus incentivizes bureaucratic professionalization under subsequent incumbents. At 
the same time, incumbent resistance to losing patronage control disincentivizes the 
introduction of tenure in the first place.  
   As a corollary, the case analysis reaffirms the assertion in chapter 2 
that the incentives for introducing merit and tenure differ. None of the supply-side 
incentives Fernández faced to introduce tenure – such as providing longer-run 
employment to party affiliates – had any incentive effect on bureaucratic 
professionalization. An important puzzle is nonetheless left unresolved: the introduction 
of tenure despite its patronage control costs. The patronage control theory only points 
to reform disincentives, not the conditions under which such disincentives are 
overwhelmed by the reform incentives prior studies had uncovered.  
   While the DR case does not permit the identification of these conditions, 
recourse to the Paraguayan case provides at least a guidepost for future research in this 
direction. In Paraguay, public employees obtained de facto tenure protections through 
unionization in the 1990s in a context of high electoral uncertainty for Colorado 
factions, yet limited electoral uncertainty for the Colorado Party (see chapter 5). 
Factional struggles appear to have precluded incumbents from forestalling the 
emergence a multitude of Colorado-affiliated unions which deprived them of patronage 
control. To the contrary, both faction and union leaders organized public employees 
collectively as electoral support bases in intra-party struggles. The implication is clear: 
future research on the determinants of tenure reforms would do well to consider not 
only inter-party but also intra-party electoral uncertainty – and the role of public 
employees in intra-party politics. 
 With this guidepost provided, step one of demonstrating the 
generalizability of the patronage control theory is complete: its explanatory power for 
bureaucratic (in)stability was underscored. Step two follows next: evidence for its 
external validity beyond Paraguay and the DR shall be examined. 
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8  
 
Moving Beyond the Two Cases:                           
Suggestive Evidence for the                       
Generalizability of the Theory 
 
Consistent with a ‘most similar system’ case selection design, Paraguay and the 
Dominican Republic were selected with a view to maximizing variance in the 
independent variable of interest. As a logical corollary, the two countries are extreme 
cases of institutions concentrating patronage control in incumbents or shifting 
patronage control away from them. While this facilitated theory testing in the 
comparative case study, it also raises an immediate concern about the generalizability 
of the findings – that is about whether empirical evidence for the explanatory power of 
the theory beyond the two ‘extreme’ cases studied may be identified.  
  In this chapter, I address this external validity concern. I do so in two 
steps. First, the scope of the qualitative inquiry is extended to late 19th and early 20th 
century reforms in the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (UK) – two 
paradigmatic cases of patronage reform. These case explorations enable me to probe 
into the validity of the theorized causal effects and mechanisms. Subsequently, I 
tentatively test the theory in a large-n context, conducting a statistical plausibility 
probe which draws on cross-country expert survey data on the structure of government.  
While data limitations thwart conclusive findings, the results of both 
the qualitative and quantitative tests are consistent with the patronage control theory. 
Confidence in its generalizability is thus much enhanced. Remarkably, case evidence 
points to a causal role of institutions allocating patronage control in both the U.S. and 
the UK – the two, probably, most studied cases of patronage reform in the literature. 
At least two of the theorized causal mechanisms also travel to these two cases. Similarly, 
the statistical analysis finds that bureaucracies are, ceteris paribus, more meritocratic 
and less politicized in countries in which institutions shift patronage control away from 
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the incumbent. We may thus expect the patronage control theory to be portable beyond 
Paraguay and the DR. The implication is clear. Patronage states not only feature 
distinct institutions allocating patronage control; these institutional differences also 
matter for their reform trajectory.  
 
Extending the Qualitative Test: Case Selection 
Four criteria guided the selection of the U.S. and UK for the out-of-sample test. First, 
cases were to meet two key theoretical scope conditions: patronage was the rule of the 
game prior to the reform episode and incumbents faced a competitive electoral 
environment. Prominent professionalization episodes under authoritarian regimes – as 
in Prussia in the 19th century or Brazil under Getúlio Vargas in the 20th century – were 
thus excluded from consideration. Second, to gauge whether the theory is portable to 
not only presidential systems beyond Paraguay and the DR, but also parliamentary 
systems, one case of each was sought.  
Third, cases of professionalization – rather than patronage resilience – 
were sought. As noted in chapter 2, reforms are rare occurrences and reform failure is 
frequently over-determined. Not selecting on the dependent variable would thus risk 
case explorations with little causal leverage. To illustrate, patronage resilience has been 
accompanied by hyper-presidentialism – and concentrated presidential patronage 
control – in recent years in most of Latin America (Zovatto, 2014). While this regional 
pattern is consistent with theoretical predictions, the frequently over-determined nature 
of reform failure risks confounding correlation with causation in brief case explorations 
which may not rule out the range of rival hypotheses.  
Lastly, two paradigmatic cases of bureaucratic professionalization were 
sought. Such cases offer the advantage of comprehensive documentation. The likelihood 
of data availability to test the patronage control theory – with its hitherto neglected 
causal variables and mechanisms – is thus enhanced.111 Moreover, rival theories tend to 
                                        
111 As shall be shown, historical studies provide evidence for the causal role of the patronage control theory 
and of its mechanisms in the U.S. and UK case. They do so as part of broader causal narratives, however 
– rather than as systematic inquiries into the reform incentives emanating from institutions allocating 
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offer prominent explanations for reform outcomes. As a result, paradigmatic cases offer 
particularly challenging – and thus robust – out-of-sample tests of the patronage control 
theory.  
The UK and U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th century fit these criteria 
particularly well. The two cases are “probably the most known examples of merit 
adoption.” (Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009, p. 434) With competitive electoral 
environments and patronage as the rule of the game, the two cases also fall within the 
theory’s scope conditions. The UK bureaucracy was “patronage ridden” in a context of 
competitive elections, albeit with limited enfranchisement (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 64). 
The U.S. case in turn is “the quintessential example of the politics of civil service reform 
when a party system has come to rely on jobs for the boys in highly competitive 
democratic electoral arenas.” (Grindle, 2012, p. 16) Lastly, the two cases featured – as 
sought – a presidential (U.S.) and parliamentary (UK) system respectively.  
Consistent with the findings of chapter 4, the case analyses below will 
seek to account for professionalization in practice. Rather than focusing on the widely 
studied approval of the 1883 Pendleton Act in the U.S. and the 1854 Northcote-
Trevelyan Report in the UK, I will examine decisive episodes for professionalization in 
practice: the implementation of the Pendleton Act under President Theodore Roosevelt 
(1901-1909) in the U.S. and the approval of the 1870 Order-in-Council to put in place 
competitive examinations during William Gladstone’s first premiership (1868-1874) in 
the UK. These episodes were decisive as they changed the dominant rule of the game 
in the countries’ bureaucracies from patronage to professionalization.  
Prior to commencing the brief case explorations, one clarification in 
regards to their purpose is due: they do not seek to rewrite history. A range of theories 
to account for the U.S. and UK case have been posited. The analyses below do not seek 
to rule them out. Instead, their aim is a more modest one: to show that institutions 
allocating patronage control added to incumbent reform incentives in these two classic 
cases of bureaucratic professionalization.   
                                        
patronage control. In other words, prior studies provide case evidence for theory testing, yet not theoretical 
arguments akin to the patronage control theory. 
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An Accidental Victor without Spoils: Institutional Incentives for 
Bureaucratic Professionalization under Theodore Roosevelt  
In the U.S., the President who professionalized the country’s patronage bureaucracy 
the most was also the President most deprived of patronage control relative to electoral 
challengers when coming to office. Similar to Lugo and Fernandez, Theodore Roosevelt’s 
rise to the Presidency was exogenous to the patronage control theory: he assumed office 
without controlling major patronage powers in a context in which patronage was central 
to electoral mobilization. As in Lugo’s case, Roosevelt’s patronage access was, when 
assuming the Presidency, curtailed by institutions which shifted patronage control 
towards electoral challengers in other state institutions. The electoral utility Roosevelt 
could derive from the patronage bureaucracy was thus reduced. Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, Roosevelt responded by professionalizing the bureaucracy. 
Professionalization enabled Roosevelt to deprive challengers of patronage control and 
enhance public goods provision in an electoral context in which patronage alone was 
unlikely to secure him re-election.  
 
Meeting the Theory’s Scope Conditions: The U.S. Spoils Democracy  
  When Roosevelt came to power, the U.S. case fulfilled two key 
theoretical scope conditions: patronage was the rule of the game and the electoral 
environment was competitive. A precursor for many developing countries today, the 
U.S. had, in the 19th century, “invented” mass democratic clientelism and patronage: 
“it had democratic institutions and competitive elections, but votes were bought with 
the currency of public office.” (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 148) Property requirements for 
voting had been lifted in many U.S. states by the 1820s. Fierce electoral competition 
ensued. To illustrate, “between 1874 and 1896, national campaigns were fought to 
virtual dead-heat conclusions, and the parties divided control of the national 
government in all but three separate two-year intervals.” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 39) To 
mobilize support from newly enfranchised voters, parties started – beginning with 
President Jackson (1829-1837) – to rely on mass patronage and other clientelist favours. 
As a result, a “blatant” patronage system emerged which “eliminated virtually all 
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criteria for public office except political affiliation.” (Ingraham, 1995, p. xviii) As in 
Paraguay and the DR, patron-politicians openly publicized their patronage powers. To 
illustrate, a Chicago Senator informed a Senate Committee that no “appointments of 
any kind, big or little, were made in the section of the city in which I lived without my 
recommendation.” (Tarr, 1971, p. 72-73)  
  In this context, the U.S. passed its first civil service legislation – the 
Pendleton Act – against the odds in 1883. While scholars have advanced a range of 
theories to account for this passage (see R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994), contingency 
played an important role. A disappointed office seeker had assassinated President 
Garfield, sparking a public outcry over the patronage system and, subsequently, the 
formation of one of America’s first interest groups, the National Civil Service Reform 
League (Shefter, 1993). Moreover, the governing Republican Party faced a likely 
electoral defeat in the upcoming 1884 elections. As such, it was argued to face incentives 
to tenure Republican appointees and narrow the patronage powers of a potentially 
victorious Democratic party (Skowronek, 1982; Van Riper, 1958).112  
The Pendleton Act created a Civil Service Commission within the 
executive branch in charge of regulating and supervising examinations for entry and 
promotion. Appointments were to be based on merit: institutions could only recruit 
among the highest exam scorers. Moreover, assessments – the customary practice of 
demanding part of civil servants’ salaries for party funding – were prohibited 
(Skowronek, 1982). As in Paraguay and the DR, enforcement powers lay with the 
executive: Presidents could classify positions into the merit-based civil service through 
executive orders. 
Yet, “the Pendleton Act … had only a marginal impact on the spoils 
system.” (Grindle, 2012, p. 66) Subsequent to its passage, in January 1884, only 11 
percent of the 131,208 positions in the executive civil service were classified – that is 
                                        
112 While this argument is frequently advanced by scholars, note that initial civil service rules required 
merit tests for employees to be classified under the merit service. Indiscriminate tenuring of party 
appointees was thus not feasible. In 1888, President Cleveland modified these rules to waive the merit 
testing for incumbents of – yet not new appointments for – classified positions (R. Johnson & Libecap, 
1994). 
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placed under an examination system for future appointments (Skowronek, 1982). This 
number increased to 38 percent in 1901 (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). The 
corresponding decrease in patronage was more apparent than real, however. The figure 
excludes positions exempted from eligibility for the federal civil service, including 
employees hired for the 1900 census, employees hired under the Spanish-American war 
appropriations and, most important, employees hired at the state and local level 
(Skowronek, 1982). Moreover, patronage appointments were sometimes made under the 
disguise of the merit system. As a result, “parties had no less federal or state patronage 
available to them in 1900 than they had in 1883.” (Shefter, 1993, p. 74) The fate of 
postmasters, the “mainstay of American party politics,” is illustrative: it remained 
largely untouched by the merit service (Skowronek, 1982, p. 72). Under Presidents 
Cleveland and Harrison (1885-1897), between 40,000 and 78,500 postmasters were 
substituted with each government turnover (Grindle, 2012). Moreover, Roosevelt’s 
predecessor in the Presidency – William McKinley (1897-1901) – was the first President 
to reverse part of the merit-based civil service, exempting 9,000 previously classified 
positions (Skowronek, 1982).  
 
Measuring the Dependent Variable: Professionalization under Roosevelt  
Under President Roosevelt (1901-1909), reform reversal was turned 
upside down. Roosevelt classified over 137,500 positions into the merit-based civil 
service – 40 percent more than all of the five previous post-Pendleton Act Presidents 
combined. As a result, more than 62 percent of federal civilian government fell under 
the classified merit service when Roosevelt left office (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). 
Roosevelt also took several measures to safeguard the merit service from undue 
interference. The resources of the Civil Service Commission were expanded, its 
supervisory authority strengthened, a field staff added to its personnel and its control 
over recruitment and promotion extended all the way down to the local offices of state 
institutions (Fukuyama, 2014). Moreover, Roosevelt ordered the Treasury in 1901 to 
withhold salaries of classified civil servants appointed in violation of civil service rules. 
In addition, Roosevelt strengthened neutrality requirements for civil servants. Non-
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merit civil servants causing public scandal or using their offices for political purposes 
were subject to dismissal. Even more stringent prohibitions were introduced for merit 
civil servants: any political activity beyond voting and private expressions of political 
opinions was disallowed. Starting in 1902, Roosevelt also imposed gag orders on civil 
servants. Henceforth, civil servants soliciting pay increases or influencing legislation 
before Congress in any way, save through their heads of departments, faced dismissals 
(Skowronek, 1982).  
 As a result of these changes, Roosevelt’s Presidency was decisive for 
U.S. civil service professionalization: “from this point on, party leaders would accept 
the notion of a minimally politicized civil service.” (Silberman, 1993, p. 277) 
Consequently, Roosevelt’s Presidency was “the high point of reformist leadership” 
(Silberman, 1993, p. 283) – and thus the crucial reform episode to study when seeking 
to test the explanatory power of the patronage control theory in the U.S. case. 
 
Roosevelt’s Exogenous Rise: An Outsider inside a Majority Party 
Similar to Lugo and Fernandez, Roosevelt’s rise to the Presidency had 
been “in part accidental” – and thus exogenous to the patronage control theory 
(Silberman, 1993, p. 271). Roosevelt had “always stood outside regular party circles” in 
the governing Republican Party (Skowronek, 1982, p. 171). He had been a Civil Service 
Commissioner from 1889 to 1895, and, after narrowly winning the 1898 elections, a 
Republican New York Governor. In the 1901 elections, President McKinley appointed 
him nominee for Vice-President to attract independent progressive voters (Silberman, 
1993). As the Vice-Presidency was a powerless sinecure, McKinley and the leadership 
of the Republican Party saw little risk in Roosevelt’s appointment. In the same year, 
however, an anarchist assassinated McKinley. Per the Constitution, Roosevelt 
succeeded him in the Presidency. As Lugo and Fernandez, Roosevelt had thus risen to 
the Presidency in a system in which patronage was central to electoral mobilization 
despite lacking control over a significant patronage network of his own. 
At the time, the Republicans counted on broad majorities in Congress. 
The Republican Party held between 61 percent and 66 percent of seats in the Senate, 
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and between 54 percent and 65 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies during the 
Roosevelt Presidencies. Yet, control and management of the Republican Party lay with 
Senator Hanna – rather than the relative outsider Roosevelt. In 1901, Hanna was the 
frontrunner for the 1904 Presidential elections. Old guard politicians estimated that “he 
already had enough delegates to be nominated on the first ballot.” (Morris, 2010, p. 95) 
Hanna counted on an extraordinary web of influence, not least including “countless 
offices in the civil service.” (Morris, 2010, p. 96) As a result, a Presidential bid on the 
part of Roosevelt in 1904 required, first of all, mobilizing an electoral support base of 
his own for the Republican nomination against intra-party challengers and, in 
particular, Hanna. Roosevelt chose to construct this support base, as aforementioned, 
through professionalization and public goods provision – rather than (solely) patronage 
and private goods provision. As detailed next, institutions which limited Presidential 
patronage control contributed to this choice.  
 
Institutions and Lack of Presidential Patronage Control in the U.S. 
Born in a revolution against the concentrated powers of the British 
Monarchy, the U.S. Constitution had divided powers among the executive, legislature 
and judiciary, as well as between the central and decentralized governments (Lipset, 
1997). Compared to state and local governments, the Presidency and federal 
government at-large controlled only a minority of spending: less than 40 percent when 
Roosevelt came to power (United States Census Bureau, 2012). With only two states 
opting for civil service statutes in the 19th century, decentralized spending outside 
Presidential control could thus be used (virtually) freely for patronage purposes 
(Shefter, 1993). 
Moreover, the legislature undertook functions and held powers – 
including in regards to patronage – typically exercised by the executive elsewhere 
(Fukuyama, 2014). The U.S. Constitution had produced a “bifurcation of control and 
responsibility” over the federal bureaucracy between the executive and the legislature 
(Ingraham, 1995, p. 15). As a long-standing scholarly literature has documented, this 
bifurcation has shaped the trajectory of administrative reforms in the U.S. until today 
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(see, among many, R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). Less systematically explored, however, 
it also shaped Presidential professionalization incentives in general and Roosevelt’s 
reform incentives in particular.  
As part of this bifurcation, Congress held powers to set patronage 
budgets and public pay and, to lesser extent, impinge upon recruitment and dismissals. 
First, Congress had the exclusive rights to introduce and approve national budgets. 
Second, bureaus and departments could submit bills directly to Congress – that is 
without Presidential clearance – in order to, for instance, amplify departmental budgets. 
Third, Congress held powers to determine public pay. It could assign salary levels for 
up to the detail of individual positions or, alternatively, appropriate lump sums for 
discretionary personnel spending by department heads. Fourth, the appointment and 
removal of a range of senior officials in the executive was impossible without Senate 
approval. In conjunction, these powers provided Congress with not only patronage 
control, but also important influence in departmental affairs. Lastly, congressional 
courtesy – an informal institution – required the consultation of Congress members for 
appointments in their districts, including for postmasters and judicial staff (R. Johnson 
& Libecap, 1994). As a result, each Congress member controlled several hundred 
appointments directly (Silberman, 1993). 
Institutions shifting the private goods benefits of the patronage 
bureaucracy to public employees further curtailed Presidential patronage powers. In 
1890, the National Association of Letter Carriers and the National Association of Post 
Office Clerks had been formed.113 As 63 percent of federal civilian staff worked for the 
Post Office (as of 1891), these associations claimed representation for an important 
share of civil servants. Starting in 1901, postal unions began lobbying Congress for more 
favourable collective pay and promotion provisions. Congress responded in 1907 with 
the Reclassification Act which granted postal workers the sought after promotion and 
                                        
113 Several additional, yet less influential public sector unions – including the National Association of All 
Civil Service Employees and the Railway Mail Association – had also been formed in the 1890s prior to 
Roosevelt’s ascent (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). 
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pay schedule (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). These collective pay rises curtailed 
Roosevelt’s budget for discretionary patronage allocations of his own. 
As a result of these de jure and de facto constraints on Presidential 
patronage powers in particular and Presidential authority more generally, “the 
President had never risen far above the status of a clerk … The ostensible head of the 
national administrative apparatus found his political and institutional resources 
hostaged to local party bosses in Congress.” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 169)  
 
Institutional Incentives for Bureaucratic Professionalization in the U.S. 
For Roosevelt’s electoral ambitions, the stickiness of institutions shifting 
patronage control away from the Presidency caused an immediate dilemma. Patronage 
was central to electoral mobilization, yet the Presidential office he had inherited was 
deprived of important patronage powers. A Republican Congress was unlikely to 
aggrandize these patronage powers to its own detriment. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, Roosevelt responded by advancing professionalization.114 The theory’s first 
two causal mechanisms were at play: reform served to both undercut the patronage 
powers of his Presidential challengers in Congress and enhance the federal government’s 
public goods provision in a context in which Roosevelt was unlikely to be able to 
compete based on patronage alone.115  
These mechanisms are implicit in accounts of Roosevelt’s reform 
rationale: “In order to secure his place in the … leadership … Roosevelt had to … [make] 
the administrative structure … more independent of congressional control. Alternatively, 
he could seek the support of the liberal/Progressive Republicans … Since none of these 
strategies were mutually exclusive, it is not surprising Roosevelt engaged in all of them.” 
                                        
114 This is not to say that Roosevelt did not use part of his patronage powers for political ends. In fact, 
when taking office, he submitted as many as thirty appointments a day to Congress (Morris, 2010). These 
served to control key state institutions and sway a subset of legislators towards supporting Roosevelt’s 
reforms and electoral aspirations (Skowronek, 1982). 
115 Case evidence for the third theorized mechanism – reform to elicit public goods from tenured employees 
and deprive predecessors of support from their tenured appointees – could not be identified. 
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(Silberman, 1993, p. 272-273) Causal process observations provide further credence to 
the two mechanisms. 
The public goods rationale for professionalization is visible in the focus 
of reform, targeting mostly technical and professional-level positions for which 
“expertise was badly needed.” (Schultz & Maranto, 1998, p. 87) As a consequence, the 
government acquired “the capacity to administer the regulatory and social … programs 
whose enactment was supported by many of the nation’s business leaders as well as 
groups further down the social scale.” (Shefter, 1993, p. 80-81) Moreover, the President 
instituted political neutrality rules for patronage appointees which safeguarded his 
public goods reputation with the electorate: appointees causing public scandals faced 
dismissal (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). In a context in which Roosevelt was, in his 
early years in the Presidency, unlikely to be able to compete electorally with Hanna’s 
patronage network, professionalization thus enabled him to mobilize a political support 
base of his own: public goods- and reform-oriented voters and groups, a constituency 
largely neglected by his competitors in Congress. Socio-economic transformations such 
as industrialization and urbanization had enhanced the electoral utility of this support 
base in the late 19th century: a new stratum of middle class professionals, civil 
associations, non-partisan media outlets and progressive business associations had 
emerged (Van Riper, 1958). 
The electoral utility of public goods provision alone, however, was 
insufficient to tilt incentives towards reform. Else, Roosevelt’s predecessors would have 
similarly advanced professionalization. With institutions allocating important 
patronage powers to the legislature, professionalization enabled Roosevelt concurrently 
to deprive Presidential challengers in Congress of patronage control.116 To illustrate, 
Roosevelt sought professionalization not only for key technical positions, but also 
fourth-class postmasters, “the motor force of the federal patronage system” (Skowronek, 
1982, p. 178). Roosevelt classified almost 15,500 postmaster positions into the merit 
service, albeit solely in safe Republican districts: “their continuance as patronage served 
                                        
116 Previous Presidents lacked similar incentives to deprive fellow party members of patronage control: they 
had been leaders of their parties and, as such, at least in part in control of party members. 
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only to strengthen local party officials and the members of Congress tied to them. They 
did not serve the president, and they were removed from patronage.” (R. Johnson & 
Libecap, 1994, p. 62)  
Roosevelt also sought to sever ties between civil servants and legislators 
more generally. As noted above, salaries were withheld from classified (i.e. merit) civil 
servants who had been irregularly appointed; such appointments were most likely made 
by or on behalf of legislators (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). Moreover, Roosevelt’s gag 
order empowered him to dismiss any public servant soliciting pay increases or legislation 
from Congress. Lastly, Roosevelt’s redefinition of political neutrality prohibited any use 
of administrative offices for political purposes. In conjunction, these measures and the 
“strengthening [of] the policing powers of the Civil Service Commission served to 
undermine congressional party influence within the administrative structure.” 
(Silberman, 1993, p. 274)117  
As predicted by the patronage control theory, Republican legislators in 
control of Congress – and, concomitantly, of legislative patronage powers – resisted 
professionalization. In fact, the reform’s “chief obstacle was a Republican Congress”; 
and, unsurprisingly, the “executive-professional offensive became mired in bitter 
opposition from congressional leaders.” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 172-173) Consistent with 
theoretical assumptions, Roosevelt was nonetheless able to advance reform: the 
Pendleton Act empowered the President to extend the U.S. merit civil service without 
congressional approval. 
 
Conclusion: Institutions Allocating Patronage Control and Bureaucratic 
Professionalization in the U.S. 
In conclusion, the brief case exploration of bureaucratic 
professionalization in the U.S. suggests that institutions allocating patronage control 
                                        
117 As a corollary, reform under Roosevelt not only professionalized the U.S. bureaucracy, but also shifted 
the locus of control over it towards the Presidency. As Shefter (1993, p. 79) put it, the “administrative 
reforms of the Progressives increased the control that the President … [was] able to exercise over the 
administrative apparatus of government, at the expense of … Congress.” Note that this was, in fact, 
precisely the ambition of Roosevelt’s stewardship theory of the Presidency. 
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added to reform incentives. They reduced the electoral utility Roosevelt derived from 
the patronage bureaucracy, while strengthening the patronage power basis of 
Roosevelt's competitors for the Republican Presidential nomination in Congress. With 
institutions depriving him of patronage control, Roosevelt faced incentives to 
professionalize to not only seek to mobilize electoral support through public goods 
provision, but also curtail patronage access of his competitors.  
  This, of course, represents not more than suggestive evidence for the 
theory in the U.S. case. Other scholars have pointed to a range of other reform 
incentives. To cite a few: as a former Civil Service Commissioner, Roosevelt’s personal 
convictions about bureaucratic professionalization loomed large (Silberman, 1993). The 
aforementioned socio-economic transformation in the U.S. enhanced the electoral payoff 
of public goods provision, while curtailing the payoff of private goods provision (Reid 
& Kurth, 1988). It also facilitated the emergence of progressive Republicans – variously 
known as Mugwumps, Independents or Liberals – whose support could be courted with 
reform, in addition to civic reform coalitions mobilizing against patronage (Van Riper, 
1958). Moreover, ever-increasing patronage budgets may have led to ever-increasing 
principal-agent problems in patronage networks, with patrons at the top no longer able 
to control appointees at the bottom (R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). A context of 
electoral uncertainty may have also incentivized professionalization to blanket in 
patronage appointees. Blanketing in could have provided job stability to appointees and 
reduced patronage budgets of (hostile) succeeding Presidents (Ingraham, 1995). 
Note, though, that these accounts do not detract from the plausibility 
of the patronage control theory: they complement rather than the rival the theory, and 
are individually insufficient. ‘Blanketing in’ may not account for an extension of the 
classified service early in Roosevelt’s term. Principal-agent problems were least acute 
in the case of Roosevelt: he had come to power with the smallest patronage network of 
all post-Pendleton Act Presidents. The U.S.’ gradual socio-economic transformation 
contrasts with the sudden expansion of professionalization under Roosevelt; and 
presidential convictions about reform rarely lead to professionalization absent other 
incentives. In fact, as Silberman (1993, p. 272) put it, Roosevelt “was committed to 
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reform not only because he believed in it, but because it was essential to securing his 
place as leader of the party to which had accidentally fallen heir.” The fate of reform 
under a second prominent President with a personal reform commitment is illustrative. 
Facing political disincentives, President Woodrow Wilson - the “father of American 
public administration” and Vice President of the National Civil Service Reform League 
– advanced professionalization only minimally (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 160). 
Credence to the explanatory power of the patronage control theory in 
the U.S. case is thus lent. Prominent scholarly explanations do not completely account 
for the reform episode; and case evidence points to a causal role of institutions allocating 
patronage control. The next section will examine whether similar evidence may be 
identified in the British case. 
 
Prime Minister vs. Backbenchers: Institutional Incentives for 
Bureaucratic Professionalization under William Gladstone 
Examining the explanatory power of the patronage control theory in a parliamentary 
system may, at first sight, appear counterintuitive. After all, parliamentarism and the 
centralization of executive power are frequently equated by scholars (see, for instance, 
Gerring & Thacker, 2004). In contemporary British politics, for instance, “because of 
the fusion of executive, legislative and party leadership in the same hand, the [parties] 
winning a British general election gain authority over all of government.” (Rose, 1984, 
p. 6) Institutions which place patronage powers outside of the control of a Prime 
Minister and his allies would, of course, run counter to this equation of parliamentarism 
and centralization of power. Yet, such institutions may exist in parliamentary systems 
– and deprive prime ministers and their allies of patronage control. Not less important, 
such institutions may – as in presidential systems – shape bureaucratic 
professionalization incentives.  
  As I shall detail, patronage control in the UK was, prior to the 1870 
Order-in-Council, fragmented. Members of Parliament (MPs) controlled autonomous 
state institutions and the associated patronage powers. As a result, they counted on 
autonomous patronage power bases. In conjunction with rigid tenure protections, 
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fragmented patronage control deprived prime ministers of not only patronage, but also 
the ability to ensure party discipline – and thus legislative support for their continuation 
in office.  
Gladstone’s rise to power in this institutional context was exogenous to 
the patronage control theory: he lacked patronage resources in an electoral context 
dominated by jobs-for-votes exchanges. Consistent with theoretical expectations, 
institutions which shifted patronage control away from Downing Street also incentivized 
Gladstone to professionalize. Two causal mechanisms were at play: professionalization 
to, first, compete electorally through public goods provision given an inability to 
compete based on patronage only; and, second, deprive challengers in the legislature of 
patronage access. As a consequence, MPs were deprived of their main source of 
independence – and thus ability to challenge Gladstone’s longevity in office.  
 
Meeting the Theory’s Scope Conditions: The UK’s Patronage Parliamentarianism 
When Gladstone assumed the premiership in 1868, the UK fulfilled two 
key theoretical scope conditions: patronage was the rule of the game and the electoral 
environment was competitive. Prior to Gladstone’s ascension, political competition in 
the 19th century consisted principally of a two-party rivalry of Whig and Tory.118 With 
relatively even parliamentary representation, inter-party competition was pronounced; 
with party switches and fluctuating support of backbenchers for party leaders, intra-
party competition was no less fierce (Namier, 1957). The period coincided with franchise 
expansion: reform acts in 1832 and 1867 expanded the franchise to 14 percent and 32 
percent of the adult male population respectively. While the franchise thus remained 
constrained – full adult suffrage was not extended until 1929 – competition for electoral 
support from those eligible to vote was strong (Fukuyama, 2014).  
Patronage was central in this electoral competition: “patronage provided 
jobs for electors, employment for placemen and rewards for the relatives and dependants 
of those landed aristocrats who could supply the government with votes in parliament 
                                        
118 The Whigs merged with the Peelites and Radicals in 1859 to form the Liberal Party. 
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and in the constituencies.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 17) Its scale was considerable. According 
to Bourne (1986, p. 15), for instance, “patronage involved, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the whole of English society.” As a result, the Tories, for instance, did “as late as 1868 
… in most constituencies … not command a party apparatus that had an existence apart 
from the patron-client chains that linked Tory squires to their tenants and dependants.” 
(Shefter, 1977, p. 437) Similarly, “for the Whigs, party power meant patronage control.” 
(Silberman, 1993, p. 365)  
The centrality of patronage in electoral mobilization was paralleled by 
the centrality of patronage in public service. Beyond a small number of offices where 
some form of examination existed – including the Treasury, the Audit Office, Inland 
Revenue and the Board of Trade – patronage was the “medium through which the 
public services were recruited.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 23) The extent of patronage expanded 
rapidly in the 19th century. To illustrate, the number of personnel in the central 
government’s provincial and metropolitan departments increased more than three-fold 
between 1797 and 1871. Concurrently, the “expansion of Britain’s colonial possessions 
provided an enormous reservoir of patronage.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 28) 
Patronage saw its first major challenge with the publication of the 
Northcote-Trevelyan report in 1854. The report was the culmination of a series of 
inquiries into the workings of the UK civil service which had begun in 1848. The report 
called for an end to patronage and sought the introduction of competitive civil service 
examinations as the general means of entry into public service (Fukuyama, 2014). An 
independent civil service commission was to supervise these examinations. Although the 
report is frequently lauded as the “birth-date of the modern civil service,” 
professionalization in practice was largely stillborn (Gladden, 1967, p. 19). While the 
Indian civil service was opened up to competition in 1854, parliament failed to introduce 
legislation to adopt the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms in the public service more 
generally (Greenaway, 2004).  
Instead, the report’s most tangible repercussion was an executive Order 
in Council in 1855. The Order established a Civil Service Commission headed by three 
commissioners appointed by the Prime Minister. The Commission was empowered to 
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issue certificates of qualification which were a prerequisite for appointment. These ‘fit-
for-office’ certificates required candidates to showcase in examinations the requisite 
knowledge, ability, moral character, health and age (Silberman, 1993).  
Yet, this system “held few terrors for advocates and dispensers of 
patronage.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 37) To be put forward for examinations, candidates 
required in almost all cases a nominator. As a result, patron-client linkages were still a 
requisite for entry. Moreover, competitions were frequently limited to two or three 
candidates. Patrons customarily nominated candidates without a chance of passing to 
assure victory of the intended nominee. The Commission also lacked authority to 
enforce uniform requirements across departments for the selection criteria, or sanction 
departments bypassing examinations (Silberman, 1993). As a result, only 24 of 47 
departments in 1870 had introduced examinations. In these departments, almost 72 
percent of certificates of qualifications were granted without any competition; 28 
percent with limited competition; and only 0.3 percent with open competition between 
1855 and 1868. Unsurprisingly, the 1855 Order in Council was found to do “little to 
diminish the importance and scale of patronage in the public services.” (Bourne, 1986, 
p. 39) 
 
Measuring the Dependent Variable: Professionalization under Gladstone 
When Gladstone assumed as Prime Minister in 1868, patronage was thus 
still the rule of the game in the UK’s civil service. During his premiership, this was to 
change. His 1870 Order in Council represented “the watershed of the rationalization of 
the bureaucratic structure” in the UK (Silberman, 1993, p. 401). The Order abolished 
nominations to examinations and, instead, opened up competitive examinations to all 
applicants meeting minimum age and health requirements. Prior testing and approval 
of candidates by the Civil Service Commission became mandatory for appointments; 
and two examination schemes were set up: one for university graduates for the higher 
civil service and one for school leavers for clerical positions.  
To facilitate cabinet approval, the Order required prior consent from 
departmental authorities to proceed with examinations. Subsequent to passage, 
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however, the Treasury was effective in using the financial sway it had acquired over 
departments in preceding decades - in particular during Gladstone’s Chancellorship of 
the Exchequer - to secure compliance. All major departments - except the Home Office 
until 1873 and the Foreign Office until 1905 - came to accept the principle (Bourne, 
1986).119 As a result, “patronage became a negligible factor in recruitment” (Silberman, 
1993, p. 401). The 1870 Order in Council thus “established the basis of the modern civil 
service in Great Britain.” (Silberman, 1993, p. 376) Concomitantly, Gladstone’s first 
premiership is the crucial reform episode to study when seeking to test the explanatory 
power of the patronage control theory in the UK case. 
 
Gladstone’s Exogenous Rise: The ‘People’s William’  
Similar to Fernandez, Lugo and Roosevelt, Gladstone rose to power 
without controlling major patronage powers in a context in which patronage was central 
to electoral mobilization. Contrary to Fernandez, Lugo and Roosevelt, however, 
Gladstone had been a long-standing MP by the time of his ascent. He had served almost 
uninterruptedly in the House of Commons since 1833. Concurrently, he had also acted 
in several senior executive positions, including as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
1852-1855 and 1859-1866. Yet, he had done so without a constituency or large-scale 
patronage network of his own. Gladstone had joined parliament as a Tory in part thanks 
to the wealth of his father. Subsequently, he had aligned himself with the small Peelite 
faction in 1846 and assumed Peelite leadership in 1850 (Partridge, 2003). Contrary to 
Whigs and Tories, the Peelites had a reputation for administrative ability. In part 
thanks to this reputation as well as balance-of-power-politics - with the Peelites 
frequently providing the swing vote in the House of Commons - Gladstone was able to 
assume as Chancellor of the Exchequer (Silberman, 1993).  
                                        
119 This is not to say that patronage did not persist as the rule of the game in pockets of the state, however. 
The Postmaster General, for instance, „was in the habit of receiving ‚recommendations‘ from Members“ of 
parliament until 1907 (Parris, 1969, p. 53); and it took until 1912 for the Patronage Secretary to transfer 
his remaining patronage powers to departments.  
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As Chancellor, Gladstone successfully constructed a popular national 
reputation based on, in particular, his support for franchise expansion. This reputation 
contributed to Gladstone’s assumption of the Liberal Party leadership in 1867; the party 
had emerged from a merger of Whigs, Peelites and Radicals in 1859. After the franchise 
almost doubled in 1867, Gladstone was elected to the Premiership in 1868 on a reform 
platform. Despite this victory, however, the social composition of parliament had 
remained largely unchanged. Half of Liberal MPs and the majority of Gladstone’s 
cabinet members, for instance, were drawn from the aristocracy and gentry (Partridge, 
2003). Moreover, Gladstone faced the same challenge which had plagued his short-lived 
predecessors: how to overcome unstable parliamentary support given high levels of MP 
independence and, concomitantly, poorly disciplined parties. As I shall detail next, poor 
party discipline rested in great part on the fragmented institutional allocation of 
patronage control: individual MPs rather than the Prime Minister controlled most 
patronage.  
 
Institutions and the Lack of Prime Ministerial Patronage Control in the UK 
Ascent to Downing Street did not provide Gladstone with centralized 
patronage control. Instead, patronage powers over recruitment and promotion were 
allocated to institutions largely outside prime ministerial control. At the same time, 
tenure protections shifted part of the remaining private goods benefits of the patronage 
bureaucracy to public employees. 
The UK’s fragmented institutional allocation of patronage control had 
originated from the dismantlement of the 1688 settlement. The settlement had allocated 
patronage control to the Monarch. It had empowered the Monarch to select the first 
minister and control appointments to the civil list – and, concomitantly, patronage in 
public service. In response, between 1780 and the 1820s, “political leaders in Parliament 
… attacked the monarch’s structure of patronage and destroyed it.” (Silberman, 1993, 
p. 300)  Yet, “the dissolution of the monarch’s control over patronage left patronage 
without any systematic rational structure.” (Silberman, 1993, p. 300) While parliament 
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had won the struggle over control of patronage, it lacked centralized organizational 
principles for its allocation – and for public administration more generally.  
Instead of centralized administrative control, any state institution 
enjoyed autonomy: it “merely reported its expenditures annually to the Treasury and 
observed, within limits, the principles of economy … It received its own revenue, it paid 
its own bills.” (Parris, 1969, p. 248) As a result, as an MP put it, “every office seems 
to be the lord of its own will, and every office seems to have unlimited power over the 
purse of the nation … instead of … being ... under the constant check of the Treasury.” 
(quoted in Roseveare, 1969, p. 129)120 Decentralized administration was exacerbated by 
the prevalence of semi-independent boards, commissions and colonial governorships 
outside of ministerial (and prime ministerial) control.  
Decentralized administration translated into decentralized patronage 
control. Institutional authorities held autonomous powers over appointments and 
promotions (Parris, 1969). At the same time, the power to appoint these institutional 
authorities rested with parliament rather than the prime minister. Parliament 
customarily selected MPs to head ministries and other institutions as a function of their 
parliamentary status – rather than their allegiance to the current prime minister. 
Parliament could also remove institutional authorities if these lost its confidence. As a 
consequence, MPs in executive positions faced incentives to share patronage powers 
with fellow MPs to retain their support.  
In addition, institutions shifted part of the private goods benefits of the 
patronage bureaucracy to public employees. Tenure protections largely precluded prime 
ministers from dismissing appointees of preceding incumbents. Prior to the 19th century, 
public office had been considered almost a freehold. Consequently, “office had the 
sanctity and integrity of private property.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 15) As a corollary, strong 
tenure protections had become both customary and legally mandated. Public servants 
“had much more security than twentieth-century civil servants” and their dismissal was 
                                        
120 As a caveat to this generalization, note that the Treasury gradually enhanced its financial sway over 
state institutions in the 19th century. The setting of salaries and pensions, for instance, had, by 1830, 
become centralized and regulated by the Treasury. Under Gladstone’s Chancellorship, the Treasury also 
enhanced its control over, among others, the establishment of positions (Silberman, 1993). 
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sometimes difficult even in cases of severe neglect of duty (Parris, 1969, p. 26).121 
Gladstone thus had to channel an important fraction of his limited patronage budget 
to the remuneration of appointees of prior incumbents. 
In sum, institutions deprived Gladstone of patronage control. 
Recruitment and promotion in most institutions were outside his sway, as was the 
substitution of appointees of predecessors. Consistent with theoretical expectations, this 
institutional allocation of patronage control incentivized Gladstone to professionalize.  
 
Institutional Incentives for Bureaucratic Professionalization in the UK 
For Gladstone’s longevity in power, fragmented patronage control 
represented a dilemma. Patronage served to sustain governmental coalitions and secure 
electoral victories. Yet, institutions deprived the Prime Minister of most patronage 
control. Two causal mechanisms were activated in response: reform to, first, deprive 
electoral challengers of patronage control and, second, compete electorally through 
public goods provision in the context of an inability to compete based on patronage 
alone.122 As Roosevelt, Gladstone thereby faced electoral competition from not only 
inter-party but also intra-party challengers. 
The allocation of patronage powers to autonomous state institutions 
controlled by MPs greatly strengthened their independence from Gladstone. Controlling 
patronage in a context in which patronage was central to electoral mobilization, MPs 
did not require prime ministerial support to secure re-election. As a result, they could 
– and often did – provide fluctuating support for the legislative initiatives and 
continuation in office of a prime minister. As the Duke of Wellington complained in 
1829, “certain members claim a right to dispose of [patronage] … whether they support 
                                        
121 As theoretically predicted, tenure protections also facilitated collective action by public employees - thus 
further curtailing incumbent patronage budgets. Starting in 1854, civil servants began acting collectively 
to press for predictability and commensurability of salary increases and pension deductions, for instance. 
The 1859 Superannuation Act was in part a response to this pressure (Silberman, 1993).  
122 As in the U.S. case, evidence for the third mechanism – reform to elicit public goods from tenured 
employees and deprive predecessors of support from their tenured appointees – could not be identified. 
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[the government] upon every occasion, or now and then, or when not required, or 
entirely oppose.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 14) Gladstone faced a similar quandary in 1868.  
As a consequence of MP autonomy, “few ministers enjoyed much 
personal (and still less party) loyalty; cabinet solidarity and the collective responsibility 
were ill-defined. It required patronage to bring together and sustain a team of front 
bench ministers.” (Bourne, 1986, p. 17) For Gladstone and his predecessors, however, 
fragmented patronage control implicated that bringing together sufficient patronage to 
sustain a government was a tall order. Prime ministers counted on a party whip who, 
as patronage secretary in the Treasury, was in charge of garnering as many patronage 
positions as possible from the distinct executive departments to strengthen party 
discipline. Yet, patronage secretaries counted on limited levers to incentivize 
institutional authorities to share patronage powers. After all, each minister, president 
of board, member of commission or governor of colony formally controlled patronage 
powers in his or her institution. Moreover, patronage powers of institutions directly 
controlled by the prime minister were limited, not least as tenure protections precluded 
substituting appointees of predecessors in these institutions. Due to this limited 
patronage control, party leaders and prime ministers had “very little leverage over the 
independence of backbencher MPs.” (Silberman, 1993, p. 334) 
 As for his predecessors, centralizing patronage control would have thus 
represented the utility-maximizing choice for Gladstone. MPs would be deprived of their 
independence, while Gladstone would count on patronage to impose party discipline 
and secure his own re-election. Yet, the stickiness of institutions allocating patronage 
control precluded this choice. Consent from a majority of MPs – many of whom were 
the principal beneficiaries of decentralized patronage control – was required to centralize 
patronage control.  
With patronage centralization precluded, professionalization offered 
Gladstone a second best. Reform deprived “MPs of one of the most important 
underpinnings of their independence – the structure of local relationships which 
patronage helped to sustain.” (Silberman, 1993, p. 340) As a consequence, backbenchers 
were “forced to rely … more and more after 1870, on … party organization and party 
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leadership … to get nominated, elected, and reelected.” (Silberman, 1993, p. 353) In 
other words, reform enabled Gladstone to deprive intra-party challengers – who could 
undermine his party leadership position – of patronage control. Concurrently, patronage 
access of inter-party challenger was curtailed; as detailed above, parliament appointed 
not only governing party MPs to head state institutions. 
By itself, however, depriving challengers of patronage control was an 
insufficient reform incentive. Else, Gladstone’s predecessors would have 
professionalized. Reform similarly required the ascent of a prime minister without a 
patronage network of his own. Gladstone lacked a patronage network spanning MPs 
and voters when coming to office. With institutions depriving him of patronage control, 
Gladstone also lacked the requisite patronage control to build such a network while in 
office – and, concomitantly, the ability to compete electorally based on patronage.123 In 
line with the theorized causal mechanism, Gladstone then sought electoral competition 
based on public goods provision – which voters were likely to associate 
disproportionately with him. As Silberman (1993, p. 398) put it,  
“Absent any coherent, disciplined body of followers who could organize 
voters, political leaders such as Gladstone … saw in a powerful 
executive the means by which they might appeal directly to 
constituencies. By continually proposing a stream of major legislation 
that would be implemented by a well-subordinated civil service, 
political leaders saw the possibility of reducing the fickleness of 
voters.”124 
 Contrary to patronage centralization, professionalization was a feasible 
choice for Gladstone. As with patronage centralization, MPs resisted – as the principal 
beneficiaries of fragmented patronage control – professionalization. Parliament had, for 
instance, voted down the 1855 Order in Council. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, Gladstone was nonetheless able to professionalize.125 The Treasury had 
                                        
123 The lack of a prior patronage network also incentivized professionalization by reducing the amount of 
patronage lost by Gladstone as a result of bureaucratic professionalization.  
124 Note that professionalization thus transformed Gladstone into not only a national politician but also a 
“new kind of executive politician” (Silberman, 1993, p. 399). Reminiscent of the U.S. case, reform under 
Gladstone both professionalized the bureaucracy and centralized control over it in the executive. 
125 As a caveat, MPs fearing a loss of patronage powers could have, of course, acted collectively to depose 
Gladstone. Contrary to presidential systems, a vote of ‘no confidence’ with a simple majority would have 
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previously – in particular under Gladstone’s Chancellorship of the Exchequer – gained 
powers to lay down general conditions of service (Gladden, 1967, p. 19). As a result, 
neither the 1855 Order nor, more importantly, the 1870 Order in Council required 
parliamentary consent.  
 
Conclusion: Institutions Allocating Patronage Control and Bureaucratic 
Professionalization in the UK 
Evidence points to the explanatory power of the patronage control 
theory in the UK case. Institutions allocating patronage control reduced the electoral 
utility Gladstone could derive from the patronage bureaucracy, while strengthening the 
independent power bases of Liberal and Tory MPs. This independence reduced 
Gladstone’s ability to ensure legislative and electoral majorities – and thus continuation 
in office. Bureaucratic professionalization resolved this dilemma. It enabled Gladstone 
to enhance public goods provision to court electoral support and to deprive intra- and 
inter-party challengers of their patronage power bases.  
  As in the U.S. case, this brief case exploration cannot provide conclusive 
evidence. Previous studies point to other possible reform incentives. To cite a few: as a 
practising Christian, Gladstone’s personal convictions against the evils of patronage 
could have incentivized reform (Partridge, 2003). War could have been at play, with 
the military and administrative disasters of the Crimean War triggering a media outcry 
and reform demands. Industrialization and the associated socio-economic changes could 
have induced reform. Reform was constantly demanded by the business-sponsored 
Administrative Reform Association, for instance (Fukuyama, 2014). Franchise 
extension could have similarly been at cause. It expanded patronage access beyond 
                                        
sufficed for this purpose. Several factors forestalled such a vote. First, the very independence of MPs 
impaired their collective action. Backbenchers had much greater capacity to hold up legislative action than 
to pass laws in the House of Commons (Silberman, 1993). Second, Gladstone had obtained an unusually 
strong legislative majority of 110 Liberal MPs in the 1968 elections (Partridge, 2003). Only mass defection 
would have thus enabled a ‘no confidence’ vote. Third, professionalization implied that MPs would 
collectively lose patronage access. MPs controlling less patronage than their peers thus benefited from a 
more level electoral playing field (see Geddes, 1991 for a related mechanism). Lastly, and as detailed in the 
concluding section of the case exploration, other factors – such as industrialization and democratic 
enfranchisement – curtailed the electoral utility of patronage for not only Gladstone but also MPs.  
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upper classes. In response, upper classes sought examinations to preserve preferential 
public service access: better educated, they were likely to trump (Shefter, 1977).126 
Enfranchisement also multiplied the number of supporters who could not be favoured 
with patronage. In conjunction with socio-economic changes stemming from 
industrialization, enfranchisement thus reduced the electoral utility of patronage 
(Parris, 1969).  
  The patronage control theory nonetheless remains plausible as an 
additional reform incentive. Prior studies offer complementary rather than competing 
explanations; moreover, the decisiveness of professionalization under Gladstone remains 
puzzling without recourse to the patronage control theory. Industrialization gradually 
shifted incentives towards professionalization. Crimean war failure preceded the 1870 
Order by 14 years. Several of Gladstone’s predecessors held similar personal convictions 
against patronage (Partridge, 2003). Enfranchisement in the 19th century was 
accompanied by rapid patronage growth, thus moderating the decline in the share of 
voters benefiting from patronage (Bourne, 1986); and preserving upper class access to 
public service did not require an expansion of examinations to clerical positions. 
Confidence in the patronage control theory is thus, once more, enhanced. Institutions 
allocating patronage control appear to have added to Gladstone’s professionalization 
incentives and to the decisiveness of his reform.  
The two cases thus lend credence to the generalizability of the patronage 
control theory beyond Paraguay and the DR. Evidence for a causal role of institutions 
allocating patronage control was found in both cases; at least two of the theorized causal 
mechanisms seem to have been at play; moreover, institutions allocating patronage 
control were not merely intervening variables: their origins – a revolution against the 
concentrated powers of the British Monarchy in the U.S. and the dismantlement of the 
1688 settlement in the UK – did not incentivize professionalization; and, lastly, a causal 
effect was identified in both a presidential and a parliamentary system.  
                                        
126 Gladstone’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Lowe, for instance, explicitly pursued this objective with his 
reform advocacy. 
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Qualitative evidence for the generalizability of the theory was thus 
provided. The implication is remarkable: the patronage control theory sheds new 
explanatory light on two of the most paradigmatic and studied cases of patronage 
reform in the literature. In the next section, I will examine whether quantitative 
evidence for the causal power of the theory beyond the four cases studied may be 
similarly identified.  
 
Beyond Small-N: A Statistical Plausibility Probe                                   
of the Patronage Control Theory 
To gauge whether the theory finds support in a large-n setting, I conduct a statistical 
plausibility probe. The probe is developed in three steps. First, the data drawn on to 
operationalize bureaucratic professionalization, institutions allocating patronage control 
and control variables is detailed. Second, the econometric model and estimation 
techniques are presented. And third, the empirical results and their implications for the 
generalizability of the theory are discussed. Prior to proceeding with the analysis, an 
important caveat regarding its ambition is due: what the analysis purports to achieve 
is no more than the provision of tentative evidence for the plausibility of a causal effect 
of the patronage control theory beyond the four cases studied qualitatively. A range of 
data limitations preclude a more conclusive and robust statistical test. With this caveat 
in mind, the statistical plausibility probe does add large-n evidence: bureaucracies are 
more meritocratic and less politicized where institutions deprive incumbents of 
patronage control.  
 
The Data and Its Limitations  
For the statistical plausibility probe, data on bureaucratic 
professionalization, institutions allocating patronage control and control variables is 
brought together. As shall be detailed, the data does not permit precise 
operationalizations of the variables of interest. To address this data limitation, proxy 
measures are made recourse to; where such measures are unavailable, the analysis relies 
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instead on variables enabling the testing of empirical implications of the theory – rather 
than of the theory itself.  
Bureaucratic professionalization is proxied by data on meritocracy and 
politicization in public sector recruitment. As noted, the equation of professionalization 
with the primacy of meritocracy in recruitment is motivated by prior studies which 
associate meritocracy – yet not other bureaucratic features such as tenure protections 
– with public goods benefits such as economic growth or lower corruption (Dahlstroem 
et al., 2011; Rauch & Evans, 2000).  
To measure the primacy of meritocracy, the analysis draws on 2008-
2012 Quality of Government (QoG) Survey data. A major advance in cross-country 
perception data on the structure of government, the web-based survey is based on 1035 
country expert responses covering in a pooled sample 135 countries. For the purpose of 
the plausibility probe, I draw on the country-level dataset. The dataset contains the 
mean of expert responses for those 107 countries which feature at least 3 expert 
respondents. The coverage of the survey extends to all regions of the world, albeit with 
somewhat less frequent responses in Africa and the Middle East (Dahlberg et al., 2013).  
Meritocracy and politicization may be usefully captured by responses 
(on a 1-7 scale) to the survey questions “When recruiting public sector employees, the 
skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job?” and “When recruiting 
public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the 
job?” A professionalization variable which ranges theoretically from -6 to +6 is then 
constructed by deducting the politicization score from the meritocracy score. As 
illustrated in Table 8.4, countries score in practice between -4.4 and +4.75, with a mean 
close to 0 (-0.1), on this measure. For an ordered logit regression – which takes into 
account the bounded nature of the data – average expert responses per country for each 
meritocracy and politicization are rounded (up and down) to recreate the ordinal 1-7 
scale; subsequently, an ordinal professionalization variable is generated by deducting 
the ordinal politicization score from the ordinal meritocracy score. The rounding 
procedure only leads to a minimal loss in variation: the correlation between the ordinal 
professionalization variable and the continuous one is 0.99. 
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As robustness checks, meritocracy and politicization are also included as 
disaggregated dependent variables in the statistical tests below. For the purpose of 
theory testing, however, the aggregate professionalization measure is more appropriate. 
Consistent with the theoretical distinction between private and public goods provision, 
it reflects in part the relative weight of public (goods oriented) and private (goods 
oriented) concerns in recruitment decisions. This would, of course, not be a relevant 
differentiation if meritocracy and politicization were perfectly negatively correlated. 
Yet, while the negative correlation between meritocracy and politicization in the QoG 
data is substantial (r=-0.84), Table 8.1 illustrates that an important share (21 percent) 
of countries feature bureaucracies in which both meritocracy and politicization are high. 
In these countries, recruitment prioritizes personnel with not only professional skills but 
also political proximity. As political proximity may in part be sought for private goods 
provision – for instance to facilitate the targeting of goods to partisans – politicization 
is deducted from the professionalization score. 
 
Table 8.1 Meritocracy and Politicization Dummy Tabulation127 
      Table 8.1.A Frequencies Table 8.1.B Proportions 
        Politicization   Politicization 
No (=0) Yes (=1) Total No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
M
er
it
o
cr
a
cy
 No 
(=0) 
4 43 47 
M
er
it
o
cr
a
cy
 No 
(=0) 
4% 40% 44% 
Yes 
(=1) 
38 22 60 
Yes 
(=1) 
35% 21% 56% 
Total 42 65 107 Total 39% 61% 100% 
 
Note also that the professionalization indicator measures the criteria to 
select personnel in practice, rather than the formality relied upon to recruit personnel. 
Hiring of public sector employees via formal examination systems is only weakly 
correlated with meritocracy (r=0.34) and lack of politicization (r=0.28) according to 
QoG survey data (see Table 8.4). In fact, an important share of countries count on 
formal examinations, yet not meritocratic recruitment (21 percent), or meritocratic 
                                        
127 Dummies are set to 1 where responses exceeded the mean value of the response scale and 0 otherwise.  
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recruitment, yet not formal examinations (10 percent) (see table 8.2). This is consistent 
with the findings in chapter 4. Formal examinations are vulnerable to manipulation in 
weak institutional contexts; at the same time, professionalization may advance through 
meritocratic patronage without examinations. Actual practices rather than formal 
procedures are thus the more appropriate proxy measure for professionalization. 
 
Table 8.2 Meritocracy and Formal Examinations Dummy Tabulation  
     Table 8.2.A Frequencies Table 8.2.B. Proportions 
     Formal Examinations   Formal Examinations 
No (=0) Yes (=1) Total No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
M
er
it
o
cr
a
cy
 No 
(=0) 
25 22 47 
M
er
it
o
cr
a
cy
 No 
(=0) 
23% 21% 44% 
Yes 
(=1) 
11 49 60 
Yes 
(=1) 
10% 46% 56% 
Total 36 71 107 Total 33% 67% 100% 
 
The statistical analysis thus steers clear of validity concerns plaguing 
studies relying on formal procedures and norms as dependent variables (see, among 
many, Folke et al., 2011; Hollyer, 2011a; Hollyer, 2011b; Mueller, 2009; Ruhil, 2003; 
Ruhil & Camões, 2003). At the same time, enhanced measurement validity comes at a 
cost. The cross-sectional QoG survey data does not permit measuring changes in 
professionalization. As the theory seeks to explain change, this is an important 
shortcoming. In conjunction with endogeneity concerns and data limitations further 
detailed below, the ambitions of the statistical plausibility probe are thus invariably 
limited to providing tentative – rather than conclusive – evidence.  
The key explanatory variable of interest – institutions allocating 
patronage control – comprises, as noted, institutions which shift patronage benefits to 
public employees and institutions which shift patronage control to government branches 
beyond the executive. The former may be plausibly operationalized based on existing 
data.128 Data to operationalize the latter, however, is unavailable.129 What existing data 
                                        
128 As a caveat, global data on public sector unionization density is unavailable (ILO, 2013). 
129 Large-n data on legislative powers over personnel only extends to legislative authority to approve 
personnel expenditures in the budget, yet not to, for instance, legislative sway over salary setting or the 
creation of positions (International Budget Partnership, 2013). At the same time, the overlap in the 
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does permit for this latter component of the theory, however, is a tentative test of an 
important empirical implication of the theory.  
Institutions shifting private goods benefits of patronage bureaucracies to 
public employees are operationalized by bureaucratic job stability. Job stability may be 
measured by the QoG survey question “Once one is recruited as a public sector 
employee, one stays a public sector employee for the rest of one’s career?” Job stability 
is, of course, not without flaws as an operationalization of the inability of incumbents 
to dismiss public employees and the ability of public employees to collectively bargain 
for generalized benefits. Public employees may leave the public sector voluntarily even 
when incumbents are unable to dismiss them; may count on job stability even where 
incumbents are able to – but choose not to – dismiss personnel; and may choose not to 
– or be legally unable to – organize collectively even when counting on job stability.  
Notwithstanding these concerns, however, we may expect job stability 
to be a prerequisite for the ability of public employees to claim part of the private goods 
benefits of patronage bureaucracies. As patronage bureaucracies are characterized by 
wage premiums (see U. Panizza, 1999), public employees face limited incentives to 
depart voluntarily and incumbents enhanced incentives to dismiss appointees of 
predecessors. Job stability absent tenure protections should thus be infrequent, except 
where turnover of incumbents is not forthcoming. When incumbents stay in office, their 
appointees may enjoy job stability even absent tenure protections. The statistical 
analysis below adds a test with a sample restricted to countries with incumbent turnover 
to exclude cases where tenure protections and job stability may not coincide. Within 
this restricted sample, job stability may be assumed to proxy tenure protections. Tenure 
protections in turn are likely to be a necessary, albeit insufficient condition for public 
employees to bargain collectively for generalized benefits; where such protections are 
absent, incumbents may dismiss public employees when these seek benefits which 
constrain incumbent patronage control.  
                                        
coverage of the QoG data and data on legislative authority over personnel expenditures is too limited to 
permit meaningful statistical analyses. 
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Contrary to institutions shifting patronage benefits to public employees, 
there is no large-n data with which to plausibly operationalize institutions allocating 
patronage control to government branches beyond the executive. As a testable empirical 
implication of the theory, however, we may expect countries with more pronounced 
political constraints on the executive to count on greater constraints on executive 
patronage control. Such political constraints may be captured by the Political 
Constraints Index V (Henisz, 2010). The Political Constraints Index measures the 
number of independent branches of government – including the number of houses of 
parliament, the judiciary and sub-federal entities; the extent of control of the governing 
coalition of these branches; and the extent of legislative fragmentation. The political 
constraints index is greater where governments face more independent branches of 
government; are less in control of them; and face a more fragmented legislature. Note 
that with increases in political constraints on the executive, we may also expect 
increases in constraints on executive patronage control. The Constraints Index increases 
with the independence – and, concomitantly, proper hiring authority – of other 
branches, such as the judiciary and sub-federal units; it increases when these branches 
and their hiring authority are not controlled by incumbents; and it increases where 
incumbents are less in control of the legislature – and thus of potential legislative 
faculties over patronage.   
To construct a cumulative measure of the extent to which institutions 
deprive incumbents of patronage control, job stability and political constraints may be 
normalized to a 0 to 1 scale and, subsequently, added up with equal weights130 to derive 
an ‘Index of Institutional Constraints on Incumbent Patronage Control’:  
Index = [Job Stability + Political Constraints] / 2 
Two objections to theory testing with this measure immediately come 
to mind – and should, hence, be addressed. First, job stability and political constraints 
on the executive could be considered proxy variables for good government in general 
                                        
130 As the patronage control theory is indeterminate in regards to the relative causal weight of distinct 
institutions shifting patronage away from the incumbent, I assign equal weight to the two institutional 
components in the Index. 
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and, as a corollary, bureaucratic professionalization. Note, though, that, empirically, 
this objection is not sustained. Countries differ sharply in their institutional constraints 
on incumbent patronage control, with values ranging from 0.16 to 0.89 (Table 8.4); and 
this variation exists not only for professional but also for patronage bureaucracies: 
institutional constraints range from 0.16 to 0.83 for countries with negative 
professionalization scores. Moreover, the correlations of job stability (r=0.34) and 
political constraints (r=0.43) with bureaucratic professionalization are relatively low. 
The aforementioned objection may thus be refuted. Not less important, this finding 
provides further evidence for the assertion that there are – contrary to the assumptions 
of prior studies – large institutional differences across patronage bureaucracies.  
Second, institutional constraints could – in the way the Index was 
constructed – affect professionalization through causal mechanisms other than those 
theorized. Job stability could facilitate professionalization by incentivizing public 
employees to invest in public sector-specific skills and learning on the job, for instance; 
with job stability, public employees could reap the benefits of these investments over a 
longer time period (see, for instance, Gailmard & Patty, 2007). The lack of a statistical 
association in prior studies between job stability and enhanced public goods provision 
– as proxied by economic growth and lower corruption – sheds doubt on this alternative 
causal mechanism, however (Dahlstroem et al., 2011; Evans & Rauch, 1999). Political 
constraints in turn could facilitate professionalization by strengthening the enforcement 
of professional civil service legislation. As noted, the political constraints score increases, 
among others, with independent judiciaries. To rule out this possibility, the statistical 
analysis below adds a test with the Political Constraints Index V disaggregated into its 
component parts. The test finds that the individual components of the Political 
Constraints Index – including an independent judiciary – are not statistically significant 
predictors of a more professional bureaucracy.  
At the same time, descriptive statistics point to the plausibility of a 
causal relationship between the Index of Institutional Constraints on Incumbent 
Patronage Control and bureaucratic professionalization. The correlation of the Index 
with professionalization (r=0.52) is larger than the corresponding correlations of each 
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of its components, job stability (r=0.34) and political constraints (r=0.43). Moreover, 
professional bureaucracies in which patronage is no longer the rule of the game – that 
is where merit has more weight than political criteria in recruitment – feature more 
frequently institutions depriving incumbents of patronage control. While patronage 
bureaucracies are evenly split between those counting on and those lacking institutional 
constraints on incumbent patronage control, professional bureaucracies are more than 
four times more likely to count on rather than lack such institutions (see Table 8.3).131 
 
Table 8.3 Professionalization and ‘Index of Institutional Constraints 
on Incumbent Patronage Control’ Dummy Tabulation132  
     Table 8.3.A Frequencies Table 8.3.B Proportions 
     Institutional Constraints   Institutional Constraints 
No (=0) Yes (=1) Total No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
-
a
li
za
ti
o
n
 No 
(=0) 
28 28 56 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
-
a
li
za
ti
o
n
 No 
(=0) 
27% 27% 54% 
Yes 
(=1) 
9 38 47 Yes 
(=1) 
9% 37% 46% 
Total 37 66 103 Total 37% 66% 100% 
 
With the dependent and key independent variable clarified, control 
variable data shall be circumscribed. To reduce potential omitted-variable biases, 
controls seek to account for the range of explanatory factors discussed in the literature 
review (see Table 2.2 in chapter 2).133 On the demand-side, these include per capita 
                                        
131 Dummies for professionalization are set to 1 for positive professionalization values and zero otherwise; 
dummies for institutions depriving incumbents of patronage control are set to 1 for Index values above 0.5 
and 0 otherwise (see Table 8.3). 
132 The tabulation remains largely unchanged when restricting the sample to countries which, consistent 
with theoretical scope conditions, feature competitive executive elections. Such conditions may be proxied 
by scores of 6 or higher on the Executive Index of Political Competitiveness in the Database of Political 
Institutions (T. Beck et al., 2001). In the restricted tabulation, 24 percent of countries feature neither 
institutional constraints on incumbent patronage control nor professionalization (as compared to 27 percent 
in Table 8.3.B); and 27 percent constraints on incumbent patronage control, but no professionalization 
(the same percentage as in Table 8.3.B). 
133 Controls replicate Table 2.2 in chapter 2 with three exceptions. First, no control for war is included as 
the QoG country dataset does not - with the possible exception of Sudan - cover war zones. Second, due 
to data limitations, no controls for the presence of collective actors pressing for professionalization is 
included. As prior studies had found collective action to be an anomaly, however, its omission is unlikely 
to cause significant omitted variable bias (see chapter 2). Lastly – and again due to data limitations – no 
control for private sector employment opportunities is included. Included controls with high collinearity to 
such opportunities – such as per capita incomes – should, however, capture at least part of their causal 
effect. 
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incomes (in logarithmic form), education levels (percent of population with secondary 
education), urbanization (percent of population), ethnic fractionalization (as 
operationalized in Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003), 
natural resource rents (as a percent of GDP), foreign aid (net official development 
assistance receipts as percent of GNI) and the openness of the economy (trade as a 
percent of GDP). On the supply side, controls include the Polity2 indicator of the Polity 
IV series as a proxy for democratic development; the executive index of political 
competitiveness from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) as a proxy for 
electoral competition; the age of the chief executive’s party as a proxy for political time 
horizons; the programmatic orientation of political parties as a proxy for party 
organization (following Cruz & Keefer, 2013); the size of government (percent of GDP) 
and five-year growth in government spending (purchasing power parity-adjusted on a 
per capita basis) as a proxies for shifts in patronage budgets and potential principal-
agent problems in patronage networks134; dummies for variation in electoral institutions, 
including proportional representation and mean district magnitudes, and an ordinal 
variable to differentiate presidential, assembly-elected presidential and parliamentary 
systems.  
As illustrated in Table 8.4, the correlations of these variables with 
bureaucratic professionalization are largely consistent with literature predictions. 
Professionalization is strongly correlated with per capita incomes and education as well 
as – as more contested in the literature – democracy and parliamentary systems (r >= 
0.4 for all variables). Moreover, it is positively, albeit not strongly, correlated with 
programmatic party organizations, longer political time horizons, electoral competition, 
openness of the economy, urbanization and faster growing governments; and negatively, 
albeit not strongly, correlated with greater foreign aid receipts, larger governments, 
greater ethnic fractionalization, larger electoral districts and proportional 
representation.  
 
                                        
134 Compensation of public employees rather than total government spending would be a more accurate 
operationalization, yet is only available for roughly half as many countries. 
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Table 8.4 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Data Source Obs Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
r 
with 
Prof 
Dependent variables 
Bureaucratic 
Professionalization (Prof) 
Dahlström, et al. 
(2011)  
106 -0.08 2.26 -4.36 4.75 1.00 
Professionalization (Ordinal) 
Dahlström, et al. 
(2011)  
106 -0.11 2.34 -5 5 0.99 
Key explanatory variable 
Index of Institutional 
Constraints on Incumbent 
Patronage Control 
Author’s own 
calculation  
103 0.57 0.17 0.16 0.89 0.51 
Job stability 
Dahlström et al. 
(2011)  
106 0.62 0.19 0.11 0.96 0.34 
Political Constraints V Henisz (2010)  165 0.42 0.31 0.00 0.89 0.43 
Demand-side control variables 
GDP per capita (log) 
World Bank 
(2012c)  
214 8.21 1.55 5.02 11.29 0.53 
% of Population with 
secondary education   
Barro & Lee 
(2010) 
159 56.24 28.43 2.00 100.00 0.40 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Alesina et al. 
(2003)  
186 0.44 0.26 0.00 0.93 -0.25 
Urban Population (% of 
total) 
World Bank 
(2012c)  
241 57.12 23.58 10.64 100.00 0.28 
Natural Resources (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank 
(2012c)  
216 8.89 13.66 0.00 74.61 -0.14 
Net Official Development 
Assistance Per Capita 
World Bank 
(2012c) 
233 94.6 217.9 -14.4 1728.7 -0.35 
Trade (% of GDP) 
World Bank 
(2012c)  
209 89.18 48.73 22.77 432.87 0.08 
Supply-side control variables 
Democracy (Freedom House 
Polity 2) 
Hadenius & 
Teorell (2005)  
162 6.31 3.08 0.00 10.00 0.41 
Electoral Competition 
(Executive Index of Pol. 
Competitiveness) 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
174 6.05 1.75 2.00 7.00 0.09 
Time Horizons (Age of Party 
of Chief Executive) 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
143 35.78 31.93 0.00 162.00 0.31 
Party Organization 
(Programmatic Orientation) 
Cruz & Keefer 
(2013) 
172 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.09 
Size of Government (% of 
GDP) 
Heston et al.  
(2012) 
185 12.14 9.03 2.87 52.97 -0.14 
5-year growth in real public 
per capita spending 
Heston et al. 
(2012)  
173 16,707 41,409 -118,575 336,848 0.26 
Political system 
(Presidential/Parliamentary) 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
172 0.78 0.94 0.00 2.00 0.47 
Proportional representation 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
159 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 -0.09 
Mean District Magnitude 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
157 18.72 56.11 0.72 450.00 -0.10 
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Econometric Model and Estimation Technique  
For the statistical plausibility probe, two specifications are employed. 
First, bureaucratic professionalization is regressed on the ‘Index of Institutional 
Constraints on Incumbent Patronage Control’ and control variables in an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression. Subsequently, to account for the delimitation of the 
values of the dependent variable from, theoretically, -6 to +6, the OLS specification is 
complemented by an ordered logistic specification with the same set of controls. Both 
the OLS and ordered logistic regression feature the following specification: 
	
	 =   +   + 	 + 
 +   
Where Professionalizationi and Indexi stand for the key dependent and 
explanatory variable of interest, and  represent vectors for the aforementioned set 
of demand-side and supply-side control variables respectively,  is the intercept and   
the error term. The subscript i represents cross-sectional units, i.e. countries. As noted, 
professionalization is an ordinal variable with a theoretical range from -5 to +5 in the 
ordered logistic regression, and a continuous variable with a range from -4.4 to +4.8 in 
the OLS regression. 
Several objections to this simple model may be raised. Most crucially, it 
lacks a temporal dimension. For a robust statistical test, constraints on incumbent 
patronage control would need to be associated with changes rather than levels of 
professionalization. Moreover, we may expect lags in the effect of the Index on 
bureaucratic professionalization as well as reverse causation between professionalization 
and several of the explanatory variables, in particular per capita incomes. The cross-
sectional rather than panel nature of the QoG survey data in conjunction with the 
absence of a suitable instrument for the Index imply that these endogeneity concerns 
cannot be addressed appropriately. This, of course, underscores once more the 
importance of interpreting the results with caution. They may, as noted at the outset, 
only provide tentative evidence for the generalizability of the patronage control theory 
beyond the four cases studied.  
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Empirical Results 
For both the OLS and the ordered logistic specification, 
professionalization is regressed on a baseline model containing only demand-side factors 
as well as a full model which additionally includes supply side factors (Table 8.5 and 
Annex G.1). For the key explanatory variable, results are consistent across all 
specifications and models: the Index is a statistically significant predictor of 
professionalization. It reaches the 5 percent significance level in both demand-side 
models, and the 10 percent significance level in both full models. The effect also appears 
to be substantively important. To illustrate, in the full OLS model, professionalization 
– which theoretically ranges from -6 to +6 – increases by 3.1 when the Index increases 
from zero to its maximum value of one.  
Also note that, when disaggregating the Index into its two components, 
only job stability remains significant – at the 1 percent (demand-side models) and 5 
percent level (supply side models) respectively. For the validity of the patronage control 
theory, this is less concerning than it may appear. Job stability is a plausible 
operationalization of tenure protections. In contrast, the Political Constraints variable 
only tests an empirical implication of the theory – rather than the theory itself. 
Moreover, its high collinearity with several controls – such as political systems and 
electoral competition – attenuates any independent causal effect.  
Beyond the Index, no other explanatory variable retains statistical 
significance across all specifications. As illustrated in Table 8.5 and Annex G.1, higher 
per capita incomes, more democratic regimes and less urbanization are – as expected 
by most studies – statistically associated with professionalization across all models in 
the Ordered Logistic Regression. In the OLS regression, however, only per capita 
incomes and urbanization retain significance – and this significance is limited to the 
baseline model. Moreover, electoral competition is statistically significant in both full 
models in the OLS regression – yet not in the Ordered Logistic Regression. Finally, note 
that, contrary to institutions allocating patronage control, none of the electoral 
institutions which prior institutional studies had focused on are statistically significant 
predictors of professionalization in any of the specifications or models. 
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Table 8.5 OLS Regression Results: Bureaucratic Professionalization 
  
Demand-
Side  
Demand-Side, 
Disaggregated Index 
Full 
Model 
Full Model, 
Disaggregated Index 
Institutional Constraints on 
Incumbent Patronage Control 
3.51**  3.06*  
(t-stat) -1.42  -1.81  
Tenure Protections  0.45***  0.45** 
(t-stat)  -0.17  -0.22 
Political Constraints  0.82  -0.07 
(t-stat)  -1.02  -1.54 
GDP per capita (log) 1.00*** 1.05*** 0.57 0.66 
(t-stat) -0.3 -0.31 -0.44 -0.44 
Secondary education 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(t-stat) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Ethnic fractionalization 1.08 1.4 0.73 1.07 
(t-stat) -0.94 -0.97 -1.09 -1.12 
Urbanization -0.03** -0.03** -0.03 -0.02 
(t-stat) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Natural Resources 0 -0.01 0.05* 0.04 
(t-stat) -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Trade 0 0 0 0 
(t-stat) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Official Development Assistance 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 
(t-stat) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Democracy   0 0 
(t-stat)   0 0 
Political Competition (Exec)   0.45* 0.51** 
(t-stat)   -0.23 -0.23 
Age of Executive Party   -0.54 -0.44 
(t-stat)   -0.45 -0.45 
Programmatic Party   0.01 0.01 
(t-stat)   -0.01 -0.01 
Size of Government   -0.92 -0.9 
(t-stat)   -0.74 -0.73 
Growth of Government   0.08 0.09 
(t-stat)   -0.07 -0.07 
Political System (Presidential vs. 
Parliamentary) 
  
0.16 0.11 
(t-stat)   -0.33 -0.33 
Proportional representation   -0.68 -0.73 
(t-stat)   -0.55 -0.55 
District magnitude   0 0 
(t-stat)   0 0 
Constant -9.22*** -10.49*** -5.37 -8.28* 
(t-stat) -1.99 -2.15 -3.79 -4.32 
Observations 94 94 78 78 
R-squared 0.41 0.421 0.498 0.512 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A range of robustness tests confirm the statistical significance of the 
Index of Institutional Constraints on Incumbent Patronage Control. The Index remains 
significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent levels when employing an ordered 
probit instead of an ordered logistic model. It also remains significant in both the OLS 
and ordered logistic model in a range of theoretically relevant restricted samples: 
countries with competitive executive elections135; countries with recent incumbent 
turnover136 and, as such, countries for which we would expect job stability to depend 
upon tenure protections; and countries with presidential systems in which we would, 
due to divided government, expect institutional separation of (patronage) powers to 
coincide more frequently with incumbents being deprived of patronage control.137 
Moreover, when disaggregating the dependent variable, institutional constraints on 
incumbent patronage control are a statistically significant predictor of meritocracy 
across all models and specifications (Table 8.6); and a statistically significant predictor 
of politicization in both baseline models. In the full model for politicization, tenure 
protections – yet not the aggregate institutional constraints measure – are a statistically 
significant predictor of lower politicization in both specifications (Annex G.2).   
Lastly, when disaggregating the Index into job stability and the 
individual components of the Political Constraints variable, none of the latter’s 
components – including independent judiciaries – are statistically significant predictors 
of bureaucratic professionalization in any of the specifications or models. Rival causal 
mechanisms – such as more professional bureaucracies through more independent 
enforcement of professional civil service legislation in court – may thus be ruled out. 
 
 
                                        
135 Competitive executive elections are proxied by scores of 6 or higher on the Executive Index of Political 
Competitiveness in the DPI. 
136 Recent incumbent turnover is proxied by a score of less than 10 in the number of years the party of the 
chief executive has been in office according to the DPI. 
137 Note that, consistent with this argument, the Index does not exert a significant effect when the sample 
is restricted to parliamentary systems. 
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Table 8.6 OLS and Ordered Logistic Regression Results: Meritocracy 
  
OLS: 
Full 
Model 
OLS: Full 
Model, 
Disaggregated 
Patronage Constraints 
Ordered 
Logit: 
Full 
Model 
Ordered Logit: 
Full Model, 
Disaggregated 
Patronage 
Constraints 
Institutional Constraints on 
Incumbent Patronage Control 2.08** 
 
4.45** 
 
(t-stat/z-scores) -0.85  -1.99  
Tenure Protections  0.25**  0.56** 
(t-stat/z-scores)  -0.1  -0.24 
Political Constraints  0.42  0.73 
(t-stat/z-scores)  -0.73  -1.64 
Full Model Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78 78 78 78 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.52 0.53 0.23 0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In sum, the statistical plausibility probe provides suggestive evidence for 
a causal effect of the patronage control theory beyond the four qualitative cases studied. 
The Index proxying the extent to which institutions deprive incumbents of patronage 
control was statistically significant across all models and specifications, and – among 
17 prominent explanatory factors – only one to exhibit such cross-specification and 
cross-model significance. Moreover, it was shown to be substantively important. 
Nevertheless, these findings may not lend more than tentative credence to the large-n 
generalizability of the theory. Data limitations thwart a more definite statistical test 
which could address a wider set of measurement and endogeneity concerns.  
 
Conclusion:                                                            
The Causal Power of Institutions Allocating Patronage Control 
Both quantitative and qualitative evidence underscored the causal power of the 
patronage control theory, even if only suggestively. Qualitative evidence was thereby 
more conclusive. The patronage control theory shed new light on two of the most 
paradigmatic cases of bureaucratic professionalization in the literature: the U.S. and 
the UK. At least two of the theorized causal mechanisms travelled to the two countries: 
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professionalization advanced to deprive challengers of patronage control and due to an 
inability of incumbents to compete electorally based on patronage alone. As such, the 
theory was also – and remarkably – portable beyond presidential systems to 
parliamentary regimes; I will return to this finding in the concluding chapter. The two 
cases also suggested that institutions were not merely intervening variables. Instead, 
the factors which originated them were distinct from those incentivizing 
professionalization. Reform was thus an unintended consequence of prior institutional 
choices. As in Paraguay, the origins of the countries’ professional bureaucracies thus 
lay in the fragmented institutional design of their patronage states. 
The statistical plausibility probe added, albeit tentatively, evidence for 
the generalizability of the theory beyond the four cases studied. Not less important, its 
large-n data showcased wide institutional differences among patronage states. It thus 
reaffirmed once more that the conflation assumption of prior studies of patronage and 
its reform is not warranted. Patronage bureaucracies are not all the same – and, as I 
showed throughout this dissertation, institutional differences among them matter for 
bureaucratic professionalization. 
With credence to generalizability lent, a discussion of the broader 
implications of the theory and the dissertation at-large for the study of patronage, 
institutions and good government is due. It is to this task that the concluding chapter 
turns. 
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9  
 
Conclusion:                                               
Patronage, Institutions and the Causes of        
Good Government 
 
To most developing countries, patronage reform remains a Holy Grail. It is as important 
for their development as it is elusive to achieve. This dissertation has shed new light on 
when this Holy Grail can be found. It has done so by developing and empirically 
validating a theory of patronage reform. The theory draws its inspiration from a simple 
recognition: not all patronage states are the same; instead, they differ in their formal 
institutional design; one such difference lies in the institutional locus of control over 
patronage; and patronage reform incentives of incumbent Presidents and Prime 
Ministers are systematically shaped by this institutional variation.  
  More specifically, I theorized that incumbents face greater 
professionalization incentives where institutions deprive them of patronage control. Two 
types of institutions are at play: institutions which shift control over patronage to other 
government branches and institutions which shift the private goods benefits of 
patronage states towards public employees. When facing such institutional constraints, 
incumbents are incentivized to professionalize to cut off patronage access of electoral 
challengers; elicit cooperation from tenured appointees of preceding incumbents; and 
shift electoral competition towards public goods provision in the context of an inability 
to compete based on patronage alone. As incumbents are (usually) legally empowered 
to professionalize, they are able to professionalize at least part of the state when facing 
incentives to do so.  
The empirical results from the comparative case study of Paraguay and 
the DR in this dissertation provided strong evidence in support of the patronage control 
theory. As I demonstrated in chapter 8, the theory also helped explain patronage reform 
in two classic cases: the U.S. and the UK; and was found to be a predictor of 
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professionalization in large-n, cross-country expert survey data on the structure of 
government.  
Case evidence also underscored that institutions allocating patronage 
control had causal efficacy of their own, rather than merely reflecting deeper causes. 
Consequently, professionalization emerged in Paraguay, the U.S. and the UK as 
unintended consequences of institutional choices made in patronage states several 
decades before. The origins of professional bureaucracies thus lay in the fragmented 
institutional design of patronage states. 
  The implications of this theory for the study of patronage reform are 
three-fold. The theory nuances the scholarly understanding of the institutional 
heterogeneity of patronage states; it adds a powerful theory and hitherto omitted 
variable – institutions allocating patronage control – to studies of patronage reform; 
and its interaction with key variables in the literature resolves contradictory findings 
regarding the signs of their causal effects (see, for instance, Geddes, 1996; Grzymala-
Busse, 2007; Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009; O'Dwyer, 2006). Whether or not electoral 
competition or the rise of political outsiders incentivizes professionalization, for 
instance, hinges, ceteris paribus, upon whether or not institutions deprive incumbents 
of patronage control. 
  The preceding chapters of this dissertation shed fresh light on patronage 
and its reform in several additional ways. Chapter 2 contained an important conceptual 
innovation. Prior studies had restricted patronage to the power to appoint. In doing so, 
they may have missed the lion share of patron powers over public servants. To overcome 
this shortcoming, I re-conceptualized patronage as discretionary power over public 
personnel, including not only appointment, but also promotion, pay and dismissal. In 
the same chapter, I also addressed the tail end of the unilinear view of patronage and 
its reform in the literature: not all reform roads lead to Weber. In prior studies, distinct 
components of a Weberian bureaucracy – in particular merit and tenure – were assumed 
to occur together in practice. Yet, their political determinants are, as I show, distinct. 
Future studies would thus do well to disaggregate distinct Weberian ideal-type reforms 
into distinct dependent variables; part of the scholarly dissent regarding the role of, for 
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instance, electoral uncertainty or public employees demanding reform may be resolved 
by doing so. At the same time, professionalizing patronage states requires merit only – 
rather than also or instead tenure.  
  In chapter 4, I demonstrate that meritocracy in practice rather than law 
matters for professionalization. Merit laws are neither necessary nor sufficient for merit 
in practice. Outlawing the spoils is thus an illusion. The wave of studies operationalizing 
patronage reform with the passage of civil service legislation thus suffers from serious 
validity limitations. Future studies would do well to focus on reform in practice instead. 
To account for reform in practice, chapters 5 and 6 suggest that incentives rather than 
ability to reform is the key explanandum on the supply side. It is axiomatic to note that 
both are needed. As I showcase, however, incumbents facing incentives to reform tend 
to be able to do so – even if only incrementally. This revises prior convictions about the 
centrality of the “politician’s dilemma” in patronage reform – the inability of 
incumbents to reform even if they wished to do so (Geddes, 1996).  
For studies seeking to explain reform incentives, the two chapters also 
underscore that demand-side factors matter principally by shaping voter preferences for 
public and private goods. Collective action to demand reform is a tall order: 
bureaucrats, business associations, civil society organizations and donor organizations 
all tend to lack either the ability or incentives – or both – to bring about reform. Similar 
findings elsewhere are thus confirmed (Grindle, 2012; R. Johnson & Libecap, 1994). 
Lastly, the dissertation also illuminates in chapter 7 why public servants 
enjoy tenure protections in some patronage states, yet not in others. According to prior 
studies, incumbents should gift tenure to their appointees in a range of contexts. Yet, 
they frequently do not. An empirical implication of the patronage control theory may 
account for this conundrum. Incumbents resist tenure as it jeopardizes their patronage 
control and electoral mobilization capacity: it disincentivizes bureaucratic performance 
and electoral campaign support while facilitating collective action for higher pay. 
 In short, this dissertation has revised predominant scholarly convictions 
about the concept of patronage; the heterogeneity of patronage states and their reforms; 
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the appropriate operationalization of such reforms; and, most importantly, the 
determinants of merit and tenure reforms in patronage states. 
In this concluding chapter, I will discuss the implications of these 
findings for patronage reform prospects, practitioner approaches to reform and the study 
of institutions and good government. The rationale for the first two discussions is 
simple. As noted in chapter 1, patronage reform is motivated by a normative concern: 
reform entails important development benefits. Identifying whether and how the holy 
grail of patronage reform will come within increasing reach speaks to this concern. The 
third implication is more scholarly in nature. The patronage control theory departs 
from conventional academic wisdom about which political institutions matter and what 
role they play in good government. To conclude this dissertation, I will discuss what 
lessons this departure holds for the study of institutions and good government in new 
democracies.   
 
Implications for the Prospects of Patronage Reform 
The patronage control theory is good and bad news for the prospects of patronage 
reform in the cases studied and the world at-large. For Paraguay, it is good news: its 
institutional set-up should incentivize reform whenever challengers control the 
legislature. For the DR, it is bad news: no similar reform incentives exists. And, indeed, 
current reforms mirror theoretical predictions. In Paraguay, Horacio Cartes won the 
2013 Presidential elections on a Colorado Party ticket – even though he had only joined 
the ANR during the Lugo administration. As a relative outsider inside the ANR, Cartes 
faced ANR legislators among his main power contenders (Pompa, 2014). Once in office, 
Cartes rekindled Lugo’s patronage reforms. In 2014, almost 15,500 vacancies were filled 
through examinations – more than in any year during the Lugo administration (SFP, 
2014). With institutions depriving them of patronage control, both Lugo as a former 
priest and Cartes as one of Paraguay’s richest men – and an alleged narco-trafficker 
(Insight Crime, 2013) – thus chose to professionalize; and in both instances, ANR 
legislators featured among the main reform opponents. In contrast, professionalization 
under the DR’s current President Danilo Medina has not advanced. With institutions 
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monopolizing patronage control in the Presidency and the PLD firmly in control of 
state institutions, Medina lacks similar reform incentives. 
  For reform in the remainder of the world, the patronage control theory 
does not paint a bright picture either. On an upside, the theory suggests that reform 
incentives may emerge unintendedly as consequences of institutional choices in 
patronage states. As I shall detail below, reformers may thus wish to focus their 
institutional engineering efforts in patronage states on designs which make patronage 
reform more incentive-compatible – rather than pushing patronage reforms which are 
politically-irrational for incumbents to implement. At the same time, however, recent 
institutional choices in many new democracies do not bode well for reform. Latin 
America, for instance, has seen a trend towards hyper-presidentialism and, 
concomitantly, an increased Presidential monopoly over patronage control (Zovatto, 
2014). Other regions have witnessed similar trends (see, for instance, Van de Walle, 
2003). While patronage states still vary in their institutional allocation of patronage 
control (see chapter 8), the centralization of patronage control makes it, ceteris paribus, 
less likely that incumbents will opt for reform. In Latin America’s patronage states, for 
instance, hyper-presidentialism has been paralleled by reforms which were largely 
circumscribed to changes in form rather than practice (IDB, 2014). The prevalence of 
“paper leviathans” thus persists (Centeno & Ferraro, 2013, p. 399).  
Regrettably, patronage reform is thus also least likely to advance in 
countries where it would be most beneficial. Where incumbents monopolize patronage 
control, reform disincentives are not the only undesirable consequence. Monopolized 
patronage control also amplifies the incumbency advantage in electoral contest. At 
worst, resource asymmetries can lead to “hyper-incumbency advantages” which tilt the 
electoral playing field towards competitive authoritarianism rather than democracy 
proper (Greene, 2007, p. 39; Levitsky & Way, 2010). In other words, the prospects for 
democracy and bureaucracy suffer where institutions centralize patronage control in the 
Presidency or Prime Ministerial office. 
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Implications for Practitioner Approaches to Patronage Reform 
As noted in the introductory chapter, patronage reform takes centre stage in 
development assistance projects, yet projects continue to fail. The findings in this 
dissertation offer three guideposts for improving this track record. First, donors would 
do well to be more selective in choosing which countries to assist. As I showed in chapter 
2, patronage persistence – and thus reform failure – is frequently overdetermined: bad 
government tends to be good politics. To understand where good government could be 
good politics, reform assistance needs to be grounded in not only technical diagnoses of 
civil service systems, as is customary; but also political diagnoses of patronage systems. 
Such diagnoses would also uncover the institutional allocation of patronage control. As 
argued, reform projects are more likely to succeed where institutions deprive incumbents 
of patronage control.  
Second, donors should focus support on patronage reform in practice. 
Legal changes do not trigger professionalization in practice. Rather, donor support for 
them may encourage patronage in practice. Such support legitimizes ‘window dressing’ 
incumbents who may, concurrently, exploit patronage in practice to the fullest.  
Third, where patronage reform is not incentive-compatible, donors 
should focus their “passion [for] institutional engineering” on institutions which enhance 
the incentive-compatibility of reform (Przeworski, 2004, p. 529) – rather than pressing 
for a reform which is irrational for incumbents to pursue. This dissertation suggests 
that institutions which deprive incumbents of patronage control, yet not of their ability 
to professionalize may be particularly conducive to this end.138 As noted, two types of 
institutions may fit the bill: those which shift patronage control towards the legislature 
and other government branches; and those – such as tenure – which shift private goods 
benefits to public employees. The latter set of institutions amounts to a reform 
prescription which is diametrically juxtaposed to the NPM paradigm and prevalent 
donor recommendations. Without wishing to gloss over their diversity, NPM-based 
prescriptions tend to prioritize performance incentives arising from flexible employment 
                                        
138 Such second-best institutional reforms, of course, may similarly – yet need not – be incompatible with 
incumbent incentives. 
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relations (see Hood & Lodge, 2006). Donor accounts even go as far as terming tenure 
and the concomitant corporate power for public servants the “merit trap” (Shepherd, 
2003, p. 16). This dissertation suggests that these negative performance incentives may 
well pertain (see chapter 7). At the same time, they tend to be minor given that the 
requisite professional qualifications to perform are limited in patronage states; and, 
more importantly, be outweighed by the benefit of enhanced incumbent 
professionalization incentives. As I demonstrated in chapter 5, tenure incentivizes merit 
reform: merit may thus follow tenure in patronage reforms. With that in mind, donors 
would do well to re-consider the merits of tenure when seeking to bring about merit 
reforms.  
 
Implications for the Study of Institutions and Good Government 
In this dissertation, I have argued for a causal role in good government of what Carey 
(2000, p. 735) terms “parchment” institutions – laws, constitutions and other formal 
rules of the game. Doing so may appear to preach to the converted. After all, “it has 
become a platitude over the last two decades to declare that ‘institutions matter’” 
(Lodge, 2006, p. 279) In patronage states, however, this assertion is frequently turned 
upside down. Marked by the un-rule of law, such states are argued to feature “weak 
institutional environments:” formal institutions are “neither minimally stable nor 
routinely enforced” (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 116; 2013, p. 93; O'Donnell, 1998). As 
a result, research on “the political economy of developing countries … [is] implicitly 
grounded in an assumption that formal rules have only weak or substantively 
uninteresting political effects.” (Levitsky & Slater, 2011, p. 2) This, of course, motivates 
the front end of the unilinear view of patronage and its reform in the literature: if 
institutions do not matter in patronage states, then all patronage states may be assumed 
to be the same. 
This dissertation suggests that the reality of the causal efficacy of 
institutions in patronage states lies – as elsewhere in the world (cf. Carey, 2000; Levitsky 
& Slater, 2011) – somewhere between the extremes of ‘institutions matter’ and 
‘institutions may be assumed away’. As I showcased in chapter 4, institutions may 
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indeed be ephemeral in patronage states: merit-based civil service legislation is not a 
predictor of merit-based civil service management in practice. At the same time, 
discounting the causal role of formal institutions in patronage states altogether – as 
much scholarly research implicitly or explicitly does – is not warranted. Institutions 
allocating patronage control did matter.139 Strong formal institutions may thus exist in 
weak institutional contexts. The resulting conundrum is clear: when do formal 
institutions in patronage states shape the opportunities and constraints of actors – and 
when do they not?  
Scholars “still have little theoretical knowledge” to explain such 
variation in institutional strength (Levitsky & Slater, 2011, p. 21). This dissertation 
adds to building such knowledge. It showed that institutions allocating patronage 
control were binding as they were largely self-referencing and self-enforcing: the 
principal beneficiaries of institutions (de)centralizing patronage control were, at the 
same time, able to veto their re- or de-centralization140 and able to ensure, at least to 
some extent, their enforcement (see chapters 5 and 8). In other words, formal 
institutions may be strong in weak institutional settings if those benefiting from them 
may veto their undoing and ensure their enforcement. Where such conditions are absent 
– as in the case of merit laws and other ‘window dressing’ institutions borrowed from 
abroad – ephemerality prevails. This conclusion is similar – but adds nuance – to prior 
studies which had emphasized the importance of congruence between rule-makers and 
rule-enforcers or actors with formal rule-making authority and actors with de facto 
power (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
If strong formal institutions exist in weak institutional contexts, then 
formal institutions may also shape the transition from weak to strong institutional 
contexts. This upends scholarly convictions about the relevance of institutions as 
consequences – rather than also causes – of the demise of patronage, clientelism and 
bad government. Having said that, this dissertation is, of course, not the first to argue 
                                        
139 This is, of course, not to say that such institutions are always sticky and binding (cf. Hallerberg et al., 
2009).  
140 As I showed in chapters 5 and 8, however, actors benefiting from patronage access were, concurrently, 
not always able to veto patronage reform. 
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for the causal weight of formal institutions in bringing about good government. As I 
outlined in chapter 2, several studies have examined the causal role of electoral 
institutions, executive-legislative relations and territorial decentralization in good 
government. Causal effects, however, have been contested or unidentifiable.  
Recall that electoral institutions were found to be in the causal spotlight 
of influential single-case studies (see, for instance, Ames, 1995), yet lacking causal 
weight in larger-n studies (Cruz & Keefer, 2013; Kitschelt, 2011). Their role is thus 
“highly equivocal.” (Gerring & Thacker, 2004, p. 298) The effect of broad differences in 
executive-legislative relations – whether regimes are presidential or parliamentarian – 
is no less contested. Some studies find a positive effect of parliamentary systems 
(Gerring & Thacker, 2004; Gerring et al., 2009); some argue for the opposite in 
patronage states (Shugart, 1999); and some find no effect at all (Cruz & Keefer, 2013; 
Kitschelt, 2011). Inconsistent effects have also been identified for territorial 
decentralization. Kenny (2013) and Grindle (2012) find that decentralized patronage 
complicates reform by multiplying the number of reform veto players. Other scholars 
add evidence for a pernicious effect on good government more generally (see, among 
many, Gerring & Thacker, 2004). A second set of cross-country studies finds the 
opposite effect, however (see, for instance, Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2009; O'Dwyer & 
Ziblatt, 2006).  
With contradictory or unidentifiable causal effects, these institutions are 
found to be “not particularly useful” in accounting for the demise of clientelism, 
patronage and bad government (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007a, p. 44). Unsurprisingly, 
most studies of weak institutional contexts disregard the (inconsistent) effects of these 
formal institutions. Instead, they assume that all patronage states are the same. At the 
same time, “whether other democratic institutions may have an impact … has been less 
well specified and explored” (Kitschelt, 2011, p. 1) This dissertation did just that. It 
shows that, contrary to conventional scholarly wisdom, formal institutions may well 
cure patronage, clientelism and bad government. The institutions which matter, 
however, are not those which prior studies had narrowed in on. Consider the case of 
electoral institutions. Institutions which allocate control over patronage arguably shape 
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incumbent reform incentives much more directly than the presence of, for instance, 
open- as opposed to closed-list systems. Even where electoral institutions are not 
ephemeral – as they frequently are in new democracies (Remmer, 2008) – their incentive 
effects are thus likely to be overwhelmed by other factors (cf. Kitschelt, 2011). 
Similarly, broad differences in democratic political systems – in 
particular presidential as compared to parliamentary regimes – tell us less about 
incumbent incentives to advance good government than scholars conventionally assume. 
Prior studies had frequently equated parliamentarism with power centralization and 
presidentialism with fragmentation. Power (de)centralization is posited to induce good 
and bad government through a range of mechanisms (see, for instance, Gerring & 
Thacker, 2004). The equation of parliamentary and presidential systems with 
(de)centralization of power is, however, not a valid cross-case assumption. Instead, as I 
find in this dissertation, it is a case-by-case empirical question. Presidential systems 
may allocate (patronage) powers solely to the Presidency as in the DR – or also to the 
legislature as in Paraguay and the U.S. Likewise, parliamentary systems may centralize 
patronage powers in the Prime Minister as prior studies had assumed or fragment such 
powers among legislators as historically in the UK (table 9.1).  
 
Table 9.1. Democratic Political Systems and Patronage Centralization 
 Political System 
Presidential Parliamentary 
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
 
P
o
w
e
rs
 Centralized DR (Fernandez)  
Fragmented 
Paraguay (Lugo) 
U.S. (Roosevelt) 
UK (Gladstone) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Consequently, parliamentary and presidential systems are each neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the (de)centralization of (patronage) powers. Inconsistent 
findings across studies equating presidential and parliamentary regimes with 
(de)centralized powers are thus unsurprising. The scholarly repercussion is 
straightforward. Valid insights into the causal effects of formal institutions in patronage 
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states require more nuanced specifications of political-institutional designs.141 By 
identifying the institutions which allocate patronage control and their effect on one key 
aspect of good government – bureaucratic professionalization – this dissertation has 
taken an important step in this direction.   
  In doing so, this dissertation has also shed fresh light on the age-old 
debate surrounding the merits of centralization and fragmentation of power (Madison, 
1787). It thereby sides with advocates of fragmentation in new democracies. For the 
case of patronage reform, this is a novelty. As noted, prior studies had argued that 
centralization induces reform by reducing the number of veto players (Grindle, 2012; 
Kenny, 2013; see also Lyne, 2008). As I have emphasized, though, incumbents tend to 
be able to reform at least part of the state;142 and fragmentation of patronage powers 
adds to their incentives to do so. The causal mechanisms in this dissertation are thereby 
distinct from those posited in prior studies. In this dissertation, fragmentation is not 
theorized to be intrinsically benign to good government due to, for instance, better 
checks-and-balances, horizontal accountability or bureaucratic oversight by multiple 
principles (see, among many, Vile, 2012). Rather, the mechanism is a more intermittent 
and less noble one. As argued, fragmentation induces incumbents to shift towards good 
government to, among others, take away patronage from challengers and regain 
electoral competitiveness. Good government may thus arise from fragmented control 
over bad government. 
 
 
                                        
141 More fine-grained analyses of institutional differences within presidential and parliamentary systems 
are, of course, mainstays in scholarly works (see, among many, Haggard & McCubbins, 2001). Possibly in 
part due to cross-country data limitations, these more fine-grained analyses have seldom travelled to 
theories of the demise of patronage and clientelism, however. 
142 As a corollary, the patronage control theory is most powerful in accounting for professionalization where 
patronage control is fragmented horizontally between distinct national branches of government – rather 
than vertically between national and subnational units; incumbents are less likely able to impose 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion for public servants of subnational units. 
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Annex 
Annex A. Case Selection 
Annex A.1 Case Selection within Latin America 
Among Latin America’s patronage states, Paraguay under President Lugo (2008-2012) 
and the DR under President Fernandez (2004-2012) were selected based on four criteria: 
comparability in human development, electoral competition and electoral utility 
maximization as well as feasibility of field research. Levels of human development may 
be proxied by the United Nation’s Human Development Index (table A.1). The 
exclusion of three countries at high levels of human development reduced the number 
of cases to seven. In these seven countries, incumbents could have expected to face 
comparable voter preferences for private and public goods. Electoral competition 
demanded the exclusion of two further cases in which victors dominated recent elections 
– as proxied by vote shares over 60 percent. Moreover, the electoral utility maximization 
assumption required the exclusion of one further case (Guatemala). No incumbent or 
governing party has, since the democratic transition, ever secured re-election in the 
country’s “casino politics” (O. Sánchez, 2008, p. 130). 
 
 
Table A.1 Case Selection 
  
Human Development 
Index (2012) 
Competition for Presidential (re-)election        
(First round vote share of winner in last Presidential election before 
2013 not above 60%) 
Paraguay Medium (0.669) Competitive (2008 Presidential elections: 40.9%) 
Dominican 
Republic 
Medium (0.702) Competitive (2012 Presidential elections: 53.8%) 
Honduras Medium (0.632) Competitive (2012 Presidential elections: 56.6%) 
 El Salvador Medium (0.680) Competitive (2012 Presidential elections: 51.3%) 
Ecuador High (0.724) Competitive (2010 Presidential elections: 52%) 
Peru High (0.741) Competitive (2012 Presidential elections: 31.7%) 
Panama High (0.780) Competitive (2010 Presidential elections: 60%) 
Nicaragua Medium (0.599) Limited competition (2012 Presidential elections: 62.4%) 
Bolivia Medium (0.675) Limited competition (2012 Presidential elections: 64.2%) 
Guatemala Medium (0.581) 
Competitive, but without incumbent re-election 
prospect (2011 Presidential elections: 36.2%) 
Sources: Beck, Clarke et al. (2001), UNDP (2012) 
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Among the remnant cases, Honduras and El Salvador were excluded 
for practical reasons. Honduras suffered a coup d’état, prolonged constitutional crisis 
and rule by a de facto regime in 2009-10. By the time of the dissertation field 
research (2012-13), reforms under the 2010-14 Lobo Presidency would have only 
seen initial implementation; and data collection on the 2006-09 Zelaya Presidency 
would have suffered from poor recall and respondent identification. El Salvador only 
saw governing party turnover in 2010 after two decades of ARENA rule. Reforms 
under the new administration would have only seen initial implementation; while 
recall and respondent identification challenges would have abounded in the 
measurement of professionalization under the ARENA versus prior administrations 
(see Annex C). 
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Annex A.2 ‘Most Similar’ Cases Selected: Paraguay and the DR 
Explanatory Variable Paraguay Dominican Republic 
Form of Government Presidential Democracy 
Electoral Institutions List Proportional Representation 
Colonial Administrative 
Legacy 
Hyper-legalism and Patrimonialism 
Pre-Reform Bureaucratic 
Rule of the Game (IDB 2006)  
Patronage 
(Merit in bureaucracy in 2004: 16/100 (Paraguay) and 19/100 (DR)) 
Societal Demand for 
Public/Private Goods  
Human Development: Medium               
(HDI 2012: 0.67 (Paraguay) and 0.70 (DR)) 
Donor Support  Support from Multiple Donors, including the IDB 
Policy Blueprint Latin American Civil Service Charter 
Political Competition Competitive Two-Party System 
(Two largest parties claimed 31.1% and 26.7% (Paraguay); and 
41.6% and 38.4% (DR) of votes in 2008 / 2010 congressional 
elections) 
Incumbent Legislative 
Representation (when coming to 
power143) 
Minority representation 
(Incumbent party holds 1 of 45 (Paraguay) and 1 of 30 (DR) Senate 
seats, and 1 of 80 (Paraguay) and 36 of 126 (DR) Chamber of 
Deputies seats) 
Per Capita Incomes (2000 US-
$ in 2008) 
Lower Middle 
$1,519 
Middle 
$3,730 
Democracy (Combined Freedom 
House (FH) score; scale 1-7; 2012) 
Partly Free 
(FH Score: 3) 
Free 
(FH Score: 2) 
Institutions Depriving 
Presidents of Patronage 
control  
Strong 
(Quasi-parliamentarian 
system) 
Weak 
(Hyper-presidentalist system) 
 
Sources: author’s own elaboration; data from Beck, Clarke et al. (2001), Bormann & Golder 
(2013); Freedom House (2012), IDB (2006), UNDP (2012), World Bank (2012c) 
 
  
                                        
143 For the DR, data on legislative representation is from 2004, i.e. the beginning of Fernandez’ second term 
and of the reform episode examined. When initially elected in 1996, Fernandez similarly counted on 
legislative minority representation: the PLD held 1 of 30 Senate seats and 13 of 120 Chamber of Deputies 
seats (Benito Sanchez, 2010c). 
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Annex B. Interview Respondents144 
Annex B.1 Interview Respondents in Paraguay 
Institution Title 
Presidency of the Republic Advisor 
Senate Senator 
Senate Senator 
Senate Director 
Senate Director 
Tribunal of Electoral Justice Judge 
Supreme Court Judge 
Judiciary School Director 
Ministry of Civil Service Minister 
Ministry of Civil Service Minister 
Ministry of Civil Service Director General 
Ministry of Civil Service Director General 
Ministry of Civil Service Director General 
Ministry of Civil Service Director General 
Ministry of Civil Service Advisor 
Ministry of Finance Minister 
Ministry of Finance Vice Minister 
Ministry of Finance Director 
Ministry of Finance Advisor  
Ministry of Finance Coordinator 
Central Bank President 
Central Bank Director 
Financial Development Agency President 
Ministry of Planning Minister 
Ministry of Health Minister 
Ministry of Health Vice Minister 
Ministry of Health Director 
Ministry of Health Director 
Social Provision Institute (IPS) Director 
Ministry of Education Vice Minister 
Ministry of Education Vice Minister 
Ministry of Education Advisor 
Ministry of Education Director 
Ministry of Culture Director 
National Council of Science Secretary 
Ministry of Agriculture Vice Minister 
Ministry of Public Works Director 
Itaipú Hydroelectric Dam Director 
                                        
144 As respondent careers may comprise several respondent types, the classification is based on the 
respondents’ most relevant (current or former) position for the interview protocol. 
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World Bank Specialist 
IDB Specialist 
UNDP Project Official 
UNDP Project Official 
UNDP Project Official 
USAID Project Official 
Centro de Estudios Judiciales Director 
CADEP Director 
CADEP Researcher 
Germinal Director 
DECIDAMOS Analyst 
Instituto de Desarrollo Analyst 
Instituto de Desarrollo Analyst 
GEAM Coordinator 
GEAM Coordinator 
Transparencia Paraguaya President 
CIRD Project Coordinator 
Universidad San Andrés Professor 
Última Hora Journalist 
Última Hora Journalist 
Radio Cardinal Director 
Union of Workers in the Ministry of 
Education President 
Association of Nurses Treasurer 
SITRADE (Union) Adjunct Secretary 
SEPEIB (Union) President 
SEPEIB (Union) Treasurer 
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Annex B.2 Interview Respondents in the DR 
Institution Title  
Ministry of the Presidency Advisor 
Senate    Senator 
Chamber of Deputies  Member of Parliament 
Chamber of Deputies  Member of Parliament 
Supreme Court   Member of Council 
Attorney General   Prosecutor 
Ministry of Public Administration Minister 
Ministry of Public Administration Vice-Minister 
Ministry of Public Administration Vice-Minister 
Ministry of Public Administration Director 
Ministry of Public Administration Director 
Ministry of Public Administration Director 
Ministry of Public Administration Director 
Ministry of Public Administration Advisor 
Ministry of Public Administration Consultant 
Ministry of Public Administration Analyst 
Ministry of Finance  Vice-Minister 
Ministry of Finance  Vice-Minister 
General Audit Institution (CGR) Comptroller General 
National Office for Personnel Director 
National Council for State Director 
Central Bank   Manager 
Banking Superintendency   Manager 
Tax Administration Agency  Director 
Customs Agency   Director 
Ministry of the Economy Director 
Ministry of the Economy Director 
Ministry of the Economy Advisor 
Ministry of Planning  Vice-Minister 
Ministry of Education  Minister 
Ministry of Education  Director 
Dominican Institute for the Education 
Quality (IDEICE)  Director 
Ministry of Health  Director 
National Health Insurance (SENASA) Director 
Teachers' Health Insurance (SEMMA) Executive 
Ministry of Agriculture  Director 
Ministry of Foreign Relations Ambassador 
Ministry of Industry  Director 
Ministry of Public Works Analyst 
Asociación Dominicana de Profesores Secretary 
Temple University   Professor 
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Iberoamerican University (UNIBE)  Professor 
Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo Professor 
Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo Professor 
Autonomous University of Santo 
Domingo Professor 
Autonomous University of Santo 
Domingo Professor 
Catholic University (PUCMM)  Professor 
Acento    Journalist 
El Caribe   Journalist 
Teleantillas    Journalist 
Alianza Dominicana Contra la 
Corrupción Director 
Coalición Educación Digna  Representative 
Coalición Educación Digna  Consultant 
Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia Project Director 
Fundación Justicia y Transparencia President 
Fundación Plentitud   Researcher 
Oxfam    Program Official 
Oxfam    Program Official 
Participación Ciudadana   Program Official 
Participación Ciudadana   Consultant 
Participación Ciudadana   Consultant 
Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative 
(IPAC) Coordinator 
USAID    Program Official 
European Union   Program Official 
IDB  Senior Specialist 
World Bank   Senior Specialist 
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Annex C. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol for Expert Survey 
 
 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis of the questionnaire was one of fifteen public sector institutions in 
one of five policy areas (see annex E). The questionnaire was repeated with the same 
respondent for each of the institutions in the policy area for which the respondent counted 
on expertise.  
Questionnaire 
1 
Introductory question: If one had sought a job in the [institution] at the service, 
administrative, technical or managerial level during the [Lugo/Fernandez] 
administration, how should one have gone about obtaining it? 
2 
[If applicable]: You mentioned that authorities at times resorted to formally 
competitive processes (concursos por oposición) to fill advertised vacancies. Could 
you lay out, in your opinion, what share of vacancies during the [Lugo/Fernandez] 
administration in the [institution] was filled through these procedures?  
3 
[If applicable]: In your opinion, what share of these formally competitive 
examinations was substantively competitive – in other words: the selection of the 
candidate was the outcome of not undue interference (injerencia indebida) but of a 
transparent competition aimed at selecting the most competent personnel?  
4 
Comparing this estimate under the [Lugo/Fernandez] administration with the 
preceding [Duarte/Mejia] administration: in your opinion, what share of vacancies 
was filled through both formally and substantively competitive and transparent 
procedures (concursos por oposición transparentes y sustancialmente 
meritocraticos) in the [institution] under the [Duarte/Mejia] administration?  
5 
Coming back to the [Lugo/Fernandez] administration: what efforts were taken to 
safeguard competitive selection processes from undue interference?  
6 Where did vulnerabilities to undue interferences in the selection process remain? 
7 
[If applicable]: In your opinion, where in the [institution] were personnel selections 
through transparent and substantively competitive procedures introduced or 
maintained? Where in the [institution] did discretionary personnel selection focus 
on? 
8 
Moving from competitive to discretionary personnel selections: in your opinion, 
under the [Lugo/Fernandez] administration, who tended to be involved in deciding 
which candidate is selected? Whose recommendations did those in charge of 
personnel selections consider? 
9 
What was the role of the Presidency in these personnel selections? 
10 
What was the role of legislators in these personnel selections? 
11 
In your opinion, what criteria did authorities in the [institution] prioritize when 
discretionarily selecting personnel? [Follow-up: in your opinion, what weight did 
professional competencies, political party affiliation and personnel connections 
have in these personnel selections?] 
12 
Comparing this estimate with the preceding [Duarte/Mejia] administration: In 
your opinion, what criteria did authorities in the [institution] under the prior 
administration prioritize when discretionarily selecting personnel? [Follow-up: in 
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your opinion, what weight did professional competencies, political party affiliation 
and personnel connections have in these personnel selections?] 
13 
Coming back to the [Lugo/Fernandez] administration: could you lay out, in your 
opinion, what motivated authorities in the [institution] to maintain and exercise 
discretion in personnel selections?  
14 
Comparing this estimate with the preceding [Duarte/Mejia] administration: in 
your opinion, what motivated authorities in the [institution] in the [Duarte/Mejia] 
administration to maintain and exercise discretion in personnel selections?  
15 
Moving from personnel selection to pay, if one was working in the [institution] 
during the [Lugo/Fernandez] administration and sought to obtain an individual 
pay increase, how should one have gone about obtaining it?  
16 
What was the role of the Presidency in determining individual pay rises? What 
was the role of legislators? 
17 
Moving from individual to collective pay increases, in your opinion, what role do 
unions play in determining collective pay?  
18 
What sources of political leverage do unions in the [institution] count on to push 
for collective pay increases? 
19 
Moving from pay to job stability: how easy or difficult was it to make permanent 
or temporary personnel redundant in the [institution] during the [Lugo/Fernandez] 
administration? 
20 
Which factors protected personnel from dismissals? [Follow-up: what were the roles 
of legal protections, union affiliation and political connections in protecting 
personnel from dismissal?] 
21 
How could authorities in the [institution] incentivize collaboration and performance 
from personnel with rigid tenure protections? 
22 
Now that you know what the research focuses on, is there any important point 
that I missed asking about or are there any additional comments you would like to 
offer?  
23 
I would be grateful for further opportunities to learn from experts about public 
personnel decision-making in the [policy area]. Could think of any other expert you 
would recommend me to contact? 
Post-Interview Procedure 
1. Full transcription of interview (where recording was permitted) 
2. Coding of interview responses (see coding scheme in Annex D) 
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Annex D. Coding Scheme for Expert Estimates 
 
Estimate Administration Coding 
Share of vacancies filled 
through  advertised and 
substantively competitive 
examinations 
Lugo/Fernandez 
Interview questions 2 & 3: multiply share 
of vacancies filled through formally 
competitive examinations (question 2) with 
share of examinations deemed 
substantively competitive (question 3) 
Share of vacancies filled 
through  advertised and 
substantively competitive 
examinations 
Duarte/Mejia 
Interview question 4: share of total 
vacancies filled through transparent and 
substantively competitive examinations 
Criteria prioritized in 
discretionary personnel 
selections 
Lugo/Fernandez 
Interview question 10: Coding: Party 
affiliation/personal connections/ 
professional qualifications are required to 
obtain a position: always or most of the 
time (100%); roughly half the time (50%); 
for a minority of positions or, for 
professional qualifications, by complying 
with minimal formal qualification criteria 
(25%); never or almost never (0%) 
Criteria prioritized in 
discretionary personnel 
selections 
Duarte/Mejia 
Interview question 11: Coding: Party 
affiliation/personal connections/ 
professional qualifications are required to 
obtain a position: always or most of the 
time (100%); roughly half the time (50%); 
for a minority of positions or, for 
professional qualifications, by complying 
with minimal formal qualification criteria 
(25%); never or almost never (0%) 
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Annex E. State Institutions Included in Expert Survey 
E.1 Paraguay (number of employees as of 2010) 
 
  
Public 
Servants 
(192.305 out 
of 260.965 
covered by 
survey) 
Ministries 
Non-departmental agency or 
executive institution 
Finance 4.214 
Ministry of Finance (includes tax 
administration) 
(2.304 employees) 
Central Bank 
(887 employees) 
Customs 
(1.023 
employees) 
Education 95.647 Ministry of Education and Culture 
(81.180 employees) 
National Universities 
(14.467 employees) 
Health 42.713 Ministry of Public Health 
(30.004 employees) 
Institute for Social Provision 
(12.709 employees) 
Economic 
Develop-
ment 
16.562 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
(3.047 
employees) 
Ministry 
of 
Industry 
and 
Commerce 
(588 
employees) 
Ministry 
of 
Public 
Works 
(2.892 
employees) 
National 
Administration 
of Electricity 
(4.699 employees) 
Itaipu & 
Yacyretá 
Hydro-electric 
Dams 
(5.336 employees) 
Justice 33.169  
Supreme 
Court of 
Justice 
(8.989 
employees) 
Attorney 
General 
(4.015 
employees) 
Electoral 
Justice 
(20.165 
employees) 
 
 
Sources: Itaipú (2013); SFP (2011b); Torres Romero (2012) 
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E.2 Dominican Republic (number of employees as of January 2013) 
 
  
Public 
Servants  
(245.085  
out of 
479.400   
covered by 
survey) 
Ministries 
Non-departmental agency 
or executive institution 
Finance 13.544 Ministry of Finance 
(3.389) 
Central 
Bank 
(2.016) 
Tax 
admin. 
(DGII) 
(2.682) 
Customs 
(5.457) 
Education 123.694 Ministry of Education 
(115.359) 
National University of Santo 
Domingo 
(8.335) 
Health 60.743 Ministry of Public Health 
(59.984) 
National Health Insurance 
(SENASA) 
(759) 
Economic 
Development 
35.005 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
(12.285) 
Ministry 
of 
Industry  
(610) 
Ministry 
of 
Public 
Works 
(11.346) 
State Electricity Companies 
(10.764) 
Justice 12.099  
Supreme 
Court of 
Justice 
(6.454) 
Attorney 
General 
(5.458) 
Electoral 
Justice 
(187) 
 
Sources: Contraloría General de la Republica (2013); Consejo del Poder Judicial (2013); UASD 
(2013) 
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Annex F. Expert Estimates: Criteria Prioritized in Discretionary 
Personnel Selections per Institution 
 
F.1 Dominican Republic 
 
Ministry of Finance  Central Bank 
 
 
Customs 
 
 
Tax Administration 
 
 
Ministry of Health 
 
 
National Health Insurance 
 
 
Ministry of Education 
 
 
 
National University of          
Santo Domingo 
 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 
 
 
State Electricity Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
83% 83%
67% 67%
50%
75%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
50% 50%
88% 88%81% 81%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
100% 100%
50% 50%38% 50%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
100%
50%50% 50%63%
100%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
100% 100%
83% 83%
42% 46%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
63% 63%
88%
0%
50%
100%
Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
100% 100%
64% 64%
29% 29%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
79%
50%
100% 100%
75% 75%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
100% 100%
67% 67%
25% 25%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
100% 100%
50% 50%38% 38%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
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Ministry of Public Works Ministry of Industry 
 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Electoral Justice 
 
 
Attorney General 
 
  
F.2 Paraguay 
 
Ministry of Finance Central Bank 
 
Customs 
 
Institute of Social Provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 100%
83% 83%
25% 33%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
83% 83%83% 83%
42% 42%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
45% 45%
90% 90%
45% 55%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
67% 67%
100% 100%
25% 25%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
75% 75%75% 75%
45% 55%
0%
50%
100%
Mejía Fernández
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professionalism
50%
13%
44% 50%
88% 100%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
25% 31%
42% 44%
100% 100%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
50% 50%
0%
17%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
50% 50%
25% 25%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
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Ministry of Health National Universities 
 
Ministry of Education 
 
Public Electricity (ANDE) 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 
Hydroelectric Dams 
Ministry of Public Works Ministry of Industry 
Supreme Court Electoral Justice (TSJE) 
Attorney General  
 
 
  
83%
42%50% 42%33%
83%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
50% 50%
100% 100%
25% 25%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
50%
67%
25% 25%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
25% 25%
50% 50%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
25% 25%33% 33%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
25% 33%
50% 50%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100%
75%
25% 38%25%
50%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
25% 25%25%
0%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
75% 75%75% 68%
13% 10%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 100%
50%
28%
0%
19%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
100% 90%
50% 52%
0%
25%
0%
50%
100%
Duarte Lugo
Party Affiliation Personal Connection
Professional Qualifications
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Annex G. Additional Regression Results 
G.1 Ordered Logit Regression Results: Bureaucratic Professionalization 
  
Demand-
Side 
Demand-Side,  
Disaggregated Index 
Full Model 
Full Model, 
Disaggregated 
Index 
Institutional Constraints on 
Incumbent Patronage Control 
3.55**  3.26*  
(z-scores) -1.41  -1.76  
Tenure Protections  0.54***  0.56** 
(z-scores)  -0.17  -0.22 
Political Constraints  0.48  -0.42 
(z-scores)  -0.97  -1.44 
GDP per capita (log) 1.14*** 1.24*** 0.72* 0.88** 
(z-scores) -0.33 -0.34 -0.43 -0.44 
Secondary education 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(z-scores) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Ethnic fractionalization 1.37 1.83* 1.14 1.69 
(z-scores) -0.91 -0.94 -1.06 -1.1 
Urbanization -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
(z-scores) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Natural Resources 0 -0.02 0.06* 0.05 
(z-scores) -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Trade 0 0 0 0 
(z-scores) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Official Development Assistance 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 
(z-scores) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Democracy   0.52** 0.60** 
(z-scores)   -0.24 -0.24 
Political Competition (Executive)   -0.52 -0.39 
(z-scores)   -0.42 -0.42 
Age of Executive Party   0.01 0.01 
(z-scores)   -0.01 -0.01 
Programmatic Party   -0.89 -0.87 
(z-scores)   -0.69 -0.71 
Size of Government   0.1 0.12* 
(z-scores)   -0.06 -0.06 
Growth of Government   0 0 
(z-scores)   0 0 
Political System   0.16 0.06 
(z-scores)   -0.32 -0.32 
Proportional representation   -0.76 -0.83 
(z-scores)   -0.54 -0.53 
District magnitude   0 0 
(z-scores)   0 0 
Constant (cut) 5.50** 7.44*** 2.39 6.39 
(z-scores) -2.2 -2.39 -3.67 -4.26 
Observations 94 94 78 78 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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G.2 OLS and Ordered Logistic Regression Results: Politicization 
  
OLS: 
Full 
Model 
OLS: Full 
Model, 
Disaggregated 
Patronage Constraints 
Ordered 
Logit: 
Full 
Model 
Ordered Logit: 
Full Model, 
Disaggregated 
Patronage 
Constraints 
Institutional Constraints on 
Incumbent Patronage Control -0.98 
 
-2.58  
(t-stat/z-scores) -1.03  -1.83  
Tenure Protections  -0.2  -0.56** 
(t-stat/z-scores)  -0.12  -0.23 
Political Constraints  0.49  1.27 
(t-stat/z-scores)  -0.88  -1.54 
Full Model Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78 78 78 78 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.19 0.21 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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